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
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
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


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
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
Point
Frederick.

Blockhouse
and Fort.

The
"Stone Frigate."

Dockyard.

From a Water Colour Sketch by Maria Robinson (afterwards Mrs. Hamilton Hamilton) daughter of General Sir F. P. Robinson. It is a view (taken from the southward) of this Chief Naval Post of Upper Canada, with its defences, as existing at the close of the War of 1812-15. "I am not aware of any others entirely of this character. About 1812 erected. About the same period a breastwork of logs and earth with traversing platform for guns, and also a Blockhouse with palisades were put up upon Point Frederick. Cadets of the Royal Military College, which now stands adjacent to it. The old "Stone Frigate" was modelled something after the plan of a frigate, and the men slept in her. Point Frederick, commanded its harbour) lies outside this sketch, to the westward.—C. W. R.



VIEW OF FORT HENRY AT KINGSTON, UPPER CANADA, 1815.

Fort Henry.

(East) of Navy Bay—or Haldimand Cove—close to Kingston, with Fort Point Henry to the East, and Fort Point Frederick to the West, and is of interest as depicting about 1814 two lofty towers of rubble work, shown here, were added to older works, upon Point Henry. These were pulled down in 1826, and later a new Fort was built. The Blockhouse, shown here, was burned about 1820. The old “Stone Frigate,” close to the Dockyard, built about 1789, became afterwards Barracks for the troops. The town of Kingston (old “Cataraqui”) with Mississauga Point (batteries upon which, with that on

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—Vice-Patrons.

The Council regret to announce the death of Admiral of the Fleet the Right Hon. Lord John Hay, G.C.B., a Vice-Patron of the Institution. Lord John Hay joined the Institution in 1858.

II.—Entrance Fee Temporarily Suspended.

At the Annual General Meeting held on March 7th last, it was unanimously resolved that for the present, and as a temporary measure, the payment of any entrance fee on joining the Institution should be dispensed with.

III.—Life Membership : Reduced Terms.

It was at the same time decided that the amount payable for Life Membership should be temporarily reduced from £15 to £10.

IV.—New Members.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of May, June, and July, viz. :—

Lieutenant E. H. Barker, King's Royal Rifle Corps.
Lieut.-Colonel C. R. L. Day, 5th Bn. Hampshire Regiment (T.F.).
Captain K. C. S. Erskine, I.A.
Second-Lieutenant A. L. Fish, East Kent Regiment.
Lieut.-Colonel F. W. F. Johnson, 6th Bn. Royal Sussex Regiment (T.F.).
Second-Lieutenant H. Shurey, East Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant G. W. G. Baass, R.F.A.
Captain J. C. T. Glossop, C.B., R.N.
Major-General R. W. Rutherford, Canadian Permanent Staff.
Lieutenant W. L. Pope, R.N.R.
Lieut.-Commander H. de B. Tupper, R.N.
Lieut.-Colonel R. W. C. Keays, I.A.
Captain P. F. Knightley, 5th Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers (T.F.).

Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Douglas, I.A.
Major W. P. Hewett, 9th Bn. Middlesex Regt. (T.F.).
Major E. H. Liddell, Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
Major G. A. McWatters, I.A.
Lieut.-Colonel F. F. Major, I.A.
Second-Lieutenant G. H. Cardew, 13th (Reserve) Bn. Hampshire Regiment.
Second-Lieutenant G. G. C. Chilcott, D.C.L.I.
Lieutenant C. A. G. Hutchison, R.N.
Lieutenant W. L. Campbell, Royal Irish Regiment.
Second-Lieutenant C. C. Curtin, 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
Lieutenant G. R. McGusty, 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles (since killed).
Second-Lieutenant P. Graham, Cameron Highlanders.
Lieutenant J. D. Macleod, Cameron Highlanders.
Captain A. R. G. Wilson, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders.
Second-Lieutenant G. I. Watson, A.S.C.
Captain R. H. W. Owen, Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
Second-Lieutenant H. V. S. Page, I.A.
Major E. W. Worrall, Somerset Light Infantry.
Commander T. J. Linberry, R.N.
Captain G. E. Millner, 24th Bn. London Regiment (T.F.).
Lieut.-Commander L. C. Bott, R.N.
Major T. M. McAvity, Canadian Forces.
Colonel C. R. Matthews, late I.A.
Second-Lieutenant A. Surtees, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders.
Captain C. G. V. M. Wardell, I.A.
Lieut.-Colonel W. L. Cotton, I.A.
Captain H. P. Beggs, 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
Second-Lieutenant A. E. Coote, 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
Second-Lieutenant S. M. Deacon, 17th (Reserve) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
Lieutenant S. G. Freeborn, Canadian Field Artillery.
Second-Lieutenant S. W. Maxwell, 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
Lieut.-Colonel R. T. Pelly, D.S.O., 8th (Service) Bn. Royal Irish Rifles.
Lieutenant G. A. Titterton, R.N.
Captain S. V. G. Burroughs, I.A.
Captain H. G. Chesney, I.A.
Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Ralph, I.A.
Lieut.-Commander R. L. Fortier, R.N.R.
Lieutenant W. C. Hake, R.N.R.
Captain H. J. T. Marshall, R.N.
Lieutenant F. A. Smyth, R.N.R.
Major A. H. Tylden-Pattensen, D.S.O., late East Kent Regiment.
Lieutenant P. L. Leigh-Breese, 4th Bn. Yorkshire Regiment (T.F.).
Captain W. Paxman, 5th Bn. London Regt. (T.F.).
Captain A. S. Bles, 10th (Service) Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Lieutenant S. A. Field, R.M.L.I.
Captain N. G. B. Goodfellow, I.A.
Captain W. R. Warden, I.A.
Lieutenant H. N. Christian, I.A.
Brigadier-General R. Ford, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.S.C.
Lieutenant M. W. Noel, R.N.
Engineer-Captain G. H. Bromwich, D.S.O., R.N.
Captain C. F. Henderson, R.N.
Captain P. H. McCleverty, I.A.

Captain A. W. T. Webb, R.E.
 Second-Lieutenant B. Bigelow, R.E.
 Second-Lieutenant A. T. Terry, R.E.
 Second-Lieutenant C. I. L. Allix, Coldstream Guards.
 Second-Lieutenant R. A. Murray, 4th (Reserve) Bn. Argyll & Sutherland
 Highlanders.
 Midshipman E. de V. Drummond-Hay, R.N.
 Lieut.-Colonel R. N. Bray, Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
 Lieutenant F. N. Attwood, R.N.
 Lieutenant D. R. Fraser, R.N.
 Colonel C. N. Watts, late Sherwood Foresters.
 Captain W. McC. Wanklyn, R.A.M.C. (T.).
 Captain F. McC. Douie, D.S.O., R.E.
 Captain C. D. P. Smallpiece, A.S.C. (S.R.).
 Captain A. C. B. Neate, R.F.A.
 Major-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., Canadian Forces.
 Lieutenant H. Fraser-Brigstocke, 8th (Service) Bn. K.O.S.B.
 Lieutenant K. J. Manners, R.N.R.
 Second-Lieutenant H. W. Leigh-Bennett, Coldstream Guards.
 Second-Lieutenant E. A. Sursham, Coldstream Guards.
 Lieutenant E. W. Loyd, Yorkshire Regiment.
 Second-Lieutenant F. Boshier, R.F.A. (S.R.).
 Lieutenant H. F. Curry, R.N.
 Captain H. Oakes-Jones, 19th (Service) Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
 Major B. F. R. Holbrooke, I.A.
 Second-Lieutenant M. O'Leary, V.C., Connaught Rangers.
 Captain R. B. Dent, I.A.
 Colonel Lord D. J. C. Compton, late 9th Lancers.
 Gentleman Cadet D. H. Yatman, Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

V.—Library Subscription Reduced.

The Council have pleasure in announcing that for the present, and as a temporary measure, it is decided to reduce the subscription to the Lending Library from 10s. per annum to 5s. per annum. The Library is rich in works of reference, military and naval, historical, scientific, etc.; a subscriber can take out as many as four volumes at one time.

VI.—The R.U.S.I. Journal.

PAYMENTS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

Naval and military officers, whether Members of the Institution or not, are invited to send papers, essays, experiences, narratives, etc., which may appear to be of general interest, for the consideration of the Editor, with a view to publication in the Quarterly JOURNAL of the Institution.

VII.—Museum Purchase Fund.

This fund has been opened with the object of purchasing suitable exhibits which are from time to time offered to the Museum, or which are put up for sale at

various auctions. The Council hope it will receive support from Members of the Institution who are interested in the Museum.

| | |
|---|----------|
| Amount already acknowledged | £32 12 0 |
| The Dowager Viscountess Wolseley | 5 0 0 |
| "O.L.I." | 1 1 0 |
| | <hr/> |
| | £38 13 0 |
| Less expended to date | 22 1 0 |
| | <hr/> |
| | £16 12 0 |

VIII.—Brackenbury Memorial Fund.

The Council have become the Trustees of the above-named fund, which has been established to perpetuate the memory of the late General The Right Hon. Sir Henry Brackenbury, G.C.B., K.C.S.I., Colonel Commandant, Royal Artillery. The funds consist of the sum of £400 invested in Exchequer Bonds, the interest on which is to be devoted to the purchase of military literature for the Library of the Staff College, Camberley.

IX.—The amount taken for admission to the Museum during the past quarter was :—

| |
|------------------|
| £40 5 6 in May. |
| £44 0 3 in June. |
| £43 7 3 in July. |

ADDITIONS.

- (3424). Field-Marshal's Bâton, which was presented by His Majesty King Edward VII. to Field-Marshal The Right Hon. Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., September 10th, 1909.—Deposited by the Trustees of the late Field-Marshal.

It is much to be regretted that the whole of Earl Kitchener's decorations and medals were on board H.M.S. "Hampshire" when that cruiser was sunk on June 5th, 1916, off the Orkneys.

- (3425). Ensign from German submarine "U.26," sunk by H.M. Trawler "Endurance" and the French torpedo boat "Le Trombe," assisted by the British and French patrol vessels.—Deposited by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
- (6790). Engraving of a large silver-gilt Shield presented to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington by the Merchants of the City of London in 1822, which was formerly the property of Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, having been given to him by the second Duke of Wellington.—Given by The Dowager Viscountess Wolseley.
- (6791). Military Medal instituted in 1915 for bravery in the field.—Given by the Army Council.

- (6792). Model of the last Bucentaur, a State galley in which the Doges of Venice, on Ascension Day in each year up to 1789, went out to the Adriatic to perform the ceremony of "wedding the sea," which was accomplished by religious rite and the casting of a ring into the water.
- The original of this Model was built in 1729, and destroyed by the French in 1798 for the sake of its golden decorations.—Given by R. Howard Krause, Esq.
- (6793). The Scinde 1843 Medal which was bestowed by the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company for that Campaign, and awarded to Major W. H. Jackson, 12th Native Infantry.—Bequeathed by the late Lieut.-Colonel W. H. M. Jackson, late 81st Regiment.
- (6794). Group of Medals consisting of the Indian Mutiny, 2nd General Service and Afghanistan Medals awarded to the late Lieut.-Colonel W. H. M. Jackson, late 81st Regiment, and bequeathed by him to the Institution.
- (6795). Cross made out of a piece of the Ensign Staff of H.M.S. "Captain," and also a piece of rope which it is believed was part of the ensign halliards.
- These were picked up by the donor, who was serving on the "Monarch," which ship was instrumental in saving some of the survivors of H.M.S. "Captain," when she sank in September, 1870.—Given by Keppel Foote, Esq.
- (6796). Irish Rebellion, 1916. Two of the postage stamps which were to have been issued by the Republican Government.—Given by Major-General The Right Hon. L. B. Friend, C.B.
- (6797). Cap Badge taken from one of the Sinn Feiners during the rebellion in Dublin in April, 1916.—Given by Major C. H. Blackburne, D.S.O., 5th Dragoon Guards.
- (6798). A small German Aerial Torpedo which was fired into the trenches near Armentières in April, 1916, and which failed to explode.—Given by Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Edwards, 10th (Service) Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment.
- (6799). A German Steel Trench Helmet which was taken from the Germans on March 2nd, 1916, near the Bluff, north of Ypres, Comines Canal.—Given by Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Division.
- (6800). Two German Hand Grenades which were taken from the Germans on March 2nd, 1916, near the Bluff, north of Ypres, Comines Canal.—Given by Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Division.
- (6801). A Valise containing three tins, the contents of which are used in connection with the German smoke helmet. This was taken from the Germans on March 2nd, 1916, near the Bluff, north of Ypres, Comines Canal.—Given by Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Division.
- (6802). A German Pistol used for firing lights to illuminate the ground in front of the trenches, with a case of cartridges for the same, which

were taken at St. Eloi on April 3rd, 1916.—Given by Major-General J. A. L. Haldane, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 3rd Division.

- (6803). A Silk Play Bill printed at Corunna in 1809 during the British occupation by the army commanded by General Sir John Moore.—Given by G. H. Gillott, Esq
- (6804). Insignia (two) of a Knight of Justice of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.—Given by the Council of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem in England.
- (6805). Two Egyptian Army Colours of the period of Ibrahim Pasha, the red being artillery, the white infantry, their date is about 1848.—Presented in memory of Colonel Sir Charles Moore Watson, K.C.M.G., C.B., R.E., by Lady Watson.
- (6806). A Leopard Skin which was presented by the King of Abyssinia to Major-General C. E. Gordon, C.B., and given by him to Lieutenant C. M. Watson, R.E., when serving on his staff in the Sudan, 1874-75.—Presented in memory of Colonel Sir Charles Moore Watson, K.C.M.G., C.B., R.E., by Lady Watson.
- (6807). Officer's Belt Plate, 42nd Royal Highlanders, previous to 1881.
- (6808). Officer's Belt Plate, 42nd Royal Highlanders, previous to 1881.
- (6809). Officer's Belt Plate, 42nd Royal Highlanders.

The above Badges were the property of the late Major H. E. Elliot.—Given by Major E. H. M. Elliot.

The attention of Members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

X.—War Relics.

The Council would be greatly obliged if any Member possessing relics from the seat of war, would kindly present or deposit same on loan for exhibition in the Museum. As the space in the Museum is very limited, they should not be of very large dimensions.



THE LATE LORD KITCHENER.

THE news of the death of Lord Kitchener has been received with the deepest regret in this country and among our Allies. Many eloquent speakers at home and abroad have tried to give adequate expression to the irreparable loss the cause for which we are fighting has sustained in his death, and it is perhaps not unfitting that in the JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION some attempt should be made to voice the feelings of the naval and military forces of the Crown.

Already, before Lord Kitchener was called to the last great office which was to be the sum of his life's achievement, he had rendered supremest service to his country; but the work which he accomplished was carried to completion in distant lands, and it may with truth be said that as a result the nation knew little personally of the man to whom the Empire owed so much. He was heard of in Egypt preparing during long years to avenge the death of Gordon, to complete the work which that remarkable man had left unfinished, to rescue a people from bondage and a cruel despotism, and a vast country from direst desolation; and when, his plans completed, his railways made, and his advanced bases supplied and fortified, Lord Kitchener moved forward and drove back barbarism and savagery, we were inclined to forget that the cause for his final triumph was to be found rather in the long years of silent and patient preparation, than in the more spectacular campaigns of a few weeks during which victory succeeded victory. Then when the war broke out with the Dutch Republics, it was felt that his work in Egypt and in the Soudan might safely for a space be laid aside, in order that he might assist Lord Roberts to retrieve the early errors due to unpreparedness at home and over-confidence in the field, and we all know with what loyalty Lord Kitchener served his Chief, and how meet and right it seemed to us that the younger man should in due course take the place of the older soldier, and carry to a triumphal conclusion the work which he had set in train. From South Africa Lord Kitchener went on to India, and for seven years held the great office of Commander-in-Chief, reorganizing the Army, making it an even fitter instrument for war than his many able predecessors had left it, and, by the magic of the prestige which had gathered to his name, securing the grants of money necessary for reorganization and re-armament on modern lines.

When at last Lord Kitchener left India, he employed what by most men might have been made the much needed holiday in visiting certain of our great Dominions, and in advising

their Governments how they could best set their military houses in order against the Day of Wrath, of which the great soldier-administrator already perhaps visioned the dawn. Thereafter he returned for a brief space to the land where he had won his early triumphs, but by supreme good fortune he was on leave in this country when in the autumn of 1914 the Great War broke out, and when, as has been our habit through the centuries, we were unready. At once the Nation, with no uncertain voice, demanded that Lord Kitchener should be appointed Secretary of State for War—an appointment which had lately undergone some vicissitudes, and the importance of which had scarcely been sufficiently appreciated. Mr. Asquith has lately told us that Lord Kitchener was not desirous of accepting office, but having laid its burdens upon his shoulders, he bore them as no other man in the Empire could have sustained the huge and ever increasing load. Nobody saw more clearly than did he the vastness of the task we had undertaken, how great were the efforts that must be demanded of every portion of the Empire, or for how long such efforts would need to be maintained. In a very noble tribute recently offered by the Prime Minister to the services of Lord Kitchener, he specially dwelt upon "the creation and organization of the vast New Armies which have transformed Great Britain for the time being, and for the first time in its history, into a military Power of the first order," and declared—and we shall be of one mind with him—that a comparable effect could not have been brought about by any one except Lord Kitchener.

When the new War Minister first assumed office he gathered all things into his own hands, and probably at that time such extreme centralization was neither undesirable, nor, indeed, wholly avoidable; but the magnitude of the work may be judged by the fact that latterly it was divided into three parts, and that two of the ablest men in the United Kingdom, the one a civilian and the other a soldier, were called upon to take their share of a labour which had grown beyond the powers of any one man. The work which Lord Kitchener began just over two years ago is still incomplete, but the foundations have been well and truly laid, and the splendid edifice he planned can now rise under the care of other hands. Britons all the world over, as also our sorrowing Allies, find it hard to believe that the great War Minister has been taken from us at the very height of his powers; but we all feel with Mr. Asquith that he has left "a place in our national life that no one else can fill, and a memory that will last as long as the British Empire."

Of Lord Kitchener we may surely say, as Clarendon said of Falkland, that, "Whoever leads such a life need not care upon how short warning it be taken from him."

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OF THE

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[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

THE EXPEDITION TO PLATTSBURG, UPON LAKE CHAMPLAIN, CANADA, 1814.

*With an Account of it, from the Journal of the late General Sir
Frederick Philipse Robinson, G.C.B.*

By MAJOR-GENERAL C. W. ROBINSON, C.B.

THE first fifteen years of the 19th and 20th centuries will always form special milestones in British history, for at both periods Great Britain has found herself strenuously engaged in a great war; and it is singular—as will be touched upon later—how many naval and military lessons, taught early in the 19th, have been reiterated, not to say needlessly reiterated, in the 20th.

For Great Britain, and Canada also, a particular interest must always attach to the war of 1812—15¹ with America, because, during it, those links of loyalty and devotion which bind Canada to the Mother Country were cemented with blood—to be forged still more indissolubly together upon many future battlefields, down to those of Neuve Chapelle, Ypres, Festhubert, and Givenchy in 1915.

In this war of 1812—15 the expedition to Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain in Canada, in 1814, holds a place of its own. It closed

¹ The war began in 1812. Peace was made by the Treaty of Ghent, December 24th, 1814, but, in America, fighting went on for some weeks after that in 1815.

with one of the hardest fought and principal naval battles of the contest, and is thus alluded to by two exceptionally distinguished Americans, Captain Mahan and Mr. Roosevelt, ex-President of the United States:—

The former writes, in "Sea-Power in its Relations to the War of 1812":—

"The battle of Lake Champlain, more nearly than any other incident in the war, merits the epithet 'decisive'; and Roosevelt, in "Naval Operations of the War between Great Britain and the United States, 1812—15," views the consequences of this battle of Plattsburg as having been "very great," for it had "a decisive effect upon the negotiations for peace, which were then being carried on between the American and British Commissioners at Ghent."

The expedition to Plattsburg was a joint military and naval one, and of very brief duration. The term "battle" can only be properly applied to the naval action which concluded it, and *was* decisive, inasmuch as it gave to the enemy complete superiority upon the waters of Lake Champlain, which determined the British Commander-in-Chief to put a stop abruptly to the operations by land. There had not, in short, been a sufficient combination of military and naval effort to ensure success.

This expedition may then be said to convey lessons as to the employment of navy and army in unison, and to illustrate, as Roosevelt has remarked, the influence that failure in any isolated enterprise may exercise upon the general result of a war, as embodied at its close in a treaty of peace. Moreover, it will always be remembered throughout Canada in association with the irritation aroused by its unexpected termination and its painful sequel in the court martial ordered upon Sir George Prevost and his death before it assembled.

Thoughts such as these suggested that it might be of interest, just now, even though attention is so engrossed by the present war,

- (1) To touch upon the striking similarity between some of the circumstances and events which have marked the early and stirring years of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is more than curious, for it is very instructive.
- (2) To give a brief outline of what happened, in the war of 1812—15 with America, during the expedition to Plattsburg in 1814, combining with it an account of the operations from the journal¹ of the late General Sir Frederick Philipse Robinson, mainly, but not entirely, devoted to the part taken in it by the brigade which he himself commanded. This throws some fresh light upon one or two details of the enterprise.

¹ This journal was given to me over thirty years ago, by his daughter, Mrs. Hamilton Hamilton, a distant cousin, who died at Brighton in 1884, in her 90th year.

As to the writer of the journal, it will sufficiently indicate his military experience—which, of course, affects the value of what he writes—to say that, after previous active service in the American Revolutionary War, and in the West Indies, he had commanded a brigade under Wellington in the Peninsula, at the Battle of Vittoria; at the successful (as well as another previous) Siege of St. Sebastian where his brigade led the column of attack, and he was severely wounded; at the passage of the Bidassoa; the passage of the Nive, where he was again severely wounded; and at the operations before Bayonne. His career,¹ in fact, was rather an exceptionally long and varied one, and he is alluded to by Napier as a man “of a high and daring spirit.”

For a short period, in 1815, he was Provisional Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada; and his remarks as to the Canada of a century ago, may, apart from those which relate to military affairs alone, have an interest for some who know the Dominion to-day.

Had a “Rip van Winkle” fallen asleep, near some country village in Canada, out of sight of towns and railways, in the autumn of 1814, to awake to-day in the summer of 1916, he might have overheard, upon his way home, much of the conversation of passers-by, without discovering that he had overslept himself by more than a hundred years. History, in certain ways, has been singularly repeating itself, largely, no doubt, owing to Great Britain being a naval rather than a military Power; and to certain, apparently inseparable, characteristics of the British race, all over the world, which form both its weakness and its strength.

He might overhear, for instance, how staunchly the Mother Country and Canada were fighting side by side, freely sacrificing all that was dear to them, and straining every nerve to make up for the want of adequate preparation at the commencement of the war, in which there had been much supineness on both sides of the Atlantic.

That, probably, would have formed repeatedly the subject of his own conversation with his friends, and, in any case, be nothing new to him. Great Britain and Canada were fighting side by side in 1814, as they are now in 1916, and as they no doubt will be after this war with Germany is over, should either be again attacked. With respect to want of preparation for war, had not Brock written in Canada, at the outset of the war of 1812:—

“The King’s stores are at so low an ebb, that they can scarcely furnish an article of use or comfort?” Also, had not the unfortunate Captain Barclay, R.N., in 1813, been compelled to lead his squadron to defeat upon Lake Erie, with but one’s day flour in store, his crews composed of soldiers, Canadian lake-men and fishermen, and but fifty British sailors, with his equipment so deficient that the gunners,

¹ Some further particulars of it, for those whom it may interest, are given in the Appendix to this paper.

being without proper matches or tubes fit to use, had to fire pistols at the priming to set the guns off?¹

Was there not even by 1814—the closing year, practically, of the war in Canada—much leeway in munitions and other respects still to be made up?

He might, too, overhear mention of recent naval and military disasters and successes; of the capture of the enemy's colonies; of blockades, with the remonstrances of neutral Powers; of Great Britain having the command of the sea; of hostile commerce having been driven off the ocean; and of rumours that the enemy was anxious for peace.

All these topics of conversation would most probably have been daily ones with him, before he had been overcome by sleep.

Of reverses and successes, by land and sea, there had been several in 1812—14, as there are in most wars. Between 1809 and 1810, the Colonial possessions of the then enemy (France) in the West Indies had been reduced (with the Dutch islands of St. Martin and St. Eustatius); Rodriguez, Bourbon, and Mauritius had been acquired. Blockades, with remonstrances of neutral Powers, were actively going on; while, with respect to the circumstances and general situation of the United States in 1814, Mahan writes:—

“The extreme embarrassment under which the United States, as a nation, laboured was mainly due to commercial exclusion from the sea”;² in other words, to the dominance of British naval power upon the ocean.

At this period the rumours of an approaching peace were many.

Thus, upon awaking from his sleep in 1916, the chance remarks of passers-by upon the general position of affairs would have seemed very natural to him.

To come, now, to particular events. It is singular that even had he overheard allusions to Antwerp, the Dardanelles, Constantinople, the vicinity of Gallipoli, Alexandria, or Egypt generally, associated with criticisms of British operations in their neighbourhood, all these would have sounded most familiar to him.

Only seven years before he had dozed off in the woods of Canada, (i.e., in 1807), when Great Britain and Russia were allied, as they now are again, against Turkey, there had been a naval expedition under Sir John Duckworth to the Dardanelles; but unaccompanied by any land force to support the fleet.

At the same time—and meant to act in indirect unison with this, by bringing pressure upon the Turks at another point—a land force under General Mackenzie was despatched to Alexandria, in Egypt.

In 1809 a joint and powerful British naval and military expedition was sent against Antwerp and Walcheren, the *personnel* of which, including both services, amounted to about 100,000 men.

¹ Proceedings of the court martial upon Captain Barclay—who was honourably acquitted—for the loss of his squadron.

² Mahan's "Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812." Vol. II., p. 355.

In 1814, early in the year, another against Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom.

All these had, in the end, failed. That to the Dardanelles forced the Straits, and reached Constantinople. Negotiations then began, during which the Turks threw up earthworks so formidable that, without a military force, it was impracticable for the Navy to occupy the capital, and the fleet withdrew.

That to Alexandria—too small for its purpose—made terms with the besieging Turks, and was permitted to withdraw to Gibraltar. Some have held that it would have been better to have sent this to the Dardanelles with Sir John Duckworth's naval force.

That to Antwerp and Walcheren, in 1809, ended in disaster, chiefly owing to delay in its despatch and also delay during its course.¹ This ran it into the unhealthy season of the year; "Walcheren" fever then destroyed half the garrison of that island, and the expedition was abandoned.

In this enterprise the Earl of Chatham commanded the land forces and Sir Richard Strachan the naval; and hence the following doggerel lines with regard to it:—

"The Earl of Chatham, with his sword drawn,
Was waiting for Sir Richard Strachan.
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Was waiting for the Earl of Chatham."

That to Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, in 1814, brilliantly successful at one moment, had to be recalled because, at the latter fortress, reserves were not available in time to secure the success which the assaulting columns had gained.

Certainly, in not a few respects, events in the early part of the 19th Century have had their counterpart in the 20th; and, through the minds of many must pass the thought of how much that was taught in the 19th had, apparently, been forgotten by the opening of the 20th.

It is interesting, too, to turn to what the historian Alison writes, referring to the year 1813:—

"Men could not be more zealous than the British Government were at this period in the prosecution of the contest, and none ever made such stupendous efforts² to carry it on as they did in this year, but they were still insensible, notwithstanding all the disasters which neglect of it had formerly occasioned, to the value of time in war. . . . So frequently has this ignorance of the simplest principles of military combination on the part of Government marred the greatest efforts,

¹ It was despatched late in July, instead of in April or May (as it has been held that it could have been); and there appears also to have been some misunderstanding, if not friction, between those in charge of the sea and land forces.

² Great Britain (be it remembered) maintained, in the year 1813, 158,000 men in seamen and marines; nearly one million men in land troops (Regulars, Militia, Indian troops, etc.), and lent a sum of eleven million pounds sterling to her allies to prosecute the war. (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXIV., p. 346, and Annual Register for 1814.)

or disconcerted the best laid enterprises of the British nation, that it deserves the serious consideration of all those who have the direction of the studies of youth, whether some instruction on the subject should not form part of the elementary education of all those who are likely from their station or prospects to be called to the supreme direction of affairs." ("History of Europe (1848)." Vol. XVI., p. 384.)

Yet it is also correct, perhaps, to say that in the conduct of her joint naval and military enterprises she has been, because of haste while unprepared, "too soon" as often as "too late," missing the difficult, but golden, medium between the two.

This has been interestingly put in a recent letter to the Press¹ in reply to some reference made to British reverses in the present war, and to consequent loss of what was termed "British prestige."

"You regard" (the writer of this letter says) "these retirements, or surrenders, as defeats, and tell us that England is always 'too late'; but you do not tell us that it is just this kind of adventure that has given England her great Empire, and which she alone, of all countries, is in the habit of making. Nor do you point out that of the thousand of such adventures she has had in her wars, she has been successful in nine hundred of them. Too late! Never! but often too soon, for she dares sometimes without sufficiently counting the cost. . . . And these adventures are in accord with British practice from time immemorial. They are the very breath of her spirit, the source of all her glory, the foundation of all her expansion; and, because they are made too soon sometimes, because the imagination of her people occasionally runs ahead of their power of execution, and a daring stroke is attempted without specialized organization, you talk of ignominious defeats, and loss of prestige, and little politicians. Great Heavens! where would England be to-day without her list of Kut-el-Amaras and Gallipolis?"

To the above I would add myself, did not the conquest of Canada in 1759, when Wolfe's soldiers climbed slowly in the darkness up the heights of Abraham, hang upon the very narrow thread of whether the pickets of the enemy on the summit were on the alert or not? In reality an almost hopeless—and at all events a most hazardous adventure—but how brilliantly successful!

To turn, now, after perhaps too long a reference to the above subjects to the

EXPEDITION TO PLATTSBURG.

Peace with France having been concluded in the spring of 1814, after the battle of Toulouse, a portion of Wellington's Peninsular army, about 16,000 men, was sent from Bordeaux to Canada to strengthen the forces there and take part in the war with America.

¹ From Mr. H. B. Hetherington, to the Editor of *The New York Tribune*. May 1st, 1916.

Landing in July and August of that year, some of the regiments were sent to the Niagara frontier, a brigade to Kingston and the remainder encamped not far from Montreal.

Kingston was at this time the chief military post in Upper Canada, an important naval station with a dockyard, and defended by batteries, blockhouses, and earthworks. It is situated on Lake Ontario; and opposite it, upon that lake, was Sackett's Harbour, then an important American naval station.

It was now determined by the Government to carry the war actively into the enemy's territory, to endeavour, with one part of the army, to take Sackett's Harbour, and with another, from the direction of Lake Champlain, to invade the northern portion of the State of New York, one great object in connection with both enterprises being to secure the naval control of Lakes Champlain and Ontario. The enterprise against Sackett's Harbour was not eventually proceeded with, but the other was.

Three brigades of British infantry from Chambly, south of Montreal, about 11,000 strong, fresh from Peninsular battlefields, with artillery, and some other troops under Sir George Prevost, then Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Canada, passed on September 1st, 1814, the International boundary line, near Odell Town, and moved upon Plattsburg. This latter town lies upon the direct route to Albany and New York, and through it the river Saranac flows to enter Lake Champlain. Near its junction with the lake and on the south bank, the Americans, having fallen back from an entrenched camp they had occupied at Champlain, had erected defensive works, consisting of redoubts, blockhouses, and batteries, in or about which there was a force of regulars and militia numbering possibly some 5,000 men.

These works it was the first object of the British land forces to capture. Arriving on the north bank of the Saranac on September 6th, Sir George Prevost erected British batteries opposite those of the enemy and near a bridge across the river which had been partially broken down.

A glance at any map will show that, before further operations could be carried on by the British to the southward, it was necessary, in order to safeguard the left flank and the line of communication with Canada, to capture the American works at Plattsburg, and secure British naval predominance upon Lake Champlain, which had not as yet been established.

There was upon these waters a British flotilla, consisting of several armed vessels—ships, schooners, sloops and brigs—built, bought, or hired in Canada, and commanded by Captain Downie, R.N., a young, active, and very gallant officer, but who had only just joined the squadron.

Immediately before the action, which was to decide naval supremacy upon the lake, it lay off Chazy, having come up from the river Richelieu; while an American flotilla, under Captain MacDonough, was anchored across the entrance to Plattsburg Bay. The American position had been very skilfully chosen and taken up, running nearly

north and south, so that it was, from circumstances, difficult to turn either flank: and from it, it was possible to bring a concentric fire upon an attacking squadron. On emergency also, by coming closer in to the shore, it could receive support from the American land batteries as well, although it is a disputed point whether in the position actually taken up the flotilla was within gun-shot, or out of gun-shot, of shore batteries. The American works were within range of the British land batteries upon the north bank of the Saranac, but the American flotilla on the lake was not.

It was arranged apparently, by Sir George Prevost and his staff, in communication with Captain Downie, that when the wind served (for these were the days of sailing ships), and under certain pre-arranged signals, the British flotilla should come out and attack the American; and, further, that when this attack opened, the British land troops should engage the enemy's batteries, threatening an attempt to pass the Saranac near its mouth, while the real passage of the river should be forced at a ford higher up by troops under Major-General (afterwards Sir F.) Robinson, whose men, provided with ladders, were then to assault the American works from the south bank, taking them partially in reverse.

In strength the British land force was more than equal to anything which it would probably have to encounter, and was a picked and experienced one. The two flotillas also were fairly matched at the time the British squadron sailed from Chazy,¹ in number of vessels, guns, and crews: but Downie was in reality very heavily handicapped. He had, as we have already said, only just taken up his command: his crews consisted of very partially trained men, including soldiers as well as seamen: his vessels were in a most incomplete state of preparation and equipment, his flagship, the "Defiance," having only left the stocks sixteen days before: and, lastly, he was called upon to perform a task, to succeed in which a seamanship, manœuvring power, and discipline only to be acquired after long training, were all required. This task was to come down southward, then bear up round a point of land, and, finally, attack, under a concentrated fire, an enemy's squadron in a strong and selected position.

It seemed desirable to give the above particulars as to the object of the expedition, and the general situation by land and water prior to the naval action upon Lake Champlain, before passing on to what is narrated in Sir Frederick Robinson's journal.

From this point, however, I give the journal itself, from the writer's departure from Bayonne, in Spain, for Canada, down to the conclusion of the Plattsburg campaign and his return to England to attend the court martial which was to sit in connection with the operations.

JOURNAL OF SIR FREDERICK PHILIPSE ROBINSON.

On the 19th (of May, 1814) the Duke of Wellington came through Bayonne on his way to Madrid. I had the honour of receiving him

¹ Or "Little Chazy," a place apparently east of Chazy on the lake shore.

with the 5th Division drawn up on both sides the high road. After he had passed the line, he received three hearty cheers. He was very kind in his manner towards me, and told me I should receive an appointment to one of the Brigades intended to embark at Bourdeaux in a few days. Just as the Duke took leave of us the courier with the mail blew his horn. The Duke ordered the mail-bag to be put into his carriage, and he, with the assistance of his staff, sorted the letters and gave us all the letters belonging to the column.

I set out from Lower Anglette for Bourdeaux on the 26th May, 1814, to join the expedition there forming against some part of North America. I arrived at Bourdeaux on the 2nd June, and from Lord Dalhousie I learned that I was appointed to a Brigade consisting of the 3rd Battalion 27th Regiment, under Major Mills, 1st Battalion 39th, Lt.-Col. Bruce, 76th under Colonel Wardlaw, and 1st Battalion 88th, under Lt.-Col. Macpherson. I had but a few days to provide myself with everything.

I left Bourdeaux on the 9th in one of the river boats; I slept at Poliac and proceeded down the river on the 10th without knowing what ship I was to go on board of. Late in the afternoon I arrived at the fleet where, after enquiring on board three seventy-fours, I found I was to sail in the "York," 74, Captain Schomberg. . . . On the 16th the fleet sailed, all the Generals having sealed orders to be opened in a certain latitude. . . . Upon opening our sealed orders, we found that the armament was destined for Quebec, where we arrived on the 9th August, after remaining nine days at the Brandy Pots, one hundred miles below Quebec. . . .

CHAMBLY, AUGUST 22ND, 1815.¹

On the 12th August, 1814, at nine in the evening I left Quebec in the steam boat for Montreal. I regretted exceedingly that our sailing during the night would deprive me of seeing the beautiful banks of the St. Lawrence for such a distance. However, the next morning, and throughout that day, the novelty of the scenery, as well as great beauty in particular places, afforded me much gratification.

A steam boat is an admirable river conveyance, and very convenient. The rate of sailing, even against the wind and current, is at least five miles an hour.

The passengers are found in everything, and pay £3 10s. od. for everything except wine and liquors. The boat was 370 tons, but in consequence of the place taken up in berths for passengers, fore and aft, together with the quantity of wood on board for supplying the furnace, she is not capable of taking so much freight as might be expected from her appearance. . . . We arrived at Montreal in

¹ From this date of "Chambly, August 22nd, 1815," it seems that the journal, down to the conclusion of the expedition to "Plattsburg," was written about eleven months after the termination of the enterprise, and while the writer of it was Provisional Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada. I leave the spelling of names of places as in the original journal—Plattsberg, "Sacket's" Harbour, etc., though it is not the spelling of to-day.

forty-two hours, from Quebec, the distance 180 miles. . . . Three Rivers, and Sorell, or William Henry, are the most material places on the river.

I remained three days with my brother William,¹ and then proceeded to take the command at Chambly, which is on the south side of the St. Lawrence, upon the Richelieu, and fifteen miles from Montreal. . . . I saw so little of the latter place, being very much occupied during my stay, that I could not make any observation beyond what may be found in any gazetteer.

I took the command of the First Brigade, at Chambly on the 17th August, consisting of the 3rd Battalion 27th, 1st Battalion 39th, the 76th and 1st Battalion 88th—as fit for any service as it was possible for regiments to be.

I found plenty of employment in correcting abuses in the different departments, and in urging them to common activity. . . . I had no idea that such confusion existed in any part of the British service, as I found to be the case at this post.

I found great relief from these vexations in preparing my Brigade for the service they were soon likely to encounter, and which from early experience I knew to be totally different from the open, manly warfare they had been accustomed to, under the Duke of Wellington.

Every morning from six to eight o'clock the regiments alternately fired ball and after a short time premiums were given for the best shots. The Light Companies were also constantly practised in skirmishing in woods, after the American fashion.

Chambly is beautifully situated on the Richelieu. There is an old French fort at the foot of the rapids. The scenery equals anything of the kind in that part of the Lower Province. . . . As a military position it can only be considered a dépôt for assistance to the frontier of St. John's or La Colle; for should an enemy penetrate so far in force, Chambly could not be defended, but a position behind Little or Red River, about a mile to the rear, might be defended until reinforcements could arrive from Montreal.

Chambly might have been made the most beautiful cantonment in Lower Canada, but hurry and want of taste in placing the public buildings have totally destroyed the effect. . . . It is surrounded by a plentiful country and extremely convenient as a post or dépôt for the frontier, being only twelve miles from St. John's, and fifteen from Montreal. It has the advantage of water communication by the Richelieu from Sorell, at which place all public stores from Quebec are landed, for the use of Chambly and its dependencies.

An enemy intending to invade the lower part of the province might pass from Vermont by the Yamaska road to the St. Lawrence (while other attacks were made upon Montreal), keeping the Richelieu between them and the defending army.

St. John's could make little resistance were it not secured by the advanced post of Isle-aux-noix, which is strongly fortified and commands the entrance to the lake.

¹ Commissary-General in Canada during the war of 1812—15. Afterwards Sir William Henry Robinson, K.H.

Towards the close of the month great preparations were made for a secret expedition, and on the 31st I received orders to march with my brigade in two divisions for L'Acadie. Generals Brisbane and Power moved forward on the same day, the first occupying the town and position of Champlain, and the second that of Burtonville.

On the 2nd September my brigade moved to Burtonville through very bad roads, rendered much worse by the number of artillery and other carriages with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades.

On the 3rd the 1st Brigade occupied the American huts on the heights above the town of Champlain. The 88th regiment was left at Champlain to keep up the communications with our lines.

On the 4th we marched to Chazy, where we halted the 5th, which time was employed in reconnoitring the western road on our right, which was said to have been rendered impassable by the enemy. But there was nothing to impede the march of infantry, and the obstacles were to be easily removed, being only trees felled across the road in particular places. The 39th regiment remained to preserve the communications.

On the 6th we marched at daybreak for Jamson's Inn, but upon arriving within half a mile, we were ordered to turn off to the right through the Cedar Swamps, which, for about a mile and a half, were the worst I had ever seen—bad by nature, and rendered extremely dangerous by the breaking of the old logs, with which a kind of causeway had been formed many years before. Scarcely a horse got through without losing a shoe, and the artillery stuck fast for three hours.

Just then we heard General Power's Brigade briskly engaged, and pushed on to his support, but he had no occasion for our assistance, as he drove the enemy before him without the slightest check whatever.

At the entrance of the town of Plattsburg the enemy had brought forward a large field gun, and fired several round shot through the column of the 3rd Brigade, within two hundred yards distance, which had nearly occasioned the loss of the gun.

On my arrival at Plattsburg I was accosted by the Quartermaster-General with the question, "Is your demi-Brigade able to move on to the attack immediately if they leave their packs?" I begged he would answer a question or two from me before I gave him any other answer than that we were always ready. . . . I told him I had heard there was a river between us and the enemy's works which was fordable in several places, and if so requested to know whether his staff were acquainted with them. . . . He said they were not. "Do you know the ground on the other side, and the distance we should have to march?" He said they were not acquainted with these particulars. . . . Just then Sir George Prevost came towards us. I then urged him to send the Quartermaster-General's Staff without delay to ascertain all the necessary information, and that if they did not return in time (it being then past three o'clock) to defer the attack till daybreak next morning, which he agreed to, and it was in a short time finally so arranged. . . . I only further requested that those

troops that might be intended to pass the ford should be there before daybreak.

I then went to one of the houses, as near to the enemy's works as I dare venture to go, from whence I had a clear view of them. . . . They consisted of three redoubts, two small blockhouses, and a battery of heavy guns towards the lake.

The redoubts were not finished, and the guns of the principal one were all *en barbette*, and consequently might be easily silenced during an assault.

At daybreak the next morning there were no orders. At six o'clock I received a message to attend at Head Quarters immediately, which was soon countermanded, and the General Officers were desired to meet at Head Quarters at nine. I then received another message that Sir George wished to see me at eight.

I accordingly attended. Sir George then said he had determined upon waiting for the co-operation of the flotilla under Captain Downie, then at Chazy (15 miles), and decided that the troops should remain in their present position until further orders.

Owing to some mistake nothing was done towards erecting batteries that night. . . . The following is a statement of our batteries:—

Four 24-pounder Carronades.

Two light 24-pounder brass guns.

Two 12-pounder iron ship guns.

One 8-inch howitzer.

There were three brigades of light six-pounders, one attached to each brigade of infantry, and some of those guns were used against the works of Plattsburg.

Nothing material occurred from the 7th until the 10th, but during that period the sharp-shooters on both sides were constantly engaged from daybreak till dark.

On the 10th orders were given for the demi-Brigade and the 3rd Brigade (Maj.-Gen. Power's) to be ready to move under my command an hour before day break the next morning. . . . I waited at my quarters till about eight o'clock, when I received a message that his Excellency desired to see me.

Just before this the scaling¹ of the guns were distinctly heard from Captain Downie's flotilla behind Cumberland Head. . . . I attended at Head Quarters immediately.

It was then agreed that the attack should be made by the troops already mentioned, to be conducted over one of the fords by the Quarter-master-General's department, and orders to that effect were delivered to me. . . . Directions were given at that time for the men to cook, but those orders were immediately countermanded.

I was leaving Head Quarters at nine o'clock, when His Excellency took out his watch, saying, "It is now nine o'clock, march off at ten." I accordingly rode to the demi-brigade and directed Lt.-Colonel Wardlaw to march the two regiments (1st Battalion 76th and 3rd Battalion 27th) to my quarters at half past nine—that route being directed in

¹ Scaling is firing blank cartridge.

order to conceal the troops from the enemy. . . . The 3rd Brigade was stationed on the road we were to take.

By this time the fleet was engaged with the whole of the enemy's flotilla. I stayed some time on a rising ground to view the action, and my opinion at the time was, that the "Confiance" could not possibly bear the heavy fire of the enemy's fleet, almost all the guns of which bore upon her. She was too small a ship to stand long against such weight of metal. . . . The ship was crippled by the time she came to anchor, and two-thirds of her guns on the larboard side were either dismounted or disabled. . . . Before I left the spot I could perceive showers of grape-shot falling about the "Confiance" in every direction.

The troops placed under my command for the attack of the enemy's works consisted of the demi-brigade of the First Brigade (3rd Battalion 27th and 76th regiment). The 3rd Brigade, under Maj.-Gen. Power, consisting of the Buffs, 5th, 1st Battalion 27th, and 58th regiments, also the Light Companies of the 39th and 88th regiments, a brigade of six-pounders under Major Green—two only of which advanced—and two squadrons of the 19th Light Dragoons. A rocket detachment, and two or three waggons followed, loaded with such ladders as I had been able to collect in the farm houses.

The column was led by the eight light companies under the command of Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Lindsay, of the 39th, and the whole proceeded for Pike's Ford, under the guidance of the Quartermaster-General's department. . . . The Saranac, at Pike's Ford, is about seventy yards wide, from two to three feet deep, with broad slippery stones at the bottom, and tolerably rapid.

When we had nearly reached the ford on advancing, we heard three cheers from the Plattsburg side. I then sent Major Cochrane to ascertain the cause.

Having marched nearly a mile and a half, the road branched off into a number of cart roads into a thick wood, and the officers of the Quartermaster-General's department were divided in opinion whether we were on the right road or not. Major Thorn, Assistant Quartermaster-General to my brigade, came to me and assured me we were wrong, and that he would undertake to conduct to Pike's Ford, without fear of any further mistake.

We accordingly retraced our steps, and in about an hour we arrived on the banks of the Saranac.

The wood was very thick on our side to within a few yards of the bank, which was about 60 or 70 feet high and very steep. I ordered the head of the column to halt in order to close up the light companies for a rush through the river. The light companies of the 3rd Battalion, 27th and the 88th, were posted to cover the rest while crossing. The men then advanced under a galling fire from about 400 of the enemy posted behind trees and bushes, and rushed through the ford, with an impetuosity that nothing could check. They were supported by the 3rd Battalion, 27th, under Major Mills, in gallant style—the light companies pursuing the enemy till they had reached the ground they were ordered to occupy. The 76th regiment followed and formed in column about half a mile on the opposite side of the ford; the two six-pounders

were let down the bank by large detachments, and the 58th Regiment crossed and formed in column in rear of the 76th. . . . The 1st Battalion, 27th, had nearly crossed, when I rode forward to give the necessary directions for the attack. I had hardly reached the front, when Major Cochrane came and delivered to me the order for retiring, of which the following is a copy :—

Head Quarters, Plattsburg,

September 11th, 1814. 12 o'clock.

SIR,

I am directed to inform you that the "Confiance" and the brig¹ having struck their colours in consequence of the frigate having grounded, it will no longer be prudent to persevere in the service committed to your charge, and it is therefore the orders of the Commander of the Forces that you immediately return with the troops under your command.

Signed

E. BAYNES,

Adjt.-Genl.

Major-Genl. Robinson.

I communicated this to Maj.-Gen. Power, who was equally astonished with me at the contents, and lamented the cause of the order. The whole immediately retired under cover of the light companies, and the two six-pounders posted on the bank.

The only accident that happened was to the 76th Light Company, owing to too great zeal and daring in Captain Purchase, who, conceiving it possible to take a gun from the enemy, did not obey the order for retiring, in consequence of which about twenty-five men, with himself and two subalterns, were intercepted. Captain Purchase was killed with eight or ten of the men, and the remainder were taken prisoners.

. . . . The enemy made a slight attempt to follow us, but retired as soon as they came within reach of the six-pounders.

The whole of the troops returned to their former ground and, in the course of the evening, orders were given for the Army to retire, right in front, two hours before daybreak, which was affected without the least annoyance from the enemy, and on the 14th the 1st Brigade returned to Chambly.

It appears to me that the army moved against Plattsburg without any regularly digested plan. There seemed a strange infatuation that it was impossible to gain any intelligence that could be depended upon, and therefore it was throwing money away to attempt it—for which reason Secret Service money was withheld from the Generals commanding at the out posts.²

¹ "The Linnet."

² Possibly in making this criticism, and in his question (alluded to previously) as to whether the position of the Fords had been ascertained, Sir Frederick, having recently come from the passage of the Bidassoa between Spain and France, had in his mind the precautions Wellington had taken before he attempted that passage. Men disguised as fishermen had been employed for days in ascertaining the exact position of all the fords, which was made known to the officers who were to lead the columns.

On the 16th of October I received an official letter from the Adjutant-General, desiring me to hold myself in readiness to remove to Kingston to take the command of the Centre Division, as Maj.-Gen. Kempt had received permission to return to England.

I left Chambly on the 21st, and took my departure from Montreal, on the 26th of October, for Kingston.

During my journey I inspected the different posts and took a careful view of the banks of the St. Lawrence. Fort Wellington (at Prescott) excited my indignation. Although immense sums had been spent on this work, after a plan of some eye-catching fortification in Germany, it does not possess one meritorious feature. There was not the flanking fire of a single gun or musket, and when once an enemy should have gained possession of the ditch every man would be as safe as at two miles distance.

I occupied several days in viewing the post of Kingston and its dependencies.¹ The town of Kingston had been surrounded by high picketting, with five blockhouses at such intervals as the nature of the ground required, for some months. A strong water battery called Mississagua, on the lake at the west end of the town. Almost the whole of our ordnance and commissariat stores were deposited in it.

On the opposite side of the bay (Great Cataraqui) is the dock yard and naval arsenal, upon a long neck of land called Point Frederick, at the southern extremity of which is a small fort containing six large guns, together with a blockhouse in which are a few carronades.

The dock yard is surrounded north and west by a high picketting, but the whole is commanded by a rising ground immediately outside the gate, upon which site I proposed erecting a small, but strong work, and to insulate the dock yard by cutting a canal thirty feet wide across the neck which would render the place impregnable against assault during the open season, and the fort would protect it in the winter.

In March, 1815, Sir Gordon Drummond took the chief command in the Lower Province, and Sir G. Murray succeeded him in the civil and military command in the Upper, assuming the title of Provisional Lieut. Governor. As soon as the season would permit he commenced a tour through the western part of the command, when the news of the Battle of Waterloo occasioned his sudden return to Europe, and I succeeded to the command and the civil administration.

On the 10th of October I received an order from the Horse Guards to proceed forthwith to England for the purpose of attending, as a witness, at the trial of Sir George Prevost.

I set out for New York via Sacket's Harbour in consequence of a letter from Sir Gordon Drummond requesting I would do so, for the sake of the expedition.

I arrived at New York on the 23rd of October after a very fatiguing journey to Albany, the passage from which place to New York is performed in a steam-boat—the distance 160 miles done in

¹ See Frontispiece, photograph of sketch taken about 1815, by Sir Frederick's daughter, Maria Robinson, afterwards Mrs. Hamilton Hamilton.

twenty-two hours. Nothing can be more pleasant than these boats during the day, but heat and bugs render the night intolerable.

I stopped at 12 at night in the Highlands, at Captain Philips's (my cousin), whom I had not seen for thirty years. My son was with me, and a negro lad let us in, but I desired him to get us a bed without disturbing Captain Philips, which he did.

After breakfast I walked about a mile to visit my old nurse. I then went to the place that formerly belonged to my father,¹ which I found so little altered that it brought tears to my eyes and many a heavy sigh to my heart. Every circumstance before the Revolutionary War was perfectly fresh in my recollection, as well as the effect produced by hostilities; that part of the Hudson River having been fortified, and consequently a large body of military were always stationed there. Upon the capture of the forts the family took the opportunity of going within the British Lines to remain in New York—to which place I had now returned after two and thirty years.

On the 7th November I sailed in the ship "Minerva," Captain Sketchley, for Liverpool, where I arrived on the 4th December. . . . I reported my arrival to the Adjutant-General, and proceeded to Thornbury, near Bristol, where I intended to remain until my presence should be required at the Court Martial.

In the course of January (1816) I received information of the death of Sir George Prevost, upon which I applied for, and obtained, permission to return to Canada.

Some days after I received another letter from Lord Bathurst notifying my appointment to the Government of Tobago, and allowing me time to remove my family from Canada, and for every arrangement that might be necessary.

I set out for Weymouth, where I embarked for Guernsey, and received the most hospitable attentions from the Governor, Sir John Doyle. I sailed from thence for Honfleur, and crossed the River Seine in a day or two for Havre de Grace, from whence I intended embarking for America, by the first convenient ship that might offer. Finding I had some time to spare before the departure of any vessel, I went to Paris, purposely to pay my respects to my great Military Master, the Duke of Wellington.

In the foregoing journal, Sir Frederick Robinson has mentioned the defeat of Downie's squadron on Lake Champlain. It may be added here that Downie himself was unfortunately killed very early in the battle, which was so closely contested that at one moment victory seemed to incline decidedly towards the British flotilla. A very interesting and detailed account of the struggle is given by Roosevelt in "Naval Operations of the War between Great Britain and the United States in 1812—15." He writes: "The British flagship, the 'Confiance,' was struck in the hull 105 times, the American

¹ See Appendix to this paper.

flagship, the 'Saratoga,' 55 times. . . . Not one of the American vessels had a mast that would bear canvas, and the captured British vessels were in a sinking condition." The British casualties were about half their strength; the American loss was also severe.

There is much discrepancy between the relative strength of the two flotillas as given by different historians. Possibly the explanation is that, as the British flotilla sailed from Chazy it was stronger than when it came into actual close action with the American flotilla, the reason being that from various causes all the vessels did not succeed in making their proper stations.

In any case, according to British accounts, the relative strength in the close fighting was decidedly to the advantage of the enemy, and is given as¹

| <i>British.</i> | <i>American.</i> |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Vessels, 8. | Vessels, 14. |
| Broadside guns, 38. | Broadside guns, 52. |
| Weight of metal, 765 lbs. | Weight of metal, 1,194 lbs. |
| Crews, 537. | Crews, 950. |

There was a bitter feeling of disappointment throughout Canada at the unsatisfactory termination of the expedition.

Auchinleck, one of the historians of the war, says: "The unfortunate commander of the British forces in the expedition against Plattsburg has been almost universally made the target against which the most envenomed arrows have been directed." The Navy were exasperated at the loss of Downie's squadron; and the Army at the land forces having been directed to retire without having assaulted the American works, which they felt confident of carrying.

A court martial ordered to enquire into the naval reverse found that it was partly due to the expected military support not having been given, upon which Sir James Yeo, who commanded the naval forces in Canada, was directed to frame definite charges, which were in effect these: that the Commander-in-Chief had induced Captain Downie to attack by leading him to expect co-operation from the land forces, which he did not give to him; that he had not assaulted the works at Plattsburg at the same time as the naval action began—as he had given Captain Downie to understand that he would; that he had disregarded the signal for co-operation which had been previously agreed upon; and that he had not made a land attack either during or after the naval action, whereas, if he had, the squadron might have been saved.

The above charges were communicated to Sir George Prevost, who was to have been given the opportunity of answering them before a court martial directed to assemble in London in January, 1816; but this court, as has been already mentioned, never sat, owing to his death. He was not therefore heard in his defence.

¹ MacMullen's "History of Canada (1868)," p. 314; Alison's "History of Europe (1848)," Vol. IX., p. 159; James's "Naval History," Vol. VI., p. 346.

This, and the death also of Captain Downie, have led to several points never having been as fully cleared up as they would have been under an official enquiry.

Sir George Prevost, in his despatch upon what took place on the day of the fighting, dated from Plattsburg, September 11th, 1814, and addressed to Earl Bathurst, makes the following statements which bear upon the above charges; though these had not been formulated when the dispatch was written:—

“ I found the enemy in the occupation of the elevated ridge of land on the south bank of the Saranac, crowned with three strong redoubts and other field works, and blockhouses armed with heavy ordnance, with their flotilla at anchor out of gun shot from the shore, consisting of a ship, a brig, a schooner, a sloop, and ten gunboats. . . . I immediately communicated this circumstance to Captain Downie who had been appointed to command the vessels on Lake Champlain, consisting of a ship, a brig, two sloops and twelve gunboats, and requested his co-operation, and in the meantime batteries were constructed for the guns brought from the rear. On the morning of the 11th our flotilla was seen over the isthmus which joins Cumberland Head with the main land steering for Plattsburg Bay. I immediately ordered that part of the Brigade, under Major-General Robinson, which had been brought forward, consisting of our Light Infantry companies, 3rd Battn. 27th and 76th Regts., and Major-General Power's Brigade, consisting of the 3rd, 5th, and the 1st Battns. of the 27th and 58th Regts., to force the fords of the Saranac, and advance provided with scaling ladders to escalate the enemy's works upon the height; this force was placed under the command of Major-General Robinson. The batteries opened their fire the instant the ships engaged.

“ It is now with deep concern I inform your Lordship that notwithstanding the intrepid valour with which Captain Downie led his flotilla into action, my most sanguine hopes of complete success were not long afterwards blasted by a combination, as it appeared to us, of unfortunate events, to which naval warfare is peculiarly exposed. Scarcely had His Majesty's troops forced a passage across the Saranac, and ascended the heights on which stand the enemy's works, when I had the extreme mortification to hear the shout of victory from the enemy's works in consequence of the British flag being lowered on board the 'Confiance' and 'Linnet,' and to see our gun-boats seeking their safety in flight. This unlooked-for event having deprived me of the co-operation of the fleet, without which the further prosecution of the service was become impracticable, I did not hesitate to arrest the course of the troops advancing to the attack, because the most complete success would have been unavailing, and the possession of the enemy's works offered no advantage to compensate for the loss we must have sustained in acquiring possession of them.”

It was asserted, and has also been denied, that Sir George Prevost had brought an undue pressure upon Downie to attack before he was ready. Another point disputed, and a very important one, was whether the American flotilla was, as Sir George states, “ out of gun-shot from the shore.” This materially affects the question of what influence upon

the naval fight the British capture of the American land works and batteries at Plattsburg, and of bringing British guns up to that point upon the shore of the lake, would have exercised. By some it is held that the American flotilla was within gun-shot from the shore, but only at a very long range.

Mahan writes:¹ "Apparently, from the balance of evidence, it was, as far as could subsequently be judged, at a little over a mile, and at all events under a mile and a-half, from the shore. . . . and" (he continues) "whether ordnance from the position of the batteries could reach the squadron, Prevost could only learn by trying, the situation was evidently one that called upon the army to drive the enemy from his anchorage. . . . It would seem clear, therefore, that the true combination for the British General would have been to use his military superiority, vast in quality as in numbers, to reduce the works, and garrison Plattsburg. That accomplished, the squadron could be driven to the open lake. . . . Apparently Sir George Prevost was swayed by the idea that a joint attack of army and navy was indispensable, and considered that, in the advance of the army along the head of Cumberland Bay and in crossing the Saranac, it would need the assistance of the flotilla to draw off the fire of the American gunboats."

But with respect to what Sir Frederick Robinson mentions in his journal, it is curious that Sir George seems to have originally decided to attack the works at daybreak on the 7th September, at which time the flotilla—some miles off, and not yet in a state to sail—could not have co-operated. It was subsequently, therefore, to this that he altered his intention and decided to wait until the fleet could co-operate.

It had even been suggested to attack the works soon after the troops first reached Plattsburg on the 6th, although, in view of the men having then been on the march since daybreak, that the afternoon was advancing and that there were no guides or information as yet as to the fords on the Saranac, the decision to attack at dawn the following day was probably, in a military sense, sound.

Above all, it is most difficult to understand why, on September 11th, the hour for Sir Frederick Robinson's force to march off from Plattsburg to force the passage of the river was deferred until 10 a.m., although the troops composing it had been ordered the evening before to be in readiness to move an hour before daybreak, and the "scaling" of Downie's guns (asserted to have been the signal that he was sailing to attack) had been heard at 7.40 a.m. It may have been that the anticipation was that the naval engagement would last much longer than it actually did. Roosevelt estimates that from the time the first British gun opened upon the American squadron, about 8.45 a.m., the battle lasted two and a-half hours, which would fix its termination at about 11.15. The naval battle on Lake Erie in the previous year had lasted considerably longer.

But, from whatever reason the hour to move off was postponed until 10 a.m., this decision seems to have been especially unfortunate.

¹ Mahan, "Sea Power in its relation to the War of 1812," Vol. II., 367-70.

The distance from the position of Sir F. Robinson's brigade to the ford of the Saranac to be forced was between two and three miles, apparently, so it might possibly have been at the ford by 11 o'clock; but as a fact there was a delay on the road, owing to a mistake on the part of those detailed to lead the column, and which it may be gathered from various sources amounted to about half an hour.

Thus it must have been about 11.30 a.m. when the column, then near the ford, heard the "cheering," which was afterwards found to indicate that Downie's flagship had struck her colours.

At this time the ford on the Saranac had still to be carried, the artillery to be got across the river, the troops to be formed up, for the assault of the works, upon the south bank, and the distance between them and these works to be traversed.

Thus, in any case, even had there been no delay upon the way to the ford, could this force have co-operated effectively with the flotilla, before the defeat of the latter, though it might possibly, had it carried the works, have prevented the Americans from securing the captured ships so completely as they did.

But the situation might have been very different had Sir F. Robinson's force marched at 7.40 a.m. when the "scaling" of the guns was heard—or been advanced upon the road to the ford still earlier than that, to there await orders.

Even had it been found that the American flotilla was out of range from the shore, the moral effect upon it of seeing the shore batteries captured would probably have been great; also the attack would seemingly have been made under very favourable conditions, for the enemy's works were being bombarded by the British batteries, and his gunboats, engaged with the British flotilla, could not have given their attention to the attacking land force.

Sir Charles Lucas, in alluding to this campaign,¹ says: "It is stated that delay occurred through the troops losing their way to the ford—a story difficult to credit, since the ford was but three miles distant, the movement was made in broad daylight, and there had been an interval of several days' inaction during which it must be supposed that the ground had been reconnoitred."

Sir Frederick Robinson's journal explains what did occur. Evidently the doubt as to the right road or track arose at a point where a number of cart tracks diverged in a thick wood. Possibly, although the track to the ford had been reconnoitred, the staff officer leading had, instead of marking the track, trusted to memory alone which played him false as to which of the divergent tracks led to the spot on the river to which he was to lead—but this must, of course, be conjecture pure and simple.

With regard to the decision of Sir George Prevost to withdraw the army at once, after the defeat of the flotilla, the Duke of Wellington writes to Sir George Murray from Paris on December 24th, 1814: "Whether Sir George Prevost was right or wrong in his decision at

¹ "The Canadian War of 1812," by Sir C. P. Lucas, formerly Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies (1906), p. 206.

Lake Champlain is more than I can tell, but of this I am certain—he must equally have retired to Kingston¹ after our fleet was beaten, and I am inclined to believe he was right.”

Sir Charles Lucas, commenting upon this campaign, expresses what is, I think, the view of very many in Canada, in these words:—

“Sir George Prevost did good work for England in difficult and dangerous times, and he did good work for Canada in that, amid the throes of a national crisis, he held the confidence of the French Canadians. His instructions and temperament made him cautious to a fault. . . . Outside the battlefield his merits were not few or small.” The responsibilities of his position, and the strain of over two years of war through which he had held it, had apparently undermined his constitution, never, it is said, very strong. The British Government would not accede to the request of his family to hold an enquiry into the charges against him after his death: but the Prince Regent publicly expressed his sense of the services generally which he had rendered to Canada, and granted an augmentation to the family arms in acknowledgment of them.

In conclusion, with respect to the effect to which the want of success at Plattsburg had upon the subsequent conditions of peace, it has been stated that Lord Castlereagh, on behalf of Great Britain, had desired to obtain such a modification of the Canadian frontier line, which ran then as now through the centre of the lakes, as would give to Canada greater control of these waters—which are of the nature of inland seas—a matter of much consequence, as naval superiority on those lakes has been held by Wellington² to be a “*sine qua non* of success in war on the frontier of Canada.” He (Lord Castlereagh) wrote³ to the Peace Commissioners of Great Britain at Ghent on August 14th, 1814, that the views of the Government were strictly defensive, that territory as such was by no means their object, but that Great Britain considered herself “entitled to claim the use of the lakes as a military barrier”; and it was apparently his design to stipulate that no fortifications should be erected on the southern shores of the great Canadian lakes. To have obtained virtual control of the lakes in this way at that period would have been a supreme advantage,⁴ but the Government could not put forward such a claim with any hope of success after the reverse to the flotilla on Lake Champlain. It might possibly have done so if, by victories at Plattsburg and at Sackett’s Harbour, British flotillas had secured an unquestioned superiority on Lakes Champlain and Ontario.

¹ Kingston (the chief military station in Upper Canada) was perhaps written in haste for Montreal, to which place Sir George fell back.

² Letter to Sir George Murray, December 24th, 1814.

³ “Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,” by Marquess of Londonderry (1853), Vol. X., p. 89.

⁴ Under the conditions of warfare to-day, with the use of submarines, mines, hydroplanes, and aeroplanes, the situation has become, of course, more or less changed.

APPENDIX.

GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBINSON.

Sir Frederick Philipse Robinson was born on September 24th, 1764, and obtained his first commission when a little over 13 years of age in the Loyalist Corps of "King's Loyal Americans" which had been raised by his father, Colonel Beverley Robinson,¹ on the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War. In this regiment three of his brothers also held commissions. He never, however, actually joined this corps, being transferred shortly afterwards to the 17th (now the Leicestershire) Regiment.

With it, when not quite 15 years of age, he found himself in command of a company at the action of Horseneck (March, 1799), there not having been time, as he says, to recall his captain who was "then flirting in New York."

After seventy-five years' service he died at Brighton, January 1st, 1852, in his eighty-ninth year, being then the "father," as it was termed, of the Army, his first commission bearing an earlier date than those of the few Generals whose names preceded his in the Army List.²

As to details of his career, he remained in America, seeing further active service, till the peace of 1783.

In 1793—4 he took part in the capture of St. Lucia, Martinique, and Guadaloupe in the West Indies, as "Captain-Lieutenant" and Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion of Grenadiers, under Colonel John Francis Cradock (afterwards Lord Howden). This was a battalion made up from the Grenadier companies of various regiments, including his own (then the 38th). On July 3rd, 1794, he was promoted captain; and, not long afterwards, Colonel Cradock, having been directed to raise another regiment, wrote to him to join him immediately, as he had obtained for him a majority in it without purchase.

It is worth while, perhaps, to-day, when recruiting for the present war is a subject of so much interest, to mention that he set off then to the Isle of Man with 120 recruits, composed mainly of pardoned deserters and men taken from jails in Dublin and elsewhere; and that after four months the new regiment, 800 strong, was inspected by General (afterwards Sir Henry) Johnson, clothed, armed, and equipped.




In 1802 he took a very active part in organizing volunteers to meet the threatened invasion of Napoleon, having been appointed an


¹ The obituary notice of Colonel Beverley Robinson's death, at Bath, in the *Gentlemen's Magazine* for 1792 says: "He was born in Virginia (then a British colony) and possessed, before the American Revolution, of a large estate in that province. During the unhappy contest between the parent country and her colonies he was a firm loyalist. He raised a regiment from among his own tenants to assist the cause of Britain. The event was to him unfortunate, his estate was confiscated and a rich inheritance for ever lost to his family. Colonel Robinson was Great Nephew of John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, translated to London, and Lord Privy Seal in the reign of Queen Anne. He was, whilst he lived, beloved and respected by all who knew him.—Flebilis occidit." His sons, after the peace, moved to England or New Brunswick or remained in the Service.

² "Stocqueler's Encyclopædia." London, 1853.

MAP OF PART OF EASTERN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

*Comprised between Prescott on the R. St. Lawrence (below Kingston),
Montreal, the R. Richelieu, and Lake Champlain.*





Inspecting Field Officer for Recruiting, first at Bedford, and afterwards in London.

Stocqueler, in his "Military Encyclopædia," says of him: "This officer in 1804 suggested various improvements and alterations, which, from their interest and importance to every military man are here recorded" (and devotes several pages to these). The Governor and Company of the Bank of England also voted him a valuable piece of plate for what he had done in connection with the Bank of England corps.

From what has been said above he was apparently an active officer. He was a strong advocate, too, for the establishment of rifle corps and light troops, having probably experienced their value in the American Revolutionary War.

In the autumn of 1812 he proceeded to the Peninsula, and in 1813, shortly before the battle of Vittoria, was appointed to command a brigade,¹ becoming a Major-General on June 4th, 1813.

Up to this time his experience of active service had been limited to the campaigns we have alluded to in the American War of 1775-83, and in the West Indies, in a junior rank; but he apparently justified his selection to higher command.

Napier, in his "Peninsular War," alludes to the "example which he set" to his officers and men at Vittoria, and to his "high and daring spirit."

At the successful assault of St. Sebastian² he was severely wounded at the head of his brigade, which formed the column of attack, and he was present also at the Passage of the Bidassoa, the Passage of the Nive (again severely wounded), and in the actions before Bayonne.

He was more than once favourably mentioned in despatches. At Vittoria³ his brigade is alluded to as having gallantly stormed the village of Gamarra Major, without firing a shot, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry.

At the Passage of the Bidassoa, Major-General Hay writes: "Major-General Robinson and the 2nd Brigade were from local circumstances warmly engaged before the remainder of the Division could come up. Each regiment in it distinguished itself."

After the conclusion of the operations before Bayonne, the temporary command of the 5th Division devolved upon him; and, peace having been concluded with France, he was appointed to a Brigade for active service in Canada.

¹ It is said in some references to him that he was sent out to Spain direct from the Horse Guards to the "discontent" of the Duke of Wellington, who had intended or desired some other arrangement. He does not himself allude to this, but if it is true—and it well may be so, for the Duke could never have known him on service, if at all—it speaks well for the fairness of the Great Duke—and this is why I mention it—that he received him most kindly as his guest at Headquarters for two days, and always treated him most considerately. He expresses more than once his appreciation of his Chief.

² "Wellington Despatches," Gurwood, Vol. XI.

³ "Wellington Despatches," Gurwood, Vol. X.

The above particulars show the experience which he had gained previous to the Expedition to Plattsburg, related in the preceding pages.

They indicate, too, that to one of his temperament, the order to retire, just as he was about to assault the enemy's works at Plattsburg, must have been especially trying.

After the Peace of Ghent, between England and America, he was, for a few months in 1815, Provisional Lieut.-Governor of Upper Canada, and in 1816 became Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Tobago, where he remained till 1821.

He was twice married (1) to Grace, daughter of Thomas Boles of Charleville, Ireland, who died in 1806; (2) in 1811 to Anne Fernyhough, Co. Stafford, and had children, none of whom, however, have left descendants.

He was appointed a Lieut.-Colonel on 1st January, 1800, Colonel 25th July, 1810, Major-General 4th June, 1813, Lieut.-General 27th May, 1825, General 23rd November, 1841. Colonel of the 59th Regiment 1st December, 1827, transferred to the 39th Regiment, 15th June, 1840, and—as was not infrequent in those days—was connected with several regiments, on promotion, transfer, etc., etc., for more or less long periods, amongst them the 17th, 60th, 38th, and 32nd.

He became a K.C.B. 1st January, 1815, G.C.B., in 1838, and had the gold medal for Vittoria, with clasps for St. Sebastian and the Nive.



THE METHODS OF BLOCKADE AND OBSERVATION EMPLOYED DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS.

AN ESSAY BY LIEUTENANT GUY E. COOPER, R.N.

"War is an option of difficulties."—WOLFE.

"Men who can wait, and bear and forbear, and remain steadily at their post under every provocation to leave it, are invincible opponents."—W. S. GILLY.

INTRODUCTION.

WITH regard to this essay, a word of personal explanation is necessary. During the summer which I spent at Greenwich, an ambitious effort was planned and materials collected. On mobilization I was appointed first lieutenant of a destroyer, and naturally have had, since July, few books available and little leisure for history. It is hoped that this will account for the very uneven nature of the essay.

The diagrams are plotted from the noon positions in the masters' logs at the Public Record Office. These are, of course, in many cases approximate, since there was no method of knowing longitude except when in sight of land. A special word of warning is necessary with regard to the diagram showing positions off Toulon. These positions were all plotted from bearings and distances of points of land, and though these bearings were magnetic, no variation was allowed for when laying them down. Actually in 1796 there was about 10° W. variation, so all positions should be moved to the eastward. This does not affect the comments on the blockade.

In all other cases variation—as noted in the logs—has been allowed for.

There is no attempt to make references to the present war, which it will be impossible to judge till we have far more materials than at present. It may, however, be permissible to point out the interest of Duncan's operations at the present juncture.

PART I.

GENERAL REMARKS ON BLOCKADE AND OBSERVATION.

Before embarking on the detailed consideration of this complicated subject, it may be as well to lay down a few general principles;

and while most of the following remarks may seem to be the baldest commonsense, it is a fact that they have been overlooked occasionally even by professed strategists. All wars do not present the same problems for solution, and where the material force and "animus pugnandi" of the combatants are practically equal, blockade and observation have hardly to be considered, since opportunities for decision by battle will be frequent. We find, however, that in our past history the Dutch Wars form almost the only example of this state of affairs.

One belligerent, therefore, must be inferior in either or both of these qualities before he comes within the scope of this essay, and this inferiority may be either local or general. During the period under review, the French were generally markedly inferior in all respects, so that problems germane to this subject were constantly arising. In view of the great variety of circumstances which may have to be considered, it is essential that each individual case should be judged on its merits and in relation to the whole plan of the war; sweeping rules of universal application will be found untrustworthy. War is, or should be, an extension of policy, and all its operations should be concerted to act in harmony with the main strategic idea and to frustrate the designs of the enemy. In such a connection the facile truisms which some historians have applied to all operations, irrespective of the general situation, should be viewed with grave suspicion.

The primary point to grasp is the essential difference between blockade and observation, and how to distinguish between the two processes. No greater error can be made than to say that the choice between the two rests on the fighting spirit of the commander; that close blockade is a strong and military measure, while open blockade—or, as I prefer to call it, observation—is weak and indecisive.¹

The fact to be realized is, that the two methods—though in essence entirely different—have each their use in the right place, while in some cases a superficial resemblance may cause them to be confused. The only sure method by which to classify any given campaign is to consider the motive which underlay each series of operations.

(a) *Blockade.*

This may be defined as the method of obtaining control of the sea by preventing the enemy leaving his port. The extreme expression of blockade is when the enemy's port is closed by means of obstacles in the navigable channels. This, though not infrequently attempted, has rarely met with great success, and can at best be only a temporary measure.

An effective blockade maintained by a fleet is one of the most exhausting methods of war possible, and can produce no permanent result. It is hardly possible to maintain a blockade against an active enemy.

¹ This sentence was written before the death of Admiral Mahan was known. I have allowed it to stand, as, without reflecting on his general merits as an historian, I cannot consider he looked at this matter with his customary justice.

The operation is, paradoxical as it may sound, essentially a *defensive* one, as the object is not to force a decision by battle, but to immobilize the enemy. It has two obvious defects. It sins against the military maxim that decisive forces should only be employed in decisive operations, while it fails as a defensive measure, since, if a given force of the enemy is to be blockaded, we shall have to expend a considerably greater force in doing so.

In the sailing era a close blockade of an enemy's port could be maintained under favourable conditions, but it was very exhausting and required a large superiority both in material and personnel over the enemy; while, however well organized, intervals of observation were bound to occur during bad weather. On the other hand, the moral effect of a blockade was such that though the blockading squadron might be invisible, the ignorance of the enemy with regard to its whereabouts would probably intimidate them from venturing out.

The classic example of a blockade is that of Brest from 1803-1805. This port was kept closed throughout the crisis of the war, as it was not considered desirable to let the command of the Channel and its approaches be in doubt for a moment. The position of Brest was favourable to the attainment of this object, as a fleet off Ushant automatically covered the vital communications to the Mediterranean, Ireland, and America.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the French fleet was never brought to action save during the observation periods under Howe and Bridport; while Napoleon frequently forbade it to put to sea owing to the rigour of the blockade and the strain which he knew it imposed on our forces.

Thus the blockade impeded a decision, but so perfectly was it carried out that the Brest fleet ceased to be a mobile factor in the war.

(b) *Observation.*

This may be defined as the method of obtaining control of the sea by disposing one's forces in such a way as to produce a decision by battle under favourable circumstances.

The term "observation" will be used throughout this essay to denote the system which has been generally described as "open blockade." The latter is essentially a contradiction in terms, and though in special cases it may have a meaning, loose definitions are such a fruitful source of error that it has been judged advisable to avoid any risk of confusion.

It will be evident that this is essentially an *offensive* system, since its end is the decision by battle, the only true object for any sound military process. It is thus in the abstract a more vital operation of war than passive blockade.

On the other hand, like most of the higher products of human intelligence, there is far more room for error than with the simpler method. The price of elaboration has to be paid, and if observation is carried out ineffectually it is not only futile but dangerous. The situation with the enemy at sea and unlocated is acutely uncertain,

and any one of the innumerable chances of war may sway the balance one way or the other. In certain areas and at certain times any delay in bringing the enemy to action might well be disastrous, and in these cases pure blockade will be the sound measure to adopt. This is generally the case when military expeditions have to be transported across a sea which is only controlled to a limited extent, or when serious invasion is threatened.

The conditions which must be satisfied in order to render a system of observation efficient, must be examined in detail from the campaigns which are comprised within this period; but a few remarks may be made in advance.

It is not in the least necessary, as is sometimes supposed, for the fleet to remain in harbour while observing. Provided there is an efficient intelligence system, it will be better for the fleet to spend much of its time at sea, as, though more expensive, this will avoid the demoralization which appears to accompany long periods in harbour, and will keep the enemy in uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the various squadrons. A suitable base, however, is quite essential for successful observation. This base should command certainly the enemy's most dangerous line of operations and, if possible, all his lines. The position of Corsica with regard to Toulon is very favourable.

It is hardly necessary to remark that a dockyard port should never be selected for such a base. The depressing effect of such a place on the personnel is notorious. Material is also apt to suffer more in close proximity to a repairing base than when ships are dependent on their own resources. The selection of a suitable base or bases is one of the most difficult tasks an admiral can have, as an error once made is difficult to repair.

In conclusion, it must always be remembered that any method of warfare is not an end in itself. Both blockade and observation are means to be employed in obtaining victory, and should be varied or combined as circumstances dictate and as the whole course of the war may require. Each squadron should not be considered as a solitary unit, but should be so disposed as to assist in the general control of the sea and aid the military offensive movements which will usually be necessary to secure a decisive victory.

PART II.

OBSERVATION.

(a) *The Channel under Howe and Bridport.*

EARLY EVENTS OF THE WAR.—The great war opened with our policy in a very unsettled state. Pitt had commenced hostilities to safeguard our interest in the Netherlands and maintain the artificial restrictions dealing with the Scheldt navigation: he was convinced that it would be a short war and over in one or two campaigns. In pursuance of

these ideas he was very loth to treat the conflict as if it was a struggle for existence.

On the other hand, a considerable party, with the King at its head, was anxious to enter on a crusade for the principle of monarchy; this was the nominal motive of the other European Powers, though it was soon evident that their passion for intrigue and lust for territory were considerably greater than their devotion to any ideal. Burke, their noblest spokesman, showed far greater vision than Pitt when he said, "It will be a long war and a dangerous war, but it must be undertaken."

The naval operations were affected by these divergent views, and the lack of a coherent policy encouraged looseness of thought.

Howe, who had been given command of the Channel fleet, was ordered:—

1. To protect the trade of the King's subjects.
2. To molest the ships of war and the trade of the French.

To secure these ends Howe resorted to observation. St. Helens was his base, occasionally advanced to Torbay. In fine weather the fleet or detached squadrons cruised to the westward. A watch was supposed to be kept on the French coast by frigates.

It will be seen that there is nothing in the orders to justify a rigorous blockading system, and indeed with the official view of the war such an expensive and exhaustive method would certainly have been condemned; it was not yet realized that the struggle was one of life and death. It must be remembered, too, that the service was not in that state of efficiency to which a few years of hostilities brought it. Not only were the seamen untrained, but the captains in the fleets were largely veterans of the previous war.

Most of the men who became famous later are found in command of frigates in 1793-1794.

Howe was thus perfectly justified in resorting to observation, but it can hardly be pretended that much skill was shown in applying the system.

St. Helens, at which he sometimes spent six months on end, had many disadvantages as a base. It was too near Portsmouth; it was difficult to leave in easterly winds; it was remote from any probable French operations; neither did a fleet at St. Helens cover the trade routes.

The watch on the French ports was very slackly maintained, nor was there a developed cruiser system. Single ships and small squadrons of the enemy cruised with impunity, cutting off our small craft and occasionally seizing a convoy. Even the winter cruise of the French in 1795, which was so disastrous to them, cost us a hundred merchant vessels. The sailing of the great convoys was covered by a cruise of the grand fleet, and this was the principal operation attempted by the latter. Owing to the inertia, the morale of the fleet degenerated until a low standard of professional efficiency was accepted by officers and men.

Howe explained his objections to anything in the nature of a blockade at some length. Summarized, they were that blockade is:—

1. Ruinous to the ships.
2. Bound to be occasionally relaxed.
3. Hateful to the seamen.
4. Extravagant in expense.

Of these the first and fourth are pertinent, considering the standpoint of the time; though it must be remembered that owing to lack of practice, the grand fleet rarely made a cruise without a chapter of accidents occurring. However much the blockade was relaxed, it could not be more open than the system Howe adopted. As for the third reason, it was in Howe's fleet at St. Helens, not in Jervis's off Toulon, that the great mutinies originated.

Yet in spite of the slack and half-hearted way in which the observation was performed, the method bore its due fruit on two occasions. As a result of the first, we have the well known action of June 1st, and this is hardly the place to discuss whether it might not have been more decisive. It is certain that no method of blockade would have produced the action, nor would it necessarily have intercepted the convoy.

On the second occasion, when Bridport engaged the French off L'Orient, there was no reason why a most decisive victory should not have been obtained had the admiral pressed his advantage. Any scheme which has for its object battle, presupposes that you will fight when you have the chance, and this Bridport did not do.

Once again, blockade would have produced no action at all.

Thus it may be said that a policy of observation was justified, but that it was not well carried out; the following points being especially noteworthy:—

1. The base was badly situated.
2. The fleet was not constantly manœuvred as a whole.
3. Commerce was not adequately protected.
4. The English leaders were not determined to force a decision.

We will now consider in some detail a very interesting campaign belonging to this period.

(b) The Bantry Expedition, 1796.

GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.—By the autumn of 1796 the French nation had secured itself against the enemies both external and internal, and had turned itself to plans of conquest. The most hated of its adversaries was England—partly because the idea of William Pitt as an arch-demon striving for the ruin of France had seized on the French imagination, but also largely because of our direct association with the revolts in La Vendée and Brittany. In point of fact, our support of the Chouans had been somewhat half-hearted, but the Republicans saw everywhere the machinations of the "enemy of the human race." As early as 1794 Carnot had noted a descent in

England as desirable, and at last—after over two years—there seemed to be an opportunity to put his scheme into execution. An army of nearly 120,000 men under the able leadership of Hoche was to be disposed of; part of this force was obviously ear-marked for an attack on England in one direction or another, and as early as June troops were collected at Brest for some venture.


If France seemed to be emerging victoriously from the catastrophes which had nearly overwhelmed her, the condition of England was very different. A succession of bad harvests had produced a dearth of corn, money was very scarce and the exchequer almost bankrupt, while the populace was in many places discontented and seditious. Our coalitions had crumbled to dust and we had hardly a useful ally in Europe. To complete the gloomy prospect, our troops had been defeated on several occasions; we had lost whole armies ingloriously in the West Indies; command of the sea was not assured to us; while Ireland was being held down with difficulty by force of arms.

It was with these conditions to face that the Government learnt that a formidable expedition, openly directed against us, was being collected, and no information could be obtained as to where the blow was intended to fall.

THE FRENCH PLANS.—The ignorance of the British Government as to the point threatened was not unnatural since the French themselves had no very clear ideas on the subject. A strong party of naval officers wished for an Indian expedition, since it offered pleasant and lucrative service, while the very inadequate crews could be trained on the voyage out. Hoche, however, was convinced that Ireland was our most vulnerable part and persistently demanded an invasion, but it was not till late October that his view was adopted, and he was given leave to select an admiral who could be trusted to carry out the scheme with goodwill. His choice fell on Morard de Galles, a man probably chosen for the reason that he was a nonentity, in bad health, and nearly blind.

An extraordinary series of delays took place owing to the want of seamen, of stores, and of discipline. Mutinies were of frequent occurrence and the military authorities quarrelled with the naval, while such was the dearth of provisions that pillaging parties from the fleet were the terror of the countryside. On December 12th Richery, with five ships, returned from an enterprising cruise to America and his seasoned crews proved a valuable reinforcement, though most of his ships were too shattered to join the expedition. A further contingent from the Mediterranean, under Villeneuve, was expected, but the patience of Hoche was exhausted and he would allow no further delay. On the forenoon of December 15th the French fleet was ordered to unmoor.

THE ENGLISH DISPOSITIONS.—The growing threat of a French offensive at sea had induced the English authorities to modify the very open observation which we have already noticed. While the grand fleet with Bridport as Commander-in-Chief, still remained at St. Helens and Spithead, one or more squadrons were kept constantly cruising in the neighbourhood of Brest and the Soundings.



The principal one was kept at an average strength of fifteen to sixteen ships of the line, while a detachment of four or five ships was generally further to the west. A squadron of from three to four frigates with small craft watched the entrance to Brest.

A chart has been plotted showing the noon positions of H.M.S. "London" during October, November, and December, until the actual campaign opened. The "London" was the flagship first of Thomson, and then of Colpoys, and her position may be taken as approximately that of the main western squadron. Throughout October the weather was fine and the fleet remained within a fairly small area. In November the positions became more scattered, and from the 16th to 18th a south-westerly gale drove the squadron to within sight of the Lizard. More surprising is the cruise to the westward at the end of the month. During all this time there were fresh gales from the eastward favourable for the French to leave Brest, and though the ships of that period were not well adapted for beating to windward, it is impossible to believe that it was necessary to be driven so far. Possibly Colpoys wished to cover a convoy, but I have found no orders to this effect. On his return from the cruise, Ushant was sighted for the first time on December 5th, but we then opened again and the further movements come within the scope of the actual campaign.

I have been unable to discover the exact position appointed by Colpoys as his rendezvous, except that it was eight leagues from Ushant, but I have marked the conjectural position which agrees with the known facts relating to it. It will be seen that the fleet was rarely within eight leagues of Ushant but that it cruised within a very definite area. Nearly all the positions fall within a circle of thirty miles radius, and this I shall call the focal area, and its centre the focus of the observing squadron. It will be noticed that the rendezvous is some distance from the focus. Some other items of interest can be gathered from the log. Owing to what the master calls the "very badness" of the meat, there are constant notices as to its being thrown overboard, a fact of some importance when subsequent events are considered.

Not unconnected with this fact, perhaps, is the way in which the punishments recorded for mutinous conduct and disobedience of orders increase in number and severity during the cruise. It may be remembered that the mutineers in the "London" at Spithead were among the most determined, and nearly hanged the first lieutenant. The frequency with which the ship was taken aback and gear carried away, also seems to show that all was not well with the internal efficiency of the fleet.

THE CAMPAIGN.—On December 15th, the French got under weigh, but a series of collisions forced them to postpone their departure and they spent the night in Camerat Road. The next day they sailed. Morard de Galles had intended to go by the way of the Passage du Raz and make a detour of 120' to the W.S.W. to deceive the English as to his destination. Changing his mind at the last moment owing to an alteration in the wind, he decided to make his sortie through

the Iroise, but his signals were not seen or not understood, and as the dark and hazy December night closed down, his ships were in great confusion. Some were involved in the difficult Passage du Raz, some running through the Iroise, some anchoring and one ashore. This scene of chaos was added to by Pellew in the "Indefatigable," who was in the midst of the enemy, having sent the "Phœbe" to warn Colpoys.


The next morning the French were in three separate detachments completely out of touch with one another, while one, owing to a misunderstanding, was steering N.W. instead of S.W. Of the subsequent fortunes of this Armada, how, contrary to all likelihood, its two main divisions joined, how the admiral and general were lost and the various other mishaps it suffered, this is not the place to speak, for the English fleet had no further influence on it.

The "Phœbe," detached on the 16th, proceeded to Colpoys' rendezvous, but could find no sign of him there and commenced to search. This must have been much impeded by the foggy weather, and not till 10 a.m. on the 19th did she reach the admiral. Colpoys stood to the southward, but missed Pellew, and so had no information as to the French direction. Being much hampered by fog he cruised on his station for a few days, and on the 20th and 21st chased an enemy's squadron. These were Villeneuve's belated ships, but they escaped into L'Orient. Colpoys then found himself short of provisions and water, with the weather still thick and stormy, so that he decided to return to Spithead for orders. Driven by a gale which severely damaged many of his ships, he finally reached St. Helens on January 1st, 1797.

COMMENT.—In any discussion of this campaign, it must be thoroughly realized that, from our point of view, it was most desirable that the French should put to sea. Hitherto our efforts on land had been frustrated, and that the French should expose not only their fleet, but an army under one of their most talented generals, to the fortunes of naval warfare, was a stroke of luck we could hardly hope for. It was an opportunity which might have restored our prestige in Europe had it been properly used. The reason why we obtained no decisive victory under these favourable circumstances is for us to seek.

In the first place we see that it was no case for blockade. A close watch off Brest would certainly have prevented the French sailing, as the state of their fleet was such that they had no desire to risk decision by battle, but as has been pointed out, their departure was what we desired.

A great defect in our plans is that Colpoys had apparently no definite orders as to what steps to take in various circumstances, in spite of the fact that an expedition was known to be ready in Brest for an unknown destination. Ireland was such a probable aim for it that he might well have been ordered to proceed to Cape Clear at once on hearing the French had sailed for the westward. This was generally done in later years—*e.g.*, Bridport's action during Bruix' cruise—as the course there covered the mouth of the Channel. Again,



he might have had instructions empowering him to reinforce Jervis if the enemy had sailed south.

It is impossible to condemn too severely the negligence which permitted a squadron in this position to run short of food and water. There was apparently no organized re-victualling system.

There is no reason to believe that Colpoys was in any way a scientific sailor, but if we look at the position of the focal area, we shall see that it is well selected for observation of Brest. It practically controls all the probable courses except that due south, and actually two of the French detachments passed through it and the third near it.

While generally out of sight of Ushant, the existence of the fleet was well known to the French, and exercised a distracting effect on their plans. Indeed the complete confusion into which they were thrown, and the division of their forces, were entirely due to the elaborate precautions taken in order to avoid the English squadron.

It is only fair to Colpoys to point out what I think has not been remarked before, that on the night of the 16th, Hoche must have been within a short distance, and during the afternoon of the 17th, Nielly was within visual range. Only the foggy and uncertain weather, which turned the whole campaign into a comedy of errors, prevented him sighting these detachments.

After the escape was known, and in the absence of definite orders, he could do little. He instinctively ran towards his focus and there met Villeneuve, showing that it was soundly if unintentionally placed. Had he been there on the 12th, he might have intercepted Richery.

Two of the points will at once strike the reader. The difficulty of getting intelligence to Colpoys—the "*Phœbe*" took two and a half days, and Pellew missed him completely—and the way in which all touch with the French was lost.

The first of these mishaps was due to the wrong position of Colpoys' rendezvous and his distance from it. The proper rendezvous would have been the focus, and a vessel should always have been left on it with some idea of the admiral's whereabouts. As it was, he had actually made a cruise right out of the focal area, and it is not surprising that there was such difficulty in finding him. Considering that the wind was easterly and the weather foggy, both circumstances favourable to the escape of the French, this stretch to the northward was inexcusable.

The other point shows the necessity of some form of inshore squadron. Pellew and his handful of frigates did brilliant work, but it may be safely said that four or five ships of the line, boldly handled on the night of the 16th, might have ruined the expedition at its start. In any case they could have kept touch with it all the way to Ireland and innumerable opportunities would have been offered for it to cut off isolated ships. It need not necessarily have been stationed like the inshore squadron in a blockade, close to the enemy's batteries; had it been even as far off as Colpoys' rendezvous it would have been in a commanding position.

To summarize the lessons of this affair.

1. Definite orders to meet every probable eventuality should have been given to the admiral.
2. An observing or blockading squadron should be kept as far as possible fully stored for any emergency.
3. The position of the squadron should be known to the cruisers, especially in hazy weather.
4. Some form of inshore squadron is always necessary.


(c) *Duncan in the North Sea.*

EARLY EVENTS.—On May 16th, 1795, the Batavian Republic, the creature and cat's paw of France, declared war on us and added a small but efficient fleet to the squadrons of our enemy. As the position of the Dutch in the Texel was suitable for either injuring our important Baltic trade or dispatching expeditions north-about to Ireland, it became necessary to watch them. This imposed a fresh burden on our already strained resources, and the destruction of the Dutch fleet became one important object in the eyes of our Ministers. The task of keeping them in check was entrusted to Duncan, who performed it with great efficiency, considering that his fleet was always the Cinderella of our squadrons in numbers and personnel; especially trying were the constant changes which took place, making it impossible for him to form a homogeneous and trained force.

The system adopted was one of observation, originally based on the Downs—later on Yarmouth, the latter being far more suitable. During easterly weather or periods of Dutch activity, the fleet cruised to the northwards across the enemy's lines of operations. The narrow waters of the North Sea enabled the squadron to cruise at some distance from the hostile coasts without fear of missing the enemy, since the difficult entrance to the Texel was always closely guarded by small craft. During the period which the grand fleet spent in harbour, control was exercised by detached squadrons.

A specimen of one of these cruises is given, a special objective being the Dutch East India convoy. It will be seen that, though far to the northward, Duncan was favourably situated for intercepting any Dutch enterprise. The cruise was partially successful, the convoy being broken up and driven to Norway, while two Dutch frigates were captured.

At the outset of operations, Duncan's instructions were not altogether clear as to whether blockade or observation was desired. In August, 1795, Spencer submitted to Duncan whether he should cruise so as to lock up the Dutch in the Texel or remain passive till they put to sea and then pursue. "The question is, I am aware, a nice one, and much may be said on both sides," he concluded, but his further letters insist on the importance of "giving the Dutch a hard blow as soon as possible." Duncan, therefore, was perfectly right in adopting a policy of observation, and his view was later upheld by Spencer in November, 1796, warning him not to beat



about to no purpose. The disadvantages which attached to this method, however, were shown by the fact that the Dutch were occasionally able to exercise at sea for a few days, and a small squadron succeeded in sailing to the Cape.

As the Dutch showed no signs of attempting decisive action, and their fleet was an embarrassment to us, an expedition was despatched in November, 1796, to attempt to seize the batteries, and, in the words of the order, "enable H.M. ships without undue loss to get within reach of the enemy's fleet."


Duncan disapproved of the project, but issued orders for engaging the Dutch and using fire-ships should the batteries have fallen. Owing to the tempestuous weather the troops could not be disembarked, so this interesting example of direct attack came to nothing.

THE DUTCH ATTEMPT AT INVASION.—After the failure of the Bantry Expedition and the defeat of the Spaniards at St. Vincent, the French resolved to employ the Dutch fleet in an expedition against Ireland, and to this end collected troops at the Texel, with whom were Hoche and the inevitable Wolfe Tone. The original expedition, which hoped to evade the British fleet, never sailed, partly because of internal dissensions, partly because of Duncan's vigilance. A later and far sounder scheme, which had for its preliminary the defeat of our force, ended at Camperdown.

THE ENGLISH MOVEMENTS AND THE MUTINY.—On April 23rd, 1797, Duncan returned to Yarmouth from a cruise, and while the fleet was refitting, unmistakable signs of mutiny appeared. With the gradual development of this we are not concerned; it is sufficient to remark that when acting on Admiralty orders Duncan sailed for the Texel on May 27th, he was gradually deserted by all his ships except the "Adamant," 50. On board this ship, as likewise in his flagship, the admiral had personally faced and broken the mutinous spirit. The mutineers proceeded to the Nore, but Duncan, with the "Abdiel," of his squadron, continued his course to the Texel. The situation was very critical, as it was known that the Dutch had fifteen sail of the line ready for sea and the expedition was in an advanced state of preparation, while the mutiny might last an indefinite time.

In these extraordinary circumstances, Duncan resolved to take full advantage of the fact that the precise strength and position of an observing fleet must be unknown to the enemy as long as it keeps out of sight of land. How audaciously the admiral carried out his plan, and how successful it was, is as well known as his noble resolution not to retreat. Reinforcements gradually reached him, and by June 9th the worst strain was over.

None the less the blockade was maintained with great rigour, the fleet frequently anchoring close to the Texel. The nerve of the nation had been shaken by the mutinies, and it was not considered desirable to permit the Dutch to undertake operations. The cruising close to an enemy's shore also braced up the relaxed discipline which resulted from the mutinies, and made the fleet an efficient instrument again.



As the months passed, the danger of the expedition sailing became less acute and the blockade was opened somewhat; Duncan, however, remaining in a commanding position. Not till September 26th was Duncan ordered in to refit, and arrived at Yarmouth on October 1st. The necessary work was begun with all speed, and the wind shifting to the eastward, an observing squadron was sent to the Texel on October 4th.

CAMPERDOWN.—The squadron detached to watch the enemy consisted of the "Russell," 74, and the "Adamant," 50, under the command of Captain Trollope of the "Russell." He had several small craft attached.

By October 7th he was on his station, and at 2 p.m. one of our luggers sighted the enemy at sea. By midnight Trollope was in touch, and then followed a remarkable exhibition of seamanship.

For nearly four days a handful of English ships remained within two to six miles of a fleet of sixteen ships and defeated every attempt to drive them off. Having early gained the weather gauge, it was resolutely kept, and the skill and audacity shown by Trollope proved that the training in resource and seamanship gained in the blockading fleet was invaluable. The only result of the Dutch efforts to attack our vessels was the disorder of their own fleet.

A diagram of this exploit has been prepared, as it shows how successfully an inshore squadron of observation, sufficiently powerful to defy frigates, could keep touch with the enemy.

Duncan, well informed as to his adversary's movements, stood across to the Texel, and then, steering to join Trollope, fought the decisive battle of Camperdown on October 11th.

For the rest of the war, the Dutch fleet gave no serious trouble. It occasionally figured in French plans and had to be watched, but took no active part in operations.

Duncan's behaviour from May, 1797, is worthy of all praise. The blockade was maintained when necessary with vigour, and observation was adopted when it promised greater fruits. The Texel was closely watched the whole time and the value of an inshore squadron shown decisively. The importance of a good base is also clear. Yarmouth was perfectly situated for operations against the Dutch; its only disadvantage being that it was not always easy to leave.


We have now seen how two of the French offensives failed; one, owing to the potential strength of an observing squadron, and the other foiled by a suitable combination of blockade and observation. The latter system ably carried out bore its legitimate fruit in a general action.

PART III.

BLOCKADE.

(a) *Jervis off Toulon, 1796.*

We have now to consider the first of the great blockades, and none of the ensuing ones show more clearly the strength and weakness



of this form of warfare. To appreciate it fully we must have some knowledge of previous events in the Mediterranean.


At the opening of the war in July and August, 1793, we find Lord Hood maintaining a blockade at Toulon and the coast of Provence. His object, however, was not so much to check the enemy's fleet as to render the population of the Midi disaffected to the Republic, and in this he was temporarily successful.

The operations of his successor, Hotham, are well known owing to Nelson's connection with them. It need only be remarked that the effect of his spiritless observation was to immobilize his force completely while attaining none of the advantages of a blockade. He neither made the destruction of the enemy's fleet his aim, nor did he give adequate support to the land operations of our Austrian allies—one of the principal reasons for his presence in the Mediterranean. It was largely owing to Hotham's inertia that Sir John Jervis had such a gloomy prospect before him when he hoisted his flag in the "Victory" on December 4th, 1795.

By this time the main current of the war was flowing against us. Austria, after a series of ignominious defeats, had been driven away from the coast and the purely maritime support we could give her.

Sardinia was concluding peace, having deserted the Coalition, and it was evidently only a question of time before the majority of the Italian States followed her example. Still more serious was the treacherous behaviour of Spain, her policy guided by the most despicable court existing, even at that time, when monarchy reached its nadir in Europe. It was impossible to disregard the large if inefficient fleet she could fling into the scales against us, while her geographical position must always have an intrinsic strategic importance.

Our immediate base, Corsica, was disgusted by our well-meaning rule and ripe to drop into the hands of any French expedition, while, as if these difficulties were not enough, the admiral could feel no great confidence in his fleet. Demoralized by indecisive actions and periods in harbour, neither officers nor men were in a satisfactory condition with regard to efficiency and discipline, while already symptoms of mutiny—ever fostered by idleness—had made their appearance. It was under these conditions that Jervis established for the first time for fifty years a continuous and close blockade. This was probably maintained at the first very largely with a view to disciplining and training the fleet. As the year drew to its close, and the victories of the French Army and the gradual defection of our Allies became evident, it assumed greater stringency. The escape even of small bodies of the enemy would have been disastrous to our tottering prestige in the middle sea, and might easily have cut off our last bases of supply, the Barbary States and Corsica. The threatening attitude of Spain also made it very undesirable that any opportunity should be given to the two fleets to unite. In these circumstances, the fleet was so disposed as to prevent any movement of the enemy without immediate action, while the smaller craft exercised general control and annoyed the French communications along the Riviera.



DETAILS OF THE BLOCKADE.—On April 12th, 1796, the squadron left San Fiorenzo Bay, and after a cruise into the Gulf of Genoa, took up their stations off Toulon on the 25th. This station was maintained until October 8th, a period of 182 days, during which time it was rarely thirty miles from the focus. The focal area is taken as a circle with radius of twelve miles. It will be noticed that the positions, at first somewhat scattered, gradually draw in, until in the last two months the positions lie almost within a semi-circle. This remarkable exploit was undoubtedly assisted by the summer weather and the fact that the severe gales, which are not infrequent in that region, nearly always blow off-shore. It was not necessary off Toulon, as it was off the Texel and Brest, to have plenty of sea room on the approach of bad weather.

Quite as remarkable as the tenacity with which the blockade was maintained, were the success of the disciplinary measures undertaken and the way in which the ships were kept in good repair. The arrangement of the fleet was that adopted in the later blockades. An inshore squadron of four or five ships of the line cruised at the very entrance of the harbour, "keeping the batteries in a constant blaze," but nearly always out of effective range. Only one ship, the "Bombay Castle," is recorded to have been struck by a shot.

The main fleet was kept in a strict formation of two columns, with the "Victory" on the weather bow to observe irregularities. Any slackness in keeping station or handling the ships was dealt with at once by the ever vigilant admiral. The great guns were exercised every day and all officers expected to take a personal interest in the condition of their ships. A wonderfully high standard of fleet work was the result.

With regard to the personnel, it might well be thought that such a monotonous and prolonged cruise would have produced much discontent. This was one of Howe's principal objections to the blockade; but, as a fact, we find exactly the reverse to have been the case. Jervis, merciless in promoting the efficiency of the fleet, was equally untiring in securing the legitimate comforts of the men under his command. An elaborate system of victualling was introduced, so that the ships were rarely without fresh provisions, and, by excellent organization, all storing was carried out expeditiously under way. A hospital ship cruised with the squadron, while for the first time adequate sick-bay accommodation was provided on board the vessels and the surgeons were forced to take an interest in their patients. The repair of the ships was also well attended to, all the artificers of the fleet being formed into one corps which gave periodical refits to each ship.

By means of these wise and careful measures, the admiral was able to write that, after 160 days at sea, the ships were "patched and painted" as though just out of harbour, and the crews were more comfortable and contented than ever before.

EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE.—It has already been remarked that in considering such a question as the utility of blockade, the governing consideration must be the general state of the war. In this case what was gained by blockade?

It was evident from the first that our position in the Mediterranean was "precautious and not at all permanent," and it was important, if only for abstract reasons, to maintain a footing in that sea and check any operations of the enemy. The French might have especially injured us by the use of detached squadrons, which would have detached wavering allies from our cause and cut up our commerce and supplies.

On the other hand, looked at from our present point of view, we can see that the blockade had little immediate effect. Our allies deserted us and Corsica was lost without any efforts on the part of the French fleet and in spite of Jervis' energy. He also could not prevent the junction of the French and Spanish forces.

Our evacuation of the Mediterranean is a remarkable example of the influence of land power on maritime operations. It may fairly be said that the armies of France drove our ships from that sea into the ocean.

The main justification of the blockade must lie in its moral effect on the Service, and this can scarcely be exaggerated. The rigorous discipline and the strenuous work revived the best traditions of the past and produced a confidence that was of untold value in the years to come. Jervis' fleet provided a nucleus of zeal and loyalty which helped to overcome the almost fatal effects of the great mutinies in the next year.


(b) *The Brest Blockade, 1803-1804.*


I shall now attempt to deal with the greatest of the blockades. Owing to the peculiar circumstances under which this essay is written, it is impossible to treat it adequately, as I have no access to the works which are essential to any detailed study. With regard to the general state of affairs, it need only be remarked that throughout this period Napoleon's designs were believed to be directed towards the invasion of England.

1.—THE TWO LONG CRUISES.—Cornwallis arrived off Brest in "Ville de Paris" on July 9th, 1803, and remained off that port till December 28th, when a gale drove him to Torbay.

The diagram illustrates the distribution of the blockade. It will be observed that it was maintained very closely indeed. The area considered is one of fifty miles square, and practically all the positions during the whole of the 175 days fall within it. Whenever the wind turned to the eastward, Cornwallis cruised close off the Black Rocks, anchoring when convenient. This patrol was so undisturbed that on July 16th, 1803, a detailed survey of the Parquette Shoal was carried out without molestation. At times our main body stood in so closely as to draw the fire of the shore batteries.

Normally, however, the squadron cruised in a focal area to the north-west off Ushant, and this gradually became the permanent station of the fleet. Cornwallis did not anchor after September, 1803, and did not close the shore batteries after October. Of course there was always an inshore squadron which was sighted daily in thick weather.





The second long cruise lasted from February 3rd to July 18th, 1804, and the diagram will show that it differed in some respects from the earlier phase. The positions are more concentrated than before and the excursions to the south and eastward have ceased completely, while the focal area assumes a greater importance. It would be interesting to know the cause of this apparent change of ideas. It can only be suggested that it was due to the growing realization of the fact that the blockade of Brest was only one of the tasks entrusted to Cornwallis. His fleet, and the subsidiary squadrons off Ferrol and Rochefort, had to exercise control over all the approaches to the Channel, and to emphasize the fact a force of battleships was generally kept off Cape Clear. The focal area in which it cruised was very suitable for patrolling the Channel, while it lessened the strain of cruising close up to an enemy's port, since there was sea room with all the prevailing winds.

2.—THE SHORT CRUISES.—In August, 1804, Cornwallis took some well-earned leave, and just before his return to the sea received orders from Melville warning him that the French might resort to desperate methods in order to secure the invasion of England. He was therefore advised to maintain the closest possible blockade, while instructions were given to guide his judgment in almost any contingency.


In view of these orders, it was somewhat curious to find that the blockade was considerably relaxed during the ensuing months. The positions for September, October, and November are shown, and they indicate a loose handling of the fleet, while, throughout the month of December, the flagship was never within thirty miles of Ushant. Torbay is visited much more frequently, and, allowing for the fact that the winter appears to have been very stormy, there is a great contrast to the previous year.

The reasons for this relaxation are difficult to state without access to the original authorities, but there can be no doubt that the previous rigour of blockade had proved very exhausting: in the Barham Papers we find frequent references to the strain of a winter blockade on ships and men, while Lord Barham himself frequently considered the opening of Brest. Still, even as modified, it was always a blockade, and though, naturally, it produced no fleet action, it bore an essential part in foiling the elaborate French scheme.

PART IV.

CONCLUSION.

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made, by examining certain campaigns of the past, to distinguish between blockade and observation and study the conditions which make each effective. Each is a distinct operation of war and must be properly applied to produce decisive results. Observation, having as its goal the destruction of the enemy's force, must always be the most attractive, but it should not be forgotten that inefficient observation is futile, while blockade is absolutely essential under certain circumstances.




As a conclusion to our study of these old campaigns, I will quote a passage from the same obscure writer whose name heads this essay. The Rev. W. S. Gilly, Canon of Durham, had in his young days served as a chaplain in the blockading fleets, and when in his old age he wrote a preface to a volume of "British Shipwrecks," he made some remarks which may seem apposite to-day when so many of us spend weary weeks steaming about the ocean on dreary and, apparently, fruitless tasks:—

"The blockading service had much to do in training our seamen in passive heroism and enduring fortitude."

During the long wars with France, it was a service wherein all those qualities were called into play which are of most value in certain emergencies.

Vigilance, promptitude, patience, and endurance were tried to the utmost in the course of those wintry months and tempestuous seasons, when single ships, squadrons, and fleets were cruising off the enemy's coast and every man on board was perpetually exposed to something that put his temper or his nerves to the test. It was a hard and rigorous school, but if proficiency in readiness and fortitude was to be learnt anywhere, it was in the blockading service.



THE NEW BLOCKADE.

Translated by permission of the Author, M. le Contre-Amiral Degouy, from an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of February 15th, 1916.

FOR the British and for their Allies it was a somewhat painful discovery when, about January 15th, 1916, there were published the American statistics proving the ineffective character of the blockade of Germany, and showing that she had never failed to be provisioned by the northern neutral Powers, and to so large an extent that she was, in a condition to keep up hostilities for some considerable time.

It may be said that this occasioned no very general surprise. Many attentive observers had for some months past made, from certain facts which had come to the notice of the public, the disappointing deduction that we were deceiving ourselves in regard to the "economic throttling of the enemy." People who were in no way inclined, in so grave a crisis, to disregard the suggestions of their own experience, the lessons of history—those, for instance, of the "Continental Blockade"—and of their knowledge of the human heart, had come to the conclusion, from the very commencement of the war of attrition, that among the neutral countries bordering on the German Empire everything would be done to satisfy their own interests, just now particularly prominent. It was clear enough that, yielding to the allurements of enhanced gains, a large proportion of the people of these smaller States would set to work not only with zeal, but, unfortunately, with ability also, to obtain for Germany all that was to her indispensable for carrying on *her* war. Those cherished but vain illusions who, moreover, imagined that any scruples about making themselves indirectly the accomplices of our enemies, who systematically perpetrated cruel deeds, would give pause to financiers and merchants, to brokers and bonded warehousemen, who saw any chance of acquiring great wealth in a few months. And those were misled by their sheer lightheartedness, who reckoned on damming the flood of suspicious goods to neutral ports, or of barring the frontier roads to the bearers of contraband, by means of laboured interchange of letters with the governments concerned—themselves deeply interested in the success of these operations, if it were only for the swelling of the customs receipts, or by means of the arrangement of "Trusts" with great commercial houses more or less sincere, and having no authority, as they were outside any pressure which it might be desirable to exert towards them.¹ And these also knew little of the

¹ "Imports ten times the normal; prohibitions to export immediately neutralized by special permits known as 'Consenten'; imports made under the Trust régime, but in regard to the ultimate destination of which there was no control. Neutrals must not be inconvenienced." Thus, Mr. J. Hedemann, French newspaper correspondent, in a letter which was published in the *Liberté* of January 26th.

resource, of the fertile expedients, of the long preparations made for an economic war by our methodical enemies; while they also wilfully ignored the prestige which our enemies enjoyed, the fear which they inspired among weak nations, and perhaps also ignored conventions previously made, the secret of which had, however, become known.

The significance and the value of these statistics of which I have just written were challenged in the British Parliament by the head of the Foreign Office, the department of State which, on the other side of the Channel, public opinion strongly blames for its inertia and credulity. It may be that some discount must be made when we are told that the northern neutrals are importing seven or eight times as much as they require for their needs, calculated at a high rate, and that the whole balance crosses into Germany. I have myself received a letter from a Dutchman of some standing who says, among other things, that his country has to provide board and lodging for many hundreds of thousands of Belgian refugees. This explanation is rather "thin," since these Belgians certainly do not require such quantities of either copper or rubber as are surreptitiously transported by parcels post. Finally, while allowing for such exaggerations as are admitted by all men of really sound judgment, the British Government has not attempted to deny the relative ineffectiveness of the actual blockade, and has stated that it proposes to adopt all necessary measures for tightening the net.

We have written "the actual blockade," but has there in fact been a real blockade at all? The British say "Yes"; the Americans say "No"; and if it be a question of a complete, of an *effective* blockade, particularly in the sense in which this adjective is applied in international law, it must be recognized that the Washington Government has justification for its denial, since it can hardly be doubted that the Baltic ports, and the ports of the greater part of the littoral of the German Empire, are not blockaded at all by the Allies, and that even those of the North Sea are only blockaded at long range—at such a distance that a blockade runner of the class of those which used to run so brilliantly into Charleston fifty years ago, would certainly have had a good chance of passing through undetected.

Now, this question of the reality, of the "effectiveness" of the blockade of the enemy's coast, has a considerable importance from a legal point of view. It is, in fact, the express condition of the legality of the exercise of the *Droit de suite*, which allows the blockader to satisfy himself of the ultimate destination of such objects or materials, contained in the list of contraband of war, and which a neutral ship may be carrying to a neutral port, or to the port of a State bordering on that of the blockaded belligerent, thus giving him some right to suspect that it will be the belligerent which, in the last resource, will benefit by such objects or by such materials.

The United States say:—"Until you have penetrated into the Baltic"—knowing well that such a condition presents many difficulties—"we cannot in justice admit the legality of the control, increasingly vigorous, which you are exercising over our cargoes shipped to Rotterdam, Bergen, or Copenhagen, still less the seizure, or even detention,

of merchandise of which the destination being doubtful—it may be justifiable and it may not—you consider is sufficient reason to stop everything.”

These observations have been put forward forcibly enough, so far as words go, by the representatives of President Wilson, during what I will still describe as “the actual blockade,” since, at the time of writing, the new blockade has not yet been vigorously entered upon. But since, from the remarks made by Sir Edward Grey, we know that there is nothing further intended than a more severe and complete application of existing dispositions, one may rightly inquire how much more energetic the American protestations will become, and what is likely to be the outcome of them?

So far as concerns one of the northern neutrals, one of the *neutres transiteurs* as they are usually called—Sweden, the State only mildly favourably disposed towards the Allies,¹ has already allowed it to be felt that matters can only go further under serious difficulties, if Great Britain means to persevere in her methods of progressive pressure upon the rightful liberties of neutrals. One of the Ministers of the Crown has stated that the chances of a conflict must not be wholly ruled out, and doubtless certain alleviations have been sought and have been found as a result of this sufficiently menacing declaration; but none the less it is clear that it would be a grave inconvenience definitely to alienate the most powerful and the best armed of the Scandinavian nations—possessing, it is said, an army of 300,000 men perfectly equipped and supplied—and in the best possible position to injure us or to injure our Allies the Russians, were it only by interrupting their communications with the ports of Norway; this latter having become an industrial nation, is now in a position to export to England or to France manufactured goods of the highest value.

In truth, one may assume that last summer those very brilliant operations of the British submarines allowed the Allies to bring the most recalcitrant of the neutrals face to face with the results of a true blockade. The reader will certainly not have forgotten the ravages caused by the submarines among the fleet of steamships, which from the Swedish ports of Bothnia were carrying to German shores the rich ores and the crude smeltings of Dalecarlia, so appreciated in the furnaces and manufactories of Westphalia and Saxony. There was grave anxiety in Germany. Was she about to be deprived of the command of the Baltic? To effect this it seemed to be enough that the bulk of the Russian fleet, whose value had been established off Courland, should join up with a big squadron of light armoured cruisers of the “*Arethusa*” or “*Calliope*” class, and of destroyers and large torpedo boats, all of a sufficiently light draught to pass the Sound without being stopped by the six-fathom shoals. The German Admiralty, having learnt that there was some question of a junction

¹ This statement was more true at the commencement of the war than it is, happily, at the present time. The Germans, by their general conduct of the war, and particularly by certain brutalities towards the Swedish mercantile marine, as well as by violations of territorial waters, have forfeited much of the sympathy which they had known how to induce during the pre-war period.

of this kind, at once took steps to close the central portion of the Sound by means of a minefield of automatic mines, without the slightest regard for the neutrality of Sweden or Denmark. Being no doubt badly anchored, these mines drifted into the Baltic, sinking indiscriminately German and neutral shipping, war vessels and merchant steamers. They had to be swept for, recovered and destroyed. Shortly after, a large flotilla of light German ships passed the Straits and moved into the Cattegat to meet a British naval force, which had never appeared and probably never was intended to make an appearance. But by degrees, aided by the season of bad weather, the patrols organized by the German Admiralty in the middle Baltic obliged the British and Russian submarines to retire to Reval. Their fruitful campaign was for the time suspended, and it became no easy matter for the Allies to establish an effective blockade of the enemy's coasts. The American contentions regained full value and weight at the very moment when it was most desirable that they should lose them; and matters still stand in the same position in regard to the main point at issue.

In the meantime, and in consequence of fresh torpedoing of steamships without due warning in the Mediterranean, the Government of the United States renewed its protestations, enquiries, and demands for explanations. It even took up the matter of the "Lusitania" again, and, rendered indignant by the fact that Germany disdainfully confined herself to offering a pecuniary indemnity to the families of American victims, America demanded that the commander of the submarine should be punished and his action disavowed. Finally, on January 29th, President Wilson made clearly known his views in regard to certain of the methods of submarine warfare, or rather of the operations of the German submarines.

I do not propose to comment at length on these propositions, now being studied by the Powers concerned, but will content myself with the remark that the wording of certain of them—the fifth for instance—does not seem to be based upon facts. No naval man would admit the principle "that a merchant vessel may not be sunk unless it is impossible to give it convoy, and when sunk the passengers and crew must first be placed in safety." It is evident that a submarine cannot give convoy to a merchant vessel; it cannot do so in any sense, certainly not from a military point of view; it would be an act of quixotic suicide which it is not easily to be expected of our adversaries.

As regards the obligation to place the *personnel* of a vessel which has been sunk in a place of safety, how can a submarine do this, and how is the problem to be solved? A big cruiser might possibly—but still with great difficulty—take on board the crew and the passengers of a medium-sized steamer which it had decided to sink. But such action can really scarcely be asked of a tiny craft of a few hundred tons in which some twenty men can with difficulty move about. All that the commander of a submarine can do is to permit the unfortunates he is about to attack to embark in their boats before their vessel is engulfed. But the boats are never sufficiently numerous; they are consequently over-crowded, and the water comes

in everywhere over the sides. Suppose they are able to get clear and set sail; what will become of them if the wind gets up and the sea becomes rough? Further, what about provisions and clothes? There has probably been no time to see to these matters, and three times out of four it is not a question of saving human beings from death, it is only a matter of prolonging their agony. But the "principle" has been observed!

What, again, is to be said about Clause 4 which lays down that the "attack on the merchantman must cease, so soon as resistance or attempt to escape comes to an end." Are we expected to believe that a German submarine which has begun firing at a steamer in movement, will at once cease firing when the merchant ship stops? Is it not realized that at medium ranges and under the peculiar conditions in which a submersible finds itself on first coming to the surface, it is very difficult to decide whether the steamer is or is not moving? And what is the submarine to do if the merchantman, armed as these already are or are about to be, has first opened fire and fired several rounds at its assailant? Can one see this latter—a German—waiting patiently, before continuing fire, in order to make quite certain that its victim has become resigned to its fate and does not propose to use its guns any more! Procedure such as this is neither military nor is it naval. Clauses of this kind must inevitably remain a dead letter.

The same remark applies to the arrangements announced by the American Government in regard to liners armed exclusively for defensive purposes, viz., that it is intended to refuse these the right of entry to American ports unless they submit to the same conditions as war vessels, that is to say, they are liable to be expelled without having been able to discharge cargo or to take in a fresh one.

We may remark that there can here be no question of any merchant ships except those of the Entente Powers, the ships of the Central Powers having disappeared from all the seas. We may also state that we are determined to arm our liners and big cargo-boats with a few light guns for war solely against submarines, but that we have only come to this resolve since we have abundantly satisfied ourselves that our enemies have decided to sink all vessels without warning; so that in all justice we can hardly be asked to renounce measures of protection, which are not only perfectly legitimate, but which are of long standing, unless the German and Austrian Governments loyally accept, without reservation, the Articles of the Convention proposed by the Washington Cabinet—Articles which must, as we shall see, have the result of completely paralysing the operations of the submarines against merchant shipping. Under such circumstances, is President Wilson ready to guarantee the good faith of the officials of the Wilhelmstrasse and of the Ballplatz, if the two Empires should by any chance accept the proposed Convention? I hardly think he will. And then—?

One can thus discern, or may be able to detect, even among those most favourable to us, a wish to hold the balance even between the two belligerents, while this wish, founded on purely political grounds, takes the place of the only desire worthy of a great civilized

nation, viz., respect for the absolute and unchallenged rights of humanity.

But what will happen—and here I enter more fully into the discussion of my subject—when, to the difficulties resulting from the proposals of the White House in regard to the armed merchant ships of the Quadruple Alliance, there are added graver and sharper disputes raised in the interests of Americans, and having their origin in the operations of the Allied cruisers in the North Sea or in the Channel—these acting just as though an Allied and sufficient naval force were blockading the German coast in the Baltic? I will not venture upon vain prophecies. But it will surely be enough to say that here are matters for serious thought among the Allies, and for Great Britain in particular. And certainly for the last-named the situation can hardly fail to be of a delicate character. To understand this it is necessary to go back some months and read again the more significant passages in Mr. Balfour's letter on the subject of the attitude of the British home fleets, a letter written for publication and which appeared in the leading French newspapers on September 7th, 1915.

"German statesmen," said the First Lord of the Admiralty, "were too well informed to suppose that they could all at once put a navy to sea equal to that of the Power constituting the most formidable obstacle to their plans for world domination; but at the same time they entertained no doubts whatever as to the advantages which their naval policy conferred upon them. As a matter of fact they calculated that a powerful fleet, even if numerically inferior to that of Great Britain, could still hold it in check, *since no English Government would dare risk a conflict which, even if it ended in victory, would leave the British naval forces inferior to those of a third Power.*"

This third Power towards which England would not care to be inferior at sea after a naval victory too dearly bought, is not any third Power, it is America, whose fleet may perhaps be looked upon as of a value great enough to equal the British fleet, weakened by the loss of a number of Dreadnoughts in a decisive action with the High Sea Fleet.¹

To speak the truth, if the views which I have just expressed interpret the thoughts of the British Government, these fears seem to me to be greatly exaggerated. Besides, whatever may happen, it is difficult to imagine the United States entering upon a conflict with Great Britain, no matter how acute may become the discussion in regard to merchantmen, and at the moment when the Republic is bitterly reproaching Germany for her refusal to disavow the action of her U-boat commanders; for how can the Americans forget that England has two Allies, France and Japan, whose squadrons might be added to the fleets of Great Britain. The combination of our five Dreadnoughts and our six "Diderots" would alone be sufficient to re-establish the balance temporarily disturbed; while one knows well

¹ The United States possess 39 armoured ships, 14 of these being Dreadnoughts, and could employ 30 in the Atlantic. The British must lose half their effective naval strength to be inferior to these. It should be noted that England has 10 more battle cruisers than have the Americans—battle cruisers being swift Dreadnoughts.

how powerful a diversion could be made by the Japanese fleet on the shores of the Western States, which are just those where the Germanophiles are most numerous. All this is not ignored by those to whose interest it is to know, and as a matter of fact if human foresight has still any value at all in the extraordinary crisis through which the world is passing, it is safe to say that neither England nor we—to whom anything of the kind would be especially grievous—nor Japan, are likely to find themselves engaged in a conflict which would shock the minds of the greater part—certainly of the most humane, moral and respectable part—of the American nation.

But our enemies, whose faults often serve us as well as do our own good qualities, may provoke war. As I said above, their pride prevents any disavowal of their piratical deeds from passing their lips; and if they persist in this attitude the rupture of their diplomatic relations with the Washington Cabinet seems assured. That, without doubt, is the least that can happen. If they do not persist, and if in regard to this matter they satisfy President Wilson, we may rest assured that their wounded pride will have its revenge, and that they will commit new and clumsy follies. In any case they will either not agree to the terms proposed on the subject of the operations of their submarines, or they will violate the resolutions on which comment was made above. And I will now explain that they cannot do otherwise unless they are to abandon all the advantages attendant upon submarine warfare.

But if, everything considered, one is right to disregard the idea of any real complications arising with America on the subject of tightening the blockade of Germany—"through the neutrals," as a Member of Congress lately remarked—it is certain that the measures which have been announced will provoke frequent and troublesome incidents. There will be reprisals, the least of which is one which has just been promised to us—the refusal to permit entry to American ports, as merchant vessels, of any steamers and cargo-boats armed for defence against submarines. It is quite clear that, since we are dependent, to however small an extent, upon American works and factories for our equipment of all kinds, it will always be to our interest to keep on good terms with a public opinion which, on the whole, is generally favourable to considerations of law and order, an opinion which the pro-Germans are always trying to enforce by urging the freedom of the seas, to be limited in time of war by the rules of international law.

It is also as well to try and keep on good terms with Sweden. I mentioned briefly just now that certain Swedish industries send some of their most important products to the Allies in general, and not only as some believe to the Russians. We have heard something lately about wood pulp, which the Swedish Minister has, provisionally, refused permission to ship to England. This is only a beginning. The more serious of the problems remaining to be solved is that of the transit of supplies intended for Russia, via the ports of a discontented Norway and the railways of a hostile Sweden.

We were told a few weeks ago that the railway connecting the coast of Mourmania with Petrograd was upon the point of being opened for traffic. This must be contradicted. Even if we admit the

employment of the line on the western shore of the White Sea, which does not seem practicable except in the height of the summer, nobody can pass from the Kola port of Alexandrovsk to the interior of Russia before the month of April. The portion which is to pass along the shores of the White Sea, from Kandalatsk to Kem is very difficult to construct, traversing as it does a region of bogs and marshes, where no line could be laid except upon a foundation of timbers. In fact, the Allies for a long time to come will be dependent on the Scandinavian railway lines running from Narwick to Lulea and from Trondjhem to Gefle. This makes a certain amount of prudence necessary.

In Denmark and Holland there have been *ententes* by means of which the Allies have been able to arrange for some limitation of exports to Germany. We shall see presently that, with the connivance of the authorities who are no longer on our side, those *Consenten* will be multiplied, by the help of which our enemies are able to receive back in detail those goods of which we believe that we have deprived them in bulk.

We shall see, for instance, that Denmark will import frozen meat to feed her population; and to that we can hardly object. But at the same time she will export "beef on the hoof"—fine, fat animals—to Kiel, Lubeck, and Warnemunde, such cattle as are produced in abundance in Denmark, the land of rich pasturages and scientific cattle raising. This procedure will have a double advantage: Germany will have the satisfaction of knowing that she is feared; the Allies, whom there is no reason to fear, will be injured, and Denmark will make substantial profits.

In fact, all the neutrals, whether producers, intermediaries, or carriers, excited by the thought of threatened interests, will exert themselves to a greater extent than ever before, to benefit our enemies by all the methods of an ingenious contraband trade.

But even this is not all. We may well believe that our enemies themselves will not remain inactive, and that they will hasten to profit by the change in opinion inculcated among those neutrals who are suffering injury by means of the new methods of long-distance blockade.

I have no wish in this connection to utter any too gloomy warnings in regard to these matters upon bases which are rather uncertain. I should need to enter into details, the statement of which would be attended by possible inconveniences. But it may be stated with a certain confidence, and without revealing to our enemies anything which they do not already know better than we do, that the submarine war will be re-opened in the North Sea with an enhanced violence, and unfortunately—and this is a delicate point—with the approval and secret support of the coastal populations of the neutral countries washed by this sea. Now, it is only necessary to cast an eye over the map to realize the facilities which the submarines will find to hand on an indented coast-line, covered with islands, seamed with hiding places and coves in which, from the first months of hostilities, they provided for themselves sheltered places and bases of supplies.

Formerly there were submarines only which had to be taken into consideration.¹ But now we must count on the employment of an unscrupulous nature of that dreadful engine of war, the automatic mine. Already the design has matured in the brain of every German of making the sea impassable for all, since it is by the sea that it is hoped to reduce to impotence the great nation selected to dominate Europe.

I say nothing about the war in the air, since its effects, whatever they may be and whatever may be done in pursuance of military or other designs, can under no circumstances be compared to those of submarine warfare. But so far as aerial warfare is concerned, we may expect a renewal of operations having for their object merely to kill and destroy, and nothing else, without any scruples whatever.

To what conclusions does all this lead? For it seems that in the end we shall find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma; either we shall tighten the blockade, exposing ourselves to serious difficulties with neutrals and arousing at the same time an increased fury of destruction among our dangerous adversaries; or we shall leave matters as they are—our enemy supplying himself from the North, with the resultant indefinite prolongation of the war.

I hasten to say this much; if the question were thus narrowly put, my choice would be made, and it would be in favour of tightening the blockade—though I realize clearly enough the serious consequences (disregarded by many people) of the resolutions jointly to be come to in London, Paris, Rome—perhaps also at Petrograd—on the subject of the long-distance blockade of Germany; but anything is better than the continuance of the situation as it is now. We have had enough of snares and delusions: enough of this timorous policy, neither pacifist nor warlike, and which is making us the laughing stock, not only of our enemies, but of those sham neutrals who help them while they enrich themselves!

But really there is no difficulty in the matter. In order to get out of what is believed to be an *impasse* there is one clear issue, and one, moreover, which already sufficiently covers the ground occupied by the discussion upon which we have just entered. It consists in an *effective blockade*. It is, by negotiations followed by acts, of which I do not here propose to give the details—the *entrance of the Allied fleets into the Baltic*. The problem which occupies our thoughts has been turned over and over in our minds, and the same solution must always present itself, the only one which satisfies all conditions. Suppose this adopted and carried into effect; all objections at once fall to the ground and every difficulty with the neutrals immediately disappears. Not, of course, that their interests will be served by an almost total cessation of their trade with our enemies, but that thenceforth they would have nothing further to urge against us. We should thus fully, absolutely exercise our *droit de suite*, since our blockade

¹ I need not pause here to remark on or expose the fatuity of the hopes which have arisen some months since as to the partial destruction of the German submarines. Our blind optimists have forgotten that German factories are producing these incessantly and with increased rapidity.

would be effective; while, further, we should display energy, decision and strength. And force is always right—even when it is used by those who are in the wrong. I may add that, by the same stroke, the ambiguous operations of submarine warfare would become impossible, or at least more difficult, thus deprived as they would be of any material assistance from neutrals. These neutrals are, in fact, behind us, and no longer in front; we are between them and our enemy. How, then, is the enemy to pass through his mine-fields innocent-looking cargo-boats which load up with wood in a Norwegian, or with minerals in a Swedish, port? He has, of course, his submarines. But these will shortly be blockaded in the ports whence they are accustomed to issue, by netting their mouths or by laying special mines defended by squadrons of light war-vessels.

It may be objected that contraband can still be passed through. But it remains to be seen if the forcing of the Danish straits, complicated by the closing of the bay of Kiel, is really a practicable operation. It would be well also to say something about calming the fears of Great Britain as to the far-off consequences of any losses which her home fleets might suffer in the carrying out of these *passages de vive force et de ces blocus rapprochés*. The letter of the First Lord of the Admiralty expressly states what these fears are when he says that "England would find herself in a state of inferiority to a third Power," even if victorious and holding the German coasts in her grip.

These are delicate matters, and perhaps I ought not to discuss them. All the same, one may feel assured that the idea of success in such operations as those to which I have alluded is no chimera, and, for my part, I am confident that in London plans of attack on the *Kieler Bucht*, the great German naval entrenched camp, have long since been drawn up, and that at Rosyth the fine British squadrons are all ready to carry them into execution—and with what rapidity and bravery after so long and wearying inaction!

Reserve must also be observed on the subject of fears in regard to the future attitude of the United States: I must content myself by recalling what I said above as to the balance of naval strength after the British and the Germans had met in a decisive action. But there is nothing to prevent one considering whether by skilled and careful negotiations—in which France, so say the well-informed, might play a very useful part—guarantees might not be forthcoming for the re-assurance of that timid policy which holds it to be absolutely necessary that the British fleet should be superior to the sum of all the other fleets. This principle has merely the basic value of a programme of construction. It cannot be held to on every and all occasions as a military dogma, since it is not merely by counting ships that we arrive at the value of a fleet as an instrument of war. And then, there must be no mistake as to the following—to be victorious in front it is always best never to be taken in reverse. The Germans know this well enough—those of them who remember the rout of Prussia in 1805 after Austerlitz; and *we* should also remember this, *we*, who are at this moment suffering from the regrettable hesitations of Napoleon III. at the time of Sadowa.

THE SEA-SOLDIER OF ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES.

AMONG some fragments of Roman pottery unearthed at Dover is a portion of a Roman tile bearing the inscription "CL. BR." Similarly inscribed tiles have also been discovered at Lympne, near Hythe, which is known to have been a Roman station, and in the museum at Boulogne, just across the Channel, is another of these tiles inscribed "TR. CL. BR." It was a well-known practice among the Romans to include such inscribed tiles in their buildings on the same principle that it is now the custom to place current coins of the realm in the foundation stone of an important edifice, and antiquarians are agreed that the abbreviations "TR. CL. BR." represent the Latin words "Tribunus Classis Britannicæ" or "Classiariorum Britannicorum"—"the Tribune of British Troops trained for sea warfare"¹—indicating that the building in which the tiles were used was erected under the superintendence of the officer holding this position.

The naval and military organization of the Greeks and Romans, as a matter of fact, approached much more nearly to that of our own day than did that of the intervening Middle Ages, and soldiers especially equipped and trained for service afloat as well as on shore were a recognized portion of their establishments for war. Most probably, too, the marines under the command of the Tribune at Dover were not only Roman soldiers but also Britons, for it was a regular practice among the Romans to raise native troops in the countries they conquered in the same way that we now have an Indian Army under British officers.

There are records of more than one marine cohort² in Britain. In the time of Trajan (A.D. 96—117) there was a cohort on service in Britain called "Coh. Classiana," with duties much the same as were later on assigned to the marines, and in the "Notitia Imperii," in the reign of Theodosius the Younger, a section headed "Item perlineam valli" states, after detailing 17 cohorts, or wings of cohorts, on guard there, that "the Tribune of the 1st Marine Cohort, styled 'Ælia et Tunnocelum,'" did duty at Bowness in the defence of the great wall which had been erected to keep off the wild tribes of Picts and Scots.³

In addition to these "Classiarii," or soldiers for sea-service, the Romans also maintained a special force of marines known as "Lembarii." Probably the latter's duties were confined to serving on board

¹ According to Vegetius the badge of these marines was a circle and was worn on their shields. It is a curious coincidence that the Royal Marine badge is a globe.

² A cohort was from 500 to 1,000 strong.

³ At Netherby is an inscription showing the number of feet of work executed by Classiarii north-west of the wall of Adrian.

river craft and the smaller natures of war-vessels, "lembus" meaning "a small, fast sailing vessel with a sharp prow; a pinnace; yacht; cutter."¹

But long before the Roman occupation of Britain the sea-soldier, or marine, formed part of the complement of ancient war-vessels. The Grecian troops employed on this service were known as "Epibatai," being quite distinct from the unfortunate "Eretai," or slaves, who tugged at the oars, and the "Nautai," or sailors, who were exempt from this drudgery but performed all the other duties in the ship.

The Epibatai were "armed after the same manner as those designed for land-service, only there seems always to have been a greater number of heavy-arm'd men than was thought necessary by land; for we find in Plutarch, that of eighteen men employed to fight upon the hatches in every one of Themistocles's ships, only four were light arm'd: Indeed it highly imported them to fortifie themselves in the best manner they could, since there was no possibility of retiring, or changing places, but every man was oblig'd to fight hand to hand, and maintain his ground till the battel was ended; wherefore their whole armour, tho' in form usually the same with that employ'd in land-service, yet exceeded it in strength and firmness."²

As early as 500 B.C. the division of the ship's companies into seamen, marines, and rowers was customary, and at the Battle of Lâdé, B.C. 497, over one hundred Greek ships had each forty armed citizens on board, "and these were picked men." This would seem to imply that they were of a superior class to their shipmates. According to the laws of Solon, when he revised the constitution of Attica, the people were divided into four classes. The chief offices of state could be held only by those who were members of the first class; inferior posts by those of the second and third classes, who were also liable to serve as horsemen or as heavy armed infantry. From the fourth class, who were hired labourers and excluded from all public offices, were recruited the light armed infantry, and subsequently the sailors manning the war-fleets of the state. According to Juvenal, too, "the whole ship's crew were usually wicked profligate fellows, without any sense of religion or humanity, and therefore reckoned among the vilest rogues."² It looks, therefore, as if the marines at the Battle of Lâdé were not a part of the general complement, but special troops embarked for the occasion. Large bodies of Epibatai were also carried in transports ready to be landed where necessary for co-operation with the fleet.

Athenæus³ says that the famous ship "Alexandria," built for Hiero, King of Syracuse (300—400 B.C.), had sixty soldiers fully armed constantly on guard on either side of the ship, besides four in each of her eight towers and three in each of her three fighting tops. If her marine detachment was only divided into two watches it

¹ Smith's Latin-English Dictionary

² Antiquities of Greece—Bishop Potter, 1706.

³ Bohn's Edition.

must have numbered at least 322 men without allowing for a single casualty. The same writer states that in an enormous warship belonging to Ptolemy Philopater (221—204 B.C.), there was a detachment of "3,000 marines or at least 2,850." This was in addition to 4,000 rowers and 400 "supernumeraries," making a total ship's company of nearly 8,000 men. The ship, it is true, he alleges to have been 560 feet long, 96 feet deep, and to have had a beam of 76 feet—which would give her roughly about the capacity of one of our modern "Dreadnoughts"—but even when we take into consideration the extra space gained by the absence of coal and engines, it is difficult to understand how this army could have been accommodated on board. It is probable that in all accounts of the extraordinarily large ships which the ancients are said to have possessed we must allow an ample margin for exaggeration.

Coming to the ordinary war-vessels of antiquity, we find that about forty men would appear to have been the general strength of the detachment of Epibatai carried on board the largest class of triremes. But at the Battle of Salamis, B.C. 480, the Athenians' triremes are said to have carried not more than eighteen of these sea-soldiers. Four of these were archers, and the remainder were armed with javelins and shields. The same number of these warriors were placed by Themistocles upon the "hatches" of his galleys when he attacked the Persian fleet. By "hatches" we must not understand what is meant by the word in its modern sense, but rather the fighting stages and gangways specially erected in ancient warships for the use of their fighting men. But among the Romans a much larger detachment was sometimes carried, some war-galleys having no less than 300 rowers and 120 marines.¹ To the latter, as the size of the ships increased, fell the duties of serving the ballistæ and other engines of war for throwing heavy projectiles, which began to form an important part of a ship's armament. Nor was the "sea-soldier" an institution confined to the navies of Greece and Rome, for he found a place on board the warships of both the Persians and the Phœnicians. During the decline of the Greek and Roman Empires, however, the special sea-soldier disappeared, and in the eighth and ninth centuries the crews of the dromons—as the biggest Mediterranean men-of-war were then termed—performed the compound duties of mariners and soldiers, being alternately or jointly employed in working the vessel, annoying the enemy or defending themselves. During the last days of the Roman dominion in England some portion, at any rate, of their Corps of Marines was placed under the immediate command of the Count of the Saxon Shore,² a high official whose special duty it was to protect the eastern coast from the ravages of the North German, Danish, and Norwegian sea-rovers, "Foes,"

¹ Service afloat does not always seem to have been popular, as Tacitus records the discontent of the *Classarii*, who wished to be transferred to a more honourable calling, "in spem honoratioris militiæ." They did not like being herded with slaves and to be exposed to danger without hope of distinction. (Rev. Edmond Warre, M.A., *Ancient Naval Tactics*.) *JOURNAL R.U.S.I.*, Vol. XX., p. 926.

² Vide Note I.

as sang a Roman poet of the time, "fierce beyond other foes, and cunning as they are fierce: the sea is their school of war, and the storm their friend; they are sea-wolves that live on the pillage of the world."¹ But the knell of the Roman Empire had been struck, her legions were recalled to defend the Imperial city against the hordes of Gothic warriors that menaced her, and Britain passed into the hands of our early English ancestors. For centuries there was nothing in the way of naval or military organizations comparable to those of classical times, if we except the navy of Alfred the Great with its Corps of Butes carles, who, as they served partly on shore side by side with the Hus carles² as bodyguard to the reigning monarch, and partly on board the Royal or whatever other ships were impressed for war service, may claim to be considered as successors to the Roman *Classiarii* or marines.

Again, in the superbly decorated and fully manned ship that Earl Godwin presented to his sovereign, there were eighty soldiers, each of whom wore two golden bracelets on each arm, weighing sixteen ounces apiece.

But with these notable exceptions the sea-soldier, as such, was temporarily defunct, at any rate in northern waters. The Vikings—the men of the creeks—who constantly harried our shores, were sailors first and foremost, but well acquainted with the handling of their weapons and with the rough rules of warfare as then understood; the ships of the Middle Ages, whether King's ships or others, were manned by seamen alone. Soldiers, it is true, often fought on board them, but they were merely passengers, the retinue of the King, noble or knight, who was using the ship either as a means of transport for a raid or more important expedition over-seas, or in some few cases to bring him in touch with vessels belonging to an enemy which he designed to capture or destroy. But their connection with the vessel was of the most temporary nature. There were for a long time no men-of-war proper. When fighting ships were required, as many ordinary trading ships as necessary were impressed and prepared for the militant rôle they were to play by the erection of fore, after, and top castles or fighting stages,³ the mounting of trebuchets or other mediæval artillery and the provision of large stones and big darts or "garots" as ammunition. The few ships belonging to the King were much the same as the rest, and like them also did their turn as merchantmen, being hired out for trading purposes when not wanted for immediate service.

Even the church dealt in these matters, for it is on record that in the fiftieth year of King Edward III. (1377), William of Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester, had undertaken to supply his sovereign with three ships for three months, and to provide each vessel with fifty men-at-arms and fifty bowmen—its marine detachment in fact. The Bishop was to pay them the usual wages, but the King was to pay the mariners.

¹ Quoted by Green in his "Short History of the English People."

² viz., boat or ship people and house people.

³ The building of these was a regular profession.

This system lasted well up to the end of the 15th century, but in the time of Edward III. there would appear to have been some provision made for a force of marines, for in a MS. of his expenses in the 21st year of his reign are found the words "Here ensue . . . and also the number of *soldiers* as well by land as sea, and shypes retayned in the warres of the saide Kinge, &c."¹

Though not, perhaps, strictly to be classed as marines, the "Retenue de poupe" in the French and Mediterranean war-vessels of Mediæval times were stationed in the same part of the ship as were the marines of later days, and seem to have formed as important a part of its fighting force. According to a French writer; "The adventurers who served on board vessels chartered by a sovereign or a foreign state were usually the sons, brothers, relations or dependants of the captains who commanded them. Moreover, the chosen band which, under the name of 'Retenue de poupe,' was entrusted with the duty of defending the captain's flag, was solely recruited from among these adventurers. Their principal duty being the defence of this flag, which floated on the starboard side close to the entrance of the poop, they were expected never to leave their post, except at the captain's express order. Even when a galley was boarded at the bow, and the deck, up to the mainmast, was swarming with the enemy, all was by no means lost, for the poop still remained in the hands of its brave defenders who died at their post rather than yield. Among the splendid feats of arms which have adorned naval history, many instances could be quoted when a ship's safety was secured by the desperate resistance of its poop guard."²

In England, by the time Henry VIII. came to the throne, there was a regularly organized Royal Navy, and the marine, or sea-soldier, was again in evidence, as we see by the following:—

"Henry VIII. anno regni tertio anno Dom. 1512. Indentura Dominum Regem, et Edwardum Howard generalem armatae super mare, witnesseth, that the said Sir Edward is retained towards our said Sovereign Lord, to be his Admiral Chief and General Captain of the army, which His Highness hath proposed and ordained, and now setteth to the sea, for the safeguard and sure passage of his subjects, friends, allies and confederates. And the said Admiral shall have under him, in the said service, 3,000 men harnessed and arrayed for the warfare, himself accounted in the same number, over and above seven hundred Soldiers, Mariners and Gunners, that shall be in the King's ship the 'Regent,' a thousand seven hundred and fifty shall be Soldiers, twelve hundred and thirty-three shall be Mariners and Gunners."³ In the same year, in preparation for war with France, the King not only got ready artillery and ships, but "caused souldiers mete for the same shippes to be mustered on Blackheath."⁴

¹ Vide Grose's "Military Antiquities."

² Paul La Croix. "Military and Religious Life in the Middle Ages."

³ Rymer. Vol. XIII., p. 326.

⁴ "Grafton's Chronicle."

Later on, in 1514, we find that the "Henry Imperial"¹ was manned by 300 seamen and 400 soldiers. The latter, however, were entered as "the retinue of Lord Ferrars." So perhaps, after all, they were not a part of the sea-soldiers belonging to the navy, but especially embarked to accompany their lord. But in 1546, in the tables compiled by Anthony Anthony, "one of the officers of the Ordinaunce," we find the regular complement of soldiers carried by Henry VIII.'s six largest battle-ships.

| Harry Grace à Dieu. | Mary Rouse. | Peter. | Matthew. | Great Barke. | Thesas of Lubeck. | Ordinaunce, Artillery, Munitions, habiliments for the Warre Shippes only. |
|------------------------|-------------|--------|----------|--------------|----------------------|--|
| 1,000 | 700 | 800 | 600 | 500 | 700 | Tonnage. |
| 349 | 185 | 185 | 138 | 136 | 118 | Menne. |
| 301 | 200 | 185 | 138 | 138 | 158 | Souldiers. |
| 50 | 30 | 30 | 24 | 26 | 24 | Marrynars. Gonnars. |
| 700 | 415 | 400 | 300 | 300 | 300 | Total. |

In 1578, the "Triumph," the largest of Good Queen Bess's ships, carried a complement of 450 seamen, 50 gunners and 200 soldiers: and the latter class were distributed throughout the fleet in much about the same ratio.² Yet only twelve years later, in the expedition to Cadiz, "there were no souldiers placed in any of her Majesty's ships, but such gentlemen as go voluntarily, and the commanders make choice of," though the hired ships, which were far more numerous, carried from 50 to 150 soldiers, according to their size.

Possibly Drake's exploits, and the thirst for over-sea adventure brought about by the treasures won on the Spanish Main, created such a demand for accommodation on board ship for gentlemen adventurers, that the soldiers were disembarked to make room for them. Their expense was probably saved to the Government, and we know that Elizabeth had a frugal mind.

Such a policy was not to everyone's taste, however, for in a pamphlet³ by Dr. John Dee, the famous Elizabethan scientist and reputed astrologer, which he published in 1577, he suggests the standing addition to the fleet of "Three score tall ships or more, but in no case fewer," and goes on to make further suggestions as to the advantages to the nation, should his proposal be carried out. Among others he urges:—

"Fourthly, how many thousands of soldiers of all degrees, and apt ages of men, would be, by this means, not only hardened well to brook all rage and disturbance of sea, and endure healthfully all

¹ Better known by her later name of "Henri Grace à Dieu."

² Vide Note III.

³ "The Petty Navy Royall."

hardness of lodging and diet there; but also would be well practised and easily trained up to great perfection of understanding all manner of fight and service at sea, so that, in time of great need, that expert and hardy crew of some thousands of *sea-soldiers* would be to this realm a treasure incomparable. And who knoweth not, what danger it is, in time of great need, either to use all fresh water soldiers, or to be a fortnight in providing a little company of omni-gatherums taken up on the sudden to serve at sea? For our ordinary Land Musters are generally intended, or now may be spared to be employed otherwise, if need be. . . . For skillful *sea-soldiers* are also on land far more trainable to all martial exploits executing; and therein to be more quick-eyed and nimble at hand-strokes or scaling; better to endure all hardness of lodging and diet; and less to fear all danger near or far, than the land-soldier can be brought to the perfection of a sea-soldier."

As a matter of fact the Elizabethan period was essentially one of transition and evolution in naval matters. The old Mediæval system, under which men-of-war, either Royal or hired, were merely vehicles for moving about detachments of soldiers wherever their knightly or noble commanders wished to go, was dead. The advent of the sailing ship proper had killed it—at any rate in this country. But as yet it was not decided whether the soldier or sailor should be in supreme command afloat; sometimes it was one, sometimes the other, according to circumstances. Often it is hard to say whether the commander of a ship, a regiment, or an expedition was soldier, sailor, or both together. In the expedition to the West Indies, in 1585—to quote from that excellent and illuminating work, "Drake and the Tudor Navy"—"Under Carleill (who was captain of the 'Tiger') was a regular military force organized in twelve companies with Captain Anthony Powell as 'Sergeant-Major' or Chief of the Lieutenant-General's Staff, and two 'Corporals of the Field' or A.D.C.s."

Of ten other Captains of Soldiers mentioned, one, Edward Wynter, also commanded a ship—the "Aid."

Again, Drake's Lisbon expedition of 1587 "comprised 17,000 soldiers and Pioneers, 3,200 English and 900 Dutch sailors, and 1,500 Officers and Gentlemen Volunteers. It was run on curious lines, as the soldiers, who numbered 115 companies, were formed into 14 Regiments whose Colonels were mostly also Captains of various ships. Curiously enough, of the two Generals, Drake and Sir John Norris, the former was a professional sailor and the latter a professional soldier. Each, however, commanded both a ship and a regiment."

From the same source we learn that soldiers and marines, when embarked, were expected to make themselves useful in the ordinary work of the ship. In most cases they were in charge of "a N.C.O. with the rank of Corporal,"² except, of course, in mixed expeditions

¹ "Drake and the Tudor Navy." By Julian Corbett

² From the reference to the expedition of 1575 which has been quoted, it does not appear that a "corporal" was necessarily a non-commissioned officer.

where their numbers were very large. But as marines they were considered in every way as part of the ship's crew and subject to the orders of the superior sea-officers." The Spaniards, on the other hand, tried to keep alive the Mediæval system referred to above—with disastrous results to themselves.¹

From the following extract from a State Paper issued by the Commissioners of the Admiralty in 1619 it would appear that the regular marine was withdrawn from sea-service about the time of the Armada fight. They write: "Indeed, till the year '88 soldiers and mariners were then usually divided, but that and later experience hath taught us instead of fresh-water soldiers (as they call them) to employ only seamen."² This is rather curious, because in a table of ships, their tonnage, cost, armament, and complements issued in 1602, a detachment of soldiers (averaging about one-third of the crew) is allocated to each ship. Possibly the interpretation is to be found in the extract from Dr. Dee's pamphlet quoted above. He is careful to draw a distinction between the marine and the "fresh-water soldier," and it may be that the "gentleman adventurers" who seem to have displaced the former, finding their golden dreams not generally realized, were, after a time, not forthcoming in sufficient numbers³ to complete the complements of Her Majesty's ships, and that the Admiralty then had recourse to the ordinary land or "fresh-water" soldier who for a time was embarked to form temporarily a portion of a ship's company when she was commissioned for service, for then, as in our times, there was a system of "skeleton" or "nucleus" crews. The "Triumph," for example, with her sea-going crew of some hundreds, only had a complement of thirty men when "in harbour"—which would mean "in reserve."

Whether this surmise is correct or not, it is certain that during the latter part of the reign of James I. the "soldier by sea" was officially omitted from the complements of our men-of-war and did not reappear until the institution of the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot by an Order in Council of King Charles II., dated October 26th, 1664.⁴

¹ Vide Note IV.

² State Papers. Dom. xvii., 103. Quoted by Oppenheim, "Administration of Royal Navy."

³ Monson noticed that, notwithstanding the destruction they brought on Spanish commerce nationally, the majority of the Elizabethan adventurers not only made no fortunes, but ruined themselves by their enterprises. Many of these, often men of good family—Champernownes, Killigrews, Careys, Horseys, and Oglanders—had already practised piracy in the Channel, and, after the death of Queen Elizabeth, reverted to their old practices, not a few even joining themselves to the savage Barbary pirates, or "Turks," as they were then called, whom they led to the spoliation and enslaving of their own fellow-countrymen, and by their sea experience so fostered their power that they became the "Scourge of Christendom." Vide Oppenheim, "Administration of the Royal Navy," pp. 165 and 177; and "Travels and Adventures of Captain John Smith, from 1593 to 1629."

⁴ Though there were no special marine regiments under the Commonwealth the regiments of Goffe and Ingoldsby served as marines in Blake's fleet in the actions with the Dutch in 1652, and in the battles of the 18th, 19th, and 20th February, 1653. Whitelock says: "The officers, mariners and soldiers behaved with great courage and gallantry."

NOTE I.—The Count of the Saxon Shore had under his command: "7 Companies of Foot men, 3 Guidons of Horsemen, The Second Legion, one cohort."—CAMDEN, 1637.

NOTE II.—*Cost of Marines' and Seamen's Clothing Temp: Henry VIII.*—In a warrant (with the King's sign manual) to the Treasurer of the Court of Augmentations to pay to William Gonson, Esq., £340, we find that portions of it were to be expended as follows:—

£24 19 6 for one week's wages, and victuals of 3 ship masters and 160 mariners and gunners.

£13 10 for 81 *Soldiers' Coats* at 3/6 each.

£15 for 200 *Mariners' and Gunners' Coats* at 1/6 each.

—Hist. MS. Commission, 8th Report, Appendix (Part II.), p. 2.

The mariners' and gunners' coats were striped Tudor green and white. As both classes wore the same uniform the gunners would seem to have been "seamen gunners" rather than marines or soldiers. The soldiers probably wore the time-honoured white "Jack" with St. George's Cross.

NOTE III.—*Complements of Men of War, Time of Queen Elizabeth.*—E. Codice Antiq: MS. Penes Sam. Knight, S.P.

| Name. | Seamen. | Soldiers. | Gunners. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|
| Tryumph | 450 | 200 | 50 |
| Elizabeth | 300 | 200 | 50 |
| White Bear | 300 | 200 | 50 |
| Victory | 330 | 160 | 40 |
| Primrose | 330 | 160 | 40 |
| Mary Rose | 200 | 120 | 50 |
| Hope | 200 | 120 | 50 |
| Bonaventure | 160 | 110 | 30 |
| Philip & Marye | 160 | 110 | 30 |
| Lyon | 150 | 110 | 30 |
| Dreadnought | 140 | 80 | 20 |
| Swiftsure | 140 | 80 | 20 |
| Swallow | 120 | 60 | 20 |
| Anthlope | 120 | 60 | 20 |
| Jennett | 120 | 60 | 20 |
| Foresight | 120 | 60 | 20 |
| Aide | 90 | 50 | 20 |
| Bull | 70 ¹ | 40 | 10 |
| Tiger | 70 | 40 | 10 |
| Faulcon | 60 | 20 | 10 |
| Aibates (?Achates) | 30 | 10 | 10 |
| Handmayd | 30 | 10 | 10 |
| Barke of Bullen ² | 30 | None | 10 |
| George | 40 | None | 10 |


NOTE IV.—*Soldiers and Sailors in the Spanish Navy.*—"With the Spaniards all was different. Their sea-discipline was cast in a military form and hide-bound with limitations that, excellent as they were on land, were fetters afloat.

"A Spanish ship was organized like a fortress, and its company was divided into three distinct bodies—soldiers, mariners, and gunners—with the soldier element supreme. 'The soldiers,' says Sir Rd. Hawkins, 'ward and watch, and the officers in every ship make the round as if they were ashore. This is the only

¹ The number of seamen or "marriners" actually given is ten only, but this is obviously a mistake or a misprint, as the total complement is set down as "Menn, 120."

² i.e., Boulogne.

task they undergo except cleaning their arms, in which they are not over curious.' In like manner the gunners were especially exempted 'from all labour and care except about the artillery.' 'The mariners,' he goes on, 'are but as slaves to the rest, to moil and to toil night and day, and those but few and bad and not suffered to sleep or harbour themselves under the decks. For in fair or foul weather, in storms, sun, or rain, they must pass void of covert or succour,' or, in other words, they were exactly in a soldier's eyes on the level of galley-slaves. Of the officers he says, 'there is ordinarily in every ship of war a Captain, whose charge is that of masters with us; and also a Captain of the soldiers, who commandeth the Captain of the ship, the soldiers, gunners, and mariners in her. . . . They have their "Maestros de campo," sergeant, and master-general or Captain of the Artillery with their Alferie major and all other officers as in a camp.' 'If they come to fight with another "armado" (ship of war) they order themselves as in a battle by land; in a vanguard, rearward, main-battle and wings, etc. In every particular ship the soldiers are all set upon the decks; their forecastle they account their head-front or vanguard of their company; that abaft the mast the rearward; and in the waist the main-battle wherein they place their principal force and on which they principally rely; which they call the "plaza de armas," or place of arms, which taken their hope is lost. Their gunners fight not but with their great artillery; the mariners attend only to the tackling of the ship and handling of the sails, and are unarmed and subject to all misfortunes; not permitted to shelter themselves, but to be still aloft, whether it be necessary or needless. So ordinarily those which first fail are the mariners or sailors of which they have greater need. They use few close-fights or fire-works; and all this proceedeth, as I judge, by error of placing land-captains for governors and commanders at sea; where they seldom understand what is to be done or commanded.'—From "Drake and the Tudor Navy," by Julian Corbett.



The circular shield is from a water-colour drawing in the Bodleian Library, stated to represent that carried by the *Legio Classis Britannicae*. The figures are from an illuminated border in a MS. of Froissart's *Chronicles*.

THE FIRST SHOT IN 1857.

BY AN INDIAN COLONEL.

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN the Indian Mutiny broke out in 1857, there were seventy-four regiments of native infantry in the Bengal Presidency. Of these, only eleven remained loyal. Four regiments were stationed at Barrackpore, within sixteen miles of Calcutta. Of these four, two mentioned in the following narrative remained loyal, the 43rd Bengal Light Infantry and the 70th Native Infantry. The 43rd, my old regiment, is now the 6th Jats, and is at present at the Front and has behaved well and done very good service. The 70th is now the 11th Native Infantry, and is, I believe, in India at present.

In 1857, the regiment, in which I was then junior subaltern with two years' service and in my nineteenth year, was one of the four Bengal native regiments stationed at Barrackpore. Barrackpore, on the Hooghly sixteen miles north of Calcutta, was at that time one of the largest cantonments on the Bengal side of India. The regiments were the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry Grenadiers, a portion of the 34th Bengal Native Infantry (three of the companies being on detachment duty at Chittagong), the 43rd Bengal Light Infantry, and the 70th Bengal Native Infantry. My own regiment was the 43rd. On two eventful days in that year of 1857, I was regimental subaltern of the day. One was March 29th, the day on which, not only the first shot in the Mutiny was fired, but the first sword drawn upon a British officer; the other was June 14th, of which more anon.

As, on the afternoon of March 29th, I was dressing to go round and visit my regimental guards, I heard a great noise and commotion. On asking my servant if he knew what it meant, he, after some hesitation, said that someone had told him that a sepoy had fired at and wounded an officer, and that there was great excitement. I dressed as quickly as possible, and just as I was about to mount my pony to ride to visit the regimental guards, a note was handed to me. It was from a sister of mine who was on a visit to the officer commanding my regiment, to the effect that a mutiny had broken out, that the commanding officer had gone off to the lines, and that the ladies were alarmed, and begging me to go to them.

My servant had told me the truth. THE FIRST SHOT OF THE INDIAN MUTINY HAD BEEN FIRED! I galloped to the house, saw the ladies, did what I could to quiet their alarm and then rode off to the lines. I visited and inspected the regimental guards, and just as I had finished I heard a shot, and at the same time saw a number of officers, mounted and on foot, rushing to the general parade ground,

from which direction this last shot had been fired. I rode straight to the spot and arrived with the others to find that Mungul Pandey, a sepoy of the 34th Regiment, had shot himself and was lying on the ground wounded.

What had occurred was briefly as follows:—This man Mungul Pandey, drugged and well primed by some bad characters in his regiment, had been sent to the grand parade ground—facing the lines of the regiment—with instructions to call out that the British “Raj” or rule was over, that all sepoys were to rise and murder the British, and so on. One, a native non-commissioned officer, hurried to the house of the adjutant of the regiment to report to him that a sepoy was running “amuck”; and other two brought similar news to two other officers. The adjutant, Captain Baugh, on receiving the report, rode at once to the quarter-guard of his regiment. On reaching the guard he pulled up, when Mungul Pandey immediately fired at him, that memorable “first shot,” fortunately, however, only wounding the horse.

Captain Baugh, disengaging himself from his fallen charger, drew a pistol from the holster and ran towards the sepoy. He fired as he ran, but, failing to hit, he drew his sword and closed with the sepoy. The latter had, besides his musket, two tulwars, or native swords, with which, one in each hand, he rushed to meet the officer; broke Captain Baugh's sword with the first blow, cut him down, and with two-fold strokes wounded him severely on head, arms and hands. The English sergeant-major of the 34th, running out to his assistance, was himself cut down. A sepoy from the guard followed, and, seizing Mungul Pandey round the waist, held him fast.

In the meantime the Brigade-Major, who happened to be passing in his trap, went to the help of Captain Baugh and the sergeant-major, and carried them both away, Mungul Pandey remaining on the spot. By this time several officers had reached the lines; the quarter-guard was ordered to fall in, and orders given to take Mungul Pandey prisoner; but it was not until General Sir John Hearsay, K.C.B., arrived that any real attempt to seize Mungul Pandey was made. General Hearsay ordered the assembled officers to fall in behind the Quarter-guard and to force them forward. The party then sullenly advanced; Mungul Pandey was seen to raise his musket, with the intention, it was thought, of aiming at the General. But it was only to turn the weapon on himself. He pulled the trigger, fired, but not, as it proved, with fatal effect. He was carried off to his regimental hospital for treatment, two men of his own caste—as is the custom in India—being told off to feed and nurse him. As a fact, not generally known, I may mention that during the night he was heard by the hospital assistant abusing the whole of his regiment and the native troops generally, for having sent him out with the promises that they would all rise and support him, and for leaving him, the cowards, to his fate, and muttering that he would the next day, in revenge, give up the names of all concerned. His two attendants did their best to pacify him, and after he had gone to sleep agreed between themselves to poison him. The Hospital assistant, overhearing,

informed the Medical officer; Mungul Pandey was removed to the European hospital and placed under a guard of British soldiers. When he recovered from his wound he was tried by court-martial and hanged. Two of the native officers of the regiment and a non-commissioned officer who were on duty on the day of his crime were also tried and blown away from guns. I was present on both these occasions.

I must now pass over some time. The excitement caused by these events had somewhat subsided, although rumours of all kinds were floating about. During April, May, and the early part of June there was much anxiety and trouble, and we never really knew when we went to bed at night whether we should be alive in the morning. I believe there was at the time only one British regiment in the Presidency Division, the headquarters of which were at Barrackpore, to watch this strong brigade of native troops and the large native population of Calcutta.

In May the Mutiny broke out at Meerut, Delhi, and other places and our anxieties were increased. I must now relate what, I may say, might have been a tragedy, but which happily ended in a comedy. I was living in a Bungalow with two brother officers; one a captain who was interpreter and quarter-master of the regiment; the other a subaltern like myself. We two youngsters occupied one bedroom, sleeping under the one punkah. The captain's bedroom adjoined and opened into ours. One night in June, shortly before we were disarmed, we three went to bed as usual. We had for weeks past slept with loaded guns, rifles, and pistols at hand, ready for any emergency. Shortly after mid-night I was awakened by what seemed to me to be a fearful struggle going on in the room near my chum's bed. I jumped out of my own bed, rushed to the wall where I had a double-barrelled gun loaded, seized it, and, placing my back to the wall, listened and waited events. The struggle, mixed with cries and screams, went on, appearing to me to last a long time, though it could only have been a very few moments when the noise ceased. I thought to myself—"well, the poor beggar is done for, my turn will come next"—and I held my gun ready to fire if anyone should approach me. Dead silence, and at last I called my chum's name in a very low voice. No reply. I then moved along the wall towards the door of the captain's room, from which my own name was called in a hoarse whisper. I replied, and was eagerly asked what was the matter. I said, "I fear poor R— has been murdered." Going into his room we consulted for a minute and I then told him to remain still and I would try and find out what had happened. We slept with all the doors of the bungalow open, so, stepping stealthily towards the middle of my room until I got the doors of both rooms on a line with the door leading to the verandah, I gazed towards the dim light of the open. Not a sign nor a shadow! Everything was still and quiet! So I ventured to creep out of the two rooms to the front of the house—my gun ready for any emergency—until I got into the compound or garden. The house had verandahs on all four sides. I walked round to the verandah at the captain's end of the

house, and found his servants sitting there huddled together in great alarm. I asked them if they had heard or seen anyone about, and they said they had seen nothing, but had heard a great noise and were frightened. I made one of them light a candle, with which we returned to the captain's bedroom and found him standing at his post, with loaded rifle in his hand. We then agreed to advance together into my bedroom to look for our chum, and, the native servant holding the candle over our heads, we walked into the room. To our amazement and surprise we saw a white figure in the far corner of the room standing between a table and the wall. This was our man, and he called to us for God's sake to get him out of the place. We moved the table and brought him into the middle of the room, and asked him what had happened. In a few moments he told us that he had had a terrible nightmare; that he had dreamt he had been in a stable with horses kicking him to death; that he had struggled to make his escape, shouting for help. What a relief to us two was his story, and how we laughed at and chaffed him. In his struggles he had knocked everything off his writing table on which had been his desk, books and miscellaneous paraphernalia. He had on a long white English nightshirt instead of the usual pyjama suit of India, and when we first saw him he looked a ghostly figure. I believe that he and I are the only two survivors of my regiment who were at Barrackpore at the time. All the rest have gone. Him I saw only a few months ago at his English home.

Now for my second memorable day. Two or three days after the ghost incident—it was on the Saturday night of June 13th—about six of us had just finished our dinner in our regimental mess and were sitting chatting and smoking when the Brigade-major, accompanied by another officer, came in and said he had been sent by the general to enquire if our regiment, or any of the officers, had a boat of any kind, as he wanted to send a message to a place called Chinsurah, a few miles up the river, for the officer commanding the 78th Highlanders temporarily quartered there. This splendid regiment had just gone through a campaign in Persia and had come on to India to help quell the Mutiny. They had only landed in Calcutta a few days before and were awaiting transport to go up country. As it so happened our adjutant did own a very good rowing boat in which we often went up the Hooghly. The brigade-major told our adjutant that, if we could form a crew to row him across the river to Serampore, the general wanted him (the adjutant) with another officer to go to Chinsurah by train and carry orders to the officer commanding the 78th.

Serampore is a native town or large village just opposite Barrackpore, and the East Indian Railway ran through it to Chinsurah and other places as far as Raneegeunge, 121 miles from Calcutta, and that was then the whole extent of railway in India. We very soon made up a crew of four, and rowed the adjutant and a captain of another regiment to Serampore, landed them there and returned ourselves to Barrackpore. On our reaching the mess house we were told that orders had been issued that everyone was to assemble and pass the night at the Brigadier-general's house under a guard of British troops.

The rumour was that the native troops were going to break out that night, kill all they could at Barrackpore and march on Calcutta.

One of my brother subs., who lived in the mess house, had gone to bed. I went to his room, woke him, and told him what the orders were, and asked him to go with me to the Brigadier's house. He absolutely refused to move, said he did not care what happened, that he was in bed and intended to remain there. I left him and went to the rendezvous, finding there assembled nearly all the ladies and children of the station and a large number of officers; in fact, everyone except the officers, with their wives and families, of one native infantry regiment who gathered together in their own mess house and mounted a guard of their own men as a protection. Almost all the officers of each native regiment had, as generally throughout India, perfect faith in their own men, and could not and would not believe that their dear old particular regiment would mutiny.

The Brigadier's house was a very fine one with large rooms. The ladies and children had rooms allotted to them, and we men roamed about in the other rooms and verandahs, and later on slept in chairs and on the ground. I had managed to secure two chairs, and, sitting on one with my legs on the other, went fast asleep. I was awakened by feeling someone pulling at one of my feet. I looked up and found it was a native servant, who told me some ladies wished to speak to me. I got up and, going to the ladies, was told by them that they were dreadfully thirsty and could get nothing to drink, for the Brigadier was not prepared for such an inrush, and the supplies in the house were exhausted. I said I would do what I could, and, taking a native with me, went to my mess and brought back a quantity of soda water, lemonade and ice, all of which were most useful and welcome.

About daybreak on the morning of the 14th, I was wandering about the verandah and met the Brigade-major. He was looking up the river—the house was on the left bank of the Hooghly—and told me he was anxiously watching for the 78th, as he expected them to come down in boats to Barrackpore from Chinsurah. He said he thought he would drive up the road bordering the river and see if anything could be seen of them. I asked him to take me with him, and we went off in his trap. No signs, but as we were returning we saw a number of large country boats coming over from Serampore, on board of which were British soldiers. We immediately drove to the landing, and there we met and welcomed the newcomers. The two officers taking the general's orders had managed to catch a train at Serampore; had arrived at Chinsurah in the middle of the night and given the order to the officer commanding the 78th. Arrangements were made for a train to bring the regiment down to Serampore, whence they crossed the river. We were all of course much relieved by their arrival. Six of the 78th officers accompanied me to my bungalow, where my chums and I made them as comfortable as we could, giving them breakfast, etc., while all the officers were made honorary members of our mess. The men were duly accommodated and provided for. The day passed quietly. Between four and five

o'clock in the afternoon bugles were heard all over the cantonment. The 78th recognized their call, and they, as did all of us, hurried into our parade uniforms and went off to our respective regiments. It appeared that, although it was Sunday, the whole of the troops were ordered to assemble on the grand parade ground. None but commanding officers knew what was to happen. The native infantry regiments having fallen in on their respective parade grounds were marched to the grand parade and formed up in line of contiguous columns in quarter distance column of companies, the 2nd Grenadiers on the right, a small remnant of the 19th Native Infantry next. Then the five companies of the 34th, the 43rd, and the 70th on the left. Six guns manned by sailors were in position on the right of the native troops, the guns loaded with grape. The two British regiments in line, one on each side of the guns, with their muskets loaded with ball cartridge. These were the 35th and the 78th. The Brigadier-general came on the ground and gave the order, "Native brigade, Native Officers and Colours to the front"! I may say that, in the native regiments, the Colours were ordinarily carried by native commissioned officers, of whom there were two to each company, styled "subadar" and "jemadar," designations equivalent to "captain" and "subaltern." This order was carried out. The Native Officers and Colours went to the front and the British officers were left in the ranks with the men.

This, I understood afterwards, was especially arranged, as it was feared that if the English officers were marched out with the native officers and the Colours, the rank and file might have got excited and done something foolish. When this order had been completed General Sir John Hearsay, who spoke the language like a native and was much beloved and respected by the native troops, addressed them, telling them that the Government had the most perfect faith in their loyalty, but was, in the public interests, compelled to disarm them, and that on the order being given for them to pile arms, etc., he trusted they would obey without any hesitation and that all would go well with them.

Fortunately the men did not hesitate, but promptly obeyed the orders given, and as soon as the arms were piled, were marched to the front, and the two British regiments closed in on the standing arms and took charge of them; and what might have been a very unpleasant incident, especially for the British officers left with the native regiments, passed off quietly and without a hitch. The native regiments were then marched back to their own parade grounds. Sir John Hearsay rode round to each regiment, made speeches to each and then the regiments were dismissed to the lines. This was the second occasion on which I happened to be regimental officer for the day.

Steamers were waiting at the flagstaff ghat, or wharf, on the river, and the arms were all taken on board and carried off to Calcutta. The evening passed off quietly, and after dinner I visited the regimental guards and found all correct. I went home, but as I was undressing to go to bed, heard a footstep on the verandah. I went out and found it was the Brigade-major who said he wished to see Captain C. who

was quartermaster of the week and one of the senior officers in my regiment. I told him that he had gone to bed thoroughly tired out as he had had to superintend the carriage of the arms to the steamers before referred to and see them stowed away and despatched, and asked if I could do what he wanted, telling him I was on regimental duty that day. He then told me that it had been reported to him that our men were deserting in numbers and that something must be done to stop it. I said I would go at once to the commanding officer, tell him, and then to the lines and visit the guards again, though I had only a very short time ago visited them and found all correct. I went off at once to the commanding officer's house and made my report. He desired me to go to an officer of the regiment, a senior captain who had been adjutant of the regiment for years, tell him that he wished to meet him at the lines at once, and then go to the lines myself, and see what was going on. I did as I was ordered and on arrival at the lines found *no rear guard!* The whole guard had apparently gone. I mounted a fresh guard, visited the others and found them all right. I stayed some time with the men, the commanding officer and the captain being there and talking to the men, trying to find out why some had run away, and pointed out to them that there was nothing to fear.

It was subsequently ascertained that a native fakir, or mendicant, had been amongst the men, frightening them with the story that steamers were coming up to Calcutta the next day with handcuffs and leg-irons and that all the sepoys were to be manacled and sent to the Andaman Islands, the penal settlement of India. Presently, on being told that the other officers had gone home I went away also. Before I had time to undress to go to bed, a non-commissioned officer came and reported that the rearguard that I had just mounted had gone off in a body and that several more men had run away. I went at once back to the lines, got hold of the native officer on duty, once more mounted a fresh guard and told the men present how foolish the runaways were. I said, to give them confidence, I would remain with them for the rest of the night, and I made one of them bring me a native bedstead and laid down there until daybreak. This guard did not desert, and I returned to my house in the daylight. In all we lost ninety men that night.

An amusing incident occurred the next day. In the early afternoon a trap was driven into our compound in which were two gentlemen from Calcutta; one, a solicitor, a brother of my captain chum. Their story was that a report had reached Calcutta that morning that the native brigade had mutinied on Sunday night, and killed a number of officers and others and were marching on Calcutta. He and his friend were determined to find out if this was true, and they started to drive along the road to Barrackpore, expecting to meet the mutinous troops on the road. They were armed with a blunderbuss, two or three double-barrelled guns or rifles and several revolvers and pistols. Not meeting with any hostile force, they drove along, and, arriving at the cantonment, came to our house. We calmed their alarms and told them they might tell the Calcutta folk that the native brigade had

been quietly disarmed the day before, and that no one had been murdered. We wanted them to stay to dinner, but they said they must return at once to satisfy their Calcutta friends that they had not been killed on the road, and so, having given them some refreshment, we sent them off on their way rejoicing. Before they left they said a rumour had been spread in Calcutta a few days before that in a night scrimmage an officer had shot a brother officer in his room, this, apparently, was the outgrowth of our nightmare scene!

Shortly after the native brigade was disarmed the 70th Native Regiment volunteered to go to Delhi to fight for the Government against the mutineers. The offer was accepted and a great deal made of it. Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, came to Barrackpore, and on a grand parade made them a speech, which was translated by Sir John Hearsay, in which he thanked them for having voluntarily offered their services to the Government, that the Government gladly accepted their offer and everything would be done to make use of the regiment as soon as possible. Steamers were ordered from Calcutta to take the regiment as far up the Hooghly and Ganges as was navigable by steamers, and the day of departure was fixed. The arms of the regiment were to be restored to them. One evening, a day or two before the regiment was to embark, a havildar (sergeant) of the regiment went to one of the captains and said he had heard that the officer was going to take his wife with him, also another lady was to go. He told the officer that he had been a good, kind friend to him for years, and that he begged him not to take his wife, nor to allow any lady to go. The officer asked him his reasons, but the man only replied, "Don't, Sahib, my tongue is tied, I cannot say any more, but don't let the ladies go." Captain W. reported this to the commanding officer and he sent on the report to the general. The result was that the order for Delhi was countermanded. The probabilities were that everything would have gone well until the regiment had arrived close to the scene of the fighting, and that there, some of the bad characters—of whom there were many in every regiment—would have shot some of the officers. There would have been a general massacre, and the greater part of the men would have joined the mutineers. This happened in many instances. It was most creditable to the regiment, both to officers and men, that subsequently the regiment volunteered to go to China, where at the time there was a small war. They were sent there, embarking on December 31st, from Calcutta, and landed at Canton shortly after that town was taken, and formed part of the garrison there for one year. This, I think, was the first time Indian troops went to China. The 70th was afterwards followed by the 47th and 65th Regiments of Bengal Infantry. I accompanied the 70th to China, being attached to the regiment as a volunteer, as the regiment was short of subalterns, and remained with it for a year.

FRANCE AND GERMANY—1870 AND 1914.

By CAPTAIN H. M. JOHNSTONE, R.E., RETD.

ALL those who take an interest in the historical development of warfare must often have cast their thoughts back to the fateful struggle of 1870—71, when our present Ally went under with such dramatic suddenness before the "brutal rush" of the outnumbering Germans. Contemplating in memory the more salient details of that *débâcle* of France, both in the matter of the comparative preparedness of the two belligerents and of their strategical and tactical methods when actually in the field, the mind naturally turns to the making of a comparison of then and now in all these matters. The paper that follows is an endeavour to make this comparison; in making the attempt the author begs a certain measure of indulgence, as he is separated at the time of writing from all historical books of reference.

I.

An important part of the outfit of a belligerent nation is the moral preparation of the people as a whole in view of international complications. It would hardly, indeed, be going too far to say that victory is impossible, unless, in the common phrase, the nation's "heart is in the right place," and in this connection there are two chief points to be considered.

The nation's heart, to follow the same metaphor, may be there—in the right place with respect to the business in imminent prospect—as the result of deliberate education of the people in the required direction, or it may be there in a sense quite divorced from the idea of this particular war or of this particular enemy.

The latter is the way with which we are familiar with respect to ourselves, that is, we have never looked upon a particular war of the future with a particular enemy as part of the national business of life. Perhaps, parenthetically, the "never" is rather too absolute, for the sound political sense of the British did see the danger of the growing German Navy, and did prevent us from slackening too much in the paramount matter of naval efficiency. Let us, therefore, say, "well, hardly ever."

The business of Prussia in 1870 had been long planned in every particular. With Bismarck at the helm, it was to be Germany an Empire, and that was to be followed by Germany the master of Europe. But, before Germany could fight as one, Prussia must establish her position as the acknowledged leader of the Teutonic race. The first step was to extend her seaboard by the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein, executed in conjunction with Austria; the next, to quarrel with her fellow-thief. The second step was necessary to the

success of Bismarck's ambition, for Austria, with a large German population of her own, had also as adherents several German States—Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, etc. These must all be taught that Prussia meant to be the leader, and this was done rapidly and most effectually in 1866. Bismarck also probably intended to make annexations from Austria, but the Emperor of the French intervened. Prussia was not ready to fight France at that moment, when the rest of Germany was disorganized, and when many of the States, lately defeated by her, would not have joined her in the new aggression. War with France would be a bigger thing than the campaign of 1866, and there must be no possible enemy in flank or rear, when the Rhine was to be crossed.

Prussia then, morally and materially prepared for war in general for many years past, and highly elated by two rapid victories, had her face skilfully turned westward by the wiles of Bismarck. This feat was easy enough in the matter of Prussia, but it must have been more difficult in the case of Bavaria and the others. Bismarck, however, was equal to the job, and preparation by education went on apace. The issue, that came only four years later, in 1870, proved how complete and thorough the education was, for there is no doubt that in the summer of that year all Germany marched upon the Rhine, not only confidently, but *con amore*. The whole nation had been morally prepared for war with France.

On the other side of the Rhine, no one liked the Germans and some feared them, while some still professed to despise them, but the nation was too distracted by its own internal affairs to turn a single face towards the danger. The Emperor and the Empress and, perhaps still more, their entourage, were the enemy to too large a section of the people for any concerted moral preparation to be possible. No French Bismarck arose, until it was too late, to weld all Frenchmen into one piece, and to turn the piece in the one direction. The people were patriots, as they proved before the war was over, but they were left ignorant before the war began, and ignorance is incompatible with moral preparation. Half the nation were madly confident, the other half indifferent. The deliberate moral preparation of the German for this particular war produced an army that proved more than a match for the sons of France, with all their high spirit and fine courage, and their natural aptitude for the field of war.

Looking around for fresh fields to conquer, Germany would at once see that long and persistent preparation would be necessary—preparation economic as well as warlike. The wealthiest of nations held the command of the sea, and she was likely to be an eventual enemy; the war efficiency of Germany had plainly roused fear in all neighbours and put them on the alert. The moral preparation was now based on the ground that Germany was surrounded by enemies jealous of her greatness, and ready to pounce upon her at the slightest show of weakness. The victorious past was used to keep up the idea of an invincibility that only required self-sacrifice and determination to render the invincibility eternal. Trust the Kaiser and his General Staff, and the German people would show the world that they were the chosen of God.

France, after some years of vacillation, during which she seemed to be content to reckon Germany unassailable and to turn her attention to things outside of Europe, began to look again with upright head across the Rhine. She wisely made alliance with Russia, but this led to the triple compact of Germany, Austria, and Italy. She still more wisely ceased quarrelling with us, and from that moment hope must have begun to grow of being able one day to avenge Sedan and the siege of Paris and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Deliberate moral preparation was now possible, directed due east, in place of desultory orientation towards Egypt and Central Africa and what not. The summer of 1914 found the French nation united in a single aim, and we have seen how complete was the moral preparation—as complete as the German, and inspired by an infinitely higher sense, the kind of sense of which the modern Teuton has shown himself incapable. It was to be a case of a fight for freedom against a fight for plunder. Thus both parties were equally prepared in a moral sense in the matter of intensity of aim, but the nature of the aim differed essentially. France had an aim that could endure even defeat; we shall be surprised if the Germans can endure it like men.

II.

In the matter of the material preparation of these two old enemies, we find the Germans infinitely the better equipped in 1870, and the same to a less extent in 1914. Material preparation can be conveniently considered under several heads, as follows:—

- (a) Numbers of trained troops of first line, that is, men with the Colours and army reservists automatically called up on mobilization.
- (b) Trained men in constituted units behind the above.
- (c) Untrained men of fighting age.
- (d) Quality and quantity of weapons.
- (e) Training in the use of these.
- (f) Provision of railway communications, and preparation for road traffic.
- (g) Air service.
- (h) Organization of the nation in general for war.

This looks a prodigious list of items for discussion in an article, but some of them will be dismissed with a very few words, and some perhaps with none. They might have been added to—for instance, organization of espionage.

(a) In 1870 the Germans planned to open the campaign with troops not far short of half a million in number, 460,000 being approximately the number which was to make up the three armies of invasion. In strong contrast with the corresponding achievement of the French, they succeeded in actually putting the full expected numbers in the field in front line. The first combat of consequence being on August 4th at Weissemburg on the Lauter, the full number was reached within less than a fortnight thereafter. Each of the armies, of which

the Second, the central one, was the strongest, had one laggard army corps, but these were following their armies closely before the middle of August. And this was not all, as a point of contrast with the French. Every battalion, regiment, brigade, division and corps was up to strength, and the artillery was all there with full ammunition trains. The only deficiency was in cavalry; two or three of the mounted divisions were not ready, the two of the First Army, for instance, being far in rear, and requiring to have their work prior to the battle of Spicheren done for them by a borrowed cavalry division of the Second Army. There were some little hitches, too, in the commissariat department. The Second Army, detained in the Rhenish Palatinate, in the bend of the Rhine defined by Bingen, Mainz, Mannheim and Alzey, was for the moment and for the next two weeks inconveniently crowded, and trouble arose about the feeding of the troops. But the country was populous and rich, and the rapid establishment of town and village markets, backed by cash payments, very soon brought the temporary difficulty to an end.

On the whole, therefore, the mobilization, the concentration, and the strategic deployment, the three successive steps that lead to manœuvre and collision, were executed according to programme, and in a businesslike manner that proved the thorough and painstaking work that had been done by the Great General Staff. In the interval of four years that had elapsed since the invasion of Bohemia, the Staff had studied meticulously the causes of the weaknesses that had appeared on the march to Sadowa, and had brought into line with the Prussian system the contingents that were to be provided by Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. The outstanding fact was that all appeared on the French frontier in full strength of men and guns, and were backed by an administrative organization that worked to substantial satisfaction.

In France a woefully different picture was presented. Starting with a nominal first line war establishment considerably smaller than that of the enemy, the French succeeded, neither at the time of first collision nor for long afterwards, in producing in the field the intended numbers. The German Staff had calculated the maximum French first line at some 340,000; the actual number which the Emperor Napoléon was promised by his War Office was 336,000. But nothing like this number appeared for the opening operations between the Moselle and the Rhine.

The cause of the grave deficit went back to the first operation of all war, the mobilization. There are two or three fundamental rules for this basic operation. The actual work of bringing up the peace units to war strength should be decentralized; units should not be transported to the concentration areas until mobilization is complete, and still less should they be moved into a strategic deployment near the enemy until they are complete in every particular; there should be no dislocations of existing units for the making up of other units; that is, every unit should obtain its human and material reinforcement from a pre-constituted reserve of its own, and not from the body of another unit of its own category. The Germans had acted strictly

up to these maxims, the French broke all three of them. They had a method of making a fourth battalion for each regiment by taking a company out of each of the three existing battalions, and each new battalion had to be hastily provided with field officers and with transport from wherever they could be got. This broke the third rule.

As to the first rule, everything in relation to mobilization, or almost everything, was to be directed from the War Office at Paris, with the natural result that the War Office Department broke down. Commanders of districts would, in some cases, wait for the work to be done for them from Paris, as per regulation; others tried to improvise means on the spur of the moment, committed illegalities, and came to loggerheads with the civil authorities. Both fell behind with their mobilization, the more energetic doing best, and having at least the credit of making the best of a bad job.

Regulations allowed just so many days for completion of mobilization, so the Quartermaster-General's department started ruthless transportation the next day after the official date. Some regiments were deliberately sent forward before they could possibly have been mobilized, even if the work had proceeded without a hitch; this was in order to carry out the strategic plan of the Emperor, which envisaged a sudden invasion of South Germany before the enemy concentration should be complete. This is a very dangerous method of starting a campaign, unless you are sure of two things—that your numbers will at least equal those of the enemy, and that your regular mobilization and concentration will be as rapid and complete as his. When the Emperor went to Metz in the last days of July, with the intention of commanding the two armies into which the French forces were divided, he found that barely two-thirds of the promised numbers were going to be present, and that the lack of transport and equipment was so great as to render impossible the proposed strategic offensive. There were on the Saar regiments of three battalions that mustered no more than 1,300 men; the missing men were in many cases dashing about the country in trains, trying to find their units and still lacking uniforms and arms. French courage did not fail, but everything else conspired to make the result a foregone conclusion; 460,000 Germans, acting on a definite plan, met 250,000 French whose plans had all gone awry.

In 1914 the Germans, though having to provide some 500,000 men for the Eastern front, of whom half at least were first line troops, contrived again to outnumber the French. We all thought we knew the exact number of active army corps and the amount of artillery that Germany could put in the field by the end of the first mobilization, and we knew that every one of these could and would be duplicated soon after; but it was supposed that a month or thereabouts would be required to have these reserve corps and divisions fit for manœuvre. The Great General Staff, however, does not do things by halves. The mobilization of the active army was secretly begun in essentials days before it began nominally, and within a week of its completion it was doubled in strength by the production of the reserve units.

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For many years the Germans had known that they must expect to have to fight on the whole of the French front and on a large part of the Russian front simultaneously. They had therefore to organize for a very big opening, and they did it. As has been so often pointed out, they planned to overwhelm the French enemy by speed, which at the opening of such a campaign meant by numbers. Our Ally's full force not being available at the outset, and the British contingent being very small, they were able at the first collision both to force frontally and to threaten outflanking and envelopment. The first month on the Western front was a period of legitimate anxiety for the world.

It is too early yet to say much of the French condition in the matter of preparedness. We were assured that the mobilization of the units went through smoothly, but it seems pretty certain that some of them could not take the field within the appointed time. It will be remembered how, a short time before the war opened, a French politician put forward an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies. He was alarmed at the turmoil over Serbia, and he asked whether the grave deficit of warlike stores, which he averred to exist a few months before, had been made good. The speaker had himself been in the Ministry of War, and knew what he was talking about. The Government reply was of the kind which is favoured by politicians, and was distinctly unsatisfactory. The matter is mentioned here as affording a possible explanation of the lagging of some of the units.

The German peace footing had been of about 800,000 officers and men. Fully mobilized, it was believed that this would be augmented to 1,700,000. France had about an equal number on her peace footing, but 46,000 of these were in Morocco and 39,000 in Algeria and Tunis. She only contrived to raise herself to this figure by extending, from two to three years, the period of service with the colours. This sort of expedient naturally reduces the numbers of the army reserve, or at least of the best part of it. Fully mobilized, the active army would fall short of the German numbers, and the troops on the other side of the Mediterranean could not all be brought into line in France. While Germany had to allot something approaching half a million to the Russian front, France had to keep 100,000 in North Africa, and a rather smaller number to watch the Italian frontier.

III.

(b) In constituted units behind the above, Germany had something like 1,600,000 men of the Landwehr, or a force approximately equal to that of the active army. Just as the latter was practically doubled on mobilization by the calling up of the army reserve, so the active army, mobilized, was duplicated by the Landwehr, whose organization into divisions was complete, with pretty full complements of officers and staffs. Behind this, again, stood one million of Landsturm, of whom the majority had at long previous dates undergone the full training, and there were skeleton cadres in existence. The total of soldiers thus approximated to 4,000,000 in number.

In 1870, the German organization was of the very same quality, the active army when mobilized being duplicated by complete divisions of Landwehr, and the whole backed by a lesser number of trained Landsturm.

France's active army of approximately a million had immediate reserves and depôts of 1,600,000, a Territorial or Landwehr force of 800,000 with a reserve of 400,000, and the total of soldiers came to 3,800,000. But it seems that the units behind the active army were not, at the outbreak of war, so near to being ready for the field as were the corresponding bodies in Germany. The Germans were thus able to attend to Belgian resistance after the occupation of Brussels with perfectly constituted second line divisions, and to keep the whole, or very near the whole, of the active units for the chief campaign.

(c) When we come to consider the respective man-powers residing in the two countries, we reach practically the question of total population. In 1870 there was approximate equality in this particular, but in 1914 the people of the German Empire had multiplied astonishingly. They now outnumbered the French by three to two. It is estimated that Germany had 9 millions of men of military age, outside of the 4,000,000 soldiers mentioned above. France would have two-thirds of this 13 million, or something like 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ million. But she had 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions of these already as soldiers, so her untrained reserve would come up to about 5 millions.

Attempts have been made to reckon what number of these are indispensable for work at home, and what number could therefore, as a last resort, be drafted into the ranks. The highest estimate gives the German soldiers at 10 millions from the beginning of the war to the present time, that is, 6 millions beyond those men who were reckoned soldiers when the war began. On the same principle the French could have 6 millions and a half of soldiers, or about 3 millions beyond those who were soldiers when the war began. This puts in a lurid light what would have been the plight of France if she had had to fight Germany single-handed, or even with the assistance of Great Britain alone.

Germany, too, is being helped in this particular by her characteristic unscrupulousness. She contrived, principally during the first year of the war, to capture a very great number of prisoners. The numbers are not well known, but they may be well over a million, and she does not hesitate to break all rules in forcing them to work for her in the industries that are subsidiary to war, as well as in direct war work, such as fortification, road and railway building in the war zone, munition work. It may be that she is able by this means to release half a million Germans for the ranks.

IV.

(d) In the matter of quality and quantity of weapons, the relative superiority of the Germans was greater in 1914 than in 1870. France, in the earlier war, had a rifle, the Chassepot, much superior in range, flatness of trajectory, and lightness of ammunition to the needle-gun

of her opponent, but a vicious tactical idea had grown up in the French Army in the question of the best use to make of the longer range that was available. The idea was to allow the enemy infantry to attack, and shoot them down before their weapon could be brought to bear. There were two fallacies in this notion. It was forgotten that the superior range could be made just as useful in attack as in defence, and thus the renunciation of attack was gratuitously foolish. It was also forgotten that the decision of a fight takes place at the short ranges, where the German and French rifles were practically on an equality of effectiveness, or at no range at all, with the bayonet.

Incidentally it may be here noted as strange that in 1870, with weapons far inferior to those of 1914, bayonets should have crossed so infrequently that the fact is a noteworthy feature of the fighting tactics of that campaign. The present war, as we see, shows a very different picture in this respect, in spite of the terrific potency of our distant-killing arms.

The French in 1870 had a machine gun of a kind, the mitrailleuse; the Germans had only their rifles. The old mitrailleuse was a clumsy weapon, made up of twenty-five barrels set round a massive spindle. The total weapon and carriage were about as bulky and nearly as heavy as a field gun, had nothing like the range of the latter, and was apt to put all of its bullets into a single living target. Germans reported that they found half a dozen bullets in a single human body, and as many as fifteen in one horse, when one would have sufficed to disable either. The French had tried to keep the weapon a secret, and thought it would come into the field as a surprise for the enemy, but, as a fact, the careful German had actually experimented with it, and had rejected it as worthless. The French ventured, at Wörth and other places, to pit the weapon against the field gun of the enemy, and had it put out of action every time in a few minutes.

In the matter of artillery the Germans had, in 1870 as in 1914, an incontestable superiority, except in one particular, in 1914, which will be touched upon later. In 1870 Germany, as we saw, had about two army corps to the French one, and the preponderance of guns was much the same in number. Everybody in those days was content with field guns and very light howitzers in the field, and the German weapons had the pull in quality as well as quantity. They wisely trusted to these, that is, made the very fullest use of them, and thus spared their foot-soldiers, and the chief battles, Gravelotte and Sedan, were won by the gunners. They massed their guns in the open—it could be done in those days—and overwhelmed the French batteries one by one, these having a pernicious habit of coming into action piecemeal in small groups.

The great surprise in 1914 was the German provision of heavy artillery. With consummate cunning was the provision kept secret. Germany had, like the rest of us, her official book of war establishment, obtainable for study by all other war staffs. Emissaries of ours, like Lord Haldane, and military attachés were told in Berlin that the German Staff were of opinion that artillery was not going to be the arbiter of future battles, and that indirect fire was too uncertain

to be depended upon. German military writers, for some years before the war, were at pains to tell us these same things, and all the time Krupp's and the Skoda works were hard at it, turning out monsters such as had never before been seen in the field. Lord Haldane and the attachés were not, you may be sure, allowed to stray to Döberitz while the monsters were being tested and the gun teams trained.

Germany, then, was secretly bent on the rapid smashing of her enemy with heavy guns, but even she had no idea of the extension that would have to be given to the system. It is pretty certain that, towards the end of 1914, she became aware that her outfit of guns and shells would have to be heavily multiplied, if victory was to be achieved. We and the French came also to the same knowledge, probably quite as early as the enemy did, but his autocratic system of government, affording him an organized country to work upon, gave him a huge advantage over France and ourselves in the matter of getting the necessary work put in hand.

In the autumn of 1914, perhaps at the time of the first battle of Ypres, his Staff at the front, collating the reports of his corps and army commanders, would find that many more guns, and a far greater complement of projectiles, were being insistently demanded. Headquarters, receiving the summarized report, would look into the matter, would find acquiescence necessary, and within a week commanders of districts would be engaged in organizing for war purposes all workshops of a suitable kind, and in mobilizing labour for them. With us and the French, such is our system of government, the people and their representatives must first be taught and persuaded that an effort of the kind had become necessary. In Germany, ordering; with us, persuading and argument. Germany got to work at once, while we had to send missionaries to preach to the people. Germany, already well ahead of us in munitions, rapidly increased her superiority over France in that particular. Fortunately for us all, she made the first use of it after the winter on the Russian front, where a gain of 200 miles of ground was of less consequence to the Allies of the Entente than 50 miles would have been in France.

France had also lost the best part of her manufacturing regions, and was thus in a specially difficult situation with regard to the great supply that was becoming so urgent. Perforce she came to depend largely on supplies of weapons from overseas. Germany, with her national organization for war, is probably even now able to produce munitions in greater quantity than Great Britain and France put together. But in spite of all her capacity she has never been able to equal the French in gunnery, and particularly in the use of the Q.F. field piece. We all know the glory of the "*soixante-quinze*."

We all know, too, the villainy of poison gas, which all of us have had to imitate. Once brought into the field of war, it has probably come to stay. After the perfidy of the Teuton in all matters of solemn engagements, no country in future will be able to eschew the devilish weapon. It is the principle of the lowest common denominator, which one sees all over the world in trade. If a thing pays, and one competitor uses it, then everyone else has to use it too.

V.

In fear of making this paper too long, the writer proposes to skip over the other items he put down some pages back. Much could be said about French and German methods of training, before 1870 and before 1914. Our Ally had, for this last war, evened up with the Germans, as compared with the relative situation in 1870.

Taking everything all round, Germany presents the spectacle of a nation that has, for two generations and more, lived for war, and for aggressive war at that. The total powers of a naturally painstaking people have been bent for all those years on a most businesslike determination to use everything for national aggrandisement. In commerce, in shipping, in education both of the young and of the adult, everything has been directed towards the ideal of a soulless rapine. There has been no scruple and no decency.

In foreign politics alone, and in the understanding of the spirit of other nations, there has been complete failure. The German put before him the ideal of strict business, and divorced it from all other considerations. He forgot that, in the case of nations as in the case of individual men, the very appearance of being "too d—d business-like" rouses all-round opposition. Germany fell into the error, and can hardly now claim a real friend in the whole world. For various reasons, not all the world is in arms against her, but none of those who are not has any faith in her, or anything but fear in the possibility of her success.

France, her old enemy, has friends all over the world, an asset of supreme value.



MAHANISM VERSUS MOLTKEISM.

By CAPTAIN R. H. BEADON, A.S.C.

IN the enunciation by Germany of her theory of "the freedom of the seas" as the ultimate object for which she is waging war, is summed up what she wishes the world to believe to be her case against England and, consequently, also those Powers which are the Allies of England to-day. But the phrase "freedom of the seas" is no mere casual journalistic catchword coined as a popular answer to the avowed determination of England to break the military power of Prussia. It is the deliberate definition of the issue and indirectly of the weapons by which that issue was to be fought.

In considering in this aspect the ultimate outcome of the struggle, to examine the issue and the means by which it must be found. There is in history a wealth of learning on the subject, which has been interpreted by no untrained or superficial intellects, and it is the living principles that underlie the power and influence of a State in the world, as hammered out by these from the teaching of the ages, that will provide guidance and light.

Stripped of all minor determining factors British navalism stands forth against German militarism, or, to put it in another and a fairer way, British sea power opposes German land power. In the consideration of these the mind must be cleared of any preconceived ideas as to the morality of the one or the other. Navalism is not necessarily the abuse of naval power any more than militarism is from its nature the abuse of military power. England believes Germany to have been guilty of such abuse, while Germany believes, or affects to believe, that her antagonist is guilty also. It is not, then, a question of charge and counter-charge before the tribunal of the world, but of two theories of war in its relation to the supremacy of nations, brought into violent antagonism, and it has yet to be seen to which the final triumph will fall.

These two theories of war have been designated as Mahanism and Moltkeism. Here is something more precise and comprehensible.

It has been said that Mahan has, through his writings, exerted great influence on the development of British sea power in late years. To the extent that he has taught Great Britain what sea power means, he has done so. The development itself was in the natural course of things and beyond the control of any single mind. National policy, and therefore a strong navy as its instrument, is not the result of a mood of a few generations moulded by contemporary circumstances and conditions. It is rather from the free play of natural forces working logically, inexorably, and continuously on the lines which are in themselves determined by race attributes and geographical position. The meteoric rise of the German Navy would seem to

contradict this last statement, but consideration will show that it does not really do so. German "sea power" is artificial, not because it is of recent growth, but because it is not vital to the existence of the German people and has been created for the specific purpose of challenging, or at least jeopardizing, that of England, whose sea power is in itself no threat to Germany. The German fleet has been termed a luxury. In the sense that luxuries are unnatural, the simile is a happy one.

The idea, already mooted in Germany, of a future Central European Confederacy of the Teutonic States, indicates that this is in reality admitted by her, though she has not yet reached the stage when she will admit it to the world.

The theory of a "Mitteleuropa" is, too, an answer to that sea power that cannot be overborne in its own element. But it is even more than that. For Germany sees in the extension of this theory her road to the East and her outlet to the commerce of the world over dry land through the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf, and she is already proclaiming the fact from the house-tops. "To-day we Central Europeans do not need the sea way as our road right up to the Indian frontier." There lies the real challenge and there is the issue defined. Germany is to carry her flag to the uttermost East without touching the sea except at the Bosphorus, where the weakest link of the chain of communication lies. It is easy to realize her relief when even that link withstood the stoutest strain that her enemies could bring to bear on it. She is, in fact, to overcome the "tyranny of the seas" with the long legs of her soldiers, aided by all that science can devise in the matter of land communications.

The tremendous organized and concentrated strength of the Germanic peoples is in itself capable of ensuring them their "place in the sun" as great and strong nations, but will it suffice to bring into submission that Power to whom there are none to deny the seas? And if it fails in so doing, it fails in its avowed aim. For without free communications, not only through two continents, but throughout the world, German influence and commerce must be "cabined and confined," German rule and domination limited, and German emigrants compelled to betake themselves to alien lands. Sea power is not, except in the case of an island people or one with a large proportion of coast line to her territory, vital to national greatness, but it is vital to world power. And world power, and no less, is the goal towards which Germany strives. While other and important conditions are involved, these aims are instinctively and naturally opposed by those peoples to whom sea power is vital—Great Britain and Japan—the two great island races of the West and the East. By France, always an important sea-going and commercial nation from the very extent of her coast line. By Italy and Portugal for the same reasons as France.

It is hard to believe that Herr Dernburg could have found much credence even in Germany when he said that all neutral countries, and even England's allies, were with Germany in her endeavours to put an end to English supremacy on the seas.

What, then, is Mahanism, and on what foundations are the teachings of the American sailor based? Why is it that his lessons demand such serious attention that the British Empire has staked its whole future on his theory of war?

Can it be that one man, however technically skilled and however profound a thinker, can lay down an infallible rule for the conduct of operations, even in the widest sense? Can it be that he can provide a guide that will serve all the changing conditions of the ages?

The answer to these last two queries is best given by a quotation from Mahan himself which may be said to embody the spirit of all his teaching. "The principles of war are neither numerous nor difficult, but their application cannot be made subject to hard and fast rules."

Here is no claim to provide an infallible guide to success. The first portion of the sentence merely embodies a truism that the whole course of human history buttresses and supports. It is when Mahan deals with the *application* of the rules of war that his voice assumes its authority. Yet he does not dogmatize. By closely reasoned argument based on historical facts, and logical deductions therefrom, he indicates the causes affecting, and the conditions underlying, national supremacy. The conclusions he reaches can be summarized thus:—

"The nation that controls the sea and understands how to apply that control against its enemies must prevail over them."

Such is the Alpha and Omega of his teaching, and he never loses sight of it throughout the whole field of his writings in which he interprets the meaning of sea power. Its absolute truth had been grasped by Nelson. "The fleets of England can meet the world in arms" cannot, indeed, hold good to-day when England would be unable to control the seas against the united fleets of the world, but a century ago, when she could do so, she actually did defy all her foes and overcome them. For sea power means communications, in which, Napoleon has said, lay the secret of war.

Once again Mahan did not formulate any special theory of war, or, indeed, lay down any specific rules by which war should be waged. He rather interpreted the meaning of sea power, and explained how and why in a long drawn out struggle between nations victory must ultimately rest with the powers that possess it.

In that great trilogy, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," "The Life of Nelson—the Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain," and "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," are to be found his doctrines set out in all their comprehensiveness and conviction. And these doctrines are presented and exemplified in more modern setting by works covering later periods, such as "The Life of Farragut," "Lessons from the War with Spain," and numerous magazine and newspaper articles. It will be a matter for regret to the historian of the future that Mahan died near the beginning of the struggle that was to put all his theories to the supreme test. It is easy to imagine how valuable to posterity would have been his critical analysis of situations dark and obscure

at the present, but which he would have flooded with light for all who would see.

It is unnecessary to enter into details of how defeat has invariably been the lot of the people who have been overthrown on the sea. Carthage, Spain, and Napoleonic France are typical examples. It will be more profitable to examine instances of a nation actually or apparently stronger than its adversary at sea being defeated, as such instances would seem submersive of Mahanism.

To take first the American War of Independence. It only needed the will to persist on the part of England to overcome the colonists while they remained alone and without assistance. As in the South African War, the struggle was, from the determination and perseverance of the weaker side and from the nature and extent of the country in which the operations took place, bound to be a long drawn out one. But the ultimate issue was certain and inevitable as long as the Americans were practically cut off from the outside world. It only assumed a different aspect when strong sea power entered the lists against England, and it then remained for sea power to decide it. If England had been able to control the seas—and from the strength of her navy it might not have been impossible—she would have even then emerged victorious. For several reasons she was unequal to the task. The threat of invasion at home and her world-wide responsibilities, both territorial and commercial, tended to a misapplication of her strength, and she consequently failed to give her armies in America the support they needed for success.

She lost her colonies in America because she could not command the Atlantic, but, at the same time, she had to thank her navy in that the war did not end more disastrously than it did; and the peace concluded was not, under the circumstances, an unfavourable one for her, in that she was able to save her Empire from dissolution in face of most formidable odds. The navy, in fact, was equal to its task as a weapon of defence, but was neither strong enough or well enough applied to be more.

The war of 1870 crowned the life work of Von Moltke. It may not be easy to realize it to-day, but it seemed to Europe at the time that it was a bold course on the part of Prussia to challenge what was reputed to be the first military power in Europe. There was, too, nothing with which to oppose the French fleet, which would seem to have the hostile coasts at its mercy. Yet her sea power availed France nothing. Except for a few minor enterprises, which had little effect on the main operations, it exerted no influence whatever. To all intents France was beaten in seven weeks. In as many months she lay prostrate at the feet of Germany. And yet she always had command of the sea, and therefore communication with the outside world. It was, in fact, only that communication that enabled her to prolong the struggle as she did.

If any war, then, would seem to prove the theories of Von Moltke it was this one. The enemy was crushed by a few swift, decisive blows. He was not permitted to make the war a long one; though he did actually make it longer than was intended. He was not

permitted to use the tremendous weapon of sea power that lay in his hands, even if he had understood how to do so.

A simile will serve to exemplify the two theories of war under discussion. It is as though two boxers were opposed, each typifying a different method of fighting. One trusts to getting in a knock-out blow early in the contest to give him the victory. The other to his quickness and skill to elude such blow, and to his staying power to enable him to wear down his adversary in a long struggle.

For sea power to be the decisive factor, the war must be made a long one—a war of attrition; and the length of it will then be in proportion to the resources of that belligerent who is driven from the seas. It is usually that sea power acts with a quiet, steady pressure, and it is because it is so quiet in its working that it is the more likely to be unnoticed and must be somewhat carefully pointed out.

But in the Franco-Prussian War it was obvious that France could not have maintained even such command of the sea as was in her control at the end, for an indefinite period. There was nothing to prevent the enemy seizing the bases of her fleet and destroying its life and sustenance. Had she been able to hold a defensive line such as traverses her western front to-day, the outcome would have had to have been decided by other means, in which a correct appreciation of the value of her navy, and its application to give it that value, might even have turned the scale in her favour. As it was, Moltkeism remained triumphant—not because it had overborne the opposing theory, but because it had never permitted that theory to be translated into action against it. It was from the results of 1870 that Germany adopted and elaborated that faith and practice so brilliantly expounded by Von der Goltz as the certain and sure hope of victory in Continental war. Aspirations on the sea were deferred until the hour drew near for the final reckoning with the one nation that stood between her and the domination of the world. To identify Moltkeism as "The Nation in Arms" is not a sufficient or comprehensive definition. Practically all peoples are "Nations in Arms," as the term is generally known. Moltkeism goes further in its science and efficiency. *It is rather the organization of not only the manhood but of the whole nation in such a way that it may be directed at any moment and in all its strength towards the forwarding of the national purpose, linked with the firm belief that the national purpose can be forwarded by war, and only by war.*

Such is Moltkeism in its conception. It remains to consider its execution. Counting on a more rapid mobilization and superiority of numbers it has been expressly designed to knock out its opponent by swift and overwhelming blows delivered regardless of the cost in life. With a view to bringing about rapidly such decisive success, it embodies the principles of both strategical and tactical envelopment. An army that carries a Sedan on its colours cannot but look with favour on the ways and means by which such a victory was won. Judged by all the recognized axioms of the science of war these theories might well seem incontrovertible. Up to a point they are; in so far

as they are concerned with supremacy on the Continent. German ambition, however, is not limited to the confines of Europe.

History teaches us that it is never safe to be dogmatic about the mentality of a people, because collective mentality never remains constant long, but varies as it is swayed by all the shifting influences and emotions to which the human mind is susceptible. By "our future lies on the water," and "the trident must be in our fist," the German Emperor set the keynote to German policy for the quarter-century immediately preceding the present war. Without any repudiation of the teachings of Von Moltke preparations were accordingly pushed forward to enable sea power to be met in its own element.

War with England had been left out of account in the European settlement timed for 1914; but when war with England came out of due time, and it was known to Germany that the struggle for European, which she had designed to precede the struggle for World, domination, would have to be fought simultaneously with the latter, she turned once more to her ancient faith. "We do not need the sea-way as our road right up to the Indian frontier." Such, judging by the utterances of the Press and of her public men, was the frame of mind in which the German people seemed to be, when, after a year of war, they stood flushed with their successes against Russia and with those of their Allies in the Dardanelles. Sea power was to be written off as of no account. The Central European idea became fashionable, and the development of a great canal system was to be a compensation for the free waterways of the world. "After all, we are winning the war without naval supremacy, or, at any rate, with the help of such limited naval strength as we do possess." It was a comforting thought while it remained. But it did not long remain.

Of late the general attitude seems to have undergone a change, due, no doubt, to the economic pressure of the blockade which Germany was at last beginning to feel. "The freedom of the seas" became the general cry. The phrase was "continually making its appearance in those essays and articles in which German publicists are eagerly discussing the industrial and economical conditions which will prevail in Germany when the war is ended. The alternative explanations of this new devotion to 'the freedom of the seas' . . . are, firstly, the Germans realize the impossibility of bringing Great Britain to terms or of ending the war at all while the command of the seas is held against Germany; and, secondly, that the Germans believe that there is no possible victory for them in sight now, but that if, by compulsion or agreement, Britain's superiority at sea could be limited there might be a better chance at some future time. It is for this reason that the sympathy and co-operation of neutrals is so persistently sought."

Germany, in short, was beginning to doubt whether Moltkeism was all sufficient to give her the final triumph.

It remains to be seen whether the naval action of May 31st, off the Jutland coast, will change or even modify that chastened frame of mind in favour of reversion to Moltkeism pure and simple as the hope of victory; or whether it will lead to belief in the possibility of actually triumphing on the sea; for if the German people lose faith

in Moltkeism there is nothing left to them, short of such belief in naval triumph, if they are to keep their faith in ultimate victory at all. But no amount of faith can alter the inexorable logic of facts. So long as England can maintain control of the seas—and there is no reason to doubt that she will be able to do so whatever the duration of the war—the ultimate issue must be in her favour as assuredly as it must be against her were her naval supremacy to be overthrown. Moltkeism is by itself insufficient for the conquering of the world, because it omits from its otherwise comprehensive doctrines the control of the communications of the world, which communications can only be controlled by the sea. And there lies the “great omission” which will bring it to naught.

It may be well at this stage of the war to re-enunciate and re-affirm our own grounds of faith, and it would be as well also for Germany to have a full understanding of them also; for the longer she maintains the fight the more complete will her final submission be.

Mr. Rudyard Kipling is reported as having prophesied that Germany would go on winning all the victories while the Allies were winning the war. That prophesy in a sense sums up the working of sea power, and yet it does not do it full justice, for it would rather seem to indicate that it is a sort of passive and negative influence that is on the side of the Allies by virtue of their supremacy on the seas—not that virile force and action that is ceaselessly and ever more strongly exerting itself to throttle out the life of the Central Powers. The most Germany can hope to do is to win all the victories; she cannot win the war.

It has been pointed out above how Moltkeism has in its execution relied on both a strategical and tactical envelopment of the enemy, and by such methods has achieved decisive successes. The scope of such envelopment is limited by either the natural or geographical boundaries of those states which constitute the theatre of war, while in any case it cannot be extended beyond that point where the land touches the sea. Thus far and no further. What if the enemy can put himself beyond the reach of the annihilating blow that is to destroy him and always retains the power to come again in his own time and at his own selected spot!

Sea power demands but one factor to make it decisive, and that is time. It comprehends a vaster and more complete envelopment than that of which Von Moltke ever dreamed. “The noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure with which sea power acts, cutting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its own supporting wars in scenes where it does not occur itself, or appears only in the background and striking open blows at rare intervals,” has not been the war with which Moltkeism contemplated to contend. Perhaps it is even not yet understood by the greatest military nation on earth. “It is a characteristic militarist theory that sea power should be written off in any squaring of accounts between real fighting men. They think it illegitimate and unheroic and have no training which enables them to see its inevitable qualities.”

"Nations, like men, however strong," says Mahan, "decay when cut off from the external activities and resources which at once draw out and support their internal powers. A nation . . . cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way by which it can communicate with other peoples and renew its own strength is the sea."

Why is it, then, that sea power has been and is so frequently either ignored or misunderstood?

It is because it is silent and often slow in its working. It does not present, except perhaps at intervals, those historical landmarks which have by themselves given the decision in a struggle between nations. A Jena, a Waterloo, a Sadowa, or a Sedan do not find their like in many Trafalgars. The Federal Navy, in 1865, could show no parallel to Appomatox, though their supremacy over the enemy was as complete and as overwhelming as that of the army, and their services towards the successful termination of the war not one jot less important.

Where a name, then, or a stray thought may call to mind the causes and measures that have led to victory on land, no such recollection or loose and superficial thinking will give true comprehension of the influence and meaning of sea power.

To quote Mahan again: "It is easy to say in a general way that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world: it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact meaning at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial, not resting as it should upon a collection of special instances on which the precise effect has been made clear by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments."

And, referring to the Napoleonic wars: "Amid all the tramping to and fro over Europe of the French armies and their auxiliary legions there went on unceasingly that noiseless pressure on the vitals of France, that compulsion whose silence when once noticed becomes to the observer the most striking and awful mark of the working of sea power."

It is towards what may be termed the "silent" aspect of naval war that historians of the subject most forcibly draw attention, because it is precisely that aspect that is likely to escape general attention. The insidious influence of sea power, paralysing as it were the energies of those against whom it is directed, is, though, only one aspect. "The due use and control of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link which lays under contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it." Sea power thus provides the means for, nay, rather dictates, aggressive war—the only war that can give decisive success. "When Monk said that the nation that would rule upon the sea must always attack he set the keynote to England's naval policy."

Under the shelter of the fleet are rallied the armies that are to carry the war into the enemy's country. By the fleet are the resources of the whole world put at the disposal of those armies, which, when the hour strikes, can be thrown with all their weight at the selected

spot. Even if repulsed they can renew their strength in their own time, which their adversary can never do. His resistance is limited by his internal resources; and his one chance of ultimate victory lies in those resources being able to outlast the resolution and will to persist on the part of those in whose hands the initiative is. From the point of view of grand strategy—and such viewpoint is the only one from which a just appreciation of all the considerations involved can be obtained, the initiative must be in the power of those who hold the sea.

Germany hopes to break up the alliance against her as Frederic the Great succeeded in doing after seven years of war. Her enemies have faith in their alliance as indissoluble until they have attained their aim, and, firm in that faith, are resolved to endure to the end.

Time is no "doubtful neutral" for them while their fleets are on every waterway of the world.



THE MAKING OF A NEW UNIT.

By C. N. W.

ALTHOUGH for many months past units of the New Armies have been employed in gradually increasing numbers on all the fronts, the 1st July, 1916, will go down in history as the date on which the New British Army was held to have completed its training by being launched into the Battle of the Somme—the first really great British offensive of the war, on the Western front—and this New Army, leavened by the remnants of the incomparable old Regular Army, is composed of “officers and men who are not professional soldiers, but are the British people”; during those opening days of the great battle they “faced a fiery ordeal and emerged from it successfully;” all ranks “displaying their magnificent quality.”

Yet in spite of the fact that since September, 1914, the units of the New Army have been raised in our midst, the very vaguest ideas still prevail as to all that goes to the making of a new formation, quite apart from the mere drilling and training of it; the British public, instructed by the uninformed journalist, seems to consider that all that is necessary to form battalions, batteries, brigades, or divisions equal to those of the “first seven divisions”—if indeed the public even now realizes what was the quality of those and the other divisions of the old Army—is to drill, and train in the methods of trench warfare, for quite a short time, the admittedly splendid new personnel; even in *The Times* one finds a writer on “New Troops in the Making” (May 25th, 1916) committing himself to the statement that finished soldiers can be turned out from the raw material in a few weeks.

All sausages are alike externally, but the difference between the first-class sausage and the middling, and the bad, is due as much to the methods of spicing and mixing the ingredients as to their mere quality; in a new unit, drill and all other training stand for the mixing, the inculcation of real discipline for the cunning addition of the spicing which turns out the perfect article, soldier or sausage. It must here be said that, partly from ignorance of history, and consequently of what the old Regular Army has done in the past, and of the qualities required for the doing, partly from the ingrained British habit of belittling its Regular fighting men, there is a strong tendency to belaud the “brains and initiative” of the new officer and the “superior intelligence” of the new rank and file to the depreciation of the corresponding ranks of the old.

His Majesty the King, in an address delivered to the gentlemen cadets of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, on July 2nd last, said: “. . . . You will soon become officers in my Army, and as such you will have the great responsibility of watching over the welfare of your men and leading them in battle.” (The order in which their

responsibilities are placed is noteworthy.) "To become an efficient leader the first essential is that you should gain the confidence of your men, and this means that you must know how to lead them. Your time here is necessarily very short—you must therefore work all the harder in order to acquire the requisite knowledge.

"Knowledge alone is not sufficient. You must cultivate a high standard of honour, moral conduct, steadfastness, and resolution, and, above all, must be loyal to your superiors and to one another. These qualities have always been the distinguishing characteristics of officers in the British Army. Most of you have come from public schools, and I am sure you will, through life, do your utmost to maintain their great traditions. . . . I hope and believe that I may rely upon you to maintain, untarnished, the very high reputation of those splendid officers who have fought so gallantly in the present great war."

Notable words which, though addressed to young men of the same class as that from which the officers of the old Regular Army were drawn, set the standard for all officers, whether of the old Regular or new amateur type; and a very characteristic journalistic comment (*Pall Mall Gazette*, July 3rd, 1916) on the King's speech runs as follows: "But the King was speaking immediately to a class of youths who may be trusted to carry on all that is best in the old military traditions. The advice applies to all who to-day receive the honour and responsibility of a commission. The war has effected a great change in this as in other respects. The doors have been thrown open more widely, and the officers who are leading our New Armies to-day are drawn far more indiscriminately from all ranks and positions." All of which though self-evident is harmless, but the scribe now proceeds, after the manner of his kind, to an ignorant depreciation of the old officer, while patting him patronizingly on the back; thus: "This more democratic system has its advantages. It ensures a higher general standard and a wider variety of intelligence and ability in those who have to lead our soldiers. The valour of the British officer in the past has never been impugned. The quality of leadership that springs from personal character and from a great and honourable tradition have also never been wanting. If the British officer has been deficient at any point it has been in certain practical qualities, intellectual rather than moral. These more practical qualities should be available enough among the young men who bear His Majesty's commission in the New Armies. But such qualifications do not complete the equipment of a successful leader of men. Our new officers are not the heirs of a long and glorious tradition. Many of them do not hail from the public school or the Universities, where the adage that manners maketh man is fully adopted. All the more important is it that they should, so to speak, create their own tradition and cultivate those qualities of chivalry and self-respect and discipline which are the essence of good manners and have always distinguished the British officer. Knowledge alone is not sufficient. It is important, perhaps more important, than has been generally recognized in the past, but it must be associated with those higher moral qualities enumerated in the King's address in order to produce the true leader whom his men will proudly and willingly follow."

Here we have displayed a quite typical ignorance of the high standard of professional attainment of the combatant Regular officer before this war broke out—a standard demanding considerable intellectual as well as practical qualities; and of the regimental system, or spirit, which made him the worthy heir of “a long and honourable tradition,” and cultivated in him the qualities of “chivalry, self-respect, and discipline” which this scribe seems to imagine can be acquired by individual effort and all at once.

How, in the Regular Army, the regimental spirit was fostered “C.N.” has set out admirably in a series of articles in *The Times* in June last: he shows how the young officer, in addition to being trained as a soldier, was taught the meaning of real discipline, which is the realization by each officer of his own responsibility; to place the regiment before self in everything, and to learn to know the men and how to handle them, sharing in their sports no matter at what personal inconvenience to himself, and winning their confidence. It took time, however, to turn out the old type of regimental officer; the process was leisurely; if a youth on joining a regiment was of the right stuff, he, sooner or later, became imbued with its traditions and “form” generally—even if he had not had the advantage (for it is an advantage) of having been at a public school; if he was not of the right stuff, he moved on elsewhere and possibly took to the lower forms of journalism. Contrast now the conditions which obtained in the raising and making of the units of the New Armies. Here we had the old and the new officer thrown together to perform a task in common—the disciplining and training, in a hurry, for war of hundreds of raw recruits. The views of the Regular on matters of discipline, and his general outlook, were, by reason of his up-bringing, poles asunder from those of the new and even of the original Territorial officer: in spite of the legend that he did not possess “knowledge” or “practical abilities,” the Regular knew his work thoroughly, and the new officer, however “brainy,” had generally a very great deal to learn; not only drill and so forth, but many other things which go to the making of a good leader.

When the units of the first hundred thousands of the New Army were being raised and trained, the Old Army was still in being, and its senior regimental officers were employed with their own corps, so dependence had necessarily to be placed, in a great many cases, on retired Regular officers to do the work—the Dug-outs on whom so much scorn has been lavished—and right well they did it, all things considered. As, however, a good many of them had either been on the retired list for some years after completing their period of command of a Regular unit, or had never attained to the command of one, the results were unequal; I speak more particularly of the Service battalions and batteries than of the second line Territorial units, which were mostly raised by Territorial officers of the active or retired lists, or by ex-Volunteers.

But in any new formation it is on the personality and quality of the senior officer, and especially of the Commanding Officer, that it depends whether that unit becomes truly disciplined, a live thing, an

entity, working with one accord for and with its chief for the good of the regiment, or a soulless conglomeration of individuals—quite apart from the degree of drill and training which may be attained; in both the Service and second line Territorial units, whenever the Commanding Officer possessed the faculty of command and was backed up by an efficient adjutant and a few good senior officers, battalions of the type portrayed by Ian Hay in "The First Hundred Thousand" resulted, in which the vinegar of the Old and the oil of the New Army were blended, and a real regimental spirit was evolved.

But this, even under the most favourable conditions, was not easily arrived at; with two types of officers, each with the defects of its qualities, differing so radically in up-bringing, in conception of duty and discipline, and in general outlook, it is not to be wondered at that in the early months of existence of the new units the professional Regular and the amateur new officer should not always have seen eye to eye, and that, till they had shaken down together, they should have formed somewhat unflattering opinions about each other.

Realizing that possibly the Regular might grate, at times, on the new officer as much as, I hear, the latter did, occasionally, on the Regular, I recently obtained from representative officers of each class their views of the other.

These I now give—not in any spirit of controversy—but to emphasize how very real was the difficulty of blending such opposite types.

The typical new officer whom I asked for his candid opinion of the Regular, as he had found him, furnished me with a somewhat disconcerting appreciation (!) entitled "The Regular officer as he is seen by the New Army or Territorial officer," in which was also embodied his estimate of the New Army and of the Territorial officer.

This particular critic is a business man of exceptional ability who, joining the Army in September, 1914, at the age of 39 as a second-lieutenant, became a captain and brigade-major the following January, and a major, second in command, of a battalion by March, 1916—a fairly rapid rise it must be allowed, even as times go; his views of the Regular, I have reason to believe are, or were, those of a considerable section of his class.

About the Regular officer he says: "My own view of the Regular officer, in the majority of cases, more especially if he has had no previous experience of the civilian soldier, is that he has little or no sympathy with him. If he is in a senior command he looks down on him and considers himself more or less unfortunate that he should have such material to train and command, and on which to depend for honours to be gained.

"He will use him to any extent, taking all credit to himself, probably flattering himself that he has been the cause and is solely responsible for the new officer's action. To my mind the Regular is selfish and small-minded and has enclosed himself in a water-tight compartment which can only be entered by those of his own brand, and he would collect nothing but the Regular brand in his compartment, whatever the emergency. I do not think that the Regular has very great brain development. He has never had to use his brain

outside routine and his training; while it makes an English gentleman of him, it leaves him in all else cramped and narrow of vision. The civilian soldier, with experience of the world, is quick to see the faulty organization-abilities (sic) of the average Regular and his complacent satisfaction with himself. The Regular forgets what the new officer has given up to join the Army and overlooks the fact that the latter has had to work harder, during the short time he has been mobilized, to acquire a working knowledge, which he (the Regular) has been gradually acquiring since he was eighteen years of age."

Of the New Army officer he says: "The new officer who has joined either a Regular battalion, or a Service battalion of a Regular unit for the period of the war, at once thinks he is surrounded with the halo of the traditions of his regiment, and he is, in imagination, at one with the Regular and looks down on the Territorial." And of the Territorial: "The old Territorial of ante-bellum days, who took the Imperial Service obligation when the war started, laughed in his own mind at the Regular officer as being nothing but a hired assassin! He considered himself above him, as he (the Territorial) had come forward voluntarily in a crisis and had given his services on a basis equal to the Regular. He would have branded himself with 'T' badges a foot long, that he might not under any circumstances be taken for anything but what he was, namely, a Territorial and not a Regular.

"The later-joined Territorial, who joined this branch either as an old Volunteer, or because it was the easiest thing to get into at the moment (when commissions were harder to obtain in the first months of the war), became at once more or less of the type of the old Volunteer redivivus. He looks on the Regular officer with feelings somewhat akin to fear, as on some superior being from whom he can expect nothing but 'strafe' and contempt, while at the same time, unlike the original Territorial, he will make every endeavour to disguise his identity, and would give his eyes to be taken for a Regular."

Now let us see what were the impressions produced by the amateur on a typical senior Regular officer concerned in the raising, making, and training of a new unit to whom I showed the appreciation I have quoted: he adopts the offensive-defensive tactics in presenting his views, it will be noticed.

Thus: "In the first place the Regular has, as a rule, very kindly feelings towards his civilian confrère. He does not, it is true, generally wear his heart on his sleeve, and his apparent lack of sympathy—by which I take it our critic means a backwardness in invariably praising men for doing the right thing and a tendency to set them right, invariably, if they do not—is due to his early training at a public school and, later, in the Service, which teaches him to regard playing the game, or the performance of duty, as a matter of course, and to expect reprimand if duty is not carried out, or the game played. Moreover, this same training also teaches him to accept as a junior and, when he himself becomes senior, to administer reproof without subsequent rancour on either side—a faculty lacking in the new officer, whose sensitiveness, or thinness of skin, is often due, I think, to an

exaggerated sense of his self-sacrifice in accepting a commission. Everyone concedes, and no one more heartily than the Regular officer, that a great number of new, and Territorial officers on the retired list, were actuated by the very highest motives in coming forward as they did at a time of national crisis, and that a considerable number of them have been pecuniary losers, though possibly gainers socially, by so doing, but in my experience some of these were a little too given to proclaiming the fact; sometimes, indeed, putting it forward as an excuse for flagrant military sins of omission or commission, the argument being that the officer concerned, having given up a lucrative business or practice, or what not, or even as head of a very leading firm, was above the vexatious restraints of regular discipline and was doing "his bit" quite sufficiently by being in the Army at all. Very often also the new senior officers who were more impatient of superior control were the greatest martinets, in non-essentials, in their own units, exacting when off duty and in the mess a ridiculous amount of deference from their juniors, and setting up a sense of friction and bad feeling. To further account for an apparent lack of sympathy on the part of the Regular sent to new units to train them as rapidly as possible for war; while the new junior officers were on the whole very keen to pick up a working knowledge of soldiering and appreciated the fact that there was no time to waste, many of the new seniors were more enamoured of its spectacular side, and would have been quite content to route march daily, parading the street at the head of the battalion, all ranks, especially the mounted officers, throwing a chest, instead of tackling the progressive drudgery of quick preparation for war. That the Regular should try to eradicate this leisurely spirit (which was most noticeable in some second line Territorial formations) and to get a move on, quite possibly hustling all ranks in the effort, does not betoken any want of sympathy or that he looks down on the new officer.

To the friction which occurred in the early days another contributory cause was, what I can but describe as, the colossal conceit of a certain class of senior amateur officers; a conceit fully equal to the self-complacency of the Regular which our critic finds so trying. For some reason, or no reason at all, the belief is still held by the public, and was indulged in by a considerable section of amateur soldiers, that, whereas in every other profession or trade a period of apprenticeship is necessary before proficiency can be looked for, soldiering can be picked up by anybody and requires no previous training; that the art of war can be applied by unskilled labour, in fact. The senior (generally Territorial) amateur officer very often fondly imagined that because he was letter-perfect (as he so frequently was) in the drill books, and had read a certain amount of military literature, there was nothing more he could be taught—and the chief offenders after the war had been running some time were those who, after serving a few weeks or months at the front had returned for duty with a new unit in process of formation.

This class, whose views of war were as narrow as its experience of it (confined moreover to trench warfare) was limited, was particularly

troublesome in a new formation, because it opposed openly or cavilled secretly at, all forms of training for officers and men except in trench-fighting, arguing that the encounter battle would never again be possible, and that, because artillery as an arm has increased so greatly in importance, all attempts to teach the new infantry to manoeuvre above ground, or to shoot except at point-blank range were a waste of time.

It is not, however, to be wondered at that this type should have existed in a nation given over to amateurism, and in this connection I cannot do better than commend to such gentlemen the book on "Ourselves and Germany," by Dr. E. J. Dillon, and especially the paragraph in it applying peculiarly to the know-all-about-it amateur officer, which runs as follows: "Englishmen in particular must learn the duty of self-abnegation for the welfare of the community" (for which read the regiment) "and substitute a scientific spirit for arrogant amateurism" (which applies to scathing criticism of the conduct of the war by higher commands, and of generals and staffs). I refrain from further counter-attack in this particular except to remark that the new officer, in spite of being so often a professed man of business, was not invariably a conspicuous success in administering the interior economy of a unit.

To the criticism that the Regular is self-seeking and selfish, the obvious retort is, so is every other professional man, including the politician. Soldiering is the trade of the Regular, and he is fully as much justified in playing for his own hand in pursuing it as the solicitor or mining engineer or chartered accountant is in his. As to being small-minded—that is a disability by no means confined to the Regular, and his tendency to "collect nothing but his own regular brand in his compartment" is quite natural; would not a solicitor or chartered accountant, entrusted with carrying out a special piece of work in his own particular line practically single-handed, but responsible at the same time for the instruction of a crowd of embryo solicitors or accountants in a rough working knowledge of law or accountancy, welcome the advent of a trained man of his own profession to assist him?

That the Regular is as a rule a bad man of business is freely admitted; and is due to his training and a subject for congratulation, for, in the rare cases in which he is a good man of business, he is generally a poor soldier. Again, he may not possess great brain development, but he is possessed of practical commonsense and the faculty of dealing with men.

To sum up: this typical new officer found the Regular, as a class, unsympathetic, patronizing, self-seeking, selfish, small-minded, prone to favour Regulars at the expense of the amateur, to have no great brain development, and, by reason of his training, to be cramped and narrow of vision, with little faculty for organization but unduly self-complacent; as a set off he concedes that the training of the Regular makes an English gentleman of him. On the other hand, the equally typical Regular found the new officer thin-skinned, given to laying

too much stress on his self-sacrifice in accepting a commission, conceited, and, in spite of being so often a professed man of business not always very brilliant in matters of interior economy.

I put all this in the past tense, advisedly, since a very great number of the new units have been welded by actual experience of war on all the fronts with the result that the angles of the old Regular and the new amateur officer have been rubbed off and each type has got to know the other and appreciate its good qualities.

To turn now from the officers to the rank and file of the New Armies and consider how the men adapted themselves, while still in the raw recruit state, to the utterly novel conditions of a soldier's life: I exclude the original Territorials who when war broke out were partially trained and had some conception of discipline. The New Army soldier had to commence from the very beginning; drawn from every class of society he had hitherto been his own master in essentials, free to come and go as he pleased, and, according to his class and means, not bound to touch his hat to, or obey the orders of, any other man except in so far as doing so affected his prospects or livelihood. The recruit of the Old Army had to undergo the same experience it is true, but he joined a formed unit and was not handicapped as the new soldier was by finding himself in a crowd of others, and commanded by officers for the most part, as raw as himself, without any equivalent to the old Regular non-commissioned officer to act as intermediary and prop.

But after the first strangeness of it had worn off, the new rank and file proved extraordinarily amenable to discipline on the whole, though, strange to say, it was men of the lower middle classes—junior clerks, shop-assistants, and so forth—and not those of the labouring or upper and upper middle classes, who were least so, which has been ascribed to the fact that from the same class a considerable number of the junior officers were granted commissions during the early stages of the war; with not altogether happy results on their fellows in the ranks who, prone as a class to the ultra-independent, resented being ordered about by brothers Tom and Dick or by cousin Harry, and very often only regarded the ranks as a mere stepping stone to becoming officers themselves.

But whether "Duke's son, cook's son, or son of a belted earl," keen to learn the new job in all its aspects they nearly all were; the early disciplinary troubles were mainly due to the utter contrast between the free life of the civilian and the necessary restrictions and observances imposed on the soldier.

From all I have gathered there was not, from the outset, on the part of the new rank and file the same antagonism to the Regular officer which was displayed openly or covertly by a certain section of new officers because the Regular, being accustomed to handle men and appreciating what life in the ranks is like, realized what the new recruit was undergoing and treated him with sympathy and understanding.

So the disciplining and the preliminary training progressed—up-hill work in the early days for those responsible, but as the weeks

and months passed the grub recruit gradually effected his metamorphosis and became the butterfly trained soldier, not quite so well disciplined and trained as his old Regular prototype, as was only natural, but, while differing from him in some respects, strongly resembling him in others, showing the same tendency to "grouse," but carry on, to regard with the deepest distrust efforts to improve his messing and possessing equal powers of fascination with the ladies.

And, simultaneously with the progress in discipline and training, grew up *esprit de corps*, confined at first to the unit, but (at all events in the service battalions) gradually extending till it embraced the regiment, the traditions and past deeds of whose old Regular battalions set the standard to be reached by the new, when the supreme test of battle should come—as it has now for so many of them.

The "halo of the traditions of the old regiment" has been a very great factor in the making of the new units. Just now there is much journalistic gush about the "spirit of the New Army"; as if that spirit were something new, and not the legacy handed down by the old Regulars.

So much for the moral aspects of raising the new units.

The difficulties experienced in their physical training—using the term in the broadest sense—arose from quite other causes than those due to the admixture of two opposite types of men in the commissioned ranks or to the newness of the majority in all ranks to the idea of discipline. New to military training they equally were, but the necessity for it in all its branches was so obvious as to need no demonstration, and it presented little difficulty to men so keen as those of the New Army and of such a generally high standard of intelligence and education.

That the general system pursued was a sound one, the performances of the New Army have proved conclusively; it was, after all, no new system, as the scribes appear to imagine, but the old regular course of progressive training modified to suit the circumstances of trench warfare and the fact that, whereas the training of the Regular recruits was reckoned in months, that of the New Army soldier had to be compressed into weeks.

The defects in the training lay, not in the system, but in the unequal observance of the syllabus laid down by the highest authority.

Thus in some commands the Brigadiers and Commanding Officers were left alone to establish, by steady drill, the surest foundation for steadiness under all conditions, before passing on to the many other subjects which had to be taught; in others, units were expected to run before they could walk, Brigadiers, instead of being free to supervise the preliminary training of their battalions, being called upon to prepare advanced tactical exercises each week, which their unfortunate brigades had to carry out, not yet knowing their right hands from their left; and regimental officers still ignorant of platoon and company drill, to say nothing of the most minor tactics, being required to write appreciations. As was to be expected, the units which had been thoroughly drilled and had not been hustled in their training turned out much better than the others.

Further, while some higher commanders ensured that the units entrusted to them received an all-round training, so far as the time available permitted, by preparations for the encounter-battle and all that leads up to it, as well as for trench warfare, others took the short view that training for any form of warfare except trench fighting was a waste of time; here again units which had received an all-round training proved of far more value than those which had specialized in trench work and little else. But whether the training was carried out methodically or erratically, on broad or on specialized lines, the greatest hindrance to it from the regimental point of view was the multiplicity of courses of instruction to which young officers were sent from their units while still in the raw recruit stage, with bad results to them and to their platoons and companies.

In spite, however, of all the drawbacks and shortcomings which attended the raising of the new units, the results have exceeded every expectation.

The New Army—*not* on a new model, but modelled on the old; trained on its system and imbued with its traditions, is proving its worthy successor, than which no higher praise can be bestowed.

This Army, formed of millions of civilians, disciplined and trained in haste at enormous expense, will, we all believe and hope, be the deciding factor of the war; this should give the politicians furiously to think on what would have been the course of the war, and what the saving of life and treasure, had the old Regular Army been of adequate strength in August, 1914.



THE BRITISH ARMY THROUGH GERMAN EYES.

Compiled by THOMAS F. A. SMITH, Ph.D.

Author of "The Soul of Germany" and "What Germany Thinks."

AS one of those who was in close touch with German opinion during the twelve years preceding the war, I have been keenly interested in following German opinion of our armies as expressed in German war literature. During my sojourn in the *Vaterland* I can only remember hearing one German speak with respect of the British Army. That was Professor Kuebler, of Berlin, afterwards at Erlangen University. He spoke with unreserved admiration for British soldiers when on the defensive.

The first mention of a British Expeditionary Force about 1905 for continental service, aroused a storm of anger and mirth in Germany. A member of the Reichstag stated in that assembly, that in case the force was landed in Schleswig-Holstein, a company of Berlin police would be sent to arrest them.

In the earliest days of the war Baron von Kuhlmann assured the British through a London newspaper that we had better keep out of the war as we had no army which could influence its course. Further, it is alleged that the Kaiser coined a notable phrase—"A contemptible little army." Whether that phrase is historic or not is immaterial, for it represents exactly what the average enlightened Teuton thought in the first months of the year 1914.

In giving the following extracts I am merely holding up the mirror to reflect German opinion, leaving all criticism to the reader's judgment.

"Among all the great European Powers, England is the only one which has not introduced national service and remained true to the principle of keeping an army of paid soldiers. Hence, when in all other lands at the outbreak of war, the entire people stands ready to defend the national honour, England is compelled to beat the recruiting drums before she can wage war. She must carry on a propaganda for the defence of the country, and the advertising art with all its tricks and methods is forced into the service of patriotism.

"During the first months of the war, recruiting progressed very slowly, and the question of how to get men was energetically discussed in the newspapers, severe criticisms on the weak measures of the Government being freely expressed. This was especially the case in the first half of November, 1914. The attacks would seem not to have been in vain, for from that time the appeals differ in their wording,

and a number of new advertisements have been brought out to entice the men of military age.

"The advertisements issued by the English Government since that date give the impression that an advertising specialist has been engaged who, according to the old recipe, works with sugar-candy and whip. In the cleverest manner he plays upon his public with all the arts of psychological suggestion, and endeavours with endless variations of the same tune to arouse patriotism—sometimes with good advice, striking appeals to national feelings and enticing hints concerning the Victoria Cross; at others with threats (national service!) and by poking fun at the slackers.

"All in all, the interest for the defence of the land seems to be greater among the women of England than among the men. The Suffragettes, whose former activities gave the English Government cause for serious thought, have placed themselves at the service of their Fatherland. Mrs. Pankhurst writes enthusiastic articles about the 'Mobilization of women for War Service,' and in fact, a large army of women has been formed who are being trained in all sorts of military work to assist in the defence of the country.

"It is not necessary to express the opinion which we Germans must form—and for that matter the citizens of other lands too, where national service has been introduced—of the dignity of a nation, which must employ such methods in order to spur on the men of the land to fulfil their duty to their native country."¹

"England wages war on business lines. It is not the sons of the land who bleed for Britannia's honour; mercenaries from the four corners of the world—including blacks—carry on the war as a trade for England's business world and nobility. England might well smirk as she uttered blessings on the Triple Entente, for has she not borne the brand of perfidy for centuries? Her breast conceals the meanest pedlar's spirit in the world.

"Every battle which Russia loses is a victory for England, and every defeat which France suffers means profit for England. She can afford to wait till her Allies are beaten and then take over their business. 'First come, first served,' does not hold good in England's case; for her motto is, the last to come gets the prize.

"Twelve Powers declared war on Germany. Then Japan, the thirteenth, poked out her yellow face and demanded Kiau Chou. A hyena had smelt corpses, but the blackmailing Mongol received no reply to his ultimatum. Grim laughter was heard in Germany—booming, bitter laughter at the band of thieves who hoped to plunder us. And in the wantonness of their righteous wrath, German soldiers scribbled on the barrack walls an immortal sentence: 'Declarations of war thankfully received!'

¹ Dr. H. Hirschberg: "Wie John Bull seine Soeldner wirbt" ("How John Bull recruits his Mercenaries"). Hirschberg reproduces in facsimile a large number of the recruiting placards which have decorated the British Isles since the outbreak of war. "Your King and Country want you" is also given (English and German) with music.

"It would be neither right nor just to accuse English soldiers of a want of courage. They have fought everywhere, by land and sea, with respect-inspiring gallantry—for mercenaries! But the war-like virtues of England's armies cannot atone for the cowardice with which she has conducted the struggle for naval supremacy. Albion signifies England's rulers. And this England of Messrs. Grey and Churchill, has covered herself with shame for all time by the manner of her warfare on sea.

"Albion has not changed. She has hidden her battleships in the bays of Northern Ireland, and conducts war on sea—not against our ships and soldiers, but against those at home, German women and children! 'The pinch of hunger makes the heart weak,' said the noble-minded Churchill."¹

"How wickedly the war was forced upon Germany! A ring of enemies surrounded her. Envy and ill-will were their motives, but they lacked the right measure for Germany's greatness. Our people stand invincible, united, staking life and everything they have—till the last enemy lies in the dust.

"Not much longer and the goal will be attained; the many-sided attack has been smashed and the war carried into enemy lands. Shining glory has been won by Germany's armies. The passionate *élan* of our soldiers, their death-despising bravery and single-minded strength, have gained victory after victory.

"Revenge begins to glow against the originator of the world-conflagration—against false England! Mute and astonished the world saw her baseness—wondering at her greatness and her sin. Envy and ill-will inspired her to cast the lives of millions into the scales, to open the flood-gates of blood, to spread pain and unspeakable misery—herself coldly smiling.

"What are men's lives to England? She pays for them. Her army of mercenaries which was to force her yoke on Europe, is paid with the gold of blackmailers. She sends hirelings into the field to defend the inheritance of her ancestors; paid mercenaries fight for her most sacred possessions, while those who pay the blood-money throng to see the masterly exponents of football. England is proud of her splendid sons who prefer this intellectual game to stern battle with the enemy.

"How different it is with our men! With shouts of joy they march out to meet the enemy, offering their lives in a spirit of glad sacrifice for the highest and best which the world has to offer humanity. Storming forwards with the song, 'Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,' our youthful hosts, greeting death with a smile, hurl themselves upon the enemy. Truly, wherever and so long as men are men, the glory of our warriors will find remembrance in brave hearts."²

¹ Fendrich: "Gegen Frankreich und Albion." ("Against France and England"), 1915.

² J. Bermbach: "Zittere, England!" ("England, tremble!") Weimar, 1915.

"According to its composition the English Army is an army of mercenaries. On that account, however, it would be a great mistake to despise the quality of the soldiers or to cherish contempt for them. The standard of physical fitness demanded of the recruits was—at least up till a short time ago—more severe than that imposed in other lands. There is no doubt, our German brothers who have met the English on the field of battle, admit that they fight not only with valour but with unyielding stubbornness.

"This results not so much from barrack-yard drill and field manoeuvres, as from the practical experience of warfare gained in many campaigns. England is occupied almost uninterruptedly in warlike enterprises in some part of the world or other. Further, the officers—belonging mostly to the upper circles—have distinguished themselves in the field by a reckless bravery which was marked perhaps not so much by military as sportsmanlike behaviour.

"All in all, the strategic value of the English Army in regard to leadership, training, discipline, and the spirit of the troops, cannot compare with the conscript armies of other lands—especially the German Army. Yet the contempt which has been expressed for it in the Press as an army of hirelings, is just as little merited to-day as it was in the past when it added many a glorious page to England's history.

"These remarks are intended as a refutation to the reproaches made against the English Army. It is true, those unjust criticisms did not originate with experts, or they would imply a dangerous under-estimation of the enemy. But in consequence of the widespread acceptance among the masses they unjustly feed the fires of hate."¹

* * * * *

"For the last ten days we have been resting to the west of Lille, not far from Armentières; an English army is opposed to us. My battery is one of the links in the long chain of growlers² which daily pour fire and iron on to the enemy. We have given up counting the days and fights, for every day has its battle. Besides the English there are Indian troops and a few French batteries in front of us.

"Every day confirms our experience that we are faced by an enemy with incomparable powers of resistance and endurance. An enemy who can hardly be shaken by the sharpest rifle-fire or the most awful rain of shell and shrapnel. We gain ground slowly, exceedingly slowly, and every step of soil has to be paid for dearly.

"In the trenches taken by storm the English dead lay in rows, just like men who had not winced or yielded before the bayonets of the stormers. From the military point of view it must be admitted that such an enemy deserves the greatest respect. The English have adapted the experiences gained in their colonial wars to European conditions in a particularly clever manner.

"In the early battles west of Lille we advanced quickly; one English position after the other fell into the hands of our infantry.

¹ Dr. G. Landauer: "England." Vienna, 1915. Herr Landauer is an Austrian.

² The Germans call their big guns "Brummer," i.e., growler.—AUTHOR.

Here I can only say very little of the appalling scenes which we saw in the captured positions; a small section of the entire panorama of horror and wretchedness.

"Not far from our dug-out there is a captured trench. An English officer, apparently forty to forty-five years of age, lies there in the midst of his men. From his papers I learn that his name is Captain H. J. Maffet,¹ of the 2nd Leicesters. Near the dead man I found a card with this report on it:—

"To Lieutenant Daly. My position lies 600 steps north-west of point 42 of the forts, battery Sénarmont; near to the edge of the Lille plain. I cannot get forward on account of heavy machine-gun fire from enemy trench which is situated in the immediate vicinity of battery Sénarmont. Please request the artillery to cover it. There is no intention to advance and it is possible that I shall be ordered to retire from the fighting line. Maintain a good firing position, dig in."

"Here the report breaks off in the middle of a sentence. Probably a shell splinter struck him in that moment. I have kept the card as well as an addressed envelope. Perhaps I shall have an opportunity after the war to forward the last words written by a fallen English comrade to his relations. I have his wrist-compass, which I shall send too."²

Lieutenant Reinhardt was wounded and returned to Germany. At the conclusion of his book (p. 95) he writes: "I was talking to a friend—a good, clever man. I had told him a few of my recollections—a thing which one seldom does. For example, that we had got to like the French and that we had learned to respect and esteem the English as true, exemplary soldiers.

"In the front trenches you soon lose your hate for the enemy; you fight from a feeling of duty, and a 'Hymn of Hate,' à la Lissauer, could only be composed by someone far away from the front. These points served as a basis of bitter criticism on the part of my friend. 'A splendid time?'³ he uttered questioningly, and then added, 'It seems to me that only littleness, love of gain and false ambition are at work.'"

* * * * *

"We have just gone into billets. Not far off are the positions of the enemy—the English. There will be a battle to-morrow and everybody is serious. Mostly, we are too tired to think when evening comes, but it is not so to-day.

"Again and again I arrive at the same conclusion—war is too great a thing to comprehend. Now we are going into battle with the

¹ From enquiries made by the writer of this article, it appears certain that the officer in question was Captain H. T. Maffett, of the 2nd Leicesters.

² Lieut. Walther Reinhardt: "Sechs Monate Westfront" (Six Months at the Western Front"). Berlin, 1915; p. 33, *et seq.*

³ *Grosse Zeit* (a great time) is the phrase which Germans use in speaking of the present war.—AUTHOR.

black-white-gold band on our breasts. Greetings to you all at home, above all to you, father. I have your blessing, haven't I?

"October 24th. We are lying before the road from Ypres to Paaschendaal. The Lieut.-Colonel has just told us that 'the losses cannot go on at this rate.' By the side of the brook, on this side the road, English sharpshooters are in hiding. They shoot damned straight. Our artillery is not yet up; the reason for our heavy losses yesterday.

"The infantry advanced with a rush towards the windmill, but we no sooner topped the hill than the English machine-guns began to rattle. Our front ranks were mown down. Every attempt to advance failed. The order was given to lie down and there we remained for four hours. Then we rushed one after the other through a hedge. When darkness fell we had nearly reached the English trenches, but were recalled and spent the night in our trench.

"The next morning passed quietly, except for rifle-fire. Captain von K. was hit, and rolled over in front of the trench. Three comrades crept out one after the other to fetch him—all three fell. At last our wounded captain was still too—killed by a second bullet. Being compelled to watch this scene without power to help, was the beginning of our day.

"Just after mid-day the music began. Crash! a shell lands in our trench on the right. A short pause, and crash follows crash as the shells are dropped into our trench at distances of four yards. Death walks slowly up the trench towards us. We know that he is coming, we see him. Everybody is lying flat on the ground. We are waiting for 'our' shell.

"If we had a communication trench we could escape—but there isn't one. We reckon the distance: twenty-five yards away another direct hit. Crash! only twenty yards. Fifteen yards! We have only five minutes to live. Thoughts of God and home and parents rush through the mind; yet they are only numb feelings. Crash! ten yards; one more and then comes 'ours.' But no, the next boom was in the trench behind, and in the same manner that trench was cleared from end to end.

"Lieutenant T. killed, Lieutenant K. takes command,' was passed along. We have hardly left the trench when bullets begin to whistle round our heads. Man after man remains behind. At last night sinks and hides the horrors of the day. I have lost my company and spend the night in the open with a few others.

"The next morning the sun shone brightly; the morning wind blows coldly over the furrows and over the dead. I have no words to describe what I saw—but my heart bled! Near Paaschendaal I found my company. Altogether there are thirty of us—out of two hundred and fifty."¹

¹ Extracts from the diary of a German soldier, published in "Der Weltkrieg" ("The World War"). Leipzig, 1915.

"By the end of the year 1914, the right wing of the German Army had pushed forward to the Yser. During weeks of hard fighting it had just been possible to maintain the hard-won positions. From Nieuport to Dixmuide along the river Yser, from Dixmuide to Ypres, by canals and flooded lands—weather and water, fog and mud stopped the German advance. Added to this, the enemy exerted himself to the utmost by bringing up new forces to drive in our right wing and force us out of conquered Belgium.

"Those who have seen the Yser district, know that towards the end of 1914 it had been rendered impossible for our troops to gain ground—there was none to gain; on all sides an endless sea of grey slime.

"Every attempt to cross the canal was thwarted by artillery fire, and in many places the enemy was more advantageously situated than our men. His trenches were at least dry while ours were flooded with water. I went into the front trenches by Dixmuide and found them lined half a yard deep with faggots and wood, yet at every step our feet sank into the water and slush.

"On the other bank of the Yser lay the enemy, and fired continuously. Anyone who saw our soldiers under these conditions and heard their jokes will never forget the sight. All the folk at home who grumbled at the slow progress ought to have been sent for a single day and night into that muddy swamp!

"In those fields and canals, in this endless morass—made impassable by flooding—many, many brave German soldiers have sacrificed their lives. During the autumn and winter months of 1914 the whole Yser region was transformed into a vast graveyard.

"The battle-front was determined by the nature of the land. It stretched from the sea through Ramscapelle, Dixmuide, Roulers, Paaschendaal to Ypres, and the rage of battle swayed like a tossing ship in ocean storm. Even now Germany does not know the greatness and terror of the battles fought there. Only names are known, such as Middelkerke, Zonnebeke, Warneton, etc.

"The Belgians fought with the courage of despair. Their battle-cry was 'Louvain!' and 'Termonde!' Highlanders, Indians, Sikhs, Ghurkas, Zouaves, Turkos, Canadians, Belgians, French, and English were thrown into the line, and ever-new regiments landed at Calais. Houses and villages were taken and retaken at the point of the bayonet, as many as seven times. Towns and bridges were conquered and lost often eight times in succession, accompanied by heavy artillery duels and incredible losses. Again and again the enemy hurled new regiments—over heaps of corpses—against our positions.

"And thus it continued day after day, while the night let loose the wildest, bitterest struggles of all. Oftentimes the bushes and shrubs were drenched with petroleum by day; then amidst the stillness of the night a screaming signal was given, and the whole plain became a gleaming, warming flame. Forwards rushed the men, to shouts of 'Hurrah!' and deep-throated German songs, interrupted by the screams of the wounded and dying, the tack-tack of the machine guns, and the maddening fire of rifles.

"Forward! Forward! with fixed bayonets into the enemy trenches. Man to man! The enemy rushed out to meet our men. Cries of 'Louvain!' 'Termonde!' 'Deutschland!' 'Hurrah!' rang through the night and the work of murder began. The terrifying yells of the Indians pierced the air, but ever forwards, till the flames sank and the battle died down like a fever—into death and stillness. The bayonet attacks were truly appalling. Many soldiers were stabbed right through from chest to back. It was, indeed, hell! The waters in the canals from Ostend to Nieuport were red with blood."¹

"While the armies of the Central Powers are lifting the Russian gate off its hinges in West Galicia, we on the Western Front are about to knock in the Anglo-French armoured door. Our enemy here, however, is tougher and more intelligent and lets his teeth be blown out of his jaws before giving way. The struggles are desperate; the storming columns of the English rush against the fire from our trenches, but our men are full of courage and confidence. I must admit that I should not like to be in Ypres to-day, nor in its immediate neighbourhood. I should not like either a friend or a brother of mine to be there. I think, too, that even for English nerves they find that hell sufficient to endure. I won't mention the French and the coloured troops who would have had enough with half. They—the English—know quite well that we are in earnest and they do not deceive themselves concerning the situation. The language of our guns is inexorable and pitiless. During those awful bombardments their aeroplanes swung up like frightened birds and flew with desperate determination over our positions in order to discover the guns, and very soon we could see the shrapnel bursting around them. One English biplane, about 7,000 feet high, was especially daring. A shrapnel exploded close above him and he turned with a daring curve and went off. But he returned again; three times he stubbornly made bold attempts to fly over our positions."

"Early next morning we visited the trenches by La Bassée. Things are already getting lively; the crack of rifles resounds and bullets go singing past above our heads. The English have begun the morning's work and are banging away to wake themselves up. They are damned keen! As soon as a cap or anything appears above our trenches, bullets come whizzing around. Outside we can see nothing; wire entanglements, grass growing wild, a wall of earth. That is all."²

Another war correspondent gives an interesting account of a visit to the Crown Prince of Bavaria's Headquarters:—

¹ Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen" ("With the Army Headquarters in the West"). Herr Binder is a war correspondent.

² Bernard Kellermann: "Der Krieg im Westen" ("The War in the West"), 1915.

"At the dinner an Austrian Airman-Colonel was present and naturally the conversation turned to aviatics. On the preceding day English airmen had bombed a neighbouring village where our men were in quarters. The Crown Prince said that he had heard the explosions. Among the hostile airmen he considered the English the best; in any case they have the fastest machines. From English airmen the conversation turned to the English soldier in general, one guest especially raised the question of the English Colonial troops. The Crown Prince answered that the Canadians are excellent soldiers and the Ghurkas too. Another guest mentioned that a telegram had just arrived stating that the English Government had been compelled to send 25,000 Australians from Egypt home again because they were absolutely demoralised. This news was received with satisfaction and amusement. 'That's fine!' said the Crown Prince.

"And what about English leaders? Who is the better general, French or Joffre?' The Crown Prince expressed the view that Joffre possesses greater talent. The thrust on the Marne which the French reckon as one of Joffre's achievements was, however, not his work but French's.

"And Kitchener, is he as great a man as the English believe?' 'I know him personally,' replied the Crown Prince, 'he seems to be an excellent organiser, that much was proved in Egypt, and to do him justice we must admit the same of the present war, but whether he is a great leader of armies, I doubt.'

"Somebody asked the question when Kitchener's much talked of army would appear in France. 'They are already here,' responded the Crown Prince, 'at least some of them have already fought against us, but the real strength of this so-called million army is in reality quite another question.'

"From Kitchener the conversation turned to Grey, and we were quite unanimous that among those who caused the war he bears the greatest guilt. Another said he had heard that when the English Government declared war on Germany they were firmly convinced that Germany would immediately give way and sue for peace. Prince Rupprecht thought it was quite possible for English madness to under-estimate Germany and over-estimate England to such an extent. He related an example of this megalomania. In his youth he had known an Englishman who had told him (and the Crown Prince mimicked his accent) 'An Englishman is ready to take on any opponent and six Germans as well.' This anecdote let loose a storm of merriment."

Later in his work Herr Goldmann describes his visit to Ypres.

"Everything points to Ypres. The finger-post at the cross roads gives the direction and the number of kilometres—only seven—which have still to be passed. Ypres is quite near and seems so easy to reach, but the road which the finger-post points to has been closed by the War God, who claims as toll—human lives, and his appetite for ever new victims for the right of way is insatiable. From here we can see the remaining turrets of the famous Cloth Hall. Turning

to the officers I said, 'It is only a few kilometres to Ypres; shall we get there?' 'Without the faintest doubt,' they answered."¹

"Since December 18th Hill 60—situated on the line Ypres to Comines—has been in the hands of Saxon troops. The French recognized the importance of the position, which is really the key to the whole district round Ypres. Day and night for nearly a month a devastating artillery fire swept the hill, but all the enemy attacks ended in failure.

"The French were relieved by the English, and a new, tenacious, embittered antagonist appeared on the scene. By means of saps and mines the enemy drew nearer till in places he was within fifteen to fifty yards of our position. Then began the work of the pioneers.

"At 7.30 p.m. on April 17th, the evening calm was broken by an earthquake-like detonation; the ground trembled far around and huge clouds of dense smoke announced what was probably the mightiest explosion of the whole war. The whole of Hill 60, in a breadth of about one hundred and twenty yards, had been blown into the air. In the large crater all lay heaped together—the horrors of war!

"It would be impossible to describe the enemy's artillery fire which immediately followed. A hail of iron showered down on the hill and a building behind it. The bitterness of the fighting—which lasted for three whole days and was largely fought out with the bayonet—man against man—defies description.

"Recognizing the importance of the position the English had brought up their best troops, the 5th Division. As a result of the three days' battle our trenches were completely levelled; they disappeared from the face of the earth. But in spite of the enemy's fire, a new position had been made, twenty yards behind the old one.

"The crater formed the dividing line; we held one edge and the English the other. In spite of their reports the English had not achieved a success; they had not advanced a single step. On the other hand we held our old position, only that the outward appearance of Hill 60 was changed.

"The other side of the crater offered good cover for the English. Several night attacks, made by us and our opponents, failed on each side. Our losses were great, but those of the English were enormous. On May 4th the 105th Regiment made a sudden attack² and drove our toughest enemy out of his trenches. The English were so surprised that they evacuated their trenches and our patrols advanced over two miles into the enemy's position, while the crater and two lines of English trenches were occupied by us. Besides that, we captured seven machine guns and one mine-thrower.

"It was a great achievement for the 105th, who had held on during the severest fighting for three weeks. The men advanced with an enthusiasm and determination which deserve admiration.

¹ Paul Goldmann: "Von Lille bis Brüssel." ("From Lille to Brussels"), 1915.

² The German author conceals the fact that gas was used.—AUTHOR.

It is true, the English tried to capture the hill again; their attacks, however—often with the bayonet—broke down under our fire and before the bravery of our troops. To-day the position is firmly held by the men of Regiment 105.”¹

* * * * *

“About a year has passed since the term ‘Kitchener’s Army’ came into use. All the other Powers engaged in this war possessed armies based upon national service. England, however, undertook to raise armies by stamping her foot on the ground. The other nations grappled and wrestled for victory with troops which were the result of many decades of organization and training. England took up the competition with them, in that she appealed for volunteers and threw them into the mighty struggle.

“It has taken a long time for ‘Kitchener’s Army’ to find its way from the recruiting office, through the barracks, across the drill-ground, over the Channel, through Northern France into the trenches—into actual warfare, face to face with the German antagonist. The battles towards the end of September gave the German troops their first opportunity of forming a closer acquaintanceship with Kitchener’s divisions. Numerous English prisoners gave us an opportunity of estimating the value of this opponent—and the picture is by no means inspiring.

“A large number of men were compelled to enlist in Kitchener’s Army because their employers had dismissed them. Pamphlets were distributed among them to convince them that they must enlist—or face poverty. The majority of the men have taken up arms unwillingly, as they do not consider themselves soldiers. All the prisoners make an un-military impression, and for the most part are happy to be out of the fighting.

“Considerable numbers of the men had never used a rifle before, others had had one to three rifle practices—making a total of fifty cartridges. Their training consisted principally in route marches. Up till a short time ago they were drilling with dummy rifles. Some of them were first armed with rifles in June, just before they were despatched to the front. Only a few of the men had ever dug a trench.

“The officers leave the practical training of the men to the N.C.O.’s—men who have been raised to that rank after a few weeks’ service as privates. England has very few so-called ‘drill-sergeants’ at her disposal to-day, i.e., older N.C.O.’s with long service behind them.

“Every sort of training is dropped as soon as they arrive in France; by a series of marches the men gradually approached the front. They entered the trenches just before the last heavy fighting. According to their utterances they had no idea of what was before them. One battalion had been in the second line only a few hours when they were surrounded by a German counter-attack. Every officer fell and most of the men were killed by German machine-guns. The reserves which were standing ready to support them, did nothing at all.

¹ Julius Hirsch in the *Fränkischer Kurier*, a Nuremberg newspaper, September 1st, 1915.

"Another battalion, likewise surrounded—moreover it had been decimated by English artillery fire—suffered such heavy losses that they surrendered at the command of their regimental commander. A third battalion was cut off from its brigade, received no support, with the result that several companies were entirely wiped out.

"Prisoners made during the English attack and who belonged to a number of other battalions, say that the whole front fell into disorder, because the expected supports did not come up. The losses caused by machine-gun fire were especially heavy; they believed that very few of the brigade were left alive. The officers had either fallen or had been taken prisoners.

"All in all, that is the value for offensive purposes of Kitchener's divisions. As a part of the men have never been in trenches, they lack the necessary powers of endurance for that kind of fighting. In spite of the fact that the men had only entered the front line just before their capture, they gave the impression of fatigue and exhaustion. Immediately they were taken in the flank, their staying powers failed and they surrendered.

"They admit that they are glad to be out of it, expressing themselves with great bitterness about the incapability of their officers. The latter, as well as the men, are mostly very young. Among them an extraordinarily large number of ill-developed men are to be found. Their discipline leaves everything to be desired. Only the larger part of the non-commissioned officers made a good impression.

"This is a picture which gives us Germans food for thought. We are reaping the fruits of our universal service (conscription) which during a hundred years has become flesh and blood to every German. The English are suffering the consequences of their system."¹

"It cannot be denied that the English have supported Joffre's offensive with valour, strength, and vigour. The battles which have raged since the end of September on the front between Givenchy la Gabelle and Armentières have given proof that the English are in deadly earnest. And if they have not obtained great success, still in this gigantic grapple, they have displayed desperate courage which compels the admiration of their opponents.

"The commander of a division with whom I spent the last few days said to me in a tone of deep conviction: 'Nobody must talk lightly of English soldiers in my presence. Their bravery and the extraordinary courage of English officers compels my admiration. Regimental commanders and staff officers advanced in the first line of their troops. They fight and fall by the side of their men. I saw several high officers killed myself.' Furthermore, I have heard his Excellency's words confirmed by many of his officers."²

¹ *Fränkischer Kurier*, October 7th, 1915. The above article emanated evidently from German official sources in order to re-assure the German public.

² Julius Hirsch (War Correspondent) in the *Fränkischer Kurier*, October 22nd, 1915.

THE RED CROSS IN THE WAR.

By H. C. COLLES.

THE Red Cross, accepted by all nations as the emblem of healing, requires no explanation. But just because its emblem has so wide a connotation, the work of the Society popularly known in this country as "The Red Cross," requires some differentiation and explanation. Every soldier knows that the whole medical service of each army is carried on under the Red Cross emblem; it is the means by which, as a result of the Geneva Convention, civilized nations at war know and respect each others hospital services. Wilful firing on or under cover of the Red Cross was to us the first intimation that in this war we were not fighting a civilized nation.

But to ordinary civilians "The Red Cross" means not a department of the Army, but a lay institution, with the upkeep and efficiency of which each individual is personally and intimately concerned. They know now that, whatever else they do or do not do, they must "support the Red Cross." Have they personal service to offer? Whether skilled or unskilled they offer it to the Red Cross. The elderly man of leisure, the medical man who is over age or can only give part time, the rejected recruit, the girl who "must do some war work," anyone, in short, who for one reason or another cannot take direct service in the Army finds something to be done for the Red Cross. That something may be as good a thing as military service; it may mean going to France, Salonika or Egypt; it may bring the volunteer under fire. On the other hand, it may mean nothing more eventful than a few hours a week spent in rolling bandages at a hospital supply depot in the suburbs of London, or signing a cheque for £1,000, or putting aside a penny a week instead of going to the cinema. At any rate it is something, and the old pre-war catchword, "Everybody's doing it," has a better meaning now that the thing done is something for the Red Cross.

Of course at the beginning Red Cross work meant a fashion of the moment, and among the thousands who thronged to the Red Cross offices or sent their cheques, there were the triflers who merely wanted a momentary notoriety. But that is over. At the end of two years the Red Cross organization is stronger than it has ever been. The triflers have been given the cold shoulder; the Voluntary Aid Detachments are filled with women who are content to go on month after month scrubbing paint and polishing brasses; the givers of money know that their gift even if it runs to four figures, is a mere drop in the ocean, nothing to plume themselves upon. The same job must be done each day, the same efforts repeated if the Red Cross is to go on. And as the Red Cross must go on, the practical jobs and the efforts to

find money for its work have become a matter of habit which will not be broken until the need is over.

What is this Red Cross organization which has established this wonderful habit, not only amongst the people of this country, but in every corner of the British Empire and in every country where British subjects are found or British interests are held dear? We will not spend many words over its history, but just a few are necessary. The important thing is to discover what it has done in the war and how the formation of this habit amongst people of all classes and all shades of opinion has enabled it to do its work.

First it must be realized that when the war broke out the present Red Cross organization centred in the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John did not exist. These two Societies had their separate offices, the one in Victoria Street, S.W., the other at St. John's Gate, Clerkenwell. Both had set up machinery for bringing voluntary aid to the Army Medical Service in case of war, both had trained detachments of men and women throughout the country, had prepared schemes for equipping and staffing emergency hospitals, and in doing so had had to face public ridicule when they spoke of being prepared for invasion. They had been more far-sighted than the majority, but the patriotic people who laid their plans, administered their modest incomes, and attempted, often in vain, to enlist the interest of the general public, would be the last to pretend that they foresaw what was coming. They had made simple preparation for the emergency of invasion; they had never contemplated the formation abroad of a vast Red Cross system on a battlefield over three continents. We need not recapitulate what happened on August 4th, 1914, and the weeks following. Immediately both Societies were overwhelmed with offers of help, applications for help, and inquiries of every kind. The British Red Cross Society, though the younger of the two, attracted the greater attention, no doubt because of the magic of its name, and an immediate effort was made to enlarge its scope to meet the needs of the situation. Queen Alexandra, its President, issued a moving appeal to the public for money, an appeal which during the month of August brought in some £60,000. Lady Lansdowne approached the Duke and Duchess of Devonshire and secured from them the generous loan of Devonshire House to be the Society's temporary headquarters.

On August 12th the first party of doctors and nurses left England to carry help to the wounded of the heroic Belgian Army which had already suffered terrible things at Liège. It will always be the pride of the British Red Cross Society that it set its foot in Belgium before the British Expeditionary Force left England, and that no less than six parties of its workers were sent to Brussels in the short interval before the fall of the city, that is between August 12th and August 20th. The next business was to send the first Red Cross Commission, with Sir Alfred Keogh, now Director-General of the Army Medical Service, as chief Commissioner. His work, with Sir Savile Crossley and Lieutenant-Colonel Wake, was to investigate on the spot the needs of the distressed Belgian Army, and to form a plan for bringing help in its most practical form. All this was preliminary

work, but by it the British Red Cross established that reputation which it has maintained so completely throughout all subsequent phases of the war, the reputation of acting promptly and without reserve, throwing its weight where it is needed, finding the right people for its work and allowing them a free hand in its execution. It has been able to do that because, as a voluntary institution trusted by its supporters, it has not had to fear that it might be called to account at each step. It has received a general mandate to do its utmost to help our sick and wounded, and on that it can take a bold stand.

But at the time of which we write it had still received no mandate, for it had not yet obtained the necessary supplies in funds and in material for its operations. That came simultaneously with the first shattering episode of the general conflict, when, Namur lost, the French and British line was bent backwards in the retreat from Mons. Sir Alfred Keogh's Commission necessarily left Belgium, and the journey through the north-east of France showed all too plainly the pressing need for some efficient scheme for carrying the wounded, for the establishment of rest stations, dressing stations and hospitals, and, though at the moment there was no actual shortage of dressings and other medical supplies, the imperative necessity of an organization able to supply any and every need for hospital equipment at the shortest possible notice.

The reports which the Commission made to headquarters in London were promptly acted upon. In the first place, Mr. Arthur Stanley, now Chairman of the Joint Committee, opened a store-house in the stables of Devonshire House to form a *dépôt* to which gifts in kind could be sent by the public at home who were almost clamorously anxious to be allowed to help the wounded, and from which stores could be dispatched to France. At the same time it became abundantly clear that the first general appeal to the public for money must be reinforced in some more emphatic way if the help of the British Red Cross Society was to be in any way commensurate with the need of the Army. Consequently Lord Rothschild, Chairman of the Council, Sir Frederick Treves, who already was busily engaged in organizing a large auxiliary force of doctors and nurses under the Red Cross, and Mr. Ridsdale, who, as Chairman of the Executive Committee had been the head and forefront of the Society's peace time preparations, addressed a letter to the Editor of *The Times*, which must be regarded as one of the historic documents of the war. It was a cry for help, appealing through *The Times* to every loyal Briton.

"No heart in the British Empire can fail to have been touched by the bravery of our soldiers and by the heroic way in which they are maintaining the reputation of our Army against tremendous odds. For the means to help the wounded, stricken while upholding every principle which England and civilization hold dear, we plead to-day. . . . Let it never be said that in the pressure and confusion of these unhappy times the wounded sailor or soldier was forgotten. Our future is in his hands. The least we can do is to afford him such assistance in his distress as will make him feel that his country is not ungrateful."

The leading article in which *The Times* earnestly commended the appeal to the public outlined with precision the function of the voluntary Red Cross Society as supplementary to the Army Medical Service. It spoke of the latter as "the most efficient, both in personnel and equipment, that has ever been known," but insisted, and with good reason, that "there are some things which an Army Medical Service cannot do in time of war," and that these things it is the special privilege of the non-combatant community to supply.

Thus began the great fund, which in two years has collected more than £4,000,000, and which, because of its origin and the undertaking given by *The Times* to acknowledge all gifts in its columns, is known as *The Times* Fund. The public only wanted a decisive lead to direct its generosity to the point where it was most needed. Four days were sufficient to produce gifts amounting to £100,000, and before another week was over that figure had been doubled. It was the immediate success of the appeal through *The Times* which led to the joint organization of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John for the purposes of the war. The first appeal was for the British Red Cross Society alone, and though no fixed sum was publicly asked for, the heads of the Red Cross work, viewing the crisis reported to them by their Commission, estimated that they must have a quarter of a million for immediate needs. By the end of the first week of September that sum was practically secured to them, and the suggestion, which came from *The Times* itself, that after the first £200,000 money collected through its fund should be shared equally between the British Red Cross and the St. John's Ambulance Association, was cordially accepted by the former. That was the first stage in the direct association of the two. A change of method, which substituted the pooling of resources for a division of the proceeds, was its natural corollary. A month or so later the two institutions founded their Joint War Committee. Both had laboured strenuously through the first crisis, and were to continue in some measure the separate departments of work upon which each had concentrated, but from henceforward, as far as the general public was concerned, their aims were one and their work was maintained through the Fund which they administered together.

The first work of *The Times* Fund was to secure something like an adequate provision of hospital stores and equipments of all kinds through the department which Mr. Stanley organized. But the second great need pointed out by Sir Alfred Keogh's Commission was almost as promptly taken in hand. That was the question of transporting the wounded from the field to the hospital. The Commission itself was able to improve matters by some improvised expedients; some railway carriages were begged or borrowed from the French railways and made into the first hospital train. But the congestion of traffic on the railways during the rapid retreat made other means of transport by road an imperative necessity. A meeting hastily called at the Royal Automobile Club on September 12th, resolved on securing motor ambulances for this purpose. Again the Red Cross did pioneer work, which eventually revolutionized the whole system of transport.

Its officials, in conjunction with the engineering staff of the Royal Automobile Club, decided on the standard type of ambulance to be adopted, and meantime *The Times* added to its general appeal for funds a special one asking for gifts of £400 each, the first estimated cost of building each car.

Through all this period of the war, until the battles of the Marne and the Aisne had determined the confronting lines in positions now so familiar that even a small change in them is a matter for encouragement or apprehension, the constant movement involving shifting of the bases far to the west, created immense difficulties in working out any system of continuous hospital supply. Sir Arthur Lawley, speaking at the Mansion House a year ago, described the situation in words which deserve quotation:—

“Let your mind travel back for a moment,” he said, “to last autumn when the tide of battle surged madly to and fro—now southward towards Paris, now northward again and westward towards Calais. The French Government were at Bordeaux; our base was St. Nazaire. Suddenly a stream of wounded men poured into Boulogne at the rate of over 2,000 a day. Hospitals had to be improvised, equipment to be furnished, stores and drugs and instruments had to be supplied, staff had to be found. A great and unexpected emergency arose, and greatly did the Red Cross organization rise to meet it. Our orderlies unloaded the trains, our ambulances carried the wounded to hospital. In the hospitals themselves our doctors and nurses, our dressers and orderlies, stood side by side with the slender advanced guard of the R.A.M.C., and for many days and many nights worked untiringly to give relief to hundreds, nay thousands, of our wounded men. At the same time from St. John's Gate and Pall Mall there rained a welcome shower of comforts and clothing, of medical stores and instruments and drugs, equipment and outfit of every conceivable kind. I do not hesitate to say that, if by nothing else, the Joint Committee by the record of work done in those few weeks has amply justified the confidence which the public has shown in its capacity for good.”

For some time Paris was the headquarters in France of the British Red Cross. There its hospitals received the wounded from the battle of the Aisne and thither its ambulances were despatched. The whole situation again changed, however, when Sir John French's forces were once more hurried north for their first famous defence of Ypres. The motor ambulances followed to Boulogne, which now became the chief port for the embarkation of the wounded into hospital ships. From there onward to the present time Boulogne has been the rallying point of our Red Cross organization in France, and there at the Hotel Christol the Commissioner has his headquarters.

With the establishment of the headquarters at Boulogne the outline of the present system of voluntary Red Cross aid to the Army Medical Service in France was drawn. It had still to be filled in in

every detail; a huge stores depôt, fed from the London headquarters, was established there. Gradually with the increase of the fleet of motor ambulances workshops for their repair and every requisite of outfit had to be supplied. It was at Boulogne, too, that the Women's Voluntary Aid Detachments first extended their work across the Channel. In October a Voluntary Aid Detachment unit, under Mrs. Furze, crossed by Dieppe to Paris, in order to establish a much-needed rest station, and its members were promptly sent back to Boulogne, where they established themselves at the Gare Centrale. We need not follow the gradual building-up of the scheme step by step. The opening of the various Red Cross hospitals at suitable points along the north coast, and of many, later, Voluntary Aid Detachment rest stations; the linking-up of railway systems and hospitals by the ever-increasing service of motor ambulances. The point is rather to contrast the hasty improvisations of October, 1914, with the wonderful machinery which exists now, and which has run with a clockwork precision throughout the heavy offensive begun in the region of the Somme. Many contributory departments sprang up as the need arose around the main business of direct help to the wounded. Chief among them was, and is, that which institutes enquiries to trace those reported as missing. The enquiry department for missing and wounded was first formed under the direction of Lord Robert Cecil, and in the days of confusion and uncertainty did inestimable service. Its work is still continued under Sir Louis Mallet's direction; its London headquarters is at 18, Carlton House Terrace, and relatives of missing men anxious for news are always sure of meeting with sympathetic attention and of securing the most careful and detailed search for information which may shed light on their troubles. Closely akin to this work is the care for those relatives who are allowed to cross to visit soldiers dangerously wounded and retained in hospital there. The regular supply of food and clothing to prisoners of war in Germany has been another special province of Red Cross work.

In reviewing the first adventures of our Red Cross in continental warfare it must be emphasized again that the peace-time preparations of both the Societies which now make up its joint organization had been directed mainly towards home service. Thousands of men trained in first aid as members of the St. John's Brigade enlisted on the outbreak of war as orderlies in the Royal Army Medical Corps. So far as they were concerned a magnificent preparation for foreign service had been made under the auspices of the Order of St. John. Apart from this both Societies had laid plans for the immediate opening of auxiliary hospitals, to be staffed largely by the members of their Voluntary Aid Detachments, and these were mobilized under the Army Medical Service. The British Red Cross Society, in addition to its activities at headquarters, had formed a network of branches all over the country with County Directors at their head; the St. John's Ambulance Brigade had long maintained ambulance corps and nursing divisions throughout the country. Both institutions were ready with plans for opening their hospitals as soon as they were accepted by the military authorities, and in both cases such hospitals have been supported from the first, except for the usual War Office

grants, by the efforts of their own districts. Their maintenance therefore is no charge upon the central fund except in cases where grants are made from time to time for special purposes.

Here, then, was the groundwork for that huge Red Cross hospital service at home, which the first Commission saw must be the companion of the service abroad. Roughly speaking, the problem was threefold: the supply of necessities for the immediate care of the wounded in the region of battle; the rapid evacuation of dressing stations and clearing hospitals by means of motor ambulances and hospital trains; and the preparation of sufficient base hospitals and convalescent homes for the reception of the wounded arriving in England. We have seen how the Red Cross put its shoulder to the wheel to secure the first two of these, and through the county branches of the British Red Cross Society and the district corps of the St. John's Ambulance it simultaneously tackled the third part.

The two Societies were able, therefore, to place a great number of equipped hospitals immediately at the disposal of the military authorities, and means of still further supplementing these were forthcoming in almost embarrassing profusion. For some time the War Office was besieged by individuals who had houses to offer to be used as hospitals. They were of all kinds, from large town and country houses to garages, stables, and even bathing huts. Some were absurdly unsuitable; other apparently excellent offers had fatal defects which only a careful examination could discover; many, again, were of the right kind, were accepted, and have since proved invaluable. But the delicate task of sorting and codifying these offers was more than the War Office could undertake in a moment of extreme emergency. It passed the whole business over to the Red Cross and determined to accept the recommendations of its experts. This department of work, known as the Auxiliary Home Hospitals, was first taken in hand by Mr. Makins, now Surgeon-General Sir George Makins, who, with Dr. Stewart and Dr. Fox Symons, built up the system which has now covered the map of England with military hospitals of this type. It should here be added that the similar organization of the Scottish Branch of the Red Cross, while preserving complete autonomy, has done a parallel work in Scotland which is of the highest order.

Before going further we may turn to results and see what is the position of this work to-day. The fact that the auxiliary hospitals worked under the local military command are, as already stated, supplied with equipment and funds from local sources, makes any comprehensive summary of their activities a difficult task, but it happens that they have just been invited at the request of the War Office to furnish their accounts to the Joint Committee, and a statement of the accounts of 813 of them has been prepared at the headquarters in Pall Mall. That statement shows that there has been a total expenditure on maintenance, administration, land, buildings and equipment of £1,091,625 17s. 3d.; that the War Office has contributed for maintenance £747,662 8s. 11d., leaving a voluntary contribution of £343,963 8s. 4d. These figures do not include rent, rates

and taxes, but in nearly every case the auxiliary hospitals have been lent free of all rent. Had the value of this contribution been assessed a very large sum would be added to the amount of the voluntary contribution. The following table of statistics, relating to 753 out of the 813 hospitals, is noteworthy :—

| | |
|--|---------|
| Total number of patients admitted | 177,001 |
| Total number of beds available | 29,987 |
| Average number of beds occupied daily | 18,650 |
| Average total cost of each in-patient <i>per week</i> , £1 2s. 9d. | |

The long periods of comparative inactivity on the battle front have of course reduced by a great deal the average of beds occupied daily. In times of stress the fullest possible demands have been and are being made upon the accommodation afforded by these hospitals, and right nobly have their staffs responded to the demands. The extraordinarily low average total cost of each patient per week (£1 2s. 9d.) is a figure which must be emphasized. It is due on the one hand to strict economy, on the other to the liberality of the public, which rejoices to shower gifts to increase the comfort and beautify the surroundings of the local hospital. The free gift of the medical profession to these hospitals is as much beyond all praise as it is beyond computation, and here, too, the Women's Voluntary Aid Detachments have done their greatest, because their most self-abnegating, work. All honour to the women who have journeyed to France, to Italy, to Malta and to Egypt as Voluntary Aid Detachment units, but they at least have had the compensation of the stimulating spirit of adventure, which to-day stirs English women equally with men. The Voluntary Aid Detachments at home have been content to scrub floors, cook dinners, clean up the surgery, sterilize the instruments, to undertake every kind of drudgery, including at times duties repulsive to women of refined upbringing. Day after day it has been for them the same dull job in the same dull place, without adventure and without reward. They have "stuck it" as the men in the trenches have "stuck it." "Indeed," said the Queen when she visited one of these hospitals, "I don't know what we should have done without our Voluntary Aid Detachments." All who know anything of them echo her words.

One of the first cares of the Red Cross at home was to provide an adequate base hospital, one which could be expanded readily to practically any size that circumstances might call for. The result was the British Red Cross Hospital at Netley. Sir John Furley, in consultation with others, designed its wooden huts 60 feet long by 17½ wide, each with twenty windows and four roof ventilators, which were placed together in the wide, open space at the head of Southampton Water. Netley Red Cross Hospital is like the well-known advertisement of the patent book-cases built up in sections—it is "always complete but never finished." Beginning with twenty-five of these huts it has received one addition after another, and, thanks very largely to its Commandant, Sir Warren Crooks Lawless, is a model of what such a hospital should be. The various county branches have undertaken the support of their own huts; generous people have endowed it with its operating theatres, its X-ray room, its pathological laboratory, and

its electric hut for the treatment of paralysis. Special smaller wards for cases of extreme danger requiring peculiarly delicate treatment have been grouped together; another group, known as the "Irish hospital," the beds of which are reserved for soldiers of Irish regiments, is entirely supported by the generosity of Lord Iveagh. One of the latest additions to Netley is the establishment of a technical hut, where the convalescents can not only amuse themselves but learn simple and useful handicrafts, carpentry, basket-making, toy-making, etc., which may be useful to them when the time comes for their discharge.

It is impossible, and fortunately not necessary, to keep to a strict chronological sequence of events in describing the multifarious activities of the Red Cross, but it is desirable to recall that the foundation of Netley and the establishment of the auxiliary home hospitals in all parts of the country had their beginning before the big constitutional change which amalgamated the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John under the Joint Committee and made their joint headquarters the present spacious offices at 83, Pall Mall. The work of the Red Cross Society had expanded, so that even Devonshire House was not large enough to contain it, and the Royal Automobile Club, again acting as the friend in need, lent offices at 83, Pall Mall, rent free for the end of the year 1914. Though the Order of St. John naturally kept open its historic headquarters at St. John's Gate for its own administration, it has shared the new Red Cross headquarters for war work. There the working representatives of the Joint Committee established themselves. Mr. Stanley became Chairman of the Joint Committee and built up the machinery of government; the Joint Finance Committee, presided over by Sir Robert Hudson, undertook the control and apportionment of the huge sums of money which were pouring in through *The Times* Fund. A little later a Collections Committee came into existence to organize further means of augmenting the Fund, having Mr. (now Sir) Charles Russell at its head. Sir Frederick Treves and his assistants of the medical and nursing staffs took up their posts there. The basement was given over to the stores department, which under Sir William Garstin's direction soon grew out of all knowledge, converting Pall Mall for the first time in its existence to the appearance of an important business thoroughfare, with lorries loading and unloading all day before the door of No. 83. Offices were assigned at the top of the building to the motor ambulance department, which presently, when Mr. E. M. Clarke took charge of its affairs, vied with the stores department in strong business management, and the rapidity with which it met all demands, whether from the War Office, the Red Cross Commissioners abroad, or the various departments at home. By the end of 1914 it began to look as though the Joint Committee of the Red Cross and the Order of St. John were prepared for all eventualities. *The Times* Fund had raised three-quarters of a million pounds and the machinery for expending it economically and to good purpose was well established; but there were in fact many crises ahead in the innumerable surprises and turns of fortune, most of them unfavourable ones, which made the history of the war during 1915.

The entry of Turkey into the conflict and the consequent threat to Egypt was the first sign that our part in the war must extend to the Eastern Mediterranean. It necessitated the concentration of large forces in Egypt, and in particular the disembarkation there of the Australian and New Zealand contingents, who were on their way to join the battle in the west. It is unnecessary to dwell on the landing on Gallipoli begun on April 25th, 1915, except as it provided one of the greatest opportunities for service which the Red Cross has known. It was only after the Gallipoli campaign had actually begun in this dramatic fashion that the Red Cross was able to gain a definite foothold in the Mediterranean. Sir Courtauld Thomson was the man chosen to go out as chief Commissioner and discover in what way the Army Medical Service could best be supplemented and strengthened by voluntary aid. He had already had great experience in Red Cross work. Two Commissioners in France had been appointed to the highest posts of medical responsibility in the Army, Sir Alfred Keogh to be Director-General of the Army Medical Service and Sir Arthur Sloggett to be Director-General in France. Sir Courtauld Thomson had followed the latter as Red Cross Commissioner in France, and though ill-health made his tenure of that office a comparatively short one, it had no doubt prepared him for some of the intricate problems which he was called upon to solve when he arrived in his new district, comprehensively described as "Malta and the Near East." The difficulties of the situation were almost overwhelming. With Sir Ian Hamilton's forces clinging to the nethermost edge of the coast and practically the whole of their hard-won territory constantly under shell fire, the great need was to ship the wounded away as soon as they had received first aid at the Field Ambulance. Trawlers and mine sweepers conveyed them to Mudros, the small island port which had suddenly become congested with every conceivable type of shipping. There they were conveyed to the hospital ships for the long journeys to the base hospitals at Malta, 700 miles away, or to Cairo, almost equally far off.

The first thing that Sir Courtauld Thomson found for the Red Cross to do was to supply everything, from soda water to mosquito nets, which might serve to ease these painful journeys. The hospital ships themselves were soon furnished with comforts. Every opportunity was taken of sending forward packages of provisions by the trawlers returning to Gallipoli after the discharge of their wounded at Mudros, and Sir Courtauld Thomson set himself to discover what was lacking in the official service in order that the Red Cross might fill in every gap. The second requirement was for a service of motor boats and other light craft to facilitate the transhipment both of men and of stores, particularly at Mudros. An appeal was made to England, and the indefatigable stores department succeeded in discovering some boats suitable for the purpose, in spite of the fact that almost everything floatable had been commandeered already by the Government. When the Red Cross workers in the Near East got their boats they were able to move more freely and to help the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps in innumerable ways.

A third feature of the work of the Commission for the Near East was one which has survived the Dardanelles campaign, namely, the establishment of Red Cross hospitals in Malta, and, still more important, in Egypt. The Egyptian hospitals are at the present time divided into two groups at and around Alexandria and Cairo. Each group is under its own Commissioner, while Sir Courtauld Thomson remains chief Commissioner for the whole area. Conspicuous in each group are the Saidieh Hospital at Cairo and the Montaza Convalescent Home near Alexandria. The Montaza hospital was the palace of the ex-Khedive, was taken over by the military authorities and handed to the Red Cross, who established there a hospital of a thousand beds with Colonel Willcocks as Commanding Officer, Mrs. Broadbent as lady Superintendent, and Miss Wood, of Guy's Hospital, as Matron. The palace stands in beautiful grounds of six hundred acres, stretching down to the sea shore, including its own harbour, and, most welcome of luxuries, two bathing pavilions. Everything has been thought of to make this palace not only a hospital but a home. A motor-boat makes six trips a day along the coast, carrying over ninety men. Games, indoors and out, are provided, cinematograph shows and concerts are given three times a week, which, as the Commissioner has already said, "have a lot to do with the recovery of the boys, who sing in harmony and forget their troubles." He adds, "I doubt if any other convalescent hospital in the world can equal Montaza, and the 7,241 boys who have been discharged to all parts of the Empire return their grateful thanks to the Red Cross."

If the Montaza Home has had special attractions to offer, the other hospitals, both those for officers and for men, have done equally solid work, and no efforts have been spared to add the graces to the solid benefits. Since the withdrawal of the Gallipoli expedition there has been, of course, no rush of wounded to the Egyptian hospitals, but sickness amongst the troops in Egypt and at Salonika has given them plenty of work.

While the development of this wide scheme of activities in the Near East was the principal addition to the responsibilities of the Red Cross abroad during 1915, at home it had equally striking extensions, of which the foremost was the equipment of the King George Hospital. That hospital, established in what was to have been the new Government Stationery Office close to Waterloo Station, contains 1,650 beds, and is therefore by far the largest hospital in London. It was designed from the first as a military hospital, but the Joint Committee of the Red Cross undertook to equip it at their own cost. There was merely the bare shell of the building. Everything had to be done, the wards, operating theatres and X-ray installation furnished, the dispensaries and stores and kitchens plenished, the staff quarters arranged, the chapel fitted up; the recreation rooms for the patients, and, finally, a garden on the roof were designed and completed. Again a special appeal as part of *The Times* Fund brought the necessary money. Beds were given by those who valued the privilege of naming them; other special gifts were asked for and almost immediately received; and the whole work was put in hand and carried through with extraordinary despatch.

The Joint Committee spent £39,000 on the equipment of the King George Hospital, and it continues to pay £500 a week towards the salaries of its civilian staff.

Again, here, as in all Red Cross work both at home and abroad, a personal care for those who come under its aid is its chief feature. It is that which most distinguishes Red Cross work from that of the Army Medical Service. The latter rightly exists to heal the soldier. The Red Cross exists to help the man, and at the King George Hospital that quality is particularly evidenced by what is known as the Compassionate Fund. This fund not only arranges the "joy rides," which are necessarily the chief form of recreation for convalescent patients in a big London hospital, where the delights of open air life cannot be given as they are at Netley, for example; it also provides from its ample stores all sorts of gifts, including a large issue of pipes and tobacco. But more essential work even than the giving of some 50,000 cigarettes a week, is what the Compassionate Fund does to help the soldier who is discharged as disabled. Suits of clothing, "civvy suits," as the soldiers say, are found for whoever needs them. Arrangements are made to put up relatives of patients who come from a distance to visit their friends, railway fares are paid, and the organizers of the fund pride themselves on discovering exactly what is needed by each man and his family.

The mention of discharged men brings us suitably to those hospitals which are concerned with the after-care of men partially or totally disabled. They are mainly men who have lost their sight, who have lost limbs, or who are paralysed, and for each class a special provision has been made with which the Red Cross has associated itself. The work of St. Dunstan's Hospital for the Blind, in Regent's Park, has been so fully laid before the public that description of it can hardly be necessary. Everyone knows what it owes to the initiative of Sir Arthur Pearson, and that its work is more one of education than of medicine. It has been well said that at St. Dunstan's the sightless man "learns to be blind"; he learns, in fact, to carry on his life, to make himself as far as possible independent of sight, to read Braille, to become proficient in any handicraft or outdoor work which he may choose, by which he can either earn a living or pursue a hobby.

While the work of St. Dunstan's is largely that of adapting the mind to circumstances, that carried on at the Queen Mary Convalescent Auxiliary Hospital at Roehampton House, and Dover House, next door, for officers, is primarily an adaptation, in some cases a recreation of the body. The idea and its realization was the inspiration of Mrs. Gwynne Holford, who, chancing to meet a man deprived of both arms and supplied with only the clumsiest of artificial appliances, saw in his need a great opportunity for private helpfulness. Roehampton House, with its beautiful grounds, was secured and turned into an ideal home. Outbuildings were built in which limbs of the most modern patterns could be made and fitted. There, since June, 1915, men who have lost a limb or limbs have been sent when their wounds were healed to be fitted with artificial substitutes, to learn to use them, and to be taught

employments as at St. Dunstan's. One of the chief objects has been to find permanent employment for the men when they leave, and conspicuous success has attended the efforts of the employment bureau. Neither St. Dunstan's nor Roehampton were started by the Red Cross, they have their own committees, with whom the credit for their well-being rests, but the Red Cross is represented on these committees, has made substantial grants to their finances, and helps them by every means in its power. Mention must here be made of another special hospital opened by the Red Cross at 78, Brook Street. It is small in size, its beds have been only recently increased from twenty to thirty, but its work illustrates the triumph of modern surgery. Ostensibly for injuries to the jaw, it may be described colloquially as a hospital for making new faces. The way in which shattered features are restored is almost unbelievable to those without personal knowledge of surgical science.

The permanent care of paralysed and otherwise totally disabled men is a work for which the Red Cross takes special responsibility. In their future there can unfortunately be no question of fitting themselves to circumstances, of finding employment and beginning a new life. They are helpless. For the remainder of their lives they will require constant care and attention and special treatment which may alleviate though it cannot cure. For them the Star and Garter Home has been planned at Richmond. The property of the well-known Star and Garter Hotel and grounds was purchased by the Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institute at a cost of £21,500, raised by a long series of sales held in all parts of the country, and was then presented by the Institute to the Queen, who graciously accepted it to be turned into a permanent home for paralysed sailors and soldiers. The Queen handed it over to the British Red Cross Society, who undertook to equip and maintain the institution in conformity with Her Majesty's wishes. The original idea was to retain the shell of the hotel building but to gut it, entirely remodel its interior economy, and to fit it with every convenience which could make it a model of what such a home should be. Plans were drawn for that purpose, but later it was found that something still better could be done by sweeping away the old building and replacing it with one designed in every particular for its new purpose. Here, the British Women's Hospital stepped in and undertook to raise a building fund of £50,000, which should be a gift from the women of the Empire to the men who had suffered for them. That has been done, but still the women's gift is incomplete, for not content with building the house they determined also to equip it, and bravely redoubled their efforts, asking for a total gift of £100,000. That sum is now nearly reached, and at the same time the British Red Cross Society has made rapid progress with its Endowment Fund. Two thousand pounds is asked for each separate room, and, as in the case of the King George Hospital, many generous people have come forward eagerly to claim the privilege of endowing and naming rooms in the Star and Garter Home. The difference, however, is that the £2,000 is a capital investment, which makes the endowment one for all time. One thousand will endow a ward bed, of which there are to be fifty altogether. The permanent Star and Garter

Home will contain 264 beds, of which 214 will be separate rooms. In the meantime the annexe of the old hotel was opened at the end of 1915 as a temporary home with 64 beds; at the present time the home is full, and is likely to remain so, for there is a waiting list which the authorities with difficulty keep down to 20. While, therefore, the greater scheme is still one for the future, and will be the noblest memorial of the war which the country can offer to its heroes, the beneficent work has already begun.

It might be supposed that with the constant need of extending and strengthening its work in France and Flanders, with the exacting ventures in the Eastern Mediterranean, and with such projects at home as have been here most briefly sketched, the Red Cross had its hands full throughout that year of many trials, 1915. In a sense it had, but it also had so many hands to work with that its action could not be hampered by filling them all. The Red Cross may have refused certain lines of action proposed to it; it has never refused them on the ground of being too busy with other things. It has found both time and money to satisfy every claim which has come within its programme of help wherever needed to the sick and wounded of the war; and while our own sick and wounded are naturally its first care, it has not stopped with them. As the Belgian Army gave its first opportunity of work abroad, so in every stage of the conflict that one amongst the Allies which was suffering most severely has found in the British Red Cross a true and staunch friend. The Anglo-French Hospital Committee was early set on foot to sift and regulate all private offers of help to the French. It undertook to do for the French Government very much what was being done for our own Government by the Auxiliary Home Hospitals Department. English men and women in great numbers were offering to set up hospitals for the French wounded and to give their personal services to nurse in the French hospitals, to drive their own motor cars, to act as orderlies, stretcher-bearers, as anything which might be useful. It was necessary to distinguish between those who wanted to help our Allies and those who wanted to help themselves. Again the sensationmonger and the notoriety seeker, even the spy had to be circumvented, while the genuine offers were most gratefully accepted, and have since been the means of bringing most efficient help where it was sorely needed. This was the first great work of the British Red Cross for France; the latest, though not the last, has been that rendered at Verdun by large convoys of motor ambulances of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John under the command of Colonel Barry. Through six months of the magnificent defence those cars have been going to and fro upon the roads behind Verdun. Constantly under shell fire, it is a remarkable fact that no driver has been hit. There have been many narrow escapes. One man seated beside a driver was shot; another car was hit, and a wounded man inside was further injured. A third car was thrown over an embankment, but these accidents are slight in comparison of what has been accomplished in the life-saving work.

The overwhelming trials of Serbia in 1914 and 1915 were among the cares of our Red Cross. Though the scourge of typhus which

followed the second Austrian invasion called for special measures which could only be made effective through an organization devoted to that one purpose alone, the Red Cross strengthened the hands of the workers from Great Britain, France, Russia and America with its gifts of medical stores, and dispatched to Salonika a special unit equipped with all necessities and comforts in Sir Thomas Lipton's yacht "Erin," which the owner had generously placed at the Society's disposal.

When Italy joined the Allies in the spring of last year, plans to show appreciation of her spirited action by some direct addition to her own admirable Red Cross service began to be debated in this country. Sir Courtauld Thomson found time, even among the heavy pre-occupations of the Gallipoli campaign, to pay a visit to the Italian front with Lord Monson. The Italian War Office and General Cadorna most courteously invited the visitors to make a detailed inspection of the Red Cross arrangements. They were enabled to trace step by step the processes by which the wounded were conveyed from the first line trenches through the field dressing stations and casualty clearing stations to the field and base hospitals. From what they saw the two Commissioners came to the conclusion that the offer of a convoy of motor ambulances would be the most practical way of showing British sympathy and goodwill. Lord Monson was then appointed British Red Cross Commissioner for Italy, and he returned to England to report, while Sir Courtauld Thomson hastened back to his absorbing region of the Dardanelles. Meantime a Committee for aid to the Italian wounded had been formed in London; Mr. G. M. Trevelyan, the historian of the Garibaldi campaigns, was busy collecting together an ambulance unit to offer its services to the Italians. It was finally agreed that the Joint Committee of the Red Cross should supply twenty motor ambulances, that the Aid Committee should devote the fund which it had raised independently to the expense of equipping and maintaining the unit, which should go out under Mr. Trevelyan's charge. This was the British-Italian unit No. 1; it started in August and got to work at the station appointed for it on September 1st. A second smaller unit, having six motor ambulances, followed on November 1st, and a third, this time with twenty-five motor ambulances, was added in February 1916. The first unit arrived in time, therefore, to take an important share in the big Italian offensive of fifty days' duration which took place in October and November, and their indefatigable effort throughout that period won the entire confidence of the Italians. It earned the reputation of a lucky unit, largely because in the terrible state of the mountain roads throughout the bad winter weather the British cars stood the strain on more than one occasion when the Italian cars broke down. This, however, Mr. Trevelyan has suggested, was neither altogether a matter of luck nor due to any intrinsic superiority in the cars, but to the British plan of appointing car officers, who supervise the running of the cars, insist on careful driving and prevent overloading. The number of kilometres traversed by the three units during the month of May, 1916, with the number of wounded carried by each, is given in the following table:—

| — | Ambulances. | Lorries. | Touring Cars. | Cycles. | Total. | Numbers carried. |
|---------------|-------------|----------|---------------|---------|--------|------------------|
| Unit No. 1... | 19,616 | 2,916 | 2,428 | 1,196 | 26,156 | 2,025 |
| „ 2... | 5,302 | 39 | 1,633 | 1,434 | 8,399 | 1,338 |
| „ 3... | 21,488 | 2,595 | 2,293 | 2,091 | 28,467 | 4,092 |
| Total ... | 46,406 | 5,541 | 6,354 | 4,721 | 63,022 | 7,455 |

The numbers, however, require supplementing, since they show that the small unit No. 2, while covering a much smaller kilometrage than either of the others, carried a disproportionately large number of wounded in this particular month. Looking at the returns for the whole period up to May during which the units have been on active service, we discover the number to be as follows:—

| — | Kilometres. | Numbers carried. |
|---|-------------|------------------|
| September, 1915 to May, 1916, Unit No. 1... | 205,423 | 28,122 |
| November, 1915 to May, 1916 „ 2... | 46,431 | 6,195 |
| February, 1916 to May, 1916 „ 3... | 89,689 | 12,036 |
| Totals | 341,543 | 46,353 |

So that No. 1, with its long and arduous service through the winter months, has done the lion's share of work.

A fourth unit has been sent to Italy. In point of time it is the third, for it began its work on Christmas Eve last, nearly two months before the arrival of unit No. 3. But it is of a special nature, not a carrying unit, but one for radioscopic examination. This unit, under the charge of the Countess Gleichen, carries a complete outfit for all forms of what is popularly known as X-ray work. It travels from hospital to hospital making examinations, on the results of which operations are undertaken. The following from a recent report gives a fair sample of the work done:—

“The new director (a surgeon) had in eleven men who had just arrived from a night attack all superficially wounded in arms and legs; radioscopied them, marked on their skins where we saw the foreign body, sent them on into the operating room, and between 9.30 and 12 o'clock the two other surgeons removed nine bits of shrapnel and one rifle bullet. Then came four desperately wounded cases. We radioscopied and found metal in each case, so we radiographed and localized them. Two were saved, but two who were bleeding internally died before they could operate.”

So the work proceeds, and in these ways the workers from our Red Cross, the only representatives of a foreign country who are taking part in the Italian operations on land, are constantly cementing the friendship between Great Britain and Italy by their good deeds. We have dwelt with some particularity on this side of British Red Cross

work because comparatively little is known of it. The people of this country still too little understand the immense difficulties in which Italy has been conducting her campaign, and some have even asked why our Red Cross should bestow so much in her service. The answer is, first, that Italy needs and deserves it; secondly, that what we have done for her has not been at the expense of our own soldiers and sailors; and lastly, that it is the glory of our Red Cross that whatever its hand finds to do it does it with all its might.

The most important expansions of the present year remain to be traced. These expansions are mainly in three areas, Salonika, British East Africa and Mesopotamia.

After the last disastrous invasion of Serbia, the result of Bulgaria's decision to throw in her lot with the Central Powers, the concentration of British and French troops at Salonika, determined the Red Cross authorities to make provisions beforehand for whatever course the campaign might take there. Early in this year, therefore, they established an immense stores dépôt in Salonika, sending out the largest single consignment of stores of all kinds which the stores department has dispatched at one time. Its value was £20,000; the goods were packed in over 2,000 bales and cases, and weighed 250 tons. The long list, which included every conceivable kind of hospital clothing, began with 15,000 dozen shirts and 10,000 night-shirts. Mr. E. A. Ridsdale had already proceeded to Salonika to represent the Joint Committee there as Commissioner. He received the stores, together with others shipped from Mudros after the evacuation of Gallipoli, and arranged for proper accommodation for the Red Cross service. Though the expectation of immediate hostilities on a large scale has not been fulfilled, yet this policy of taking time by the forelock has been amply justified. The Salonika stores have been invaluable, not only to our men suffering from the effects of a treacherous climate, but also to the sick and wounded in the French and Belgian hospitals. M. Labadens, Director-in-Chief of the French Medical Service at Salonika, has expressed his thanks to the present Commissioner, Mr. Fitzpatrick, in the following terms:—

"En vous retournant le reçu ci-joint, je tiens à vous exprimer mes sincères remerciements pour la générosité dont vous faites preuve vis-à-vis de nos formations. Vous avez déjà fait parvenir récemment des approvisionnements importants à nos bâtiments-hôpitaux et vous venez de contribuer à l'amélioration de notre hôpital pour contagieux."

"Je vous prie d'être mon interprète auprès de votre Société pour l'intérêt que, par votre entremise, elle veut bien manifester à nos hôpitaux."

The second new commission to be appointed was that of British East Africa, and the Joint Committee was fortunate in securing as Commissioner Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomery, who had an intimate knowledge of the country, and who left England with a small staff early in the New Year. The Joint Committee had previously made grants to help the ambulance service in British East Africa, but it

was felt that the time was now ripe for a more definite action. The Commissioner was given a grant of £10,000 to employ in such way as his judgment might direct, and since then several motor ambulances, the bodies painted white and specially designed with ventilators and electric fans to mitigate the intense heat, have been dispatched to him.

But the most important and certainly the most urgently needed effort of this year has been that undertaken for Mesopotamia. Many will remember the incidental mention in the official despatch of the fact that a Red Cross gift of clothing arrived just in time to be a very real boon to General Townshend's gallant but ill-fated garrison at Kut. It was certainly not for lack of trying that the Red Cross did not succeed in doing more than it actually did for the earlier stages of the Persian Gulf expedition. It is, of course, impossible to enter into any details on this subject at this moment, when Parliament is still awaiting the promised papers on the conduct of the expedition. We will only recall that somehow, in spite of all difficulties, the Red Cross got its stores up to Kut. Now its help is being accepted by the authorities in a larger measure. Mr. Ridsdale was able to go on from Salonika to Basra and to penetrate to Amarah. He reported: "The Medical Service, and of course to a still greater degree the Red Cross, has to be content with what odds and ends [of transport vessels] it can manage to persuade those responsible for the ordnance supplies to afford it. There is one exception, the hospital ship called the 'Sikkim,' which is of course earmarked for medical and Red Cross stores. There was a second, the 'Coromandel,' but it is broken down." Mr. Ridsdale was received by Sir Percy Lake, who, "with the greatest wish in the world to be of assistance to us . . . has explained the position he is placed in, and has entirely satisfied me that I cannot reasonably press for the Red Cross stores to be allowed space on the up-river steamers at the present moment." This is the same problem as that which Sir Courtauld Thomson had to confront in Gallipoli last year, but complicated by the restrictions of the river. Now a department of the Red Cross at home is busily engaged in supplying an efficient service of shallow draft boats, propelled by paraffin or petrol, for the rapidly developing Red Cross work on the Tigris. Twenty launches have been dispatched and are doing excellent work. Four of these are small "runabouts," the other sixteen measure 40 ft. by 9 ft., with a draft of 2 ft. 4 ins. By the time that this number of the JOURNAL is published it is probable that eight more such launches, with a steam tug, will be on their way to the scene of action, if they have not actually arrived. With this fleet, and with the new arrangements made by which Colonel Gould in Bombay controls the supply of all necessary stores in conjunction with the department in Pall Mall, the Red Cross has great hopes of materially aiding the Army Medical Service in effecting the much-needed transformation in the care of the wounded in the Mesopotamian expedition.

Having thus barely outlined the major activities of the Red Cross in the further fields of the war, we return to what, after all, is the matter of greatest concern, the help being carried to our wounded who, at the moment of writing, are pursuing the implacable offensive

begun in the region of the Somme on July 1st. We have seen how the complex organism was gradually constructed stage by stage through the first months of the war. Sir Arthur Lawley succeeded Sir Courtauld Thomson in France and carried on the work with untiring energy and conspicuous success through 1915. He was succeeded a few months ago by Lord Donoughmore, who now holds office as the Chief Red Cross Commissioner in France. Under him there are now ten hospitals and convalescent homes, amongst which the St. John's Brigade Hospital at Etaples, with 520 beds, is a conspicuously fine example. The Red Cross has supplied four hospital trains, and the women's V.A.D.'s have established rest stations at all important points on the lines of communication. Special stress may be laid on the motor ambulance and transport service, because it is, in fact, what the circulation of the blood is to the human body. In every crisis the successful care of the wounded depends on their rapid and, as far as possible, comfortable transport from the front to the base. Without the motor ambulances the hospital work, both abroad and at home, would be paralysed, and in this vital work the Joint Committee's ambulances are taking their full share. Five of its convoys are working behind the British lines, and the whole of the work on the lines of communication is now undertaken by others of them. This is exceedingly important, for it must be remembered that ever since the early stages of the war the Red Cross, loyally fulfilling the demands of the War Office, has refused to take into its service as drivers men of military age and fitness. The number of such men remaining with it has been reduced to a minimum. By undertaking the work on the lines of communication the enlisted Army drivers with their cars are set free for the more arduous tasks. For some of the base work in France women drivers are being employed with highly satisfactory results. There are about 100 of them altogether, and the motor ambulance service at Le Tréport, the last base to be taken over from the Army by the Red Cross, is now entirely run by twenty-five of these women. A high official of the War Office lately told the manager of the Red Cross motor ambulance department that nothing had impressed him in France so much as the rapidity and skill with which the wounded are evacuated, and the public at home has the means of corroborating the statement as it daily congregates round Charing Cross station and watches the arrival of the wounded who less than twenty-four hours before were themselves in the thick of the fight. The soldier himself cannot realize, and nobody wants him to realize, what expenditure of care and thought and money and energy his "ticket to Blighty" costs, but it is largely owing to the Red Cross that when he gets it, it proves to be a first-class one. The only comprehensive way of illustrating this is in the form of a table, and the following, which accounts for all the Red Cross vehicles on active service on June 30th, 1916, making a total of 2,063 motor-driven vehicles, may serve the purpose. These figures have not been published before. Incidentally they show, by comparison with those of June, 1915, that the motor fleet of the Red Cross has been more than doubled in the last twelve months.

| Type of Car. | British Army in France and Belgium. | With the Allies, French, Bel- gium, Italian and Russian Armies. | Miscel- laneous Hospitals in France and British Ambulance Committee of French Red Cross. | Mediterranean, Serbia, Mesopotamia and British E. Africa. | Home Service. | Total. |
|-------------------|--|--|--|---|------------------|--------|
| Motor Ambulances | 1,056 | 144 | 44 | 64 | 161 | 1,469 |
| Lorries ... | 84 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 111 |
| Repair Wagons ... | 9 | 2 | — | 1 | — | 12 |
| Soup Kitchens ... | 16 | — | 1 | — | — | 17 |
| Brakes and Buses | 13 | — | — | — | 1 | 14 |
| Touring Cars ... | 175 | 9 | 8 | 18 | 61 | 271 |
| Other Cars ... | 55 | — | 5 | 1 | 22 | 83 |
| Motor Cycles ... | 69 | 5 | — | 8 | 1 | 83 |
| Postal Vans ... | 3 | — | — | — | — | 3 |
| Total ... | 1,480 | 172 | 60 | 98 | 253 | 2,063 |

Finally, a word about the people who have done this great work and who will continue to do it as long as the war lasts, and after while the need continues. Those people are not only the doctors and nurses who serve the hospitals, the V.A.D.'s, the men and women who drive the ambulances, the orderlies, mechanics, cooks, clerical staff, storekeepers, warehousemen, and packers; they are not only the organizers who, ever since the war began, have sat in the Pall Mall offices controlling their departments or journeyed into the wilds, risking health and sometimes life itself, to straighten out the business and smooth the way of the wounded man. Behind all these there are the people who have provided the money. *The Times* has already acknowledged £4,100,000. It has come from members of every class of society; it has been raised in a thousand different ways. First come the individual gifts, some in thousands of pounds, some in pence. The King and Queen, Queen Alexandra and members of the Royal Family have set the example which has been followed in every part of the Empire, by British subjects living outside the Empire, and by members of allied and neutral nations. From Lord Astor, who began *The Times* fund with £20,000, to a workhouse inmate who pressed two halfpennies into the hand of a guardian, with the words "for the poor soldiers"; all these countless individuals have played their part as Red Cross workers.

One of the chief activities of Sir Charles Russell's Collections Committee has been to bring the claims of the Red Cross before

representatives of the principal trades of the country. A very large proportion of the total fund has been provided by the trades who, forming their own committees, have vied with one another in raising money for the Red Cross. The leather trade, the wholesale textile trade, millers, grocers, confectioners, drapers, meat importers, and butchers, have made their contributions; but the most remarkable of these special efforts has been the British Farmers' Red Cross Fund. Mr. Herbert Brown succeeded in firing the enthusiasm of the agriculturalists of this country with the proposal that they should find £100,000 for this work. From the first it was agreed that the Farmers' Fund should be devoted to the most urgent branches of the work as they occurred. A hospital in France, an X-ray apparatus, help for the Serbians were among the earlier of these objects. Later, a motor-ambulance convoy, work in Malta and the Near East, and the endowment of the Star and Garter Home were appealed for. While a large proportion of the £100,000 was raised by the gifts of individuals, the happy idea of holding large jumble sales in every county, to which the farmers could give not money but farm-produce, proved so successful that at the present time not £100,000, but nearly £400,000 has been received from the Farmers' Fund, and it is expected that by the end of the year its contribution will have reached half a million.

Next to the farmers the most remarkable corporate effort at home has been that of the coal-owners and coal-workers for the provision of motor-ambulances. Mr. Dennis Bayley, who himself was a motor driver for the Red Cross early in the war, is primarily responsible for this fund, which now is the main reservoir for the upkeep and extension of the transport of wounded service. Mr. Bayley went to the Midlands and told his personal experience of the work that the ambulances were doing. The coal-workers agreed to a voluntary tax, the owners to devote a proportion of profits. The movement begun in the mines by the Midland Counties Colliery Owners' Association spread throughout the coal regions of England and of Wales.

The Lord Mayor of London raised £130,000 in the City; churches of every denomination have produced an equal amount in two years of collection. Two great sales of works of art held in the spring of 1915 and 1916 by Messrs. Christie, Manson & Woods produced together nearly £90,000.

But we must pass over many admirable efforts made at home in order to touch on those of the Dominions. Australia sent its first gift of £1,000 within a fortnight of the declaration of war, and continued sending its gifts in instalments until, in May, 1915, its contribution had exceeded £100,000. Not only this, but immense consignments of goods, from blankets to frozen carcasses of meat, were sent either to be sold for the Red Cross, or to be used by the stores department. Similarly, New Zealand sent large sums of money and gifts in kind with the understanding that when the Australian and New Zealand contingents came into action the Joint Committee should supply the needs of their wounded. Canada's first care was to organize an elaborate and highly efficient

Red Cross service for its own troops, but when the Joint Committee had been in existence for a year, and the first anniversary of its birthday was celebrated on "Our Day" (a special appeal for its work made throughout the Empire), Canada made the most princely response. The province of Ontario alone sent £300,000 and other provinces contributed liberally. Egypt sent over £100,000 on the same occasion; India, South Africa, and the smaller Colonies contributed with the utmost liberality.

The "Our Day" appeal at home and abroad brought in upwards of three-quarters of a million, and it may be noted that a similar appeal is now being made for "Our Day" on October 19th of this year, and that the Dominions and Colonies have telegraphed their determination to redouble their efforts.

It is impossible to predict what the needs of the future may be, but experience has taught two things; first, that the voluntary Red Cross organization will continue to the end to strengthen the hands of the Army Medical Service; and, secondly, that the civilian population of the Empire will see to it that the Red Cross suffers no shortage of supplies. The Red Cross is the chief weapon with which the civilian population can help to win the war and thank the soldier.



THE 53rd REGIMENT IN THE NEPAL WAR.

PART I.

By CAPTAIN CHARLES CHEPMELL.

[This account has been compiled from the diaries of two officers, which have been lent by Colonel W. Rogerson, and is published with the permission of the descendants of the diarists. The first portion—from October 14th, 1814, to April 19th of the year following—is by Captain Charles Chepmell, who served in the 1st Bn. 53rd Regiment from May, 1804, to April, 1822, when he went on half pay; the second part—April 19th to May 21st, 1815, is by Lieutenant Henry Sherwood. This officer obtained an ensigncy by purchase in the 45th Foot in April, 1798, and became Lieutenant in the 53rd a few days later. His wife, Martha Mary Butt, was the writer of "The Fairchild Family," "Little Henry and His Bearer," and other half-forgotten but once enormously popular works for children.]

OCT. 14, 1814.—About 9 o'clock arrived at Meerut, breakfasted with Hanson (Quartermaster 53rd) and was told that the regiment was encamped at a place about nine miles distant. Called on Mrs. Piercy, Mrs. Mawby, Mrs. Sherwood, Portbury, Stewart & Knox (53rd). Stone wished me to accompany him to the Camp but could not as bearers or coolies were not to be had. I contrived by borrowing a few garden coolies to start with him in the evening: and walked to the spot where the regiment was encamped. Dined at the Mess and was informed of being appointed Major of Brigade to Colonel Mawby. Received a note from Mrs. M. for the latter.

OCT. 15.—Marched with the regiment an hour before daylight.

OCT. 16.—Marched with the regiment.

OCT. 17.— do. do. at 4 a.m.

OCT. 18.— do. do. do.

OCT. 19.— do. do. do. and arrived at Sehampore about 10 o'clock.

Cuppaidge and the Colonel were there. Was informed we should march the following morning and commence our operations against the Gorkalese. A detachment under Colonel Carpenter marched this morning to force the Timly pass in the first range of hills.

OCT. 20.—Marched at daylight and encamped at Kengrey about 9 close to a Nullah.

OCT. 21.—Marched about daylight and entered a thick forest until we reached the foot of Kengrey pass. This forest abounds with wild elephants, tygers and all kinds of animals. . . . Heard that the enemy intended to defend the pass. In the evening walked about

three miles into it, met with a sepoy who had gone forward with an officer of artillery to reconnoitre. Captain Fast with two companies of the 17th met us on our return and about 12 o'clock at night sent us down word that he had possession of the top.

OCT. 22.—Moved about an hour before daylight and proceeded up the pass, a stony bed, for upwards of $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Here where there were two roads the guide made a mistake and took them two miles up the wrong one which appeared the broader. Crowned the height at 11 a.m. The Europeans dragged up the 6-pounders, saw two muskets left by the enemy the night before and a curious dagger. Did not arrive at our ground at Deyrah till near 1 p.m. At sunset Colonel Mawby, Cuppaidge and Linford and I went out to reconnoitre the fort of Kalunga but could gain little or no information.

OCT. 23.—At daylight Colonel M., Linford, Lieut. Young, Cuppaidge and I went towards the fort to reconnoitre. Went to within one mile of the base of the hill when our advance parties fell in with a picket of the enemy about 200 strong, recalled the party and went into another direction, a close thick jungle, but on coming into a small open space we observed by our spying glasses that the enemy had quitted their ramparts and naturally concluded they were coming down the hill with an intention of cutting us off. I was directed to gallop towards the camp to get the whole of the line turned out, and marched towards the party to support it in case of an attack.

I accordingly did so and was on the point of moving to its support when Cuppaidge galloped in and countermanded the order. The Colonel determines on making an attack the following morning and sends for a reinforcement of infantry and field guns, which arrive in camp about half after 11 o'clock at night.

OCT. 24.—Until half after 1 o'clock a.m. writing orders and directions for the operations of the following daylight. Went to rest about 2 o'clock and up again at 3. The whole of the line moved at half after 4 in the under-mentioned order.

Detachment Light Infy. under Capt. Warren, 2 Companies 53rd, 17th N.I., Heavy Artillery, 2 six pounders and $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch howitzers, Detachments 7th N.I. forming a reserve. The Cavalry ordered to a village called Raspoor to intercept the enemy in the event of success. About sunrise we reached the foot of the hill and ascended the tableland without opposition. The enemy opened a fire upon us from some few small guns. Went down with the men of the 53rd to drag up the guns, which we succeeded in doing in the course of an hour. Opened fire on the fort from the 6-pounders but no effect followed from the fire.

About 11 pushed on a 6-pounder nearer to the fort along the road to the table land, but a report spreading that the enemy was moving down to attack the party in front, the whole moved down to its support and proceeded along the road until we reached the end of the table land, and perceived a descent before us through which we had to pass to ascend the hill on which the fort is built. The difficulty here we had to encounter was great as the road was stockaded leading to the fortress.

Colonel Mawby, taking into consideration these obstacles and the number of the force under his command, did not deem it adequate to storm the place and we returned to camp about 4 in the afternoon.

Notwithstanding the enemy fired at us for several hours not a life was lost and only a few wounded. Colonel M. on his return to camp sent off a despatch to General Gillespie to acquaint him with the events of the day.

OCT. 25.—General Gillespie sent word that he would be with us on the following morning.

OCT. 26.—Went out in the morning to meet the General, came up with him about two miles from camp, rode forward to order the line out to receive him. Received a reinforcement of men, 2 mortars, and two 12-pounders (brass) and 2 6-pounders. Dined with the General in the evening.

OCT. 27.—Went out with the General to reconnoitre the fort, and to seek for ground of encampment nearer to it. He fixed upon a spot.

OCT. 28.—Preparations made for finishing scaling ladders, fascines and gabions.

OCT. 29.—Arrangements made for the attack on the fort by storm. Five columns were to move in the course of to-morrow night to their respective rendez vous. Dined at the General's in the evening.

OCT. 30.—In the morning we left the camping ground at Deyrah and encamped in column of attack on the spot fixed on by the General. About 3 p.m. Colonel Carpenter with the 1st Column¹ marched off the ground and proceeded along the road leading to the tableland: took possession of it exactly an hour and five minutes after his departure. The guns of the fort opened upon him but to no effect. The artillery and the guns with a portion of the pioneers shortly after followed to prepare the batteries. Major Ludlow commanding the column of Reserve marched to the tableland.

OCT. 31.—At 3 a.m. Major Kelly commanding another column commenced his march to the place of his destination. At 4 a.m. Captain Fast did the same. At midnight the Quartermaster² of the 53rd Regt. reported the near approach of that Corps which had received directions to remain in camp for its protection.

At 5 a.m. rose and went to the General's tent: at daylight he mounted his horse and we proceeded to the hills: at sunrise the batteries opened; but made no impression on the walls: at length the General ordered Colonel Carpenter's and Major Ludlow's columns to advance up the hill and to storm the fort. They did so most gallantly, but were unsuccessful, this report coming to the General he ordered three companies of the 53rd³ to move from camp, and directed the officer who commanded the advanced party to keep his post to the last extremity, as he intended to proceed himself to the spot. The companies of the 53rd at last arrived (the General ordered two more to be sent for) with a 6-pounder dragged up by the men; he moved

¹ Including 2 Coys. 53rd, Lieuts. Young & Anstice. Their Captains were McCaskell, on leave, Chepmell, Major of Brigade.

² Hanson was Q.M., he died at Berhampore Dec. 1. Lieut. Emery was acting Q.M.

³ Under Captain Coulman.

on (after giving directions to Colonel Mawby to remain at the batteries with the reinforcements of the regiment ordered up) and in about three-quarters of an hour afterwards a report came down of the General's death, and of the impracticability of success under the existing circumstances and the great obstacles both natural and artificial we had to overcome.

The Officer commanding the advance sounded the retreat and with the utmost difficulty the advanced guard was brought down.

This was a cruel day, two and twenty officers killed and wounded.

Nov. 1.—The General's body was removed at 4 a.m. towards Merat for internment (buried 3 officers and several men). In the evening application having been made to the Killedar for permission to remove the dead left on the hill: in the evening several bodies were brought down amongst which was that of Lieut. Gosling, the whole were buried. They had been stripped of their cloathing and some were sadly mangled.

Nov. 2.—Looked out for encamping ground. Lieut. Broughton of the 19th Regt. died of his wounds during the night.

Nov. 3.—Marched at daylight to the new encamping ground distant from the old about a mile and a quarter. Lieut. Broughton was buried this morning.

Nov. 6.—The wounded to the amount of 96 left camp on their way to Seharampore where the field hospital was established.

Cornet McDonald of the 8th Dragoons died of his wounds.

Nov. 7, 8, & 9.—4 Coys. of the 19th Regt. marched to rejoin Colonel Ochterlony.

Nov. 10.—Heard of the fall of Nallaghur. Captain Smith of the Engineers joined the army.

Nov. 12.—The engineer made a reconnaissance this morning.

Nov. 14.—Went on the tableland with the engineer and the reconnoitring party. The enemy only fired two shots during the time we were on the hill but they afterwards annoyed the party covering the Pioneers.

Saw a large fire on one of the mountains supposed to be a signal of the enemy.

Nov. 15.—Heard that the battering train had left Delhi on the 10th. 4 Coys. of the Light Battalion marched to take possession of the Budray mountain at 5 p.m.

Nov. 16.—4 Coys. of the Light Battn. marched at 4 a.m. for Calsee to reinforce Colonel Carpenter, his post being threatened by the enemy. About 8 a.m. a note reached camp from Captain Warner, commanding the Budray detachment, stating that he was halted and in consequence of the bad road he was unable to proceed and waited for fresh orders.

Nov. 17.—Nothing heard of Capt. Warren's detachment. Men were sent this morning in quest of information. About 3 p.m. saw a number of men descending the mountains, about 200, dressed in white, several conjectures concerning them, some supposing them to be our sepoys going down for their provisions, etc.

In the evening no account.

Nov. 18.—Still in the dark concerning the Budray detachment, more Hircarrahs dispatched for intelligence. Commenced on the construction of fascines etc. A letter was received from Capt. Warren stating his having ascended the mountain but was obliged to return to the village of—[illegible]—for provisions. Orders sent off to desire he would take possession and establish a post on the mountain with 2 Coys. and return to camp with the remainder of the detachment.

The men observed yesterday turned out to be our Sepoys. Some of the enemy came down from the fort last night and attacked some panchuckies (?) from whom they seized flour.

Nov. 19.—Observed the sepoy ascending the mountain without opposition and later some of the detachment descending.

Nov. 20.—Heard that a reinforcement of men had entered the fort last night firing matchlocks etc. Rejoicing in consequence of this was heard in camp by several persons.

Nov. 21.—An order to recall the Det. from Budray was dispatched this evening.

Nov. 22.—Captain Warner returned to camp leaving 2 Coys. A Goorkah came in from the fort and said he had absconded in consequence of their not giving him any food.

Nov. 23.—Heard that the Battering Train has got over the Pass last night, and that they would be within a day's march this evening.

Nov. 24.—The long expected 18 pounders at length arrived this morning under escort of the 1st Battn. 13th N.I. One troop of Horse Artillery, Baldock with 2 Coys. 17th N.I. and 2 Coys. of the Light Battn. likewise joined and the remainder of the Budray detachment. The troops ordered to march to-morrow.

Nov. 25.—A little before sunrise the troops took the direction agreeable to the orders of yesterday, about 11 heard the guns from the fort firing on the column on the tableland. Our column encamped in a valley to the Northward of the fort and distant from it about one mile. At 4 p.m. went up to look after the advance guard and found them under cover of a few huts about 250 yds. distant from the fort.

There was a square stockade about 300 yds. to our right, which we supposed to be evacuated as the enemy did not fire or shew themselves from it, but we were soon undeceived in this respect as they commenced firing very warmly with matchlocks upon us. Their silence was evidently a stratagem to draw a party towards the place and then to attack them. As soon as a howitzer could be dragged up the hill we fired a few shells, one of which happening to burst over them forced the party to fly and an officer and others of the 53rd taking advantage of this advanced and took possession of the place. One of the enemy was found dying with his wounds inside the stockade. The batteries constructing as quick as possible.

Nov. 26.—During the night the mortars and 12-pounders were brought into the batteries. The howitzer throwing in occasionally a few shells into the fort. At 7 a.m. the Europeans and Sepoys dragged up the four 18-pounders and at noon the first shot from the battery guns was fired. The enemy about 4 p.m. attempted to make a sally but were driven back.

Nov. 27.—During the night the Killedar sent to offer terms which could not be accepted of. At 7 he sent another message and the batteries ceased. The last messenger went up the hill with us and the only terms which we could give them having been delivered, he and a soubadar went to the fort the latter waiting for an answer, they both soon afterwards returned and the Killedar's man said that the Sirdar could only give up the fort on the first proposition. As soon as the Goorkah got within the walls our batteries then opened and resumed breaching.

The storming party, composed of seven Grenadier Companies, 1 battalion company and Light Infantry of the 53rd, advanced to the storm and persevered until [illegible] to carry the place. Another column was sent to their support but they were equally unsuccessful. I advanced with the last party and perceived the slope leading up to the breach to be very easy indeed, but those who saw the descent pronounced it impracticable.

I received a few blows from stones which at first staggered me but soon got well except a little stiffness. 2 guns were advanced close to the breach to see what could be done, but it was all in vain and the parties were at length recalled to the batteries.

Nov. 28.—In the morning a letter was sent to the Killedar for the dead bodies. They were brought down to the number of thirteen amongst which was Harrington, Lieut. 53rd, shockingly mangled, both legs being torn from the body, so were many of the others. In the evening the slain (officers and men) were buried. The batteries keeping up during the last twenty four hours a slow fire.

Nov. 29.—The batteries continuing a fire of shot and shells at stated periods of time.

Observed a party of the enemy on the second range of mountains endeavouring to descend.

Several wounded of the enemy were found in the jungle and brought into our camp.

A report of great misery in the fort.

Nov. 30.—About 2 a.m. the enemy began to evacuate the fort and were fired on by Major Ludlow and Captain Burke's columns with a severe loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major Kelly took possession of the fort at 4 a.m. A little after daylight I visited the fort when a scene presented itself sufficient to melt the fiercest and most cruel heart. The dead, wounded and sick of the unfortunate wretches as had not escaped, both men and women, lay all huddled together, several little children crying, all together formed such a spectacle impossible for words to describe. Near 100 bodies were collected and about 60 wounded inside the fortress were taken down to camp as well as several prisoners. The wounded and prisoners of the other columns were sent to Deyrah. The jungles all about appeared to be filled with wounded and runaways.

Poor Linsford of the Horse Artillery died of his wounds and was buried this evening. Captain Warner was sent to try and cut off Bulbuddar's¹ (the Killedar) retreat but he returned next morning.

¹ Bulbuddar Tappa.

DEC. 1.—Major Ludlow was sent off with a party to endeavour to come up with the enemy.

DEC. 2.—Major Ludlow returned to camp about 9 a.m. and reported having fallen in with and defeated the enemy who had collected to the number of about 300. He killed and wounded between 60 and 70 of them (2 Officers wounded.) Heard that Colonel Ochterlony had received a check in his approach to Raunaghar.

DEC. 3.—Marched at 7 a.m. and returned to the old ground at Deyrah. Visited the fort.

DEC. 4.—The wounded marched from Deyrah to the field hospital at Sehampore.

DEC. 5.—Heard of the taking of Fort of Barant by Col. Carpenter, the enemy having evacuated it.

DEC. 7.—Rain all day and snow on the mountains.

DEC. 8.—Prevented marching by the constant rain.

DEC. 9.—Marched at 8 and reached camp 14 miles distant, a good road.

DEC. 10.—Marched at 7 a.m. to the encampment about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond the little village of Hunspeer, the river Aum on this side of it and about half a mile distant from the camp: a foot and a half of water in its bed. Where we crossed is rather rapid and very clear. The roadway good. Timly pass about 4 or 5 miles distant. The fort of Barant on the summit of a mountain 6,000 feet in height in sight. Heard that the enemy had vacated the blockade at Deo and our men had taken possession of it. Some tents are discernible on the mountains, supposed to be the spot where the Deo stockade is, distance marched about 9 miles.

DEC. 11.—Marched at 7 a.m. and arrived at Fizabad on the river Jumna at 11. The men did not arrive till near 1. Distance marched about 13 miles through the Timly pass, the Ghaut is not so difficult of access as that of Kerney. Received a letter from McIntyre at Calcutta date 25th Nov.

DEC. 12.—Marched 12 miles, capital roads, camp 1 mile from the Jumna.

DEC. 13.—Marched 14 miles, tolerable road, encamped close to the Ghaut on the Jumna 4 miles from Chilkana. The 6th and Light Battalion crossed the river.

DEC. 14.—The guns and battering train crossing the river, 6 boats for the purpose. Very unpleasant weather, raining.

DEC. 15.—Guns and park stores crossing. Rain as yesterday. Saw an Army List for June.

DEC. 16.—Crossed the Jumna this morning, arrived at Boonah about 4 miles from the Ghaut.

DEC. 17.—Marched to Sunkeerah about 9 miles good road. Nahan in sight and the forts of Jumpta and Mornee.

DEC. 18.—Marched to Seidoura about 13 miles, road tolerably good. Major Kelly's battalion joined us. Heard that General Martindell had arrived yesterday at Sehampore.

DEC. 19.—Marched and arrived at noon at a village in the Mukunda Nullah called Mogymund, distance about 12 miles: the two last very difficult for the guns being over large stones. About a mile from hence we entered the Goorkah possessions and their outpost was situated up a hill about 150 feet in height, on which was erected a stockade but they had evacuated it. This was ordered to be destroyed. Advanced with two other officers about three miles towards Nahan to a small village called Silany. Did not meet with one of the enemy. Returned to camp exactly at 1 p.m. General Martindell arrived at seven.

DEC. 20.—Two Native Battalions, 6th and L.I., went off from camp towards Nahan to feel their way thither. Reports current of Nahan being evacuated and the enemy retired to Jumpta. About noon saw our troops ascending the hill and taking possession of the palace.

DEC. 21.—Rode to Nahan, reached the summit 1.30. The roads in some places almost impracticable for any animal. On the summit of the mountain are two respectable small stone redoubts and the palace is surrounded with a stone wall. Plenty of water on the hill. Returned to camp.

DEC. 22.—The Pioneers and Bildars hard at work making a road up the mountain. Heard of Hanson's death, which took place at Berhampore on the 1st inst.

DEC. 23.—Hard at work in making road for the stores etc., tho' the distance is only 7 miles to Nahan from the camp it will take many days to get up the whole park.

DEC. 24.—Road getting on. The 13th marched to Nahan in consequence of information received that the enemy had been reinforced.

DEC. 25.—The General went up to Nahan. In the evening received orders to march and to follow him next morning.

DEC. 26.—Marched at 7 and reached the summit of Nahan in 2 hours 40 minutes. During the night a column under Major Ludlow marched, composed of Grenadiers 53rd, 6th N.I. and 3 Coys. Light Infy., and another under Major Richards composed of Light Coy. 53rd, part of the 13th N.I. and 4 Coys. Light Battn. It was supposed that the object in view was to establish a post.

DEC. 27.—Awoke this morning by the firing of musquetry which proceeded from the attack of Major Ludlow's column. Saw the action very plainly which lasted from 8 till half past 9 when our men were overpowered and obliged to retreat with loss. At 2 p.m. firing was heard from Major Richards' quarter. I went to a spot from whence I saw the attack which lasted till near 5 p.m. when the column was recalled.

DEC. 28.—At 2 a.m. Major Richards' party returned.

DEC. 29.—I reconnoitred.

DEC. 30.—Reconnoitred again 7 a.m. to noon.

JAN. 1, 1815.—Attended the funeral of Lieut. Thackeray. Heard of the fall of Ramghur.

JAN. 2.—Attended funeral of Lieut. Wilson.

JAN. 3.—The Court of Enquiry to investigate into the failures of the 31st Oct. and 27th Nov. last assembled this day.

JAN. 4.—Attended the funerals of Lieut. Munns and Ensign Stalkland slain on 27 Dec.

JAN. 7.—The wounded left for Sehampore. Took a long walk down to the park with Price.

JAN. 8.— do. do. do.

JAN. 9.—Appointed Major of Brigade by Field Army Orders until his Excellency's pleasure is known.

JAN. 17.—Heard of General Woods and Colonel Bradshaw's checks.

JAN. 18.—Party of our recovered men came in from Sehampore and four Coys. 27th N.I. from Hansi. The Goorkahs destroyed a stockade vacated by their Allies who came into us yesterday. A party of our irregulars took post on a stockaded hill called Boneta about 9 miles to the westward of Nahan, 800 men under Kishen being marched to take up a position to the northward of the fort. Heard further accounts regarding Colonel Wood's failure. Himself and 5 other officers wounded, killed 12 men and 86 wounded and missing of the King's 17th Regt.

JAN. 19.—Heard of Captain Sibley's death in Colonel Bradshaw's detachment—he commanded the advanced post of the party with five companies and a gun.

JAN. 20.—Appointed Quarter-master of Brigade from the 7th inst. in the room of Cuppaidge, 53rd, nominated to the Brigade-Majorship.

JAN. 21.—Heard that Ochterlony had made a movement which induced the enemy to abandon some stockades in the vicinity of Ramghur and which our troops took possession of.

JAN. 22.—Rain in the morning: very unpleasant cold weather.

JAN. 23.—Gloomy reports from all the different armies.

JAN. 25.—Thunder and rain, with hail showers. 7 Coys. of the 26th Regt. arrived at Mogymund.

JAN. 26.—Heard that General Mawby had retreated to Bettrah. The light guns went down to the park.

JAN. 27.—Very heavy rain during the night. The ammunition and stores going down to the Park, suppose to move very soon.

JAN. 28.—Bearers employed in conveying the Powder etc. to the Park.

JAN. 30.—One of the Engineer officers returned from surveying a road leading up the Mountain which I believe was found impracticable for cattle. Heard of an intercepted letter from Rungore to his father.

JAN. 31.—A party of 250 Goorkahs attacked a post occupied by our irregulars (in number about 300) at daylight, when the enemy was repulsed with a loss of 20 killed and many wounded.

FEB. 1.—The Irregulars made a movement from the Mountain towards the hills to the West of the fort and occupied them. Major Kelly and the reserve marched in the night to occupy some heights west of Jumta.

FEB. 2.—Rose at daylight to observe the motions of the enemy on the heights and was happy to see the Irregulars had occupied

the Westernmost heights. Between 11 and 12 the Brigade was turned out and marched to the N.E. point of Nahan to attract the attention of the enemy from Kelly's column which was moving up the hill to join the Irregulars.

FEB. 3 & 4.—Heavy rain. Our men on the heights suffering severely from the bad weather. 20 lives lost by it.

FEB. 5.—Major Ludlow with his Regt. went up the hills & relieved Major Kelly and the Reserve. Dreadful sickness amongst the Sepoys in consequence of the bad weather and rain.

FEB. 6.—Dreadful heavy rain.

FEB. 7.—Dreadful heavy rain.

FEB. 8.—Showers of hail in the morning and snow later on, some inches, had near three inches thick on the fly. Jumpta and the surrounding hills covered completely with it. Our people suffering much from the wet & cold.

FEB. 9.—Weather a little cleared up. The 27th Regt. arrived at the bottom of Nahan. I was directed to meet them and shew where they were to encamp to-morrow on reaching the summit of Nahan.

FEB. 10.—The 26th Regt. marched up to Nownie this day. Went down to meet the 27th.

FEB. 11.—At a $\frac{1}{2}$ after 6 a.m. started from Nahan with Price, 53rd, and Hall and reached the post at Nownie in 2 hours 30 minutes, tified there and returned to Nahan.

FEB. 12.—Light Battalion went up to Nownie. The 6th and 26th took up a position on Black Hill, no opposition. Balbudder and a large reinforcement got into the fort.

FEB. 14.—Went to Nownie with the Colonel, breakfasted there. The General soon afterwards arrived and accompanied him to the advanced post. Returned to Nahan by a new road. Saw an Army List for August, Rees (53rd) out of it.

FEB. 15.—Our troops took up a position and commenced making batteries. All kept on the alert in consequence of information received of the enemy's determination to attack us. Firing heard from Ramghur.

FEB. 16.—Heavy firing heard from Ramghur.

FEB. 17.—Started at 7.30 to reconnoitre the watercourse of the Makanda from its junction with the Silanee Nuddy, and to ascertain if the 18-pounders could be got up to the Northward of Nahan along its bed.

FEB. 18.—5 Coys. of the 27th Regt. went up to the Jumpta heights. Our 6-pounders and 4 howitzers opened on the enemy's advanced stockade, but after a few shots the distance was found to be too great to have any effect. The General determines on getting up two 18-prs. and a road for that purpose is begun from Nahan towards the Jumpta Mountain. 5 Coys. of the 27th marched in from the park.

FEB. 19.—A working party of 200 of our men went down to the Park to drag up the 18-prs. This will be a work of difficulty and labour as the distance is $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles in ascent. Some shells from the

8-in. mortars were thrown during the day. Heavy showers during the night.

FEB. 20.—During the day our mortars & howitzers throwing shells. Report of 1 killed and a few wounded from our firsts of yesterday. The two 18-prs. were brought up to the summit of Nahan to the astonishment of all. Heard that Ramghur had capitulated.

FEB. 21.—Our Irregulars under Young (53rd) went out to attack a body of the enemy but were defeated with the loss of 150 killed and 85 wounded. Goorkhas lost it is said about 100.

FEB. 22.—Went up the hill with Piercy (Major 53rd) and returned in the evening to Nahan. Some of the bearers were attacked by Goorkhas in the water course leading up the new road and were plundered of their Banghy baskets. We were just on the point of returning by that road when they came to the batteries and related what happened to them.

FEB. 23.—Came up the hill with the Colonel and Cuppaidge. Heard that a party of the enemy was still lurking in the water course. Sent a party of Irregulars to drive them out, which they did.

FEB. 24.—Wrote a letter to Sherwood and enclosed one for Mr. Auber¹ (at Cawnpore). The enemy fired three shots at us during the day but we did not return the compliment. There was another skirmish in the watercourse between the Goorkhas and our Irregulars. Many of the Irregulars deserted during the day.

FEB. 25.—At daylight the enemy fired at our battery one shot, but which we did not return. The desertion amongst our Irregulars became most alarming: so much as to require two Coys. of Regulars to reinforce the post at Nownie. Sent 100 Irregulars to stockade themselves on the road between this and Nahan to keep it open.

FEB. 26.—The enemy fired 4 or 5 shots. We returned the compliment with a few shells, one of which burst very well.

FEB. 27.—A brisk fire in the watercourse with the Irregulars and the enemy in consequence of their observing two of the Engineers who went out to reconnoitre a new road for the 18-prs. and which I was sorry to hear they reported impracticable, as the one they intend bringing the guns up by will be greatly exposed to the enemy's fire. The 15th Regt. and 2 Coys. of the 26th marched into Nahan. The enemy did not fire a gun from their advanced stockade during the day. Working on the road.

FEB. 28.—Roadmaking, gave the enemy a few shells. Kishun Sing with 400 of his followers left Nownie without orders and proceeded to Nahan.

MARCH 1.—The enemy fired six shots at us in the evening without any injury. A good deal of musquetry in the watercourse.

MARCH 2.—Went down to Nahan, put a letter in the post, breakfasted and tiffed there. Started at 3 p.m. reached Black Hill in a little more than four hours. Received 4 letters, one from William dated 4th January 1814, another from George from the Thames on board the "Niger" dated July 30th, 1813, forwarded to me from

¹ Paymaster 53rd.

Madras 2nd Feb. 1814 by the purser of the "Acorn." A few shots as usual from the enemy's gun. A new road being made for the 18-prs. as the old one was considered too exposed to the enemy's fire.

MARCH 3.—Price & Emery came up to see me. Fired a shell or two at the enemy.

MARCH 4.—200 Irregulars marched to reinforce the party at Syne Keder. Buried the body of one of our Grenadiers who was slain on the 27th Dec. I recognised that it was Corporal Roberts from the colour of the hair and whiskers. The flesh was all devoured. A few shells as usual.

MARCH 5.—Visited the outpost of Nownie. No fire from the enemy on our batteries.

MARCH 6.—No firing from the stockades or our batteries, roads getting on very fast.

MARCH 7.—A good deal of firing during the day. Two well directed shrapnels were fired at four fellows who came down the mountain, which made them run pretty fast. The enemy erected a new stockade on round hill in spite of all our shells to prevent it. The range was too great. Road getting on well.

MARCH 8.—A smart fire kept up between our Irregulars and the enemy. The former were posted at the village of Jumpta and the latter came out of their advanced stockades. A few shots passed during the day. The 18-pr. road is coming on very well.

MARCH 9.—Rain most of the day. Not a shot or a shell fired. A report came that 9 Coys. had marched from the fort at noon but their destination was not known.

MARCH 10.—Road going on remarkably well. The enemy quiet during the day but in the evening a trifling fire between them and our Irregulars at the village of Jumpta. 2 shots were fired from one of the 6 prs.

MARCH 11.—Heard a heavy cannonade supposed to be the detachment of Ochterlony's Army against the fort of Tarraghur. Received a letter from Sherwood enclosing one from McIntyre at Calcutta relative to my baggage which he sent up the country with Mr. Auber and which had arrived at Meerut. A little sniping in the evening. Two breast-works were thrown up during the night, one at the village of Jumpta and the other across the road near the trees.

MARCH 12.—Between 11 & 12 a.m. the enemy paraded a part of their force amounting to near 900 men and marched them down the hill to the Northward of the fort. They returned a few hours afterwards. Fired several shells during the day and some at night at their nearest stockade. Heard of the fall of Jhauntghur.

MARCH 13.—About sunrise the enemy fired two shots. No other firing during the day. Road said to be ready. Heard of Montgomery's death (Lieut. 53rd). He died on his way from Seharampore to Meerut on the 8th inst. A Company of the sepoys was sent to strengthen the post half way between this and Nahan, for the purpose of protecting the 18-prs. on their way up the height.

MARCH 14.—The 18-pounders left Nahan at daylight on their way to the Heights, and at sunset put up for the night near the stockades

of our Irregulars—which is about half-way. The enemy fired seven shots at us about sunrise; and we returned during the day a few shells. Heard of the surrender of the Fort of Tarraghur, on the 11th inst.: the garrison prisoners of war.

MARCH 15.—The 18-pounders were brought up to the foot of Black Hill, and there remained for the night. The enemy fired six shots at sunrise. We returned some shells and fired six during the night.

MARCH 16.—The enemy at sunrise fired several shots and opened a gun from the center of the first stockade. At 10 a.m. the Europeans dragged the 18-prs. into the Batteries. The remainder of the 53rd came up the Hill as also the General. Fired several shells from the 8-inch, shot from the 6-prs., and 2 rounds of shrapnells from the 18-prs. At sunrise perceived that the enemy had thrown up an Embrazure for a gun along the Trench to our left of the first stockade, and had dug a trench to our right of it.

MARCH 17.—At sunrise found the following works erected by the Engineers—viz., at the village of Jumpta, where are posted two $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch Mortars and one $4\frac{2}{5}$ -inch Howitzer; at the mountain one 6-pr., two $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch Howitzers and two 8-inch Mortars. About 10 a.m. the 18-prs. opened on the advanced stockade, and the whole of the Mortars and Howitzers, and continued till the close of the evening. The third shot from the Battering guns knocked over a poor fellow. Very little impression made on the first stockade.

MARCH 18.—Heard by a deserter that eight men were killed by the cannonade of yesterday—the 18-prs. firing and all the Mortars and Howitzers, but no considerable impression made on the stockade; in the afternoon the Pioneers were employed making a road beyond the Howitzer Batteries to a point in its front where I imagine a new Battery will be constructed during the course of the approaching night.

MARCH 19.—At sunrise perceived that a small work had been thrown up about 150 yds. beyond the mountain on which the two prs. were placed. Firing from all the guns and mortars during the day. No impression of consequence made on the stockade. Some shells were very well thrown into the enemy's left trench. Heard that 17 men were killed by the fire of yesterday. The fort of Chamba surrendered to General Ochterlony. Read a letter from George dated 20th March 1814 from the Cape of Good Hope.

MARCH 20.—A little after sunrise perceived that one of the 6-prs. had been advanced about 40 yards in front of yesterday's battery and one of the 18-prs. placed in its room. A heavy fire of musquetry shortly after commenced which lasted all day and nearly the whole of the night. The other 18-pr. was removed in the course of the day and placed in the battery at the mountain. Towards the evening the stockade was nearly destroyed, and the enemy seeing our reliefs from the trench coming down thought that a storm was going to take place and consequently brought down considerable reinforcement from the fort to the trench. Our casualties this day amounted to 22 killed and wounded. Heard that the enemy had 45 killed and wounded from the fire yesterday.

MARCH 21.—In the morning the trench from the left of the advanced 6 prs. was carried up to a little stony ridge about 200 yds. from the stockade. A great deal of firing during the 24 hours. Heard the enemy lost 35 men yesterday in killed and wounded. Our casualties amounted to about 15.

MARCH 22.—Throughout the day and night heavy firing of mortars, guns, musquetry. Heard the enemy's loss yesterday was 17 killed and wounded. Ours amounted to 26 killed and wounded. In the evening a few of our sepoys and Irregulars foolishly went up a ridge of a hill to snipe at the Goorkahs but they were recalled when observed by the General. One of the Irregulars was left dead on the spot. The enemy fired several shots from the gun in the second stockade whilst the relief of the trenches took place. The two howitzers brought up again to the old 18-pr. batteries.

MARCH 23.—Perceived this morning that a cut had been made in our trench which adds considerably to its strength. Firing throughout the day as usual. The two 5½-inch mortars were brought up close to the advanced 6-prs. One 6-pr. was carried to the Village of Jumpta in lieu of one of the mountain howitzers whose carriage was broken. The 18-pr. situated near the first trees was brought up in the evening to the old battery. The casualties this day on the part of the enemy amount to 30 killed and wounded and our side to 5.

MARCH 24.—Firing throughout the day as heretofore. Some of the Light Companies went down to Nahan. The enemy opened their gun from the second stockade towards evening. Their loss this day 8 and ours 4 killed and wounded.

MARCH 25.—The firing of musquetry was not so heavy during this day. An explosion took place in rear of the first stockade which we supposed to be their magazine. The Irregulars went down to Nahan this morning. I saw an unfortunate fellow executed by the enemy. His head was cut off with a sword and the body kicked down the hill. Our casualties amounted to 4 killed and wounded.

MARCH 26.—Very little fire of musquetry. The whole of the guns and mortars opened when the trenches were relieving. Casualties on our side one.

MARCH 27.—Little or no firing during the day with the exception of a few shells at intervals. Mr. Frain sent in a flag of truce with a letter to Runghur complaining of his having put to death some of the Zemindars and that we should retaliate if conduct such as this was persisted in. The man returned with an answer, the contents of which are not known. The enemy fired their first shot from the gun in the second stockade.

MARCH 28.—Very little firing throughout. One man wounded. Heard that the man beheaded by the enemy on the 25th was the son of a Tesseel of Mumbra. The answer which was sent to Mr. Frain by Ranjour stated that the cases complained of were committed by his foraging parties without his orders. A deserter came in from the fort who says that they are greatly in want of provisions of all kinds.

MARCH 29.—Firing the same as yesterday. Report that the enemy was hard pressed for provisions. The siege is apparently turning into a blockade.

MARCH 30.—Between 4 & 5 a.m. a firing was heard from the North East. Saw a new stockade erecting on the Eastern part of the Syne. In the afternoon heard that there had been an attack on a post of our Irregulars at Meranka Teebah in which they were defeated with a loss of one hundred killed. We know not whether our people or the enemy erected the new stockade. Firing as usual. One or two wounded on our side.

MARCH 31.—About midnight Major Richards marched from Nahan with a column of 1100 men (regulars) and 5 or 600 Irregulars to take up a position to N.E. of the fort and cut off the enemy's supplies in that direction.

The 2nd Bn. 27th Regt. marched down to Nahan to reinforce the garrison there under Colonel Kelly which now amounts to 1000 regulars.

Heard that the people who were in the stockade on the Eastern part of the Syne was that party of the enemy who defeated the Irregulars. In the evening we saw them abandon that post. Our loss was not as great as was reported yesterday. The firing from the guns and mortars was kept up as usual.

APRIL 1.—Firing of mortars etc. as on preceding days. Major Richards' encampment was seen from Nahan but not from these hills. Saw an unfortunate Irregular brought up to the hospital most dreadfully wounded with seven sabre cuts in their affair of 30th ulto.

APRIL 2.—Firing of mortars etc. as usual. One of the 18-prs. which was in advance was brought back to the old battery. Major Richards was attacked by a large column of the enemy who were obliged to fall back after a smart fire. The enemy's loss is supposed to amount to 112 prisoners, amongst the latter Jussambpunt Cazy. Our casualties to 4 killed and 27 wounded. Major Richards' camp distinctly seen from the hill above Black Mountain. 5 Gun Lascars were killed bringing down the 18-pr. by the enemy's musquetry.

APRIL 3.—Firing as usual. The enemy's loss greater than was yesterday supposed, amounting it is said to 150 killed and wounded, among the former a younger brother of Balbudder named Cheit Sing, and Balbudder himself severely wounded and is not expected to recover (Balbudder Tappa who was Killedar at Kalunga).

APRIL 4.—Firing as usual. A flag of truce sent into the enemy through the advanced post but no one appears to know who sent it. The General sent a letter in a different direction to Rungour to say if Balbudder was sent in to us that the Medical Officer would cure his wounds. No answer was I believe received or if any was brought the contents are not made publicly known. A work was thrown up in the advanced post by way of strengthening it.

APRIL 5.—Heavy firing throughout the day. Heard that Balbudder was not wounded in the action with Major Richards.

APRIL 6.—Firing as yesterday. In the evening saw a party of the enemy collecting towards the village near the Southern stockade, which had all the appearance of a foraging party.

APRIL 7.—Firing as usual. The enemy attacked some servants going from Nahan to Major Richards' post and wounded some of them.

APRIL 8.—Firing as usual. A violent squall in the morning with hail. Heard that the 53rd was to canton at Nahan during the hot and rainy seasons.

APRIL 9.—Firing as usual.

APRIL 10.—Firing as usual. In the morning a violent squall of wind and rain. In the afternoon a party went down from Nahan and destroyed all the grain it possibly could. The enemy sent down about 100 men to watch them and a sniping took place with the party covering the workmen and the Goorkahs.

APRIL 11.—Firing as usual. Wrote a letter to McIntyre at Calcutta to send me up some supplies. A squall of wind and rain at night. Destroying the cultivation round the hills.

APRIL 12.—Firing as usual. The 26th Regt. marched from Black Hill and took up a position between it and Munlyah.

APRIL 13.—Firing as usual.

APRIL 14.—Firing as usual. In the evening heard that the Regiment was to proceed by water to Calcutta as soon as the river was open.

APRIL 15.—Firing as usual. Wrote a letter to McIntyre counter-ordering the supplies.

APRIL 16.—Little or no firing. In the evening Major Deare with the Light Battn. marched and occupied Captain Wilson's post and the latter moved round to a hill to the Northward of the Fort. The enemy attacked and carried a post of the Irregulars. Killed 9 and wounded 30. Enemy's loss 4 killed.

APRIL 17.—Saw Captain Wilson's party on the hill newly occupied. Report says Rungour wishes to treat with us and all accounts agree as to their want of provisions.

APRIL 18.—Went to Major Deare's post. In the evening kept all on the alert because of the enemy's intention to attack some post or other. Heard that there had been an assault on some of our troops before Maloune.

APRIL 19.—Heard that the Goorkahs had lost 400 men and we 300 in the affairs of the 15th and 16th at Maloune endeavouring to obtain a position on the heights before that place.

[Captain Chepmell's Nepal Diary here ends.]

PART II.

By LIEUTENANT HENRY SHERWOOD.

APRIL 19, 1815.—I was still unwell but having laid a dawk (i.e. relays of men to carry a palanquin) and sent off my servants I left Meerut at 4 p.m. and reached Seharampore, a distance of 70 miles, at 10 next morning.

APRIL 20.—Not knowing what to do with myself I plucked up a little impudence and called on a wounded officer, to whom I had once been introduced and he gave me breakfast and tiffin. I set off on horseback, the wind blew so strong I had great difficulty in holding my umbrella, and the sun was too powerful without it. I passed the night at the Custom Ghaut.

On the 23rd I got up the hill to the camp on foot, for a horse can scarcely carry itself. I got up by 5 o'clock and found our regiment by the side of the ridge under Black Hill about 100 yards below. The General and the Colonel were at the top of Black Hill. The Colonel came down and would take me up to dinner, but I was too fatigued.

APRIL 24.—At daylight I went up Black Hill and breakfasted with Colonel Mawby.

APRIL 25.—I again went up Black Hill, which is a good pull, being I believe from my tent at least as high as the high rock at Bridgenorth.

We are building small redoubts on the top of Black Hill and Nownie as protection to our rear. The younger men laugh at the precaution and give them ridiculous names: however it is but prudent to be secure, for the enemy may have 6,000 men, while we have not 2,000 in any one army. The Goorkhas are deserting in great numbers.

MAY 1.—50 came in to-day.

MAY 4.—This evening a most furious north-wester came on which soon brought rain: and it was so cold I was glad to get up and dress myself in warm clothes. I was afraid of my tent blowing away and had all my servants holding on to it. Lieut. Daley¹ was driven out of his tent and came in. The night was very dark with vivid flashes of lightning, and the howling of the wind was tremendous. I wonder the Goorkhas did not make a sally. I shivered in my red coat and wrapped on my Goodeni. In the morning we saw the next range covered with snow and this is summer. We calculate ourselves 6,000 feet above the plain.

MAY 9.—We did nothing: deserters coming in every day who report the state of starvation of the garrison.

I went with Emery and Brodie² to look out from our 18 pr. battery on Red Hill which is calculated at one mile from the first stockade. While standing behind and leaning on Brodie's chair, a shot passed under my arm and struck Brodie breaking the small bone at the very point of his elbow. It was very painful and a dangerous wound.

MAY 13.—There being so many deserters it seems that Rungour has promised to treat or fight.

MAY 14.—This day two Vakeels came in, but their terms could not be listened to. Ummur has surrendered Malaon to General Ochterlony.

MAY 15.—Upwards of 160 deserters came in and fresh vakeels, but terms not acceptable.

¹ Daley or Daly was appointed Adjutant vice Chepmell promoted.

² Lieut. Brodie died on passage to England in 1818.

MAY 16 & 17.—Constant messages passed. We can only guess it is all over.

MAY 18.—Runjour came down and a tent was pitched for his visit. He remained about an hour and all was settled. He walked three times round the temple of the goddess Jumpta and returned. So Jeytuk is surrendered.

MAY 19.—I went up Black Hill and was detained by Colonel Mawby to dinner. I got private leave to go to Meerut after muster on the 24th.

MAY 20.—Seeing some of our officers strolling towards the Goorkhas' advanced posts, I also went to the first stockade, and found it not so formidable as I expected. An order soon came to prevent any one going in to the works, and also to hinder the Goorkhas coming to us, particularly to hinder provisions going.

The poor creatures are actually starving, and some of them could scarcely be driven from our trenches. We gave a small quantity of food to them. It is not yet certain when Ranjour leaves the fort as it is necessary that his Brahmin should point out a fortunate hour.

MAY 21.—I again went up Black Hill for news, and found it was the opinion of the big wigs that the 53rd Regt. would be at Nahan by the 24th. The Goorkhas now wish to enter our service and one of their Chiefs, a brother of Balbudder Tappa is come over with his regiment. He quarrelled with Runjour. They say they defended Runjour as long as they could having eaten his salt, but that they find the English salt much sweeter.

Before I left the hills I went as far as the enemy's fourth stockade and was astonished at the weakness of the works, but the natural strength of the position is very great, I should say insurmountable. From our trench the ground rose quite 45° to their first stockade: the sides of the ridge on each side of the path being nearly perpendicular, and from their first stockade on each side there is a trench cut with steps to the second stockade with a narrow path, where in many places only one man could pass, and even then it was broken by rocks which required to be climbed over. From the 2nd to the 3rd stockade the approach was more easy. At this point you descend till you join the hill on which Jeytuk stands, but which is so steep that you cannot ascend it in a straight line. The fort is nothing if it could be reached: one shot would destroy it.

Hearing that orders were issued for our flank Companies to take possession of the fort this evening I set off for Nahan.

THE WAR.

ITS NAVAL SIDE.

THE GREAT SEA BATTLE.

The most important naval event of the war happened on May 31st—June 1st, when a battle was fought between the main British and German fleets in the North Sea. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, in his despatch, dated June 24th, 1916, says that "the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on May 31st, 1916, to the westward of Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark." Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, in describing the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene, says that on the presence of enemy vessels being indicated, at 2.20 p.m., "the direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base." The encounter which took place has therefore been described sometimes as the Battle of Jutland Bank, and also as the Battle of Horn Reef. The Germans call it the Battle of the Skager Rack.

The following official *communiqués* concerning the battle were issued by the Admiralty through the Press Bureau:—

Friday, June 2nd, 7 p.m.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31st, a naval engagement took place off the coast of Jutland. The British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell were the battle-cruiser fleet and some cruisers and light cruisers, supported by four fast battleships. Among those the losses were heavy. The German battle fleet, aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with our main forces, and soon after these appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships. The battle-cruisers "Queen Mary," "Indefatigable," "Invincible," and the cruisers "Defence" and "Black Prince" were sunk. The "Warrior" was disabled, and after being towed for some time had to be abandoned by her crew. It is also known that the destroyers "Tipperary," "Turbulent," "Fortune," "Sparrowhawk," and "Ardent" were lost, and six others are not yet accounted for. No British battleships or light cruisers were sunk. The enemy's losses were serious. At least one battle-cruiser was destroyed and one severely damaged; one battleship reported sunk by our destroyers during a night attack; two light cruisers were disabled and probably sunk. The exact number of enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been large.

Saturday, June 3rd, 1.5 a.m.

Since the foregoing *communiqué* was issued, a further report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, stating that it is now ascertained that our total losses in destroyers amount to eight boats in all. The Commander-in-Chief also reports that it is now possible to form a closer estimate of the losses and damage sustained by the enemy fleet. One "Dreadnought" battleship of the "Kaiser" class was blown up in an attack by British destroyers, and another "Dreadnought" battleship of the "Kaiser" class is believed to have been sunk by gunfire. Of three German battle-cruisers, two of which, it is believed, were the "Derfflinger" and the "Lutzow," one was blown up, another was heavily engaged by our battle fleet and was seen to be disabled and stopping, and the third was observed

to be seriously damaged. One German light cruiser and six German destroyers were sunk, and at least two more German light cruisers were seen to be disabled. Further, repeated hits were observed on three other German battleships that were engaged. Finally, a German submarine was rammed and sunk.

Saturday, June 3rd.

With reference to the German "Wireless" message to the Embassy, Washington, yesterday, containing a report of the speech of the President of the Reichstag, it is noted that the loss of the battleship "Warspite" is again officially affirmed. This is untrue, that ship having returned to harbour. The loss of the "Alcaster" ("Acasta") is also announced; this is not true, that vessel having also returned to her base. The names of the three British destroyers not hitherto named, making the total of the eight lost which were reported in the official *communiqué* issued early on Saturday morning, are "Nomad," "Nestor," "Shark."

Sunday, June 4th, 9.50 p.m.

Until the Commander-in-Chief has had time to consult the officers engaged, and to write a full despatch, any attempt to give a detailed history of the naval engagement which began on the afternoon of May 31st, and ended in the morning hours of June 1st, would evidently be premature. But the results are quite plain. The Grand Fleet came in touch with the German High Seas Fleet at 3.30 on the afternoon of May 31st. The leading ships of the two fleets carried on a vigorous fight, in which the battle-cruisers, fast battleships, and subsidiary craft all took an active part. The losses were severe on both sides, but when the main body of the British Fleet came into contact with the German High Seas Fleet, a very brief period sufficed to compel the latter, who had been severely punished, to seek shelter in their protected waters. This manœuvre was rendered possible by low visibility and mist; and although the Grand Fleet were now and then able to get into momentary contact with their opponents, no continuous action was possible. They continued the pursuit until the light had wholly failed; while the British destroyers were able to make a successful attack upon the enemy during the night. Meanwhile, Sir John Jellicoe, having driven the enemy into port, returned to the main scene of action, and scoured the sea in search of disabled vessels. By noon the next day, June 1st, it became evident that there was nothing more to be done. He returned, therefore, to his bases 400 miles away, refuelled his fleet, and in the evening of June 2nd was again ready to put to sea. The British losses have already been fully stated and there is nothing to add to, or subtract from, the latest account published by the Admiralty. The enemy losses are less easy to determine. That the accounts they have given to the world are false is certain—and we cannot yet be sure of the exact truth. But from such evidence as has come to our knowledge, the Admiralty entertain no doubt that the German losses are heavier than the British—not merely relatively to the strength of the two fleets, but absolutely.

There seems to be the strongest ground for supposing that included in the German losses are:—

Two battleships.

Two "Dreadnought" battle-cruisers of the most powerful type.

Two of the latest light cruisers ("Wiesbaden" and "Elbing").

A light cruiser of the "Rostock" type.

The light cruiser "Frauenlob."

At least nine destroyers and a submarine.

Three further denials of statements in the German official reports were made by the Admiralty through the Press Bureau. The first of these was issued in reference to the German *communiqué* of June 5th, in which it was stated that the British armoured cruiser "Euryalus" was set on fire and burnt out, and that a German submarine had sunk a British destroyer off the Humber. The Admiralty stated that no destroyer nor any other British warship of any description had been destroyed, off the Humber or anywhere else, by a submarine or by any other agency, since the action of May 31st. The "Euryalus," it was added, was not present in the North Sea during this battle, and was therefore not sunk by German fire. The second denial was published on Tuesday, June 6th, in reply to a German official statement issued by the Chief of the Admiralty Staff on June 2nd, in which it was stated that a British submarine was sunk in the course of the battle, during the afternoon and night of May 31st. The Admiralty announced that all British submarines which were at sea on that date had then returned to harbour. It was pointed out that if a submarine was sunk, it was an enemy submarine, and this vessel should be added to the list of German losses. The Admiralty also stated that the assertion of the loss of the "Warspite," "Princess Royal," "Birmingham," and "Acasta" in the action of May 31st, claimed by the enemy on the evidence of British sailors picked up by German ships, was false. Again, on June 8th, the Admiralty announced that in a German official account of the North Sea battle, the loss of the "Lützow," "Rostock," and "Elbing" was admitted, in addition to the "Pommern," "Wiesbaden," and "Frauenlob," the loss of which was announced in the German official *communiqué* on June 1st; but the account repeated that the "Warspite," "Princess Royal," "Birmingham," and "Marlborough" were sunk. These vessels, said the Admiralty, were not sunk, and were safe in port; and the repetition of the false statement compelled a repetition of the former statement issued by the British Admiralty on June 6th: "This is false; the complete list of British losses has been made public."

The first German version of the battle was sent through the wireless stations on Thursday, June 1st, and was as follows:—

During an enterprise directed towards the north our High Sea Fleet on Wednesday last met a considerably superior main portion of the British battle fleet. In the course of the afternoon, between the Skager Rack and the Horn Reef, a number of severe and, for us, successful engagements developed and continued all night. In these engagements, as far as is at present ascertained, we destroyed the great battleship "Warspite" [the British official report says that no battleships were sunk], the battle-cruisers "Queen Mary" and "Indefatigable," two armoured cruisers of the "Achilles" class [the "Warrior" was of this class], one small cruiser, and the new destroyer leaders "Turbulent," "Nestor," and "Alcaster." According to trustworthy evidence a great number of British battleships suffered heavy damage from the artillery of our vessels and the attacks of our torpedo-boat flotillas during the day battle and during the night. Among others, the great battleship "Marlborough" was hit by a torpedo, as is confirmed by the statements of prisoners. A portion of the crews of the British vessels that were sunk were picked up by our vessels. Among them are two sole survivors of the "Indefatigable." On our side, the small cruiser "Wiesbaden" was sunk by the enemy's artillery in the course of the day battle, and during the night the [battleship] "Pommern" by a torpedo. Regarding the fate of the "Frauenlob" [protected cruiser], which is missing, and some torpedo-boats, which have not returned up to the present, nothing is known. The High Sea Fleet returned to our harbours in the course of to-day.

A second official message was issued by the Chief of the German Admiralty Staff on Saturday, June 3rd, as follows :—

To prevent the spread of fantastic reports it is again stated that in the battle off the Skager Rack on May 31st, the German High Sea forces engaged the entire modern British Fleet. To the statements already published it must be added that, according to the official British report, the battle-cruiser "Invincible" and the armoured cruiser "Warrior" were also destroyed. We were obliged to blow up the small cruiser "Elbing," which on the night of May 31st was heavily damaged owing to collision with another German war vessel, so that it was impossible to take her back to port. The crew were rescued by torpedo-boats with the exception of the commander, two officers, and eighteen men who remained on board to blow up the vessel, and who, according to subsequent Dutch reports, have been brought to Ymuiden in a tug and landed there.

On Wednesday, June 7th, an official telegram from Berlin gave a denial to all official and semi-official Press reports from the British side which, so the telegram said, were systematically spread abroad in order to deny the greatness of the British defeat in the naval battle on May 31st, and create the impression that the battle was a victory for the British arms. The telegram continued :—

It is asserted, for instance, that the German Fleet left the battlefield and that the British Fleet remained master of it. As regards this it is stated that by the repeated and effective attacks of our torpedo-boat flotillas during the battle on the evening of May 31st the British Main Fleet was forced to turn round and never again came within sight of our forces, and in spite of its superior speed and reinforcements by a British battle squadron of twelve vessels, which came up from the southern region of the North Sea, never attempted to come again into touch with our forces to continue the battle or to effect a junction with the above-mentioned squadron in order to bring about the desired destruction of the German Fleet. The British assertion that the British Fleet in vain endeavoured to reach the fleeing German Fleet in order to defeat it before reaching its home *points d'appui* is contradicted by the alleged official British statement that Admiral Jellicoe, with his Grand Fleet, had already reached his base at Scapa Flow (Orkneys), 300 miles from the battlefield on June 1st. Our numerous German torpedo-boat flotillas, which were sent out after the battle to make a night attack towards the north beyond the theatre of the day battle, did not find the British main fleet, in spite of a keen search. Moreover, our torpedo-boats were able to rescue a large number of British survivors of various vessels which had been sunk. As further proof of the fact disputed by the British of the participation of the entire battle fleet in the battle, it is pointed out that the British Admiralty report announced that the "Marlborough" was disabled. Furthermore, one of our submarines on June 1st sighted another vessel of the "Iron Duke" class heavily damaged steering towards the English coast. Both the vessels mentioned belong to the British main fleet.

In order to belittle the great German success, the British Press also attributes the loss of several British vessels to German mines, submarines, and airships. In this connection it is expressly pointed out that neither mines, which, by the way, would have been just as dangerous to our own fleet as to that of the enemy, nor submarines were employed by our High Sea Fleet, and German airships were exclusively used for reconnaissance work. The German victory was gained by able leadership and by the effect of our artillery and torpedoes.

Until now we refrained from contradicting many of the alleged official British assertions regarding German losses. The latest assertion again and again repeated is that the German Fleet lost not less than two vessels of the "Kaiser" class, the "Westfalen," two battle-cruisers, four small cruisers, and a great number of destroyers. Moreover, the British indicate that the "Pommern," which we reported lost, is not a ship of the line of 13,000 tons, built in 1905, but a modern "Dreadnought" of the same name. We state that the total loss of the German High Sea Forces during the battle of May 31 and June 1, and subsequently, are:—

One battle-cruiser,
One ship of the line of older construction,
Four small cruisers, and
Five torpedo-boats.

Of these losses, the "Pommern," launched in 1905, the "Wiesbaden," the "Elbing," the "Frauenlob," and five torpedo boats, have already been reported sunk in official statements. For military reasons we refrained till now from making public the loss of the vessels "Lutzow" and "Rostock." In view of the wrong interpretation of this measure, and, moreover, in order to frustrate English legends about gigantic losses on our side these reasons must now be dropped. Both vessels were lost on their way to harbour after attempts had failed to keep the heavily damaged vessels afloat. The crews of both ships, including all severely wounded, are in safety.

While the German list of losses is hereby closed, positive indications are to hand that the actual British losses are materially higher than established and made public by us on the basis of our own observation. British prisoners state that beside the "Warspite," the "Princess Royal," and the "Birmingham" were also destroyed. According to reliable reports the "Dreadnought" "Marlborough" also sank before reaching port. The battle of Skager Rack was, and remains, a German victory even if the result is judged solely by the losses in ships officially admitted by the British. The total tonnage of German losses is 60,720 tons against 117,750 tons British losses.

In the American newspapers on July 1st, there appeared a detailed official report by the German Admiralty in regard to the battle, telegraphed to the United States by the Berlin correspondent of the Associated Press. This version of the action was published in *The Times* and other British papers on Monday, July 3rd. It was, in effect, a summary of the material facts, according to German claims, contained in a much longer official account contributed to the German Press on July 1st—5th.

In addition to the Admiralty *communiqués* given above, a statement was officially circulated for publication which had been drawn up by Mr. Churchill in circumstances explained by him in a letter to the Press on June 20th. In this letter, he stated that he went to the Admiralty at eleven o'clock on the morning of June 3rd, to ask for news, and after he had read the telegrams from the admirals, he was asked if he felt able to give a reassuring interview for the benefit of the neutral Press. After having consulted two friends of high official position, he had a talk with Mr. Balfour, who informed him that he would render a public service if he made a statement. He then drafted the following statement, and left it in the hands of the Admiralty officials to use as they saw fit:—

I have had an opportunity of examining the reports of the admirals, and of considering the information in the possession of the Admiralty. The following facts seem to me to be established:—

1.—The naval supremacy of the British Fleet in capital ships depends upon the super-"Dreadnoughts" armed with the 13.5-in. and 15-in. guns, and these are sufficient by themselves to maintain control of the seas. Of these vital units of the first rank we have only lost one—the "Queen Mary." There appears to be no doubt that the Germans have lost at least one comparable ship. If this should be the "Lutzow" or the "Derfflinger" that vessel is the heavier loss to them, actually and relatively, than the "Queen Mary" is to us.

2.—Coming to vessels of the second order, we have lost the "Indefatigable" and the "Invincible." These are of an entirely different class from the super-"Dreadnoughts" and, valuable vessels as they are, do not rank as primary units at the present time. A "Dreadnought" battleship of the "Westfalen" type would be a loss comparable to either. The armoured cruisers "Black Prince," "Defence," and "Warrior" belong to the third order of ships, of which we possess a very large superiority. The sinking of the two brand-new German light cruisers "Wiesbaden" and "Elbing" is, in fact, a more grievous loss to the enemy. In all those vessels the most serious feature is the loss of their splendid and irreplaceable crews. The destroyer casualties appear to be about equal. On these terms, we, being the stronger, are the gainers. Our flotillas have long sought such opportunities.

3.—Our margin of superiority is in no way impaired. The dispatch of troops to the Continent should continue with the utmost freedom, the battered condition of the German Fleet being an additional security to us.

4.—The hazy weather, the fall of night, and the retreat of the enemy alone frustrated the persevering efforts of our brilliant commanders, Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, to force a final decision. Although it was not possible to compel the German Main Fleet to accept battle, the conclusions reached are of extreme importance. All classes of vessels on both sides have now met; and we know that there are no surprises or unforeseen features. An accurate measure can be taken of the strength of the enemy, and his definite inferiority is freed from any element of uncertainty. The fast division of "Queen Elizabeths" seems to have vindicated all the hopes reposed in them.

I cannot record these facts without expressing my profound sympathy with those who have lost their dearest ones. Many of the most gallant sailors our island has ever nurtured, and some of our most splendid officers have gone. But they have died as they would have wished to die, in a blue-water action, which as it is studied, will more and more be found to be a definite step towards the attainment of complete victory.

THE KING AND THE FLEET.

In answer to a congratulatory birthday message from the Commander-in-Chief, on behalf of the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, the King sent a gracious reply, referring to "the splendid gallantry of the officers and men under your command;" mourning "the loss of brave men, many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their country's cause;" and regretting that the German High Seas Fleet, in spite of its heavy losses, was enabled by the misty weather to evade the full consequences of an encounter they have always professed to desire, but for which when the opportunity arrived they showed no inclination. "Though the retirement of the enemy immediately after the opening of the general engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valour and efficiency of the fleets under your command."

On June 13th, King George left London on a visit to the Grand Fleet. His Majesty inspected the whole of this force, and returned to Buckingham Palace on Sunday, June 18th. The King also visited the wounded from his ships in the Royal Naval Hospital at South Queensferry and in the Royal Infirmary at Edinburgh. During his visit, the King addressed representatives of units on parade in the following terms:—

Sir John Jellicoe, officers and men of the Grand Fleet. You have waited for nearly two years with most exemplary patience for the opportunity of meeting and engaging the enemy's fleet. I can well understand how trying has been this period and how great must have been the relief when you knew, on May 31st, that the enemy had been sighted. Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching darkness prevented that complete result which you all expected, but you did all that was possible in the circumstances; you drove the enemy into his harbours, and inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added another page to the glorious traditions of the British Navy. You could not do more, and for your splendid work I thank you.

On the conclusion of his visit the King sent the following message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet:—

I am thankful to have had this opportunity of congratulating you and the Grand Fleet on the result of the recent engagement in the North Sea. Assure all ranks and ratings that the name of the British Navy never stood higher in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, whose pride and confidence in their achievements are unabated. Good luck and God speed. May your future efforts be blessed with complete success.

On Sunday, June 4th, Sir John Jellicoe addressed the following message to the Fleet:—

I desire to express to the flag officers, captains, officers, and men of the Grand Fleet my very high appreciation of the manner in which the ships were fought during the action on May 31st, 1916. At this stage, when full information is not available, it is not possible to enter into details, but quite sufficient is already known to enable me to state definitely that the glorious traditions handed down to us by generations of gallant seamen were most worthily upheld. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable nature robbed the Fleet of that complete victory which I know was expected by all ranks. Our losses were heavy, and we miss many most gallant comrades, but although it is very difficult to obtain accurate information as to the enemy losses, I have no doubt we shall find that they are certainly not less than our own. Sufficient information has already been received for me to make that statement with confidence. I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller information on this point at an early date, but do not wish to delay the issue of this expression of my keen appreciation of the work of the Fleet and my confidence in future complete victory. I cannot close without stating that the wonderful spirit and fortitude of the wounded has filled me with the greatest admiration. I am more proud than ever to have the honour of commanding a Fleet manned by such officers and men.

[The despatches of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty will be found on page 687 *et seq.*]

NORTH SEA.

NEW SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN.—In the last issue of this JOURNAL the events and incidents in the North Sea down to the end of March were recorded. It was noted that although the new German submarine campaign against British,

Allied, and neutral commerce was due to begin on March 1st, during the first fortnight of the month there was little or no sign of a special effort on the part of the "U" boats. In the last two weeks, however, they became increasingly active. During the first part of April the campaign continued to grow in intensity, but by the end of the month it had died down again. The full blast of activity appeared to be of longer duration than some of its predecessors, and was ascribed partly to improvements in the boats used. With submarines of greater tonnage, with more speed, and larger capacity for carrying torpedoes, as well as increased sea-keeping qualities, an effort was made by the enemy to fulfil the promise held out when the first "blockade" was inaugurated early in 1915 of "cutting off the greater part of England's food supply," and thereby starving the country into submission. But the attempt failed.

THE "SUSSEX" CASE.—As briefly recorded on page 423 of the last issue, the French cross-Channel steamer "Sussex" was torpedoed on March 24th, but reached Boulogne with a loss of 100 lives out of the 380 passengers and crew on board at the time. Prince Bahrām of Persia was among those lost, and Sir Edward Grey stated in the House of Commons on April 4th that very sincere sympathy was felt for the relatives of his Highness, and expressions to this effect had been conveyed to his father. The German Admiralty at first declared that the "Sussex" was probably regarded as a troopship and therefore torpedoed. If the submarine commander was under the impression that the "Sussex" had soldiers aboard, it was stated, then he was within his right in torpedoing her. On April 6th, the Naval Attachés of the American Embassies in London and Paris were reported to have sent to Washington the results of their examinations of the fragments of the torpedo which struck the "Sussex." Their investigations left no doubt that the missile was of German make. On April 12th, a German Note replying to the United States inquiries was issued. It stated that the submarine met "a long, black vessel, flying no flag, with a grey funnel, a small grey upper deckhouse, and two high masts." The German commander was firmly convinced that this was a war vessel, a minelayer of the recently-built British "Arabis" class. A sketch of the vessel made by the commander of the submarine and a picture of the "Sussex" from an English newspaper were appended to the Note for comparison, and to show "that the 'Sussex' was not identical with the attacked vessel." On April 13th, however, the French Government announced that it had in its possession the name of the commander and the number of the German submarine which attacked the "Sussex." The officers and crew of the submarine, which was sunk by the Anglo-French flotilla on April 5th, had confirmed all the information in the hands of the French Government concerning the matter. It was also announced that thirteen fragments of the torpedo which sank the steamer were in the possession of the French authorities. On April 15th, the British Foreign Office issued a rejoinder to the German statement, in the following terms:—"1.—There is no resemblance whatever, as contended by the Germans, between a vessel of the 'Arabis' class and the 'Sussex,' and it is quite impossible to mistake one vessel for the other. 2.—The Germans are condemned out of their own mouths by their statement that the commander of the German submarine fired on some vessel at a certain moment. Now that certain moment was precisely the time at which the 'Sussex' was attacked. 3.—The German submarine commander admitted that he had destroyed the fore part of the vessel he attacked. No other ship but the 'Sussex' suffered in this way." At length, on May 10th, the Germans definitely admitted having destroyed the vessel, stating that it could no longer be doubted that the supposed warship torpedoed on March 24th was in fact identical with the "Sussex." On receipt of this decision, Mr. Lansing announced that Germany would be asked to give

all details of the punishment meted out to the commander of the submarine which attacked the "Sussex." The United States desired to ascertain whether he was punished in a manner which might be considered adequate. On May 12th, M. Marcel Hutin, writing in the *Echo de Paris*, asked whether Admiral von Capelle, the new German Minister of Marine, had not given advancement to Ober-Lieutenant Otto Steinbrick, commanding "U.18," who, according to the information of this writer, was the officer responsible for the torpedoing of the "Sussex."

LOSS OF THE "ZENT."—One of the worst cases of loss during the new campaign was that of the unarmed British steamship "Zent," which was sunk by a torpedo from a submarine at 10.20 p.m. on April 5th, without any warning whatever. The submarine was never seen. The "Zent" sank in a few minutes, and in the official announcement made by the Admiralty on April 18th it was stated that forty-nine lives were lost in her. She was outward bound from Liverpool, an Elders and Fyfes steamer of 3,890 tons, and was destroyed twenty-eight miles south-west of the Fastnet. The ship was in ballast, and five minutes' grace would have enabled the whole crew to escape.

DUTCH SHIP TORPEDOED.—In announcing the "Zent" case the Admiralty also referred to that of the "Eemdijk." This Dutch steamer was torpedoed by an enemy submarine on April 7th whilst on passage from Baltimore to Rotterdam. She had Dutch colours painted on her side in four different places, and also carried a rigid painted ensign at the foremast head, a rigid painted houseflag at the mainmast head, and her name and port of registry in large white letters on her side. The ship did not sink, but was beached in England, and a careful examination by experts was made of the fragments of steel and brass found inside her. These were undoubtedly portions of a torpedo, and had the same appearance as those found in other cases in which ships had been torpedoed by German submarines. The steel fragments were considered to be portions of the air chamber, and the brass fragment part of a crankshaft key. "No steel of the thickness or material of these fragments is used in any known type of British or German mine.

OTHER CASES.—On April 15th, *The Times* stated on excellent authority that the mail steamer in which Lord and Lady Chelmsford and their four daughters went out to India on the appointment of his lordship as Viceroy was subjected to a futile attempt at destruction from an enemy submarine. On April 27th, the Admiralty stated that the Norwegian barque "Carmanian," of 1,843 tons, was sunk by gunfire on the 25th from a German submarine fifty-five miles off the west coast of Ireland. The crew took to their boats, and the submarine immediately left them. One of the boats capsized. The other boat, containing the captain and nine men of the crew, landed on the west coast of Ireland, and the occupants were rescued by cliff ladders. On the 28th, the Admiralty announced that the British steamer "Industry" was sunk by an enemy submarine and the crew left in open boats in the Atlantic, 120 miles from the nearest land. The boats, with the entire crew, were picked up by the American liner "Finland." The "Industry" was proceeding to a United States port, and was unarmed. The Danish schooner "Christian" was also sunk by a German submarine fifteen miles from land. The crew escaped in their boats and were picked up by another vessel. The French fishing schooner "Bernadette" was sunk in the Atlantic by an enemy submarine on May 1st, at a distance of 150 miles from the nearest land. The crew of thirty-four escaped in boats, of whom eight were picked up, leaving twenty-six adrift, and of whom apparently nothing more was heard.

"CYMRIC" SUNK.—Shortly after noon on May 8th the White Star liner "Cymric," which left New York on April 29th for Liverpool, was torpedoed 138

miles from the Irish coast without warning. The vessel remained afloat until 3 a.m. next morning. Four of the crew were killed by the explosion of the torpedo and one by drowning in the lowering of the boats. The remainder, numbering 105, were landed at Bantry. They were picked up by a British naval vessel after having been adrift for about nine hours. The "Cymric" took fire after the torpedo struck her. According to the captain's narrative, all on board left the ship and took to the boats, but at 3.30 p.m. the captain and the Marconi operator returned and sent out a wireless message for assistance, which was replied to. The sea was very rough, and a Dutch steamer which was the first to arrive on the scene could not pick up the survivors in consequence.

SACRIFICE OF LIFE.—In several ships destroyed during April and May there was unfortunately loss of life. The case of the "Zent" has been mentioned. In the Italian steamer "Unione," torpedoed on April 10th, all the firemen were killed or drowned, the ship sinking so quickly that they did not have time to come on deck. The captain made a declaration on arriving at Brest that no signal was given before the torpedo was fired. In the "Simla," eleven men were drowned. In the "Chantala," the fourth engineer and eight lascars were lost; and from the "Chick" a boat with the captain and seven men was reported to be unaccounted for. The captain and five men were likewise said to have been lost in the sinking of the "Vesuvio," and from the Norwegian schooner "John" the entire crew of six was missing. The Spanish steamers "Santanderina" and "Vigo" lost four and eight men respectively when they were sunk; in the case of the latter, it was also stated that the submarine prevented the lowering of boats by shelling the ship after she had been stopped. Four men were also reported missing from the Norwegian ship "Baus," three from the "Silksworth Hall," and two were killed in the mining of the "Shenandoah," while the "Bendew" was also said to have lost a fireman. These cases, occurring during the period from April 1st to 17th, during which the new campaign was at the height of its virulence, showed that about 124 seamen lost their lives in consequence of the destruction of ships by torpedoes and mines. Questioned as to whether the Pope had approached Germany on the subject of submarine attacks on merchant ships, Sir Edward Grey stated in Parliament on May 18th that the Foreign Office had been informed by Sir Henry Howard that the Vatican had made representations to the German Government in order to induce them to abandon their submarine warfare.

RELATIVE LOSS.—In a letter to *The Times* on April 4th Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge gave the following particulars of the losses caused by the attacks by submarine, cruiser, mine, etc., on mercantile vessels:—"The loss inflicted by the enemy on the steam shipping of the British Empire down to March 23rd, that is to say, in nearly nineteen months of war, amounts to less than 4 per cent. of the number of vessels, and a little more than 6 per cent. of the tonnage. The French loss in steamers amounts to a little over 4 per cent. of the number of French vessels of the kind, and to rather more than 7 per cent. of the tonnage. The Russian steamers lost amount to rather less than 3½ per cent. of the number, and to rather less than 5 per cent. of the tonnage. The Italian steamer losses are nearly 3½ per cent. of the number, and rather more than 4½ per cent. of the steam tonnage."

SUNK AT SIGHT.—On May 11th, in a written answer to a question in Parliament, Dr. Macnamara published a list of thirty-seven unarmed British merchant vessels which had been torpedoed without warning between May 7th, 1915, and May 10th, 1916. In another list, he gave the names of twenty-two neutral merchant vessels torpedoed without warning between the same dates, according

to the evidence available. The British list began with the "Lusitania" and concluded with the "Cymric." The neutral list included nine Norwegian ships, four Dutch, three Danish, three Swedish, two Spanish, and one American. In reply to another question, the Parliamentary Secretary said that the farthest distance from land at which a German submarine had sunk an unarmed merchant vessel without rendering any assistance was the case of the steamship "Silverash," which was sunk on October 6th, 1915, 180 miles from the nearest land.

NORWEGIAN SHIPPING LOSSES.—Official figures issued on May 11th, according to an Exchange message from Copenhagen, show that eighty-two Norwegian steamers, of a total of 115,933 tons, and fifty-three sailing vessels, totalling 50,378 tons, were destroyed during 1915. The Norwegian Mercantile Marine was, however, enlarged by the addition of vessels approximating 141,036 tons during the year. The value of the ships destroyed by torpedo was nearly £6,000,000.

"DONEGAL" REPORT.—On April 3rd, the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that in the German Wireless Press of that day the *Kölnische Zeitung* was quoted as having been informed from a "reliable source" that an English ship of the "County" class, apparently the "Donegal," had struck a mine and sunk in mid-February of this year. There was no truth whatever, added the Secretary, in this statement.

THE "APPAM" CASE.—On May 12th, the hearing was begun before Judge Waddill, at Norfolk, U.S.A., of the arguments in the case of the Elder Dempster liner "Appam," which was captured by the "Möwe" when she broke out of the North Sea. The British owners claimed that the possession of the vessel should revert to them owing to the action of the prize crew in taking her to an American port by a roundabout course, and permitting her to remain more than twenty-four hours in a neutral port. The judge, overruling the protests of counsel for the German Embassy, allowed the publication in court of the American State Department's communication to Count Bernstorff, which expressed the view that the "Appam" did not fall within the protecting clauses of the Prussian-American treaty. The defendants argued that under the treaty a vessel belonging to Germany could remain indefinitely in American waters, but counsel for the British line contended, on the other hand, that the treaty only granted asylum to ships of war accompanying prizes, whereas the "Appam" was herself the prize, and came into port unaccompanied by a ship of war.

AMERICAN NOTE.—On May 16th, the American State Department made public the text of the Note addressed on March 2nd to Count Bernstorff, declining to allow Germany to claim permanent asylum in an American port for the "Appam." The note declared that Article 19 of the Treaty of 1799, upon which the Count sought to found his right to intern the "Appam," could not be construed to confer upon the captors of that vessel other privileges than those usually granted by maritime nations to prizes of war—viz., to enter neutral ports only in case of stress of weather, want of fuel, or the necessity of repairs, but to leave as soon as the cause of entry had been removed. The Note added that the United States court having assumed custody of the "Appam," the fate of the vessel must now be decided in accordance with the municipal law of the country. The State Department refused the request of Count Bernstorff to intern the crew of the "Appam" on the ground that they resisted capture, or to intern her military passengers.

"U"-BOAT SUNK.—On April 5th, a *communiqué* issued by the French Ministry of Marine announced that a German submarine had been sunk on that day by an Anglo-French flotilla. The officers and crew were rescued and taken prisoners. Unofficially, it was reported that this was the boat which attacked the

cross-Channel steamer "Sussex." It was also stated that her crew numbered two officers and twenty men, and they surrendered and were taken on board a French vessel, the submarine being refloated twenty-four hours later and brought into harbour.

CAPTURED SUBMARINES.—On April 8th, the Secretary of the Admiralty referred to a statement which had appeared in the Dutch paper *Toekomst* to the effect that the captain of a Dutch mail boat had "confirmed by oath" that he saw captured German submarines on the Thames under the command of British officers. This, the Secretary added, was a sheer invention.

AIR ATTACK ON WARSHIPS.—On April 17th, the French official *communiqué* stated that "During the night of April 15th one of our warplanes attacked in the North Sea, at an altitude of 100 yards, an enemy ship, upon which it fired sixteen shells, the majority of which got home."

RAID ON LOWESTOFT.—On the morning of April 25th, the German battle-cruiser squadron, accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers, appeared off Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth. They arrived at about 4.30 a.m., and were engaged by the local naval forces, but after bombarding the two places for some twenty minutes returned at full speed to Germany, chased by the British light cruisers and destroyers. On shore, two men, one woman, and a child were killed, and the material damage done was insignificant. Afloat, two British light cruisers and a destroyer were hit, but none were sunk. In the German report, it was claimed that a British destroyer and two patrol boats were sunk, one of the latter being the trawler "King Stephen," which a few weeks earlier had seen the Zeppelin "L.19," sinking in the North Sea, but was unable to save her crew as they outnumbered, and so could easily have overpowered, his own crew. The Germans also asserted that a bombardment of the "fortifications and important military buildings at Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft" was carried out "with good success." This was the fourth raiding attempt on the East Coast of Great Britain by the enemy. In the first, on November 3rd, 1914, they visited Great Yarmouth, but misjudged the range and their shells fell harmlessly on the beach. On the second occasion, they shelled Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepoons on December 16th, 1914; while in their next attempt, on January 24th, 1915, they were brought to action by Sir David Beatty and lost the "Blücher" sunk and other ships damaged. The attack on April 25th occurred simultaneously with the outbreak of the revolt in Ireland.

AIRCRAFT IN THE RAID.—The Admiralty stated that during the operations of the German squadron, two Zeppelins were pursued by naval land machines over sixty miles out to sea. Bombs and darts were dropped, but apparently without serious effect. In the *London Gazette* on June 22nd, Flight-Lieutenants C. H. S. Smith, V. Nicholl, and F. G. D. Hards, of the Royal Naval Air Service, were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross in recognition of their services on the morning of the 25th April, 1916, when they pursued Zeppelins between fifty and sixty-five miles out to sea, attacking them with bombs and darts. On his return journey Flight-Lieutenant Smith sighted the enemy fleet accompanied by submarines, which latter he attacked and compelled to submerge. It was also announced by the Admiralty that an aeroplane and a seaplane attacked the German ships off Lowestoft, dropping heavy bombs, and four enemy submarines were also attacked by bombs. One seaplane came under heavy fire from the hostile fleet, but the pilot, although seriously wounded, succeeded in bringing his machine safely back to land. It appeared from the *London Gazette* of June 22nd that this officer was Flight-Sub-Lieutenant H. G. Hall, R.N.A.S., who received the D.S.C. for the manner in which he carried out an air patrol with an observer

during the attack by the German squadron. "Although severely wounded in the shoulder by shrapnel and weak from loss of blood," said the *Gazette*, he "succeeded in piloting the machine back to his station and landed safely." Another officer decorated for services during the raid was Squadron-Commander D. A. Oliver, who was awarded the D.S.O. for the manner in which he pursued out to sea the enemy fleet and flew along their line dropping bombs, being subjected to intense anti-aircraft fire. Chief Carpenter T. F. Barry and Carpenter F. R. Hill also received the D.S.C. in recognition of their services during the action between the British cruisers and the enemy squadron.

FIRST LORD'S LETTER.—On May 8th, Mr. Balfour received a deputation from the raided towns, and afterwards wrote to the Mayors of Lowestoft and Yarmouth a letter in reference to their interrogation as to whether he could say anything to reassure the people. After dealing with the probable objects of such attacks, and their futile outcome, Mr. Balfour foreshadowed an alteration in the distribution of our naval forces on the east coast. "In the earlier stages of the war," he said, "considerations of strategy required us to keep our battle fleets in more northern waters. Thus situated, they could concentrate effectively against any prolonged operation such as those involved in an attempt at invasion, but not against brief dashes effected under cover of the night. But with the progress of the war our maritime position has improved. Submarines and monitors, which form no portion of the Grand Fleet, are now available in growing numbers for coast defence, and, what is even more important, the increase in the strength of the Grand Fleet itself enables us to bring important forces to the south without in the least imperilling our naval preponderance elsewhere. It would be unfitting to go into further details, but I have, I hope, sufficiently stated the reasons for my conviction that another raid on the coast of Norfolk (never a safe operation) will be henceforth far more perilous to the aggressors than it has been in the past, and if our enemy be wise is therefore less likely." On the publication of this letter, the Mayor of Scarborough telegraphed that it would give immense satisfaction and a greater sense of security, be of considerable advantage to many of the hard-hit people of Scarborough, and remove a false impression, if it could be stated that the remarks in the letter applied equally to Yorkshire as to Norfolk and Suffolk. Mr. Balfour replied that the general consideration set forth in his letter was applicable to the east coast.

AIR SCOUTING.—The Lowestoft and Yarmouth raid on April 25th was preceded by visits of German aircraft to the neighbourhood of the south-east coast of England, their purpose being no doubt chiefly to observe the disposition of the British ships in the lower part of the North Sea. On April 24th (Easter Monday), a hostile aeroplane appeared over Dover at 11.45 a.m. from the eastward, and circled over the town at a height estimated to be 6,000 feet. Anti-aircraft guns at once came into action, and the machine was driven off, no bombs being dropped. The aeroplane was watched by hundreds of holiday makers on Deal pier and promenade and other places in the vicinity. On the evening of this day, three Zeppelins crossed the east coast, two coming over Norfolk shortly before half-past ten, and the other following at about eleven o'clock. Two other Zeppelins were reported off the coast, but did not come inland. Only two airships, in fact, made any serious attempt to penetrate over the land, and these, although they dropped about seventy bombs, did trifling damage, a man seriously injured being the only casualty officially reported. On the night of April 25th, hostile airships raided the counties of Essex and Kent, but they were met by a brisk fire from anti-aircraft guns, and retreated after having achieved little or nothing. On the night of the 26th, Zeppelins were again reported over the east coast of Kent, between 10.30 and 11 p.m., but they did not penetrate inland, probably on account

of mist. One bomb was dropped, which fell into the sea. In the House of Commons on April 27th, Mr. Tennant said that the raids on the 25th and 26th were beaten off by gun-fire. The Royal Naval Mobile Brigade, stationed somewhere on the east coast, were complimented by the Field Marshal commanding the Home Forces on their having hit a Zeppelin at midnight on Easter Monday on its return after the raid.

AIRMAN'S ADVENTURE.—In reporting the operations of the naval machines which met the Zeppelins in their raid on April 24th, the Admiralty said that one pilot was missing. He ascended during the course of the raid, and attacked a Zeppelin off Lowestoft at about 1.5 a.m. on the morning of the 25th, but had not been heard from since. On April 27th, however, a Dutch lugger brought into Scheveningen this officer and his machine. He had been in the sea for thirty hours, having been compelled to descend owing to lack of benzine. His identity was revealed as Flight-Sub-Lieutenant S. G. Beare. An official report by the Dutch General Headquarters stated that the officer had been liberated, as he was picked up shipwrecked outside Dutch territorial waters. His biplane, however, was interned until after the war. A similar experience befell Squadron-Commander F. E. T. Hewlett after the raid on Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, 1914, when he was compelled to descend in the sea owing to engine trouble, was rescued by a Dutch trawler, landed in Holland, and afterwards released. A further Zeppelin raid by five airships took place over the north-east coast of England and south-east coast of Scotland on May 2nd. A few bombs were dropped in Yorkshire, but generally the movements of the raiders appear to have been uncertain, and no reports of damage were made.

"E.22" Lost.—The loss of another British submarine, the eleventh recorded officially, was announced on the afternoon of April 27th. This boat was "E.22," a new vessel only completed since the war began. News of the loss was first communicated by the German Wireless and accepted by the Admiralty. It appears that the boat was sunk on April 25th by German naval forces "in the southern waters of the North Sea." Two men were rescued and made prisoners. It is significant that nine of the eleven British boats officially reported as lost since the war began have been of the "E" type. One of the others was "D.5," and the identity of the vessel which grounded off the Dutch coast on January 20th last was not revealed.

"U.C.5" Lost.—The Germans also lost another submarine during April, and just as the sinking of "E.22" was first reported in their wireless and accepted by our Admiralty, so the loss of this boat was announced by the British authorities on April 28th and confirmed on the 30th by the Chief of the Naval Staff in Berlin. The German boat was lost off the east coast on April 27th. One officer and seventeen men of the crew surrendered, and were made prisoners. The number of the boat was given officially as "U.C.5," and the vessel was on July 24th brought to London for exhibition off the Temple Pier.

ZEPPELINS DESTROYED.—Early in May, Germany lost three of her Zeppelin airships, two in the North Sea and one at Salonika. The first to be destroyed was "L.20," one of the five taking part in the raid on the night of May 2nd. On her return journey this vessel experienced difficulties owing to the weather, and was driven out of her course by a strong southerly wind. One account stated that the airship had been damaged by shell-fire while operating over the English-Scottish border, another that she encountered a snowstorm, and it was also reported that French and British vessels had attacked her. In any case, she attempted to land in Norway, but was disabled near Stavanger, colliding with a low-lying rock and doubling up, afterwards drifting ashore. The crew were all rescued, some being injured. The wreck was taken charge of by the Norwegian

authorities, and on May 4th was fired upon and destroyed by a detachment of soldiers, as it began to roll dangerously in a strong wind. The official German admission of the loss was as follows:—"In spite of a heavy bombardment, all the airships returned to their home ports with the exception of 'L.20,' which, owing to a strong southerly wind, was driven off to the north and came to grief near Stavanger. The airship was lost, but the entire crew were rescued." The second Zeppelin destroyed was "L.7," which on May 4th was attacked by a British light cruiser squadron off the Schleswig coast. Sir John Jellicoe reported that the "Galatea," Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, and "Phaeton," Captain J. E. Cameron, seriously damaged the vessel by their gunfire, but her destruction was completed by a British submarine under the command of Lieutenant-Commander F. Feilmann, which rescued seven of the airship's crew and returned with them. The submarine was attacked and slightly injured by a German cruiser on her return journey. The third Zeppelin brought down was "LZ.55," which was stated to have been a present from the Kaiser to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. On May 5th, the Admiralty said:—"Vice-Admiral de Robeck reports that at about 2.30 this morning a Zeppelin approached Salonika. When passing over the harbour, she was heavily fired on and hit by the Fleet, and came down in a blaze near the mouth of the Vardar river." A later statement said that survivors of the crew had been found, and four officers and eight men had been made prisoners. As soon as the airship came down, a detachment of French cavalry was sent to cut off the crew from escape, and two or three naval search parties were also landed. A midshipman is reported to have first secured the flag of the Zeppelin, measuring three yards by two, and to have sent it to General Sarrail, who displayed it in his office. One of the airship's propellers was also said to have been taken on board the battleship "Agamemnon," the Fleet flagship, as a souvenir. Prisoners declared that the airship had come from Temesvar, in Hungary, and that owing to the length of the journey—500 miles—the craft only carried a small crew, not more than half that usually on board. There was some hope of salvaging the wreck, and General Sarrail stated that he hoped to bring the skeleton to Salonika. French Army mechanics were employed rebuilding it after it had been extracted, with great difficulty, from the Vardar marshes and towed to an open space round the White Tower at Salonika. On May 18th, a German aeroplane endeavoured to drop bombs on the remnants of the Zeppelin, but was driven off by Allied aircraft.

NAVAL AEROPLANES LOST.—On May 7th, the Admiralty admitted the loss of two naval aeroplanes, one of which was brought down on the 5th, off the coast of Flanders, during an air fight in which a German torpedo boat assisted; and the other being captured on the 6th in the same neighbourhood by a German torpedo boat. In the former, Flight-Sub-Lieutenant H. R. Simms, the pilot, and Sub-Lieutenant C. J. Mullens, the observer, lost their lives; while in the latter Flight-Sub-Lieutenant A. T. N. Cowley and Sub-Lieutenant R. M. Inge were made prisoners. In the same *communiqué* in which the Germans announced these incidents they also claimed to have sunk by gun-fire the British submarine "E.31," on May 5th, but this was denied by the Admiralty, the vessel having returned safely to her base. It was assumed that she was the submarine which destroyed the Zeppelin "L.7."

"WANDLE'S" FIGHT WITH SUBMARINE.—On April 29th, the steam collier "Wandle," of 889 tons, owned by the Wandsworth and Wimbledon District Gas Company, and commanded by Captain G. Mastin, of South Shields, engaged an enemy submarine off the Tyne, which she had left that morning. The "U"-boat was not seen until a shot from her had passed close to the ship, and it was then discovered that the submarine had a sail rigged to cover her conning tower

and periscope. She was about a mile and a half away, travelling in the same direction as the collier. Captain Mastin put his helm hard over to bring the raider astern, and gave orders to man the gun and get the boats ready. The gun was but of small calibre, of course, but after it had fired three rounds, which fell very close to the submarine, the latter made no further attempt to close, and the remaining shots from the "Wandle" were said to have taken effect. The submarine also fired six rounds, the second of which carried away part of the port lifeboat and davits, and wounded a fireman, who was landed when the vessel put back to the Tyne. The little engagement lasted about half an hour, and the engineers and remainder of the crew stood to their posts with perfect coolness while it lasted. On May 4th, the "Wandle" had a great reception when she made her way up the Thames to the Wandsworth Gas Works on the midday tide, and after her arrival a cheque for £250 was presented to the captain and crew, the Mayor of Wandsworth, the Chairman of the Company, Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, and others being present. Sir Evelyn Wood made the presentation, and shook hands with W. E. Norton, R.N.V.R., the gunner who fired the successful shots. In the evening, Captain Mastin visited Mr. Lloyd George.

OTHER MERCHANT SHIP FIGHTS.—On May 5th, the Clan Line steamship "Clan Macfadyen," from Cochin, arrived at Gravesend, and reported having been attacked by two submarines when in the Bay of Biscay. The first submarine opened fire at a range of only about fifty yards, and fired a large number of rounds, but although much damaged about her funnel, boats, etc., the skilful handling of the ship by Captain W. Millar prevented her being mortally injured. The gun mounted for defence in the steamer was promptly brought into action, and it is believed the submarine was hit. Anyway, she made off, but three hours later the vessel encountered another submarine, which fired a torpedo, but missed her by a few feet. Another Clan vessel, the "Clan Lindsay," which arrived at Tilbury on May 7th, reported having been fired at by a submarine in the Bay of Biscay on the 3rd. She was homeward bound from the Malabar coast, and the submarine, revealing itself suddenly from behind a neutral ship, signalled "Stop immediately," and opened fire. The merchant ship replied, though without hitting the submarine, and after another exchange of shots the latter disappeared. In the same week, the French steamer "Donkalla," owned by the Compagnie de Navigation Paquet, and registered at Marseilles, reported a somewhat similar encounter. Captain Ambroselli, on arriving at Toulon on May 6th, reported that he had been attacked by a German or Austrian submarine, which fired a torpedo, but the missile was avoided by the use of the helm. An hour later, the look-out sighted the periscope of the same, or another, submarine, and fire was opened upon it from the "Donkalla's" gun, with, it was believed, successful results, the submarine not being seen again.

BELGIAN COAST AFFAIRS.—On May 17th, it was officially announced that an encounter had taken place on the previous afternoon off the Belgian coast, between a force composed of British destroyers and monitors and some German destroyers. After a short engagement, the enemy withdrew to their ports, and the British force had no casualties. A few days earlier, on May 8th, the Germans claimed to have had a short engagement with five English destroyers to the north of Ostend, wherein one destroyer was heavily damaged. This, however, was denied by the British Admiralty, which stated that "there is no foundation for the German claim. A few shots were exchanged between British and German torpedo boats, when the enemy at once returned into harbour." On three other dates in May, the Germans referred to naval operations off the Belgian coast, but no reference thereto was made by the British Admiralty. On May 20th, they announced that their airmen had "successfully attacked enemy vessels off the

coast of Flanders." On May 25th, they claimed to have attacked "English torpedo and patrol boats by German aeroplanes off the coast of Flanders." And on May 30th a similar claim to have attacked "an enemy destroyer squadron before Ostend" was made. On June 8th, it was stated by the Admiralty, a British patrol force composed of monitors and destroyers was engaged off Zeebrugge with the enemy's destroyers, which, on being fired upon by the monitors, returned into port. On the British side there were no casualties, and no damage was sustained by any of the ships. Dutch papers stated that in the fight a German submarine was reported to have been sunk by gunfire from one of the monitors. Towards the end of June, the German forces at Zeebrugge were said to have increased by several new torpedo boats and submarines.

CAPTURE OF STEAMERS.—A somewhat new turn to the enemy's activity at Zeebrugge was given on June 24th, when the Great Eastern Railway steamer "Brussels" was captured by a German torpedo flotilla and taken into port. The capture is said to have been aided by a spy in the "Brussels" who remained on deck all night and posed as an American, although he talked German fluently when landed and was at once set at liberty. The steamer was captured at 2 a.m., when armed parties from the destroyers boarded her, hoisted the German flag, searched the cabins, and so forth. On arriving at Zeebrugge, the passengers and crew were sent to Bruges, and the ship unloaded, after which it was reported in the Dutch Press that she was taken into the inner harbour to be fitted as an auxiliary cruiser. On July 5th, another steamer, the "Lestris," of the Cork Steamship Company, was captured while on a voyage to Rotterdam with a mixed cargo. The Germans announced this as follows:—"On Wednesday morning, the English steamboat 'Lestris,' coming from Liverpool, was taken as a prize not far from the English coast by part of our High Sea forces."

FRENCH AIR ATTACK.—On June 27th, the French official *communiqué* announced that "during a reconnaissance in Belgium, three of our armed aeroplanes fired sixty-five shells on German boats near the Belgian coast."

"HAMPSHIRE" SUNK.—At 10.30 a.m. on June 6th, a telegram was received at the Admiralty from Sir John Jellicoe reporting with deep regret that the cruiser "Hampshire," Captain Herbert J. Savill, with Lord Kitchener and his Staff on board, was sunk the previous night about 8 p.m., to the west of the Orkneys, either by a mine or torpedo. Four boats were seen by observers on shore to leave the ship. The wind was N.N.W., and heavy seas were running. Patrol vessels and destroyers at once proceeded to the spot, and a party was sent along the coast to search, but only some bodies and a capsized boat were found up to the time of the Commander-in-Chief's report. On June 8th, the Admiralty announced that one warrant officer and eleven men had survived, being washed ashore on a raft. On the 10th, the Admiralty announced the receipt of a further report from the Commander-in-Chief, according to which it had been established that the "Hampshire" struck a mine about 8 p.m. on June 5th. She was accompanied on her voyage by two destroyers until the captain of the "Hampshire" was compelled to detach them at about 7 p.m. on account of the very heavy seas. The ship sank within ten minutes of the mine explosion. Immediately on the receipt of the news destroyers and patrol vessels were despatched to the scene, and search parties were sent in motor-cars to work along the coast. In spite of all the measures taken, however, the Commander-in-Chief concluded, with the deepest possible regret, that there could be no doubt that the boats which left the ship were wrecked in the heavy sea on a lee shore.

LOSS OF LORD KITCHENER.—The "Hampshire," it was officially stated, was on her way to Russia, Lord Kitchener having left England on a visit to that

country on the invitation of his Imperial Majesty the Tsar. The Secretary of State for War was accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel O. A. FitzGerald (Personal Military Secretary); Brigadier-General W. Ellershaw; Second-Lieutenant R. D. Macpherson, 8th Cameron Highlanders; Mr. H. J. O'Beirne, of the Foreign Office; Sir H. F. Donaldson and Mr. L. S. Robertson, of the Ministry of Munitions; Mr. L. C. Rix, Shorthand Clerk; and Detective MacLaughlin, of Scotland Yard. Three personal servants, and a driver, R.H.A., were also attached to the party. Lord Kitchener, at the request of the Government, was to have taken the opportunity of discussing important military and financial questions. On June 13th, Sir John Jellicoe telegraphed to Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as follows:—"The thoughts of all in the Grand Fleet are turned at this solemn moment to the great soldier whose loss we, in common with the whole nation, deplore so deeply. It was our privilege to see him last. He died with many of our comrades. We mourn with the Army. His incomparable life work for Sovereign and country will ever be held in remembrance for all generations." Sir William Robertson replied: "I beg to thank you in the name of the Army for the kind message from the Grand Fleet. It affords still another proof of the bonds of affection and true comradeship which have always so closely knit together His Majesty's naval and military Services. The whole Army sympathizes with you in the loss of the brave sailors who met their death with our late Chief."

INQUIRY RESULT.—An official inquiry was held into the loss of the "Hampshire," at which the twelve survivors from that ship were all examined, and at its conclusion the following statement was issued by the Admiralty:—

The following are the conclusions arrived at concerning the circumstances of the disaster:—

"The 'Hampshire' was proceeding along the west coast of the Orkneys; a heavy gale was blowing, with the seas breaking over the ship, which necessitated her being partially battened down. Between 7.30 and 7.45 p.m. the vessel struck a mine, and began at once to settle by the bows, heeling over to starboard before she finally went down, about fifteen minutes later. Orders were given by the captain for all hands to go to their established stations for abandoning ship. Some of the hatches were opened, and the ship's company went quickly to their stations. Efforts were made without success to lower some of the boats, one of them being broken in half during the process, and her occupants thrown into the water.

"As the men were moving up one of the hatchways to their stations Lord Kitchener, accompanied by a naval officer, appeared. The latter called out, 'Make way for Lord Kitchener,' and they both went up on to the quarter-deck, and subsequently four military officers were seen on the quarter-deck walking aft on the port side.

"The captain called out for Lord Kitchener to come up to the fore bridge near where the captain's boat was hoisted; he was also heard calling for Lord Kitchener to get into the boat, but no one is able to say whether Lord Kitchener got into the boat or not, nor what occurred to this boat, nor did anyone see any of the boats get clear of the ship. Large numbers of the crew used their life-saving belts, waistcoats, etc., which appear to have proved effective in keeping them afloat. Three rafts were safely launched, and, with about fifty to seventy men on each of them, got clear of the ship. A private soldier appears to have left the ship on one of the rafts, but it is not known what became of him. It was light up to about 11 p.m.

"Though the rafts with these large numbers of men got safely away, in one case out of over seventy men on board, six only survived. The survivors all report that men gradually dropped off and even died on board the rafts from exhaustion, exposure, and cold. Some of the crew must have perished trying to land on the rocky coast after such long exposure, and some died after landing."

In forwarding this Report of the Inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet says:—

"I cannot adequately express the sorrow felt by me personally and by the officers and men of the Grand Fleet generally at the fact that so distinguished a soldier and so great a man should have lost his life whilst under the care of the Fleet."

BALTIC.

GERMAN AIR RAID.—With the melting of the ice in the Baltic during April, a renewal of the German effort to obtain possession of the Gulf of Riga was anticipated, but it did not come off. On April 8th, four German naval aeroplanes attacked the Russian aerodrome at Papenholm, near Kielkond, on the large island of Osel, at the entrance to the Gulf, when, according to the German account, twenty bombs were dropped. In spite of anti-aircraft fire, it was claimed, all the German machines returned safely.

SUBMARINES AT WORK.—It was stated in the *Norwegian Shipping Gazette* about the middle of April that the German Navy had stopped the international passage south of the Sound, not merely by the usual mine obstructions, but also by steel nets designed to entrap British submarines on their way to the Baltic. Danish torpedo boats had been carefully watching to see that the obstructions were not placed in Danish territorial waters. In three articles published in the daily Press on June 21st, June 23rd, and June 28th respectively, Mr. Rudyard Kipling was permitted to describe, from the logs of the boats themselves, the doings and work of British submarines in the Baltic and Sea of Marmora, under the description of "Tales of 'The Trade.'"

RUSSIAN NAVAL PROGRESS.—In two articles published in the *Daily Mail* on June 14th and 15th, Mr. Hamilton Fyfe described a visit to the Russian Baltic Fleet and an interview with its Commander-in-Chief. Admiral Kanin said that the Russians were "in a quite different position from that of a year ago. We are, to begin with, very much stronger in ships. I have, in addition to the four new 'Dreadnoughts,' a large number of other ships put into commission during the last twelve months. In torpedo boats and submarines we are now especially strong. Our mine-layers and mine-sweepers are numerous and devoted."

GERMAN AIR ATTACKS.—On May 1st, a German naval airship attacked military establishments in the Moon Sound and at Pernau (north-east of the Gulf of Riga). The vessel returned safely. At the same time, German seaplanes dropped bombs on the military installations and aerodrome at Papenholm, which lies athwart the Gulf. Two days later, the Germans again announced that the activity of their naval airmen was vigorous in the Baltic, and that a squadron of seaplanes had bombarded the Russian battleship "Slava." The Russians made good reply to such attacks, and it was admitted by the enemy that on May 1st one of their air squadrons attacked the German installations at Windau, and that early on the morning of May 7th some Russian torpedo boats bombarded the north-eastern coast of Courland, between Royen and Markgrafen.

SUBMARINE BLOCKADE RESUMED.—On the Baltic being cleared of ice, the Russo-British submarines resumed their blockade of the German ports. On May 16th, three steamers were sunk by a Russian submarine, the "Hera," "Kollga," and "Bianca." The "Hera," an oil-tanker of 4,705 tons, was torpedoed outside Landsort Lightship at 9 a.m., and the German-American Petroleum Company, of Hamburg, thus lost a useful vessel. The "Kollga" was a collier, bound from Hamburg to Stockholm. She was destroyed, apparently by the same submarine, twenty miles S.E. of Landsort on the afternoon of the 16th. The "Bianca," bound from Hamburg to Gelle, also with coal, was of 1,054 tons, and was destroyed about half an hour after the "Kollga," a Swedish steamer picking up the crews of both ships. On May 22nd, a further trio of steamers was reported to have been sunk, the "Pera," of 4,000 tons, belonging to the German Levant Line; the "Hebe," of 2,000 tons; and the "Worms," of 4,400 tons. The two former were sunk near Oland Island, to the south of Stockholm; and the "Worms" off Norrtelje, to the north of Stockholm. On May 17th, the German steamer "Trave," of 762 tons, bound from Lubeck to Norway with coal, was torpedoed off Kullen by an Allied submarine, her crew of fourteen being saved, as usual, for it was a feature of these operations that every facility was given to the seamen in the attacked vessels to make good their escape.

ACTION OFF LANDSORT.—On June 30th, about fifteen miles off Landsort, an engagement occurred between Russian and German light craft and destroyers. The affair was indecisive, and there were no losses on either side. The official Russian *communiqué* stated that "a detachment of several of our cruisers and torpedo boats, searching for enemy forces between the island of Gothland and the Swedish coast, discovered no big naval unit. At daybreak, our cruisers were attacked by a flotilla of enemy torpedo boats, who were easily repulsed by the fire of our guns. Attacks by enemy submarines were also unsuccessful. Our detachment regained its base without loss and without having been damaged." In the German official account, it was stated that the Russian squadron included an armoured cruiser, protected cruiser, and five destroyers, and that the fighting took place between Häfringe and Landsort.

GERMAN CONVOY ATTACKED.—On the night of June 13th, the Russian torpedo boats attacked a convoy of German steamers under an escort of warships. The result was brilliantly successful, the Russians sinking two of the conveying vessels of the small torpedo boat type and an auxiliary cruiser, the "Herrmann." The Germans stated that the latter was attacked by four Russian destroyers, and set on fire, when her own crew blew her up. Her commander and about one-third of the crew were rescued and made prisoners. The Russian vessels suffered no loss or damage. In the course of the engagement the German ships fled towards Swedish territorial waters, and for this reason the Russians did not pursue them. According to accounts in the Scandinavian papers, the action lasted for forty-five minutes, and there were thirteen or fourteen merchantmen in the convoy, which was quite dispersed, and four or five of its units sunk, the rest taking shelter in Swedish waters. The flotilla was attacked by six Russian destroyers, and, according to one account, submarines were also present. The auxiliary cruiser "Herrmann" was of 3,000 tons, and was stated to be armed with 6-in. guns.

COAST BOMBARDMENT.—On July 2nd, on the right wing of the Russian Army, in the region of Riga, Russian ships co-operated with the land artillery in bombarding the enemy's lines. An enemy aeroplane dropped twenty bombs without success upon the vessels. The Germans, however, claimed to have hit the battleship "Slava."

ADRIATIC.

SEAPLANE RAID.—A remarkable raid by the occupants of two seaplanes was recorded in an Italian official *communiqué* on April 12th. In the Lower Adriatic, these two Italian machines, having bombed a point on the enemy coast and put to flight the men guarding it, alighted on the sea and reached the shore. The four officers in the seaplanes then landed, and burned a house which was being used as a signal station. They then blew up a small munitions depôt, ignited several coal stacks, and destroyed the landing stage, afterwards flying back to their base. In the same *communiqué* it was announced that one of the Italian airships dropped half a ton of bombs on Nabresina Railway Station, north-west of Trieste. All of them exploded, and the airship returned unharmed. Also in the Upper Adriatic there was brought down by anti-aircraft batteries an enemy seaplane, from which two officers were made prisoners.

HEAVY AERIAL FIGHTING.—It was announced on May 4th by the Austrian Naval Staff that at 3 o'clock on the previous afternoon a squadron of their seaplanes bombarded the railway station, a sulphur factory, and the barracks at Ravenna with good effect. Conflagrations were observed in the sulphur factory and at the railway station. Although fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries, all the seaplanes returned. The Italians reported that only a few persons were wounded and very slight damage was done. On the same night, two Italian airships bombarded enemy entrenchments, batteries, and camps in the Wippach valley, and in returning one of them was cut off by artillery fire and brought down, its four occupants being killed.

DESTROYER AFFAIR.—On May 3rd, a small affair between Italian and Austrian torpedo craft occurred to the south of the mouth of the River Po. Ten Austrian torpedo boats were sighted by four Italian destroyers, and were chased back to Pola by the latter. The Italian destroyers continued the chase to within twenty miles of Pola, said the Rome *communiqué*, shelling the enemy continuously, and only abandoned the pursuit when several large enemy warships were seen leaving Pola to support the hunted torpedo boats. Austrian seaplanes attempted, but without success, to drop bombs on the destroyers.

AUSTRIAN DESTROYER SUNK.—On May 4th, in the Lower Adriatic, an Austrian destroyer was torpedoed and sunk by the French submarine "Bernouilli." No details were given. On May 16th, an Austrian vessel with munitions from Cattaro was reported to have struck a mine off Durazzo and sunk.

VALONA AND BRINDISI BOMBED.—On May 4th also an attack was made in the morning by Austrian seaplanes on Valona, and in the afternoon on Brindisi. The Austrian *communiqué* claimed that at Valona the batteries and the aerodrome were several times hit, and that at Brindisi railway trains, the station warehouses, the arsenal, and a group of destroyers lying close together were hit, while many bombs exploded in the town. An ascending hostile aeroplane, it was added, was immediately chased. The Italians stated that two of their aeroplanes went up from Brindisi to counter-attack the enemy machines, one of which they destroyed. The Austrians also said that on their way back, far out at sea, their seaplanes observed the Italian cruiser "Marco Paulo," with her crew standing close together on deck. She was fired at with machine guns.

A HOSPITAL SHIP LIE.—It was announced by the Press Bureau on May 8th that the following wireless message had been addressed to the German Embassy at Washington: "Athens reports British and French, violating Geneva flag, exclusively effected transport of Serbs in hospital ships in order to avoid torpedoing by submarines." The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that "this is an absolute fabrication."

THE POPE'S NAVAL ENSIGN.—An Exchange message from Rome on June 12th announced that the Pope, intending to safeguard diplomatic representatives of the Holy See from war risks, had bought the steamer "Nuncius," and the Italian Government had permitted the use of Citta Vecchia as a permanent harbour. The ship is painted white and yellow, and flies the Papal flag—the first time, it is believed, that this flag has been flown at sea since the loss of temporal power. The first voyage, added the report, would be made to Buenos Ayres, carrying the new Papal Nuncio, Mgr. Vassallo di Torregrossa.

COUP AT TRIESTE.—On May 28th, there occurred what was evidently a daring coup by a torpedo boat of the Italian Navy. A semi-official message from Rome announced that on this Sunday night, the torpedo boat with great skill approached the entrance to the port of Trieste, and there torpedoed and sank a large transport. To perform this feat the vessel must have negotiated a strong mine belt in the Gulf of Trieste. After the torpedo, which the boat managed to discharge, had found its mark in the steamer anchored inside the harbour, the enemy turned on his shore searchlights but failed to detect the raider, which returned to her base without a scratch.

ITALIAN TRANSPORT SUNK.—Towards the evening of June 9th, the Italian transport "Principe Umberto," of 7,929 tons, was sunk by submarine in the Lower Adriatic. Three steamers transporting troops and war material, and escorted by a flotilla of destroyers, were attacked by two submarines of the Austrian flotilla, and although the latter, on being discovered, were promptly counter-attacked, one of their torpedoes struck the "Principe Umberto," which sank within a few minutes. In spite of the life-saving facilities at the disposal of the convoy, said the Rome semi-official report, and the prompt assistance of other units in those waters, about half the troops on board the transport were lost.

ISTRIAN COAST RAID.—During the night of June 11th, Austrian seaplanes dropped a few bombs on Venice, causing very slight damage. One woman was killed, however, and four civilians were injured. In the same semi-official *communiqué* in which this was announced, it was also stated that at dawn the same day Italian torpedo boats approached a place on the Istrian Peninsula, and after carrying out a reconnaissance bombarded an important point near Parenzo. They were persistently but vainly attacked on their return journey by five enemy seaplanes, and all returned without loss. On the morning of the 12th also one of the Italian seaplanes in the Upper Adriatic, after repulsing an attack by an enemy machine, dropped bombs on military establishments near Trieste.

MEDITERRANEAN.

CONSTANTINOPLE AIR RAID.—On the evening of April 14th, a raid on Constantinople was carried out by three British naval aeroplanes. It was officially announced that bombs were dropped on the Zeitunlik powder factory and the aeroplane hangars. Another naval aeroplane visited Adrianople and dropped bombs on the railway station. The officers who took part in these operations were Squadron-Commander J. R. W. Smyth-Pigott, Flight-Lieutenant K. S. Savory, and Flight-Sub-Lieutenants R. S. W. Dickinson and I. H. W. Barnato, all of whom returned safely. The flight to Constantinople and back measured over 300 miles, and though fine weather prevailed at the start, adverse conditions supervened, with wind, rain, and thunderstorms.

AIRMEN'S AWARDS.—In the *London Gazette* of June 22nd several of the airmen in the Eastern Mediterranean were awarded honours for good service. Lieut.-Col. E. L. Gerrard, Royal Marines, the Wing-Commander in command of the Royal

Naval Air Service in this theatre of the war, received the D.S.O., and the official notice stated that "The present efficiency of this Wing is due very largely to Wing-Commander Gerrard, whose personal example and the manner in which he has encouraged the younger officers under his command are all that can be desired." Flight-Lieutenant K. S. Savory and Flight-Sub-Lieutenant R. S. W. Dickinson also received the D.S.O. "in recognition of their services on the night of April 14th-15th, 1916, when they carried out a flight to Constantinople and dropped bombs upon points of military importance, returning safely to their base after a long flight in rough and stormy weather." Squadron-Commander J. R. W. Smyth-Pigott and Flight-Sub-Lieutenant I. H. W. Barnato were in the same *Gazette* stated to have been mentioned in despatches.

"**RUSSELL**" SUNK.—On April 27th, it was officially announced that the battleship "Russell," Captain W. Bowden-Smith, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral S. R. Fremantle, had struck a mine on the previous day in the Mediterranean and sunk. The admiral, captain, commander, and twenty-three other officers, with 676 men, were saved, leaving about 124 officers and men missing. The latter included Lieutenant-Commander L. P. Freyburg, four lieutenants, and five out of the six midshipmen in the vessel. In all there were twenty-one officers killed or drowned, and six died of wounds. On April 30th, a message from Copenhagen referred to a German report that the "Russell" was not blown up by a mine, but was torpedoed by a German or Austrian submarine. This report added that there are no mine dangers at all in the Mediterranean, since the placing of mines is very difficult on account of the depth of the water. On May 1st, it was reported from Malta that the survivors from the "Russell" had been landed there. The "Russell" was the tenth British battleship lost in the war, and all of them, with the exception of the "Bulwark," which was destroyed by an internal explosion, were the victims of torpedoes or mines. The "Russell," launched in 1901 and completed in 1903, belonged to the "Duncan" class of pre-"Dreadnoughts," and was of 14,000 tons displacement.

WAR VESSELS MINED.—On May 1st, the Admiralty announced that the armed yacht "Ægusa," Captain T. P. Walker, R.N.R. (a retired Vice-Admiral), and the mine-sweeper "Nasturtium," Lieutenant-Commander Robin W. Lloyd, R.N., had struck mines in the Mediterranean and sunk. The captains and officers of both ships were saved, but there were six missing from the crew of the "Ægusa" and seven from the "Nasturtium." The former vessel was previously called the "Erin"—the well-known steam yacht of Sir Thomas Lipton. The "Nasturtium" was the third vessel of her class to be sunk. On February 10th the "Arabis" was lost in a night attack by German torpedo craft in the North Sea; and on March 1st the "Primula" was torpedoed and sunk in the Eastern Mediterranean.

MONITOR ATTACKS.—On May 8th, the Turkish official *communiqué* stated that off the island of Imbros a monitor and a cruiser, supported by the observations of aeroplanes, threw forty shells in the neighbourhood of Sedd-ul-Bahr, without effect. One of the Turks' aeroplanes, they claimed, hit the enemy cruiser with two bombs, and the vessel, wrapped in smoke, took to the open sea. In the vicinity of the coast islands, a monitor, a torpedo boat, and two enemy aeroplanes opened fire against some coast points, but were obliged by the reply of the Turkish artillery, added the *communiqué*, to cease fire, the monitor and torpedo boat being both hit. On May 6th also the Turks stated that two of their aeroplanes threw ten bombs on a ship cruising near Akaba, slightly injuring a soldier.

MONITOR SUNK.—On May 17th, it was officially announced that a delayed telegram from Vice-Admiral de Robeck stated that on the night of May 13th one of the small British monitors, "M.30," commanded by Lieutenant-Commander

E. L. B. Lockyer, was struck by the enemy's artillery; and, taking fire, was subsequently destroyed. Two men were killed and two wounded.

LEVANTINE COAST ATTACKED.—A War Office *communiqué* announced the bombardment by ships and aircraft on May 18th of El Arish, an important post on the enemy line of communications from Syria to Egypt. This Levantine coast fortress is 100 miles or so east of the Suez Canal, and thirty-five miles west of El Rafa, the coast terminus of the frontier line between Egypt and the Turkish province of Jerusalem. The warships are believed to have reduced the fort to the south-west of the town to ruins, and both the ships and aircraft returned safely. On the same day the Turks announced that Smyrna was bombarded by two warships. Both places had been shelled before in the war by Allied vessels, particularly in the early part of the attack on the Dardanelles.

EGEAN COAST BOMBARDMENTS.—A bombardment by the Allied Fleet of Dedeagatch, Porto Lagos, and other Bulgarian towns is reported unofficially to have taken place on June 23rd. On the same day, it was stated in a Turkish *communiqué* that "an enemy warship off Tenedos threw some shells on the neighbouring coast and then withdrew. Another warship that tried to pass by Phokia, on the island of Makronisi (Gulf of Smyrna), made for the open sea in the direction of Mytiene." On June 14th, the following was issued in Sofia:—"On Saturday six enemy ships approached the mouth of the Mesta about a quarter past twelve. The ships opened fire against the coast from the river mouth to Kaleburun. The fire was directed especially against the villages and farms on the bank of the river and on the unharvested crops. In the afternoon four of our aeroplanes attacked the ships with bombs and forced them to retire at full speed in the direction of Thasos. Our aeroplanes, although vigorously fired at, returned safely. The bombardment of the coast caused us no losses."

SUBMARINE MENACE.—The submarine menace in the Mediterranean, which, as indicated in these notes last quarter, assumed larger proportions in the early spring, afterwards died down again, and there was a considerable falling off in the number of victims. A sign of the change was the announcement in the *Nieuws van den Dag*, of Amsterdam, in the middle of June, that the Nederland Company, which some time before had decided to send its ships round the Cape to the Dutch East Indies, was then about to resume the customary route through the Suez Canal.

"U.35's" CRUISE.—On June 21st, a German submarine, reported to be "U.35," put into the Spanish port of Cartagena, ostensibly to deliver an autograph letter from the Kaiser to King Alfonso, thanking the latter for the warm welcome extended to the defeated Germans from the Cameroons on their arrival in Spanish territory. On arriving, the submarine moored next to the German interned vessel "Roma," which revictualled her, and to which she discharged thirty-five cases of hospital stores addressed to the Germans from the Cameroons. The Spanish authorities subsequently ordered the submarine to moor near a Spanish cruiser, the "Cataluna," and forbade unofficial visitors going on board the craft. A special train was despatched to Cartagena by the German Embassy at Madrid to bring back the Kaiser's letter. Lieutenant von Arnault, the commander of "U.35," stated in interviews while at Cartagena that he had sunk fifty vessels—forty-seven with the bow guns. He claimed that the French liner "Provence II." was among them. The submarine carried an Iron Cross flag, and was said to have a displacement of 832 tons on the surface and 1,200 when submerged. She left Cartagena at about 3 a.m. next morning, well within twenty-four hours of her arrival. Telegraphing on June 25th, the correspondent of *The Times* at Madrid said that "the real object of the visit of the German

submarine . . . was to establish the right, hitherto implicitly denied, of German submarines to use Spanish ports for the purpose of taking in supplies."

SHIPS SUNK, AND RETURN.—The "U.35," on putting to sea again, evidently took to commerce raiding for a few days. Several merchantmen were reported sunk in the region in which she was known to be cruising. Any doubt on the matter, moreover, was set at rest when, on July 6th, a German official *communiqué* said:—"Our submarine 'U.35,' which took to Cartagena an autograph letter from the Emperor to the King of Spain, as well as medical supplies for the interned Germans, has returned after successfully executing its task. In the course of this journey, it sank *inter alia* the French armed steamer 'Herault,' capturing one gun." The "Herault" belonged to Marseilles, and her commander, Captain Cauvin, had time to launch his boats before the ship went down, so that most of those on board were saved, but one Arab stoker was killed and an engineer and another Arab stoker injured.

BLACK SEA.

BLOCKADE OF TURKEY.—During March, much activity was displayed by the Russian Fleet in arresting the traffic in provisions and petroleum which had been carried on by means of steamers and small sailing vessels between Constanza and Constantinople. On March 25th, the steamer "Turkestan," sailing under Persian colours, was sunk off Mangalia. Another steamer, the "Esperanza," had been destroyed off Cape Kali Akra a few days earlier, as had other smaller vessels. Many were also reported to be at Constanza, not venturing to undertake a voyage. A correspondent of *The Times* at Bukarest mentioned that in the course of these operations the crews of the vessels sunk in most instances were saved and set at liberty, the captains being previously photographed and informed that in case of a repetition of their offence they would be deported to Siberia.

JAPANESE MISSION.—On April 30th, it was announced that the Japanese Naval Mission to Russia, of which Rear-Admiral Akiyama was at the head, had arrived at Sebastopol in the course of its visit to the Russian ports and ships in the Black Sea. The Mission had already been to the Baltic.

ENEMY SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.—It was mentioned in these notes last quarter (page 439) that an official Turkish *communiqué* had claimed the sinking by submarines of two Russian vessels, one a transport full of soldiers, on March 30th and 31st respectively. On April 9th, a Russian official *communiqué* described this Turkish report as a pure invention, "for during the period in question no warship, auxiliary, or merchantman was sunk in the Black Sea, except the hospital ship 'Portugal,' which, in accordance with international conventions, was undefended." Describing the general activity on the part of the submarines, the *communiqué* stated that they had on several occasions attacked Russian vessels off the Caucasian coast, but always unsuccessfully. One small trawler which had become a wreck on the rocks was fired upon. "Our destroyers," it was added, "are discharging their duties as patrols with complete success, being frequently in pursuit of submarines. The torpedo boat 'Strogyi' succeeded in ramming a submarine not far from the place where the 'Portugal' was sunk."

CAPTURE OF TREBIZOND.—On April 18th, it was officially announced that Trebizond had been taken. This most important fortified position on the Anatolian coast fell to the efforts of the troops of the Caucasian Army under the Grand Duke Nicholas, and the ships of the Black Sea Fleet under Admiral Eberhardt. The official *communiqué* said:—"The successful co-operation of the Fleet permitted us to effect the most daring landing operations, and to give continual artillery support to the troops, which were operating in the coastal region." In the early

stages of the war Trebizond was the chief base of supplies for the Turkish campaign in the Caucasus, the Turks having at first the command in those waters, and so being enabled to transport supplies and munitions from Constantinople. On the Russians taking this naval control from them, the position of the Turkish Third Army became precarious, and after the seizure of Erzerum, which the Turks lost largely through lack of munitions, the defeat of their left wing, resting on the sea coast, was only a matter of time. The Turks, retreating from Trebizond, fell back on Platana, about ten miles to the west, being harassed on the way by the guns of the Fleet. On April 23rd, the Turks reported officially that "Engagements are proceeding between our coastguard detachments and Russian detachments which have been landed at Platana."

SUBMARINE COUP.—On April 19th, the Russian official *communiqué* stated that one of their submarines in the Black Sea, although attacked by a Turkish aeroplane, had succeeded in sinking a steamer and a sailing vessel near the entrance to the Bosphorus. The submarine was heavily fired upon by enemy batteries.

RAID ON ZEITUNLIK.—On April 24th, the Turkish powder factory at Zeitunlik, near Constantinople, which had already been attacked by British submarines and aircraft, received a further visit from two Russian aeroplanes. These machines discharged a dozen bombs at the factory, which was reported to have been set on fire.

RUSSIAN PROTEST.—On April 29th, there was issued through the Press Bureau the text of a formal protest which the Imperial Government of Russia had lodged with all the Powers with whom she was at war against the violation of the usages of war and persistent disregard of treaties and engagements exemplified in the destruction of the hospital ship "Portugal." This vessel, manned by a Russo-French crew, was proceeding across the Black Sea to the port of Ofou. At 8.30 a.m. on March 30th she was stopped in the vicinity of Cape Fathia to enable one of the small craft that accompanied her to effect some trifling repairs, and while lying motionless a submarine fired two torpedoes at her, one of which took effect. There were lost in all 115 persons, including fourteen ladies of the Red Cross, fifty surgeons or doctors, many nurses, both female and male, some Russian sailors, and twenty-nine French sailors. "The circumstances of the attack," the Russian statement concluded, "absolutely preclude all possibility of any mistake having been made by the submarine."

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS.—On May 2nd, a Turkish *communiqué* announced that their submarines in the Black Sea had recently chased three steamers on to the beach and completely destroyed one by firing at it. They had further sank four sailing vessels laden with provisions. North-west of the position at Sohum the submarines were bombarded from the coast town of Socha.

BLACK SEA MINES.—On May 2nd, a *communiqué* from the Russian Headquarters mentioned that a minefield had been discovered in the Black Sea. On all the mines there was the inscription, "Christ is Risen," painted in white in Bulgarian characters. On May 8th, a neutral report stated that a German submarine had struck a mine near Varna and sunk, a number of her crew being saved by a destroyer.

"BRESLAU" OUT AGAIN.—The Turco-German light cruiser "Breslau" has continued to make fitful appearances in the Black Sea during the past quarter, although not often. On April 8th, a Wireless Press message from Rome stated that the vessel had been struck by a shell during a naval engagement in the Bosphorus, and as a consequence she would probably remain immobilised for some time. She was again heard of, however, on Sunday, May 7th. At 4 a.m. that

morning, flying the Russian flag, she appeared off the Crimean health resort of Eupatoria, which is a quite unfortified town some thirty miles north of Sebastopol. Stopping three and a half miles from the coast, the cruiser opened fire on a steamer and some sailing vessels anchored in the harbour. She also fired a few shells into the town, and left after a stay of forty minutes. One person was killed and two were wounded in the town, while three were killed and nine wounded in the vessels in harbour. These facts were given in the Russian *communiqué*. The Turks claimed that the "Breslau" destroyed between Eupatoria and Sebastopol a ship of 4,000 tons and a number of sailing vessels. They also asserted that the raid was a reprisal against the Russian Fleet, "which bombards open towns and villages of the Anatolian coast and destroys harmless sailing vessels and fishing boats." Early in June, Dr. Ludwig Ganghofer, the German war correspondent, writing from Constantinople, pictured the "Goeben" and "Breslau" as the terrors of the Black Sea. Although their crews had covered themselves with glory, said this writer, their deeds have never been allowed to become public! He was allowed, however, to give "a few hints," and stated that the "Goeben," now the "Yawus Selim," had "dashed through fire and death under the crescent flag dozens of times since her celebrated escape from the harbour at Messina, at the beginning of the war. More than once the wonderful fighting ship has been severely damaged, but she has never received a mortal wound. The great cruiser is as fit as ever, and only a few scars tell of the terrible battles she has fought."


SUBMARINE EXPLOIT.—On May 24th, it was announced from Petrograd that a Russian submarine had sunk a big Turkish barge, laden with coal, near the entrance to the Bosphorus. Coast batteries fired on the submarine, which was subsequently attacked by a Turkish seaplane. The submarine, however, opened fire with a machine-gun on the seaplane and forced it to retreat, after which the Russian boat, which was not damaged, successfully submerged.

SUBMARINE REPORTED SUNK.—A report from Amsterdam to the *Figaro* on May 8th stated that a German submarine had struck a mine and sunk off the port of Varna. The greater part of her crew were rescued by a destroyer. On the 14th, the correspondent of the *Daily Mail* at Odessa telegraphed that the German Admiral Suchon had arrived at Varna, from Constantinople, and had inspected new workshops for assembling submarines sent in sections from Germany. He also visited new submarines which were ready for the Black Sea. With him was reported to be the German captain who is to command the submarine flotilla. This correspondent added that during the war the Russian Fleet had sunk seventy Turkish steamers and 8,000 sailing vessels.

BURGAS BOMBARDED.—A significant movement of the Russian naval forces was reported via Bucharest on May 23rd, to the effect that several Russian warships and aeroplanes had been seen from Constanza on the 20th, proceeding in the direction of Varna. Nothing further was divulged, however, until the Bucharest correspondent of the Italian journal *Messaggero* telegraphed that a Russian Fleet bombarded Burgas on the night of June 3rd. It was stated that the German submarine construction works were destroyed as a result of this attack.


TORPEDO CRAFT ACTIVE.—On June 22nd, it was officially announced in Petrograd that the Russian torpedo boats had sunk five big sailing vessels with cargoes in the Black Sea, and also some smaller craft. Some prisoners were captured. The passenger steamer "Mercury," added the *communiqué*, struck an enemy mine and sunk, but the majority of the passengers were saved. It was also reported on June 19th that a small action had occurred off Sulina, at one of the mouths of the Danube. Four Turkish torpedo vessels attacked a Russian warship

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
Approximate
Track of British Battle Fleet.....
" " British Battle Cruisers.....
" " Enemy's Ships.....



THE BATTLE.

LEET

P.M.



P.M.
7.16.

LITTLE FISHER.
BANK

JUTLAND

BANK

TRUE NORTH

Horn Reefs
Light Vessel

Daylight
1. VI. 16.

Daylight
1. VI. 16

NOTE

This chart must be taken as diagrammatic only, and as a general indication of the course of the Battle.

1737

convoying some lighters in the direction of Odessa, and a lively cannonade followed, but the result was indecisive.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S DESPATCH.

Admiralty, July 6th, 1916.

The following despatch has been received from Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, reporting the action in the North Sea on May 31st, 1916:—

"I. on Duke," June 24th, 1916.

SIR,—Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on May 31st, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.

The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, May 31st, the First and Second Battle-cruiser Squadrons, the First, Second, and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons and destroyers from the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Flotillas, supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, First and Second Cruiser Squadrons, Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas.

The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle-cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle-cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service.

The following extracts from the report of Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene:—

"At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from 'Galatea' (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.), indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.

"At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.

"After the first report of the enemy the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle-cruiser Squadrons and Fifth Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They

¹ All times given in this report are Greenwich mean time.

engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the Second Light-cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers by the time we turned to E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light-cruiser Squadrons was excellent, and of great value.

"From a report from 'Galatea' at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered 'Engadine' (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in 'Engadine' about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

"At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to twenty-five knots, and formed line of battle, the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron forming astern of the First Battle-cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the Thirteenth and Ninth Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The Fifth Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

"At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.

"At 4.8 p.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The destroyer 'Landrail' (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart), of Ninth Flotilla, who was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of 'Lydiard' (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and 'Landrail' undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. 'Nottingham' (Captain Charles B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

"Eight destroyers of the Thirteenth Flotilla, 'Nestor' (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), 'Nomad' (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), 'Nicator' (Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), 'Narborough' (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), 'Pelican' (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), 'Petard' (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson), 'Obdurate' (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sans), 'Nerissa' (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with 'Moorsom' (Commander John C. Hodgson), and 'Morris' (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of Tenth Flotilla, 'Turbulent' (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), and 'Termagant' (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the Ninth Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m., simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy destroyers.

The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner, and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and fifteen destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective, owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.

"'Nestor,' 'Nomad,' and 'Nicator,' gallantly led by Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of 'Nestor,' pressed home their attack on the battle-cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. 'Nomad' was badly hit, and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently 'Nestor' and 'Nicator' altered course to the S.E., and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned sixteen points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, 'Nestor' was badly hit and swung to starboard, 'Nicator' altering course inside her to avoid collision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. 'Nicator' made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), Thirteenth Flotilla. 'Nestor' remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. 'Moorsom' also carried out an attack on the enemy's battle fleet.

"'Petard,' 'Nerissa,' 'Turbulent,' and 'Termagant' also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. 'Petard' reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while 'Nerissa' states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.

"From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The Fifth Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

"At 4.38 p.m. 'Southampton' (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered sixteen points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. 'Southampton,' with the Second Light-cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. 'Southampton's' reports were most valuable. The Fifth Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course sixteen points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas in 'Barham' (Captain Arthur W. Craig), this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

"At 4.57 p.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet. 'Fearless' (Captain (D) Charles D. Roper), with the destroyers of First Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. 'Champion' (Captain (D) James U. Farie), with Thirteenth Flotilla, took station on the Fifth Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

"The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by 'Princess Royal' (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.) and 'Tiger' (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. 'Onslow' (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey) and 'Moresby' (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist 'Engadine' with the seaplane, rejoined the battle-cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of 'Lion' (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10 p.m. 'Moresby,' being two points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship of the line. 'Moresby' then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined 'Champion.' In corroboration of this, 'Fearless' reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

"At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E., and the estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron. Possibly Zeppelins were present also.

"At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north five miles. I thereupon altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the 'Koenig' class.

"At about 6.5 p.m. 'Onslow,' being on the engaged bow of the 'Lion,' sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. 'Onslow' at once closed and engaged her, firing fifty-eight rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. 'Onslow' then closed the enemy battle-cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed with the light-cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused 'Onslow' to stop.

"At 7.15 p.m. 'Defender' (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to ten knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers, by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, closed 'Onslow' and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m., June 1st, when 'Onslow' was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey, of 'Onslow,' and Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer, of 'Defender,' for special recognition. 'Onslow' was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding Third Light-cruiser Squadron as follows:—

"Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the 'Derfflinger' to attack her."

PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET AND THIRD BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON.

On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying cruiser and destroyer force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close the Battle-cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., which was in advance of the Battle Fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5.30 p.m. this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the "Chester" (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and, although the ship suffered considerably in casualties, her fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. she rejoined the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle-cruisers, the squadron taking station ahead of the "Lion" at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle-cruiser Fleet. He reports as follows:—

"I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy battle-fleet.

"By 6.50 p.m. the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. three miles, and I ordered the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to eighteen knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than four miles, and the enemy ships

were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the report of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

"From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third Light-cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo. 'Falmouth' (Captain John D. Edwards) and 'Yarmouth' (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light-cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. 'Indomitable' (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the 'Derfflinger' class fell out of the enemy's line."

Meanwhile, at 5.45 p.m., the report of guns had become audible to me, and at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the position of the enemy's battle fleet could not be determined. The difference in estimated position by "reckoning" between "Iron Duke" (Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B.) and "Lion," which was inevitable under the circumstances, added to the uncertainty of the general situation.

Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O., were seen to be in action, and reports received show that "Defence," flagship (Captain Stanley V. Ellis) and "Warrior" (Captain Vincent B. Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser at this time. She was subsequently observed to sink.

At 6 p.m. "Canterbury" (Captain Percy M. R. Royds), which ship was in company with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyer "Shark" (Commander Loftus W. Jones), "Acasta" (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and "Christopher" (Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement the "Shark" was sunk.

At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle-cruisers, were sighted by "Marlborough" bearing before the starboard beam of the Battle Fleet.

At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-cruiser Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle-cruisers, and at 6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.

At this period, when the Battle Fleet was meeting the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.

I formed the Battle Fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle-cruisers ahead of the Battle Fleet.

The divisions of the Battle Fleet were led by :—

The Commander-in-Chief.

Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.

Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.

Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.

Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.

Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.

At 6.16 p.m. "Defence" and "Warrior" were observed passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy fire. "Defence" disappeared, and "Warrior" passed to the rear disabled.

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when "Black Prince" (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m.

The First Battle Squadron became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the "Kaiser" class. The other Battle Squadrons, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on battleships of the "Koenig" class.

At 6.6 p.m. the Rear-Admiral Commanding Fifth Battle Squadron, then in company with the battle-cruisers, had sighted the starboard wing-division of the Battle Fleet on the port bow of "Barham," and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet, but on realizing the direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy Battle Fleet. An accident to "Warspite's" steering gear caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy's line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Edward M. Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve.

The action between the Battle Fleets lasted intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations of course had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.

At 6.55 p.m. "Iron Duke" passed the wreck of "Invincible" (Captain Arthur L. Cay), with "Badger" (Commander C. A. Fremantle) standing by.

During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul

out of the line and at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.

Sir David Beatty reports:—

"At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the south-westward.

"Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battle-ships, apparently of the 'Koenig' class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to twenty-two knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was S.W., speed eighteen knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again, after a very short time, the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

"At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon located two battle-cruisers and battle-ships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by 'Lion,' and turned away eight points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. 'Princess Royal' set fire to a three-funnelled battleship. 'New Zealand' (Captain John F. E. Green) and 'Indomitable' report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and 'Falmouth' reported that they were last seen at 8.38 p.m., steaming to the westward.

"At 8.40 p.m., all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.

"I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. 'Minotaur' (Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing north five miles, and I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing N.N.E. I kept you informed of my position, course, and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

"In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so."

As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a "following" or "chasing" fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on "Marlborough"), and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue

the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range were aided by the weather conditions, which were ideal for the purpose. Two separate-destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.

The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came into action at 6.17 p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle-cruisers and light cruisers, which were also engaged. The fire of "Marlborough" (Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. The ship commenced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvos at a ship of the "Kaiser" class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, but reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvos at a ship of the "Koenig" class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.

The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return fire than the remainder of the Battle Fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. "Colossus" (Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound) was hit but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.

In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my flagship "Iron Duke" was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee leading one of the divisions—the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting of "Koenig" and "Kaiser" class and some of the battle-cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. "Iron Duke," having previously fired at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the "Koenig" class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo and only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organization of the flagship, so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.

The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battle-cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.

The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the "Kaiser" or "Koenig" classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle-cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely damaged.

During the action between the Battle Fleets the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., with the addition of "Duke of Edinburgh" (Captain Henry Blackett) of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van, and acted as a connecting link between the Battle Fleet and the Battle-cruiser Fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.

The attached cruisers "Boadicea" (Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.), "Active" (Captain Percy Withers), "Blanche" (Captain John M. Casement), and "Bellona" (Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton) carried out their duties as repeating-ships with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.

The Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m., and again at 8.18 p.m., when they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O., to attack:

On each occasion the Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy Battle Fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The "Calliope" (Commodore Le Mesurier) was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage, although I regret to say she had several casualties. The light cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with torpedoes at this time, and an explosion on board a ship of the "Kaiser" class was seen at 8.40 p.m.

During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers, and destroyers.

After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy's tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they were favoured by the conditions of visibility.

Night Dispositions.—At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy ships.

During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawksley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselan J. B. Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.

It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred, including that of "Tipperary," with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.

Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from "Spitfire" (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the other from either "Ardent" (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), "Ambuscade" (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or "Garland" (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).

The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels, besides light cruisers, and comprised vessels of the "Kaiser" class, was taken by surprise. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships of the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later by "Mænad" (Commander John P. Champion) on the five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the line being also hit.

The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but the "Onslaught" (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.) was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In the "Onslaught" Sub-Lieutenant Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached her home port.

During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, "Castor" (Commodore James R. P. Hawksley) leading the flotilla, engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point-blank range.

Sir David Beatty reports:—

"The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, 'n 'Champion,' took station astern of the Battle Fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to 'Petard' and 'Turbulent,' switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire, which disabled 'Turbulent.' At 3.30 a.m. 'Champion' was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. 'Moresby' reports four ships of 'Deutschland' class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by 'Moresby' and 'Obdurate.'

"'Fearless' and the First Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 31st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, 'Fearless' was unable to follow the battle-cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station to the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the 'Kaiser' class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after."

There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light-cruiser Squadron in the rear of the Battle Fleet was in close action for about fifteen minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period "Southampton" and "Dublin" (Captain Alberic C. Scott) suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron appeared to be very effective.

"Abdiel," ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterized her work.

Proceedings on June 1st.—At daylight, June 1st, the Battle Fleet, being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from "Marlborough" to "Revenge," as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron. "Marlborough" was detached by my direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine attack *en route*. The visibility early on June 1st (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until 9 a.m. The British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 a.m. the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.

The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers "Ardent" (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), "Fortune" (Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry), and "Tipperary" (Captain (D) Charles J. Wintour), were picked up, and the "Sparrowhawk" (Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins), which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and

at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, June 2nd. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for "Warrior," which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of "Engadine" on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light cruiser having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.

Sir David Beatty reports in regard to the "Engadine" as follows:—

"The work of 'Engadine' appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed 'Warrior' for seventy-five miles between 8.40 p.m., May 31st, and 7.15 a.m., June 1st, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's company."

I fully endorse his remarks.

The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 p.m. on June 2nd was reported ready for further action.

Losses.—The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.

I deeply regret to report the loss of H.M. ships "Queen Mary," "Indefatigable," "Invincible," "Defence," "Black Prince," "Warrior"; and of H.M. torpedo-boat destroyers "Tipperary," "Ardent," "Fortune," "Shark," "Sparrowhawk," "Nestor," "Nomad," and "Turbulent," and still more do I regret 'the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.

The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action.

Personnel of the Fleet.—The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.

I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.

Details of the work of the various ships during action have now been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that

department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.

The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during and after the action; they could not have done better.

The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle-cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armoured than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, and the flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the First, Second, and Fourth Squadrons of the Battle Fleet and the Second Cruiser Squadron.

I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all the vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous throughout the day.

I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the Battle Fleet. They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney's squadron, owing to its position, was able to see more of the enemy Battle Fleet than the other Battle Squadrons, and under a leader who has rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the Battle Fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.

Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers, and finally his Battle Fleet. I can fully sympathize with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.

Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work performed by the Light-cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan D. W. Napier, Commodore William E. Goodenough, and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He states

that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff :—

" I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, the Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture; my Secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander, Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire."

I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his long experience in fleets, special gift for organization, and his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.

My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also assists me in the working of the Fleet at sea, and to whose good organization is largely due the rapidity with which the Fleet was fuelled and replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me during the action.

Commander Charles M. Forbes, my Flag-Commander, and Commander Roger M. Bellairs, of my Staff, plotted the movements of the two Fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my Staff, acted as observer aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These officers carried out their duties with much efficiency during the action.

The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander Alexander R. W. Woods, assisted by the other signal officers, and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. The signal departments in all ships deserve great credit for their work. My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also of much service to me throughout the action.

The high state of efficiency of the wireless telegraphy arrangements of the Fleet, and the facility with which they were worked before, during and after the action, is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been invaluable throughout the war.

A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all ships.

My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and Victor H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the action. Their records have been of much assistance.

To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout the operations.

In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of their Lordships the names of officers and men all of whom did not come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of specially distinguishing themselves.

I append the full text of Sir David Beatty's report to me, from which, as will be seen, I have made copious extracts in order to make my narrative continuous and complete.¹

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

J. R. JELlicoe, Admiral
Commander-in-Chief.

ENCLOSURE.

LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS PUT OUT OF ACTION, MAY 31ST—JUNE 1ST, 1916.

Battleships or Battle-cruisers.

Two battleships, "Dreadnought" type.

One battleship, "Deutschland" type.

(Seen to sink.)

One battle-cruiser.

(Sunk—"Lutzow"—admitted by Germans.)

One battleship, "Dreadnought" type.

One battle-cruiser.

(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

Light Cruisers.

Five light cruisers.

(Seen to sink; one of them had the appearance of being a larger type, and might have been a battleship.)

Torpedo-boat Destroyers.

Six Torpedo-boat destroyers.

(Seen to sink.)

Three torpedo-boat destroyers.

(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

Submarines.

One submarine. (Sunk.)

APPENDIX.

SIR DAVID BEATTY'S REPORT.

"Lion," June 10th, 1916.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that at 2.37 p.m. on May 31st, 1916, I was cruising and steering to the northward to join your Flag.

The light cruiser screen was disposed from E. to W.

At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from "Galatea" (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.) indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn

¹ The list of ships and commanding officers which took part in the action has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with practice.

Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base. At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward, and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.

After the first reports of the enemy the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle-cruiser Squadrons and Fifth Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the Second Light-cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers by the time we turned to E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light-cruiser Squadrons was excellent and of great value.

From a report from "Galatea" at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered "Engadine" (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in "Engadine" about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to twenty-five knots and formed line of battle, the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron forming astern of the First Battle-cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the Thirteenth and Ninth Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The Fifth Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.

At 4.8 p.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The destroyer "Landrail" (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart), of the Ninth Flotilla, which was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of "Lydiard" (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and "Landrail" undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. "Nottingham" (Captain Charles B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

Eight destroyers of the Thirteenth Flotilla, "Nestor" (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), "Nomad" (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield),

"Nicator" (Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), "Narborough" (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), "Pelican" (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), "Petard" (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson), "Obdurate" (Lieutenant Cecil H. H. Sams), "Nerissa" (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with "Moorsom" (Commander John C. Hodgson) and "Morris" (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of Tenth Flotilla, "Turbulent" (Lieutenant-Commander Dudiey Stuart), "Termagant" (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the Ninth Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy's destroyers. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and fifteen destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.

"Nestor," "Nomad," and "Nicator," gallantly led by Commander Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, of "Nestor," pressed home their attack on the battle-cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. "Nomad" was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently "Nestor" and "Nicator" altered course to the S.E., and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned sixteen points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo "Nestor" was badly hit and swung to starboard. "Nicator" altering course inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. "Nicator" made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain D, Thirteenth Flotilla. "Nestor" remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. "Moorsom" also carried out an attack on the enemy's Battle Fleet.

"Petard," "Nerissa," "Turbulent," and "Termagant" also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. "Petard" reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while "Nerissa" states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.

From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The Fifth Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

At 4.38 p.m. "Southampton" (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered sixteen points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle-cruisers altered course

shortly afterwards, and the action continued. "Southampton," with the Second Light-cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. "Southampton's" reports were most favourable. The Fifth Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course sixteen points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas in "Barham" (Captain Arthur W. Craig) this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

At 4.57 p.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet. "Fearless" (Captain (D) Charles O. Roper), with the destroyers of First Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. "Champion" (Captain (D) James U. Farie), with Thirteenth Flotilla, took station on the Fifth Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the Second Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by "Princess Royal" (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.) and "Tiger" (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. "Onslow" (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey) and "Moresby" (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist "Engadine" with the sea-plane, rejoined the Battle-cruiser Squadrons, and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of "Lion" (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10 p.m. "Moresby," being two points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship in the line. "Moresby" then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke and rejoined "Champion." In corroboration of this "Fearless" reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m. and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E., and the estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received by his light cruisers, which had sighted, and were engaged with, the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron. Possibly Zeppelins were also present. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north five miles. I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the "Koenig" class.

At about 6.5 p.m. "Onslow," being on the engaged bow of "Lion," sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. "Onslow" at once closed and engaged her, firing fifty-eight rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of

hits. "Onslow" then closed the enemy battle-cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the commanding officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged, and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them, and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused "Onslow" to stop.

At 7.15 p.m. "Defender" (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to ten knots while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers by a 12-inch shell, which damaged her foremost boiler, closed "Onslow" and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was resecured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. June 1st, when "Onslow" was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of "Onslow" and Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer of "Defender" for special recognition. "Onslow" was possibly the destroyer referred to by Rear-Admiral Commanding Third Light-cruiser Squadron as follows:—"Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again and made straight for the 'Derfflinger' to attack her."

At 6.20 p.m. the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron appeared ahead, steaming south towards the enemy's van. I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy Battle Fleet.

By 6.50 p.m. the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. three miles from "Lion," and I ordered the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to eighteen knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than four miles, and the enemy's ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo. "Falmouth" (Captain John D. Edwards) and "Yarmouth" (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy under-water explosion was observed. The Third Light-cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity

to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. "Indomitable" (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the "Derfflinger" class fell out of the enemy's line.

At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the south-westward. Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. and S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the "Koenig" class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to twenty-two knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was S.W., speed eighteen knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by "Lion," and turned away eight points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. "Princess Royal" set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; "New Zealand" (Captain John F. E. Green) and "Indomitable" report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and "Falmouth" reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to the westward.

At 8.40 p.m. all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.

I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. "Minotaur" (Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing north five miles, and I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing N.N.E. I kept you informed of my position, course and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

In view of the gathering darkness, and of the fact that our strategic position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so.

The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in "Champion," took station astern of the Battle Fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, June 1st, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to "Petard" and "Turbulent," switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire, which disabled "Turbulent." At 3.30 a.m. "Champion"

was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. "Moresby" reports four ships of the "Deutschland" class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by "Moresby" and "Obdurate."

"Fearless" and the First Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of May 31st. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, "Fearless" was unable to follow the battle-cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the "Kaiser" class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after.

The First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons were almost continuously in touch with the battle-cruisers, one or both squadrons being usually ahead. In this position they were of great value. They very effectively protected the head of our line from torpedo attack by light cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt in helping to regain touch when the enemy's line was temporarily lost sight of. The Second Light-cruiser Squadron was at the rear of our battle line during the night, and at 9 p.m. assisted to repel a destroyer attack on the Fifth Battle Squadron. They were also heavily engaged at 10.20 p.m. with five enemy cruisers or light cruisers, "Southampton" and "Dublin" (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffering severe casualties during an action lasting about fifteen minutes. "Birmingham" (Captain Arthur A. M. Duff), at 11.30 p.m., sighted two or more heavy ships steering south. A report of this was received by me at 11.40 p.m. as steering W.S.W. They were thought at the time to be battle-cruisers, but it is since considered that they were probably battleships.

The work of "Engadine" appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed "Warrior" for seventy-five miles, between 8.40 p.m. May 31st, and 7.15 a.m., June 1st, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's company.

It is impossible to give a definite statement of the losses inflicted on the enemy. The visibility was for the most part low and fluctuating, and caution forbade me to close the range too much with my inferior force.

A review of all the reports which I have received leads me to conclude that the enemy's losses were considerably greater than those which we had sustained, in spite of their superiority, and included battleships, battle-cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers.

This is eloquent testimony to the very high standard of gunnery and torpedo efficiency of His Majesty's ships. The control and drill remained undisturbed throughout, in many cases despite heavy damage to material and personnel. Our superiority over the enemy in this respect was very marked, their efficiency becoming rapidly reduced under punishment while ours was maintained throughout.

As was to be expected, the behaviour of the ships' companies under the terrible conditions of a modern sea battle was magnificent without exception. The strain on their moral was a severe test of discipline and training. Officers and men were imbued with one thought, the desire to defeat the enemy. The fortitude of the wounded was admirable. A report from the Commanding Officer of "Chester" gives a splendid instance of devotion to duty. Boy (1st class) John Travers Cornwell, of "Chester," was mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him. His age was under 16½ years. I regret that he has since died, but I

recommend his case for special recognition in justice to his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him.

In such a conflict as raged continuously for five hours it was inevitable that we should suffer severe losses. It was necessary to maintain touch with greatly superior forces in fluctuating visibility, often very low. We lost "Invincible," "Indefatigable," and "Queen Mary," from which ships there were few survivors. The casualties in other ships were heavy, and I wish to express my deepest regret at the loss of so many gallant comrades, officers, and men. They died gloriously.

Exceptional skill was displayed by the Medical Officers of the Fleet. They performed operations and tended the wounded under conditions of extreme difficulty. In some cases their staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the inevitable lack of such essentials as adequate light, hot water, etc., in ships damaged by shell fire, tried their skill, resource, and physical endurance to the utmost.

As usual, the engine room departments of all ships displayed the highest qualities of technical skill, discipline, and endurance. High speed is a primary factor in the tactics of the squadrons under my command, and the engine room departments never fail.

I have already made mention of the brilliant support afforded me by Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., and the Fifth Battle Squadron, and of the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral Hon. H. L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., brought his squadron into action. I desire to record my great regret at his loss, which is a national misfortune. I would now bring to your notice the able support rendered to me by Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B., and Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, C.B. In the course of my report I have expressed my appreciation of the good work performed by the Light-cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., Commodore W. E. Goodenough, M.V.O., and Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O. On every occasion these officers anticipated my wishes, and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I desire also to bring to your notice the skill with which their respective ships were handled by the Commanding Officers. With such Flag Officers, Commodores, and Captains to support me my task was lightened.

The destroyers of the First and Thirteenth Flotillas were handled by their respective Commanding Officers with skill, dash, and courage. I desire to record my very great regret at the loss of Captains C. F. Sowerby ("Indefatigable"), C. I. Prowse ("Queen Mary"), and A. L. Cay ("Invincible"), all officers of the highest attainments, who can be ill spared at this time of stress.

I wish to endorse the report of the Rear-Admiral Commanding the Fifth Battle Squadron as to the ability displayed by the Commanding Officers of his squadron.

In conclusion, I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain R. W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag Commander, Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture; my Secretary, F. T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant, Commander R. F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances, despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire.

In accordance with your wishes, I am forwarding in a separate letter a full list of officers and men whom I wish to recommend to your notice.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

DAVID BEATTY,

Vice-Admiral.

The Commander-in-Chief,
Grand Fleet.

ADMIRALTY MESSAGE OF APPROVAL.

The following letter has been addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty:—

Admiralty, July 4th, 1916.

SIR,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on May 31st, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle-cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.

2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of May 31st and June 1st gave ample proof of the gallantry and devotion which characterized all who took part in the battle; the ships of every class were handled with skill and determination; their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff; while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally conspicuous.

3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of the country were high; they have been well fulfilled.

4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

THE WAR.

ITS MILITARY SIDE by J. D. F.

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SECTION XXXI.

The Campaign in German South-West Africa from August 4th, 1914, to July 9th, 1915.

(Additions.)

- P. 445. Aug. 4th.—*German Forces.*

Colonel Von Heydebreck was originally in command; he was killed accidentally by a bomb explosion about February, 1915. He was succeeded by Major Von Francke; promoted to Colonel.

- P. 446. Aug. 4th.—*Union Forces.*

Northern Army.

For Transvaal Scottish and Kimberley Regiment read 2nd Battalion of both. For Rand Regiment read Rand Rifles.

Delete Rand Light Infantry.

Add 1st and 2nd Durban Light Infantry.

Southern Army.

No. 1 Column.—The Transvaal Scottish was the 1st Battalion of the regiment.

Add Rand Light Infantry, 1st Kaffrarian Rifles, 1st Kimberley Regiment, South African Railway Engineers (part).

No. 3 Column.—Delete 1st and 2nd Durban Light Infantry and 1st Kaffrarian Rifles.

- P. 446. Sept. 19th.—Luderitz Bay was occupied on this date.

- P. 447.—The date of the occupation of Garub was February 22nd.

SECTION XXXVIII.

The Austro-German Campaign in Poland from August 5th to September 5th, 1915.

AUG. 5TH.—The general battle line at this time was: Mitau—Ponevie—Kovno—west of Grodno—Ossowietz—Lomza—Ostrolenka—Rozan—Wyszchow—Radzymin—Warsaw—Ivangorod—Opalin—Sokal—Brody—Zaleszcwici—Czernowitz.

The Austro-German Armies were now reorganized as follows:—

Army Group of the North.—Field-Marshal Von Hindenburg Commander.

Army of Von Falkenhäusen—eight divisions.

Army of Von Below—twelve divisions.

Army of Von Eichorn—five divisions.

Army of Von Scholtz—six divisions.

Army Group of the Centre.—Prince Leopold of Bavaria Commander.

Army of Von Gallwitz—ten divisions.

IVth Army—twelve divisions.

Army of Von Woyrsch—eight divisions.

Army Group of the South.—Field-Marshal Von Mackensen Commander.
 Army of the Archduke J. Ferdinand—sixteen divisions.
 Army of Von Arz—twelve divisions.
 Army of Von Boehm-Ermoli—eight divisions.
Army Detachment of South-East.—General Von Linsingen Commander.
 Four divisions.

The total Austro-German strength was thus 102 divisions—fifty-one army corps.
 The Russian Armies were organized as follows:—

Army Group of the North.—General Alexiev Commander.
Army Group of the Centre.—General Everts Commander.
Army Group of the South.—General Ivanoff Commander.

(No details of strength available.)

AUG. 6TH.—Army Group of the Centre—Novo Georgievsk completely isolated
 Von Gallwitz occupied Sierok.

AUG. 10TH.—Army Group of the Centre—Von Scholtz took Lomza.

Army Group of the South—moving on Wlodawa.

AUG. 11TH.—Army Group of the Centre—Von Gallwitz occupied Malkin. Von
 Woyrsch occupied Lukow and moved on Siedlice.

AUG. 12TH.—Army Group of the North—Von Below moved on Dvinsk. Kovno
 heavily bombarded. (The attack commenced on August 5th, 1915.)

Army Group of the Centre—Von Gallwitz occupied Zambrovo. Von Scholtz was
 moving on Bialystok.

Army Group of the South—very heavy fighting about Wlodawa.

AUG. 13TH.—The Russian centre commenced to retire from Siedlice.

There was heavy fighting all along the whole battle line.

AUG. 14TH.—The Russian centre had now reached Losice.

AUG. 15TH.—Army Group of the North—very heavy fighting at Kovno. Some
 of the north-eastern forts captured.

Army Group of the Centre—Von Gallwitz crossed the River Nursec. Von
 Woyrsch advancing east of Lukow.

Army Group of the South—Von Mackensen captured Wlodawa.

AUG. 16TH.—The general battle line was: Mitau—Ponevie—Kovno—west of
 Grodno—Ossowietz—west of Bialystok—west of Bielsk—west of Brest Litovski—
 north of Wlodawa—south of Kovel—Sokal—Brody—Czernowitz.

AUG. 17TH.—Army Group of the North—Kovno captured by the Germans.

AUG. 18TH.—Army Group of the Centre—Von Gallwitz occupied Bielsk.

AUG. 19TH.—Army Group of the North—Novo-Georgievsk was captured by the
 Germans.

AUG. 20TH—22ND.—Army Group of the North—heavy fighting about Koshedary.

AUG. 23RD.—Army Group of the North—Ossowietz captured.

AUG. 25TH.—Army Group of the South—Brest Litovski evacuated by the
 Russians.

AUG. 26TH.—Army Group of the North—Von Scholtz occupied Bialystok.

AUG. 27TH.—Army Group of the North—Von Eichorn occupied Olita.

AUG. 28TH.—Army Group of the North—Von Below commenced heavy attack
 on Fredrickstadt.

Army Group of the South and Army Detachment of South-East—commenced
 an outflanking movement towards Lutsk.

The general Austro-German line was being pushed further east.

AUG. 30TH.—Army Group of the North—heavy fighting about Fredrickstadt.
 Von Eichorn immediately west of Grodno.

Army Group of the Centre—close to Pruzany.

Army Group of the South—about Kobrin and to the south-east.

Army Detachment of the South-East—before Lutsk.

AUG. 31ST.—The Russian Army Group of the South made a vigorous attack about Zloczow with some success.

SEPT. 1ST.—Army Group of the North—very heavy fighting about Friedrichstadt. Von Eichorn reached Orany.

Army Group of the Centre—Von Gallwitz carried part of the defences of Grodno.

Army Group of the South—Von Boehm-Ermoli captured Lutsk.

Army Detachment of the South-East—Von Bothmer captured Zborow.

SEPT. 2ND.—Army Group of the North—very heavy fighting about Friedrichstadt, the Russians making a vigorous counter-attack.

Army Group of the Centre—severe fighting about Grodno.

Army Detachment of the South-East—Von Bothmer took Brody; there was a general advance along the south-eastern line, with heavy fighting.

SEPT. 3RD.—Army Group of the North—severe fighting about Frederickstadt, the Russians being compelled to retire.

Army Group of the Centre—The Russians made a vigorous counter-attack at Grodno with some success.

SEPT. 4TH.—Army Group of the Centre—Von Gallwitz captured Grodno.

SEPT. 5TH.—H.I.M. the Emperor of Russia assumed the supreme command of the Russian Forces. The general battle line was: west of Riga—before Friedrichstadt—Sauken—Vilkomir—west of Vilna—Grodno—Pruzany—east of Brest Litovski—east of Kovel—Loutsk—Tarnopol—Czernowitz.

SECTION XXXIX.

The Austro-German Campaign in Poland from September 6th to 30th, 1915.

SEPT. 6TH.—The general organization of the forces was now as follows:—

Austro-Germans.

Army Group of the North—Field-Marshal Von Hindenburg (from Riga to south of Grodno).

Army Group of the Centre—Field-Marshal Von Mackensen (from south of Grodno to Kovel).

Army Group of the South—General Von Linsingen (from Kovel to Czernowitz).

Russians.

Army Group of the North—General Russki (opposing Field-Marshal Von Hindenburg).

Army Group of the Centre—General Everts (opposing Field-Marshal Von Mackensen).

Army Group of the South—General Ivanoff (opposing General Von Linsingen).

A.—OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY GROUPS.

The Austro-German plan of operations in this theatre was to:—

1st.—Capture Vilna and Grodno.

2nd.—Cut off the Russian retreat from those towns and district.

The Russians were chiefly concerned with carrying out the withdrawal of their troops and causing the enemy as much loss as possible.

The general Austro-German scheme of operations was as follows:—

Operations East of Grodno.

(a) Von Gallwitz to move on Mosty and cut off the Russians retiring from Grodno on Lida, from the south.

(b) Von Scholtz to move on Orany and attack the Russians retiring from Grodno, from the north.

Operations against Vilna.

- (c) Von Eichorn to make a direct attack on Vilna from the west.
- (d) Von Lauenstein with a very large force of cavalry to move south and south-east from Svetsiany and outflank the Russians retreating from Vilna on Minsk from the north, on a front about Soly—Smorgon.

(a) OPERATIONS EAST OF GRODNO.

SEPT. 8TH.—Grodno had fallen on September 3rd, 1915, but the Russians were only retreating slowly from the district. The Russians were on the line Orany—east of Grodno—Skidel—Mosty.

SEPT. 12TH.—Skidel was captured by Von Gallwitz; the Russian line was now Orany—Mosty.

SEPT. 18TH.—The general battle line was east of Orany—Mosty—Zelva.

SEPT. 20TH.—The general battle line was west of Voronovo—west of Lida—Slonim.

SEPT. 22ND.—The general battle line was Lebedevo—east of Ivie—Baranovitchi.

(b) OPERATIONS AGAINST VILNA.

SEPT. 6TH.—The main attack against Vilna commenced about this time. The general battle line to the west of Vilna was Vilkomir—Koshedary—west of Sumiliski, while further north Von Lauenstein's cavalry force was to the north and west of Vilkomir.

SEPT. 8TH.—Von Eichorn's left carried the hills west of Meiszagola, and his right centre took Novo Troki.

SEPT. 10TH.—Von Lauenstein's cavalry began to advance from Vilkomar and Kurkl on Svetsiany, with the object of outflanking the Russians from the north side of Vilna.

SEPT. 12TH.—Von Eichorn's left stormed Meiszagola and forced the Russians to retire.

SEPT. 13TH.—Von Lauenstein's cavalry occupied Podrobie.

SEPT. 15TH.—Von Lauenstein moved south on the front Podrobie—north of Vileika.

SEPT. 17TH.—Von Lauenstein occupied Vileika. Von Eichorn's right was half-way between Orany and Lida, while his left was advancing north-west of Vilna.

SEPT. 18TH.—Vilna was occupied by Von Eichorn. The Russians fell back towards Minsk.

SEPT. 19TH—20TH.—Very heavy fighting about Michelski, Smorgon, and Molodetchna. The Russians succeeded in protecting their right flank and continued their retreat. By the evening of September 20th, 1915, they were thirty miles east of Vilna and had not been outflanked.

SEPT. 21ST.—The Russians took Zebedsvo and Smorgon and there was heavy fighting about Vileika.

SEPT. 21ST—30TH.—Heavy fighting all along the front Vileika—Novo-Grodek, which line was held by the Russians on September 30th, 1915.

B.—OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL ARMY GROUPS.

SEPT. 5TH.—Von Mackensen's left was near Volkovysk and Kartnzkaia, while his centre was near Drohiczyn. His force was endeavouring to cut off the Russians between the Pripet marshes and Baranovitchi.

SEPT. 7TH.—Von Mackensen occupied Volkovysk and Drohiczyn.

SEPT. 16TH.—Von Mackensen occupied Pinsk with his right, his left moving on Baranovitchi.

SEPT. 30TH.—The general battle line was Novo-Grodek—west of Baranovitchi—east of Pinsk.

C.—OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY GROUPS.

SEPT. 5TH.—The general object of Von Linsingen's operations was to drive back to the east the Russian forces opposed to him.

SEPT. 7TH—8TH.—Von Linsingen's left was advancing from Lutsk and Dubno against Rovno; his centre was moving on Tarnopol, while his right was preparing to attack Tremblova.

There was very heavy fighting about Tarnopol and Tremblova, the Russians being very successful.

SEPT. 11TH—13TH.—Von Linsingen's left had heavy fighting about Sarny. His right centre and right were heavily engaged and were driven back some distance by vigorous Russian counter-attacks.

SEPT. 17TH.—Von Linsingen's left had further heavy fighting about Sarny, but had no particular success.

SEPT. 18TH—30TH.—The Russians retook Dubno on September 23rd, and temporarily occupied part of Lutsk. On September 30th, 1915, the general battle line was Lutsk—Dubno—west of Tarnopol—west of Tremblova.

NOTE ON THE GENERAL BATTLE LINE IN POLAND AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, 1915.

SEPT. 30TH.—The general battle line was west of Riga—Friedrickstadt—Jacobstadt—west of Dvinsk—Viday—Smorgon—Novo-Grodek—Slonim—Lipsk—east of Pinsk—west of Sarny—west of Lutsk—Dubno—Tarnopol—west of Tremblova—Czernowitz.

SECTION XL.

The Campaign in France, North-east of Paris, from October 1st to November 18th, 1914—

(The First Battle of Ypres.)

OCT. 1ST.—The general positions were :—

Allies.

Belgians—about Antwerp.

Seventh French Army (Foch)—Lille—Albert.

Second French Army (de Castelnau)—Albert—Lassigny.

Sixth French Army (Maunoury)—Lassigny—Soissons.

Ist Corps, British Army (Haig)—Vendresse—Chavonne.

IInd Corps, British Army (Smith-Dorrien)—Chavonne—Missy.

IIIrd Corps, British Army (Pulteney)—Missy—Soissons.

IVth Corps, British Army (Rawlinson; one division only)—between Ypres and Antwerp.

Fifth French Army (d'Esperay)—Vendresse—Suippes.

Fourth French Army (de Cary)—Suippes—Clermont.

Third French Army (Sarrail)—about Verdun.

First French Army (Dubail)—Verdun to south.

Germans.

Army of the Meuse (Von Emmich)—Antwerp and to the south and south-west.

Sixth German Army (Crown Prince of Bavaria)—Lille—Bapaume.

Second German Army (Von Bulow)—Bapaume—Lassigny.

First German Army (Von Kluck)—Lassigny—Laon.

Seventh German Army (Von Heeringen)—Laon—Rheims.

Third German Army (Von Hausen)—Rheims—Vouziers.

Fourth German Army (Duke of Württemberg)—about east of Vouziers.

Fifth German Army (Crown Prince of Prussia)—about Verdun.

Detachment (Von Strautz)—about St. Mihiel.

Detachment (Von Deimling)—St. Mihiel to south.

THE GENERAL PLANS.

Allies.

On the assumption that Antwerp would be held by the Belgians, it was decided to occupy the line Antwerp—Ghent—Tournai—Arras—Lassigny—Verdun—to the south, and to take the offensive against the German lines of communications east of Mons, from the base, Ghent—Tournai.

Unfortunately it soon became evident that the Belgians could not hold Antwerp, and consequently fresh arrangements had to be made. The new plan involved the retirement of the Belgians, covered by Rawlinson's forces, to the line Zeebrugge—Ypres to protect the left flank of the Allies, while the turning movement against the German lines of communication was to be carried out as before.

As regards the British forces, it was decided to remove them from the line Soissons—Vendresse and post them on the left flank of de Castelnau's Seventh French Army, their places in the original line being filled by new French formations.

Germans.

The object of the Germans was to outflank the Allies to the north, and occupy the northern (industrial) provinces of France.

THE TRANSFER OF THE BRITISH FORCES.

The arrangements for this were as follows:—

- (a) To commence on October 3rd, and be completed by October 19th, 1914.
- (b) IIInd Corps (Smith-Dorrien) to arrive on the line Aire—Bethune on October 11th, 1914.
- (c) IIIrd Corps (Pulteney) to detrain at St. Omer on October 12th and move up on the left of the IIInd Corps.
- (d) Ist Corps (Haig) to move up on the left of the IIIrd Corps by October 19th.

The whole of these movements were very successfully carried out, the cavalry covering the flank of each corps until the succeeding corps arrived, with much skill.

THE IIIND CORPS (SMITH-DORRIEN).

OCT. 11TH.—The 2nd Cavalry Division had severe fighting with the enemy's cavalry north of the Aire—Bethune canal and succeeded in joining hands with the divisional cavalry of the IIIrd Corps (6th Division) about Hazebrouck. The cavalry also met the left of the IIInd Corps which got into position on the Aire—Bethune line that evening.

OCT. 12TH.—The IIInd Corps wheeled to the right and took up the line Merville—Givenchy. An effort was made to continue the wheel, the 5th Division moving on Annequin and assisting the French forces in that neighbourhood, the 3rd Division deploying on the left of the 5th Division. There was heavy fighting but no very great progress was made.

OCT. 13TH—14TH.—There was heavy fighting all along the front east of Merville—Givenchy, but little further progress was made.

OCT. 15TH.—The 3rd Division drove the Germans back from the Estaires—La Bassée front, the 5th Division occupying Pont Fixe.

OCT. 16TH—31ST.—Very severe fighting all along the front; the positions were well maintained.

OCT. 16TH.—The 5th Division advanced towards Aubers, the fighting being very severe.

OCT. 17TH.—The 5th Division captured Aubers after very heavy fighting, and the IIInd Corps was now on the line Aubers—west of La Bassée. The enemy force in this neighbourhood was reported to be 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 9th Cavalry Divisions, supported by some Jaeger battalions and part of XIVth Army Corps.

OCT. 18TH.—The Germans attacked vigorously all along the line but with little effect.

OCT. 19TH.—Severe fighting all along the line. The British captured **Le Pilly**.

OCT. 20TH.—The enemy retook **Le Pilly** after very severe fighting.

OCT. 22ND.—Very severe attacks by the enemy all along the line. The IInd Corps front was now **Givenchy—Lorgies—Neuve Chapelle—Fauquissart**.

OCT. 24TH.—The Lahore Division (Indian Army Corps) was moved to **Lacon** to support the IInd Corps which had suffered very severely. Very heavy fighting all along the front of the IInd Corps; a part of the line was broken but retaken again later.

IIIRD CORPS (PULTENEY).

OCT. 11TH.—The detrainment at **St. Omer** was completed; the corps moved towards **Hazebrouck**.

OCT. 12TH.—The corps remained at **Hazebrouck**.

OCT. 13TH.—The general line reached **Strazeele—Caestre St. Sylvestre**, and prepared to advance towards the line **Armentières—Wyttschaete**.

OCT. 14TH.—The advance commenced and **Le Bailleul** occupied; the general line was now **St. Jans Cappel—Bailleul**.

OCT. 15TH—16TH.—The 4th Division reached **Nieppe**; the 6th Division **Sailly—Bac St. Maur**.

OCT. 17TH.—The enemy now began to retire; the front was now **Bois Grenier—Le Gheir**.

OCT. 18TH.—The advance was continued. The enemy's line was now **Radinghem—Perenchies—Frelinghem**. The IIIrd Corps made a vigorous attack, but could only make small progress. The general positions at nightfall were:—

6th Division: **Radinghem—La Vallée—Emnetiers—Capingham—Premesques** railway line 300 yards east of **Halte**.

4th Division: **L'Épinette** to river 400 yards south of **Frelinghem—point** half-mile south-east of **Le Gheir**.

Reserve: **Armentières**.

French cavalry was on the right, British on the left.

The enemy had been considerably reinforced: there were reported to be three or four divisions of cavalry, the XIXth Saxon Corps, and at least one division of the VIIth Corps.

OCT. 20TH.—There was very severe fighting all along the line and **Le Gheir** was captured by the enemy. It was, however, skilfully recovered, the enemy being driven back with great loss.

OCT. 22ND—23RD—24TH.—Very severe fighting along the whole front, but the positions were well held.

OCT. 25TH.—The general line of front was slightly retired.

OCT. 29TH.—A very heavy enemy attack on **Le Gheir** was repulsed. An attack south of **Croix—Marechal** was at first successful, but the enemy were eventually driven out with great loss.

OCT. 30TH.—Very severe fighting about **St. Ves**, but the positions lost were recaptured.

OCT. 31ST.—The already very long front of the corps was extended to include the extreme right of the 1st Cavalry Division.

THE 1ST CORPS (HAIG).

OCT. 19TH.—The detrainment was completed and the corps was in position between **St. Omer** and **Hazebrouck**. Owing to the small number of troops between **Lille** and **Ostend** and the vigorous attempts being made by the enemy to drive back the Belgians and **Rawlinson's** corps (one division only), the Commander-in-Chief decided to move the 1st Corps to the north of **Ypres**. The 1st Corps was therefore directed on **Thourout**, with the view of capturing **Bruges**, and driving the enemy towards **Ghent**, but the Commander (**Haig**) was, after passing **Ypres**, to decide whether to attack towards the north or the south. French cavalry were to operate on the left of the corps, and the 3rd Cavalry Division to the right.

The Belgians were firmly entrenched to the north and holding out well. The Commander-in-Chief now issued orders to the IInd and IIIrd Corps to remain on the defensive, and the IVth Corps (Rawlinson) was directed to conform generally to the movements of the Ist Corps.

OCT. 20TH.—The general front was Elverdinghe—point one and a-half miles north-west of Zonnebeke.

OCT. 21ST.—An attack on the line Poelcapelle—Passchendaele was ordered, but the advance was slow, owing to the severe fighting, not only in front, but on the two flanks held by the IVth Corps and 2nd Cavalry Division. At 2 p.m. the French cavalry on the left of the corps were directed to retire west of the canal, and consequently the advance halted on the line Zonnebeke—St. Julien—Langemarck—Bixschoote.

In the evening the Commander-in-Chief visited Ypres and arranged for the French Territorial Divisions there quartered to move north and protect the left flank of the Ist Corps. He also informed the General Officer Commanding the Ist and IVth Corps that the Ninth French Army and other troops were coming up to assist the Belgians, and that the two British corps were to hold their ground for two or three days till the French movement developed.

OCT. 22ND.—There was severe fighting all along the line, and a position north of Pilkem was lost.

OCT. 23RD.—The position north of Pilkem was recovered, the enemy losing considerably. A further attack later in the day was repulsed. A division of the Ninth French Army arrived and took over part of the line held by the 2nd Division.

OCT. 24TH.—The 2nd Division took over the line Poelzelhoek—Becelaere—Passchendaele road, hitherto held by 7th Division. Heavy enemy attacks were repulsed.

OCT. 25TH.—The 1st Division was relieved by French Territorials and concentrated about Zonnebeke. The 2nd Division (7th Division on its right) made some progress towards the north-east.

OCT. 27TH.—The IVth Corps was now temporarily broken up, the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division being attached to the Ist Corps. The Commander of IVth Corps returned to England to organize his 8th Division.

The Ist Corps line was then reorganized as follows:—

7th Division—east of Zandvoorde—Menin road.

1st Division—Menin road—Reytel village.

2nd Division—Moorslede—Zonnebeke road.

OCT. 29TH.—Very heavy attack on the position of the 1st Division. The division counter-attacked about 2 p.m., and by the evening captured Kruseik Hill, the general line reaching north of the Menin road.

OCT. 30TH.—The enemy were heavily reinforced and commenced an attack on Zandvoorde. The 3rd Cavalry Division had to withdraw to Klein Zillebeke ridge, and the right of the 7th Division had to retire. Part of the IXth French Corps came up to assist, and was posted on the right of the Ist Corps.

OCT. 31ST.—The IXth French Corps detachment attacked vigorously in the early morning, but could make little progress. The enemy now made heavy attacks along the Menin—Ypres road and south-east of Gheluvelt. The 1st Division had to retire, a part of the 7th Division was cut off, and the position now became very critical. At 2.0 p.m. the 1st Division was on a line Frezenberg road—Ypres—Menin road, while the 7th Division had been bent back to the Zillebeke ridge. At 2.30 p.m. a vigorous counter-attack was carried out by the left of the 1st Division and right of the 2nd Division, and Gheluvelt was retaken.

INDIAN CORPS.

OCT. 19TH—20TH.—The Lahore Division arrived at Lacon.

OCT. 22ND—24TH.—Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division sent to reinforce Allenby's cavalry; the rest of the division was moved up in rear of the

IIInd Corps, one brigade taking over the ground on the extreme left occupied by French cavalry on October 24th.

OCT. 25TH.—Very heavy fighting round Neuve Chapelle.

OCT. 27TH.—The enemy captured Neuve Chapelle.

OCT. 28TH.—The 47th Sikhs, 9th Bhopal Infantry, and 20th and 21st Companies of the 3rd Sappers retook Neuve Chapelle.

OCT. 31ST.—The Meerut Division arrived at Lacon. The IIInd Corps was now withdrawn from the front line, its place being taken by the Indian Division.

THE IVTH CORPS (7TH DIVISION ONLY), RAWLINSON.

OCT. 16TH.—The IVth Corps and 3rd Cavalry Division, which had previously been acting directly under the British War Office, was now placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief in France. Its position was Zandvoorde—Gheluvelde—Zonnebeke; the 3rd Cavalry Division was about Poelcapelle on the left flank. The 87th French Territorial Division was at Ypres and the 89th French Territorial Division at Poperinghe. The commander of the IVth Corps was now ordered to conform generally to the movements of the IIIrd Corps and Cavalry Corps, and to guard against any attack from the north-east.

OCT. 17TH.—Four French cavalry divisions deployed to the north of the 3rd Cavalry Division and drove the enemy out of the Forest d'Houthulst, and moved on Roulers.

OCT. 17TH—18TH.—The Commander-in-Chief desired an advance on Menin, but this, owing to the threatening attitude of the enemy to the north-east, could not be carried out. The division remained in the positions held on October 16th, 1914.

OCT. 20TH.—The IVth Corps was directed to conform generally to the movements of the Ist Corps which had now come up into position. The general line was now Elverdinghe—Zonnebeke.

OCT. 21ST.—The general front was Poelcapelle—Passchendaele. Very heavy fighting.

OCT. 27TH.—The IVth Corps was broken up. The 7th Division was transferred to the Ist Corps.

THE CAVALRY CORPS.

OCT. 11TH.—This force consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and was transferred to the north, as explained for the Ist, IIInd, and IIIrd Corps.

The 2nd Cavalry Division gained the woods to the north of the Aire—Bethune canal, and took Mont des Cats after much fighting.

OCT. 14TH.—The 1st Cavalry Division came up, and the whole cavalry corps, after much fighting, occupied the high ground above Berthen.

OCT. 15TH—16TH.—The corps reconnoitred the River Lys.

OCT. 17TH—19TH.—The corps continued the reconnaissance, but was unable to secure a footing across the river. It was now ordered to act on the defensive.

OCT. 20TH.—Heavy fighting all along the line. The positions were: 1st Division, St. Yves—Messines; 2nd Division, Messines—Garde Dieu—Houthem—Kortewide.

OCT. 21ST.—A heavy attack was made on the 2nd Cavalry Division, which had to retire on the line Messines—9th Kilo on the Warneton—Oostaverne road.

OCT. 22ND.—The 7th Indian Brigade was sent to Wulverghem to assist the cavalry corps. One battalion moved to Wytschaete, another to Voomezeele.

OCT. 23RD, 24TH, AND 25TH.—Numerous severe attacks by the enemy were repulsed.

OCT. 26TH.—The Commander-in-Chief directed a forward movement to be made in conjunction with the 7th Division, but the effort was unsuccessful.

OCT. 30TH.—Very heavy enemy attacks, especially about Hollebeke. About 1.30 p.m. the 3rd Cavalry Brigade near Hollebeke had to retire, and the 2nd Cavalry

Brigade, from 1st Cavalry Division, moved to a point between Oostaverne and St. Eloi to support the 2nd Cavalry Division. Heavy attacks were made on the 1st Cavalry Division about Messines. The Commander-in-Chief decided to send a brigade from IIInd Corps to assist the cavalry corps.

OCT. 31ST—NOV. 1ST.—Very heavy fighting all along the line. On the latter day the XVIth French Corps, with the 1st French Cavalry Corps, came up, and the latter took over the position held by the 2nd Cavalry Division.

BATTLE LINE ON OCTOBER 31ST, 1914.

The British battle line was as follows: Boesinghe—Zonnebeke—Gheluvelde—Warneton—south of Armentières—Fauquissart—Givenchy.

EVENTS FROM NOVEMBER 1ST TO 18TH, 1914.

NOV. 1ST.—Heavy attack on Klein Zillebeke, which was driven off. A vigorous attack was also made about Messines and the enemy captured Hollebeke and Messines. During the night Wytschaete was also taken.

NOV. 2ND.—Very heavy fighting all along the line. Wytschaete retaken. The enemy's XXVIIth, XVth, IInd, and XIIIth Bavarian Corps were now attacking the front held by the 1st British and IXth French Corps.

NOV. 5TH.—The 7th Division was sent to act as reserve, and its place taken by part of the IInd Corps (eleven battalions) and three Territorial battalions.

NOV. 6TH.—Very heavy attack on Klein Zillebeke, and the French at that point were driven back. The cavalry, however, now came up and reinforced the line, holding the trenches throughout the night.

NOV. 7TH.—Heavy fighting all along the line.

NOV. 8TH—10TH.—Artillery actions along the whole front. On November 10th a vigorous attack by the Prussian Guard was beaten off with great loss at Gheluvelde.

NOV. 12TH.—Enemy attacks on Klein Zillebeke and Messines were repulsed.

NOV. 13TH—18TH.—General fighting all along the line. On November 14th, 1914, Field-Marshal Viscount Roberts of Kandahar died at General Headquarters.

SECTION XLI.

The Retreat of the Belgian Army from Antwerp to the River Yser, October 6th to 16th, 1914.

OCT. 6TH.—The forces involved in this operation were:—

Allies.

British—IVth Corps (7th Division only and 3rd Cavalry Division) and three naval brigades.

Belgian—1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions of the Field Army; the garrison of Antwerp, 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions.

French—A brigade of French Marine Fusiliers attached to Belgian Army.

[Note—the British troops were under the direct orders of the British War Office.]

Germans.

The army for the siege of Antwerp—IIIrd Corps of the Reserve; a division of Marines; 26th and 37th Brigades of Landwehr; 4th Ersatz Division; 1st Ersatz Reserve Division; a Bavarian division (?); a brigade of siege artillery, and a brigade of Engineers.

The general position at this date was:—

Allies.—At Antwerp the line of the River Nethe had been pierced by the enemy; and the River Dendre and River Escaut were constantly being attacked. Ghent, however, was secured and the troops there were covering the line of communication between Antwerp and the base at Ostend. Of the British forces,

the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division had landed at Nieuport and Ostend and were moving towards Ghent, while the Naval Brigades had just reached Antwerp.

The Germans.—These were conducting the siege with great vigour, and had advanced to the west as far as Schoonaerde, threatening Ghent.

The Belgian Plan of Operations.—As there was great likelihood of the Belgian Army being surrounded and cut off from the main French and British about Lille and Ypres, it was decided to evacuate Antwerp and take up a position on the River Yser from the sea about Nieuport to Boesinghe. A small garrison was left in Antwerp itself with orders to continue the struggle as long as possible.

OCT. 7TH.—The Belgian forces retired across the River Escaut safely; the enemy advanced on Schoonaerde, Berlaere, Cruyshautem, and Nazareth. The Belgian 4th Brigade was sent to reinforce the troops at Ghent, as the British from Ostend had not yet arrived.

OCT. 8TH.—The 3rd Division had heavy fighting at Lokeren; the 1st Division was sent by train to Ostend, the remaining divisions moving on the line of the Terneuzen Canal.

OCT. 9TH.—The brigade of French Marine Fusiliers reached Ghent, as also a considerable part of the British 7th Division. There were now from 25,000 to 30,000 Allied troops there.

The German movements were as follows:—

37th Landwehr Brigade and 4th Ersatz Division about Lokeren (the latter crossed the river at Schoonaerde).

1st Ersatz Division and the Bavarian Division advanced towards Ghent from Lemberge, Gontevde, and Quatrecht.

There was heavy fighting about Melle.

The main Belgian Army was now on the line of the Terneuzen Canal, from Ghent to the north, with rearguards at Loochristy, Lokeren, Watchebeke, and Moerbeke.

OCT. 10TH.—Antwerp surrendered.

The general position was now as follows:—

(a) The French main Army was about Arras.

(b) The main British Army was moving east from St. Omer.

(c) The German forces released from the siege of Antwerp, and assisted by four new corps, the XXIIInd, XXIIIrd, XXVIth, and XVIIth Reserve were marching west and north.

As a result the Belgian Army about Ghent and the Terneuzen Canal were in danger of being driven back on Holland, and it was therefore decided to at once continue the march on the River Yser position, especially as the troops at Ghent had so far barred any attack on that position.

OCT. 11TH.—In the evening a heavy attack on the British 7th Division at Ghent was repulsed. The general retreat from Ghent commenced. The Belgian cavalry had considerable fighting on the Terneuzen and Schipdouw Canals and on the Rivers Escaut and Lys. The 1st Division moved through Lootenhulle, the 2nd Division via Ussel and Bruges.

OCT. 12TH.—The retreat was continued. The 3rd British Cavalry Division occupied Roulers, and took up the line Oostneu Kerche—Isseghem.

OCT. 13TH.—The retreat of the Belgian forces continued, and by the evening a position east of the forest of Houthulst was reached. The 3rd British Cavalry Division reconnoitred towards Ypres and Menin, and gained touch with Allenby's cavalry corps about Kemmel.

The Germans entered Ghent.

OCT. 14TH.—The Belgian retreat continued. The IIIrd German Reserve Corps reached Bruges.

OCT. 15TH.—The Belgian Army commenced to take up its position on the River Yser from Nieuport to Boesinghe. Its strength was about 82,000 men.

OCT. 16TH.—The general position was:—

- (a) Belgian Army on the River Yser.
- (b) British 7th Division, Zandvoorde—Gheluvelde—Zonnebeke, with the 3rd Cavalry Division on the line Bixchoote—Poelcapelle.
- (c) French Territorials (87th and 89th Divisions), west of Ypres.

The British 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division were now transferred to the command of the British Commander-in-Chief in France.

SECTION XLII.

The Belgian Campaign North-East of Paris, from October 16th to November 1st, 1914.

OCT. 16TH.—The position of the Belgian Army on the River Yser was:—

- 2nd Division—from the sea north-west of Nieuport—Pont de l'Union; advanced parties at Lombaertzyde bridge to east of Nieuport, Mannekensvere.
- 1st Division—from Pont de l'Union—Borne 10; advanced parties at Schoore and east of Schoorbake bridge.
- 4th Division—from Borne 10—Borne 14; with advanced posts at Keyem and Beerst.
- French Marine Fusiliers from Borne 14—north of Noordschoote; advanced post, bridge east of Dixmude.
- 3th Division—about Noordschoote.
- 6th Division—from south of Noordschoote—Boesinghe.
- 3rd Division—in reserve about Lampernisse.
- 1st Cavalry Division—towards Roulers, in touch with the French cavalry.
- 2nd Cavalry Division—in reserve between Nieuport and Furnes.

Fighting commenced about St. Pierre Capelle and the enemy made a reconnaissance about Dixmude.

OCT. 17TH.—German columns were found to be advancing along the Plasschendaële Canal, from Leffinghe on Slype, from Ghistelles on Zevécote, and from Staden on Zurren. The German artillery bombarded Slype and Rattevalle. The Belgian movements were:—

- 5th Division—to Lampernisse in reserve for Dixmude.
- 3rd Division—to Avecapelle.
- 6th Division (one brigade)—to replace 5th Division.

OCT. 18TH.—The German attack commenced; Mannekensvere was taken by them, but afterwards recaptured. A British flotilla north of Nieuport came to the assistance of the Belgians about Lombaertzyde very successfully. Schoore and Keyem were taken by the enemy. Owing to the British cavalry movements the Belgian right was now considered to be safe; and French Territorials took the place of 6th Division. The reserves were now: 3rd Division, Wulpen; 5th Division, Oostkerke; 6th Division, Lampernisse. 1st Cavalry division maintained touch between the right and the French cavalry.

OCT. 19TH.—Severe fighting between Lombaertzyde and Beerst, which latter place was captured by the enemy. The 6th Division moved to Pervyse to support the centre; while 5th Division attacked Vladslloo. The latter occupied Beerst and Vladslloo, but was withdrawn on news being received of a heavy German advance north and south of Roulers.

OCT. 20TH.—At 6 a.m. the Germans attacked Lombaertzyde and the farm Bamburgh, and occupied them. A German attack at Dixmude failed. Very heavy artillery bombardment all along the line.

OCT. 21ST.—The German forces were distributed as follows:—

4th Ersatz Division—opposite Nieuport.

IIIrd Reserve Corps—Nieuport—Keyem.

XXIIInd Reserve Corps—north of Dixmude.

XXIIIrd Reserve Corps—north and south of Dixmude.

The Belgian and French Commanders decided to limit the length of their line to a front of 20 kilos (southern end St. Jacques Capelle).

Arrangements were also made with the French Commander-in-Chief to secure the safety of the front St. Jacques Capelle—Boesinghe with fresh French troops.

During night of 21st there was a heavy enemy artillery bombardment. Trenches south of Dixmude were captured by the Germans but retaken later.

The general position of the Belgian Army was critical, as most of the reserves were in the front line.

OCT. 22ND.—Early in the morning the Germans carried a temporary bridge near Tervaete and crossed to the left bank of the river. Numerous attempts were made to drive them back, but these were unsuccessful. There was heavy fighting all along the line. The Belgians regained the farm Bamburgh.

OCT. 23RD.—The 42nd (French) Division arrived and moved to Nieuport. The chief fighting was about the loop of the river west of Tervaete. By the evening the troops in this area were much fatigued, and the French were asked for help. A brigade of the 42nd (French) Division was sent and reached the neighbourhood of Tervaete during the night.

OCT. 24TH.—There was heavy fighting all along the line. The Belgian forces had to retire on the line of the Noord Vaart and Beverdijk. Further French reinforcements were asked for, and promised for the next day. Nearly all the 42nd (French) Division was now before Tervaete.

OCT. 25TH.—The German attacks were less violent. A vigorous attack by the 5th Division and a French brigade from Oud Stuyvekenskerke failed. It was now decided to inundate the country from the sea, about Nieuport towards Dixmude, and preparations for this were begun. By constructing dams across the aqueducts under the Dixmude—Nieuport railway and opening the Nieuport sluices, the whole area between the line and the River Yser could be flooded and a good obstacle placed in front of the new Belgian positions against any further enemy advance.

OCT. 26TH.—The Belgian guns now began to give out, and there was only about 100 rounds of ammunition per gun left.

It was therefore decided to retire to the line of the railway, more especially as the troops, owing to the heavy fighting, were much exhausted. By the evening the general line was east of Nieuport bridgehead—railway line (Nieuport—Dixmude)—Borne 4—Oud Stuyvekenskerke—Borne 16—bridgehead east of Dixmude. The two cavalry divisions were about the different bridges on the Furnes—Loo canal.

OCT. 27TH—28TH.—There was less fighting and arrangements were made to reorganize the 3rd and 6th Divisions. The inundation works were now completed, and on 28th the water had spread out in front of the 2nd Division position.

OCT. 29TH.—A heavy bombardment by the enemy on the positions held by the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Divisions. The water now began to extend to the south.

OCT. 30TH.—The enemy got into Ramscapelle, but were driven out later. The inundation progressed and the enemy found part of their trenches untenable.

Up to this date the Belgians had lost about 14,000 killed and wounded, and more than half the guns were unfit for further use.

SECTION XLIII.

The Belgian Campaign North-East of Paris from November 1st to December 31st, 1914.

Nov. 3RD.—Reconnoitring parties reached Lombaertzyde and the south of St. Georges. The French improved the bridgehead at Dixmude.

Nov. 4TH.—The Belgians occupied Lombaertzyde, but had to retire as night came on.

Nov. 8TH—10TH.—The French (81st Division) advanced about 200 yards. Enemy attacks on St. Georges, Schoorbake, and Tervaete were repulsed. On November 9th Dixmude was heavily bombarded, while on November 10th the enemy succeeded in capturing the town.

Nov. 11TH—Dec. 15TH.—General fighting all along the line. On the latter day the enemy occupied St. Georges. A combined French and Belgian attack on Lombaerte commenced under a heavy bombardment.

Dec. 16TH.—The attack of December 15th made some progress and the sea was reached. During the night of December 16th—17th very heavy attacks from Lombaerte were repulsed.

Dec. 18TH.—The Belgian and French trenches were now within 100 yards of Lombaerte. Progress was also made towards St. Georges.

Dec. 28TH.—The Belgians and French captured St. Georges.

Dec. 31ST.—The enemy were still on the right bank of the River Yser.

SECTION XLIV.

The Western Campaign from November 20th, 1914, to February 1st, 1915.

During this period the operations were much limited by the weather, and those undertaken were chiefly of a minor character.

Nov. 23RD—24TH.—A detachment of the 2nd Lincoln Regiment cleared the enemy advanced trenches. The Germans succeeded in taking about 800 yards of the trenches held by the Indian Corps, but these were recovered by the Meerut Division during the night.

Nov. 24TH—25TH.—A detachment of Royal Engineers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers mined and blew up a group of farms used by German snipers on the Touquet—Bridoux road.

Nov. 26TH—27TH.—A detachment of the Scots Guards rushed some trenches and gained valuable information regarding the enemy's position. A patrol of the 2nd Rifle Brigade also rushed some trenches.

Nov. 30TH.—His Majesty the King arrived at General Headquarters, remaining until December 5th, 1914.

Dec. 7TH.—The concentration of the Indian Corps was completed by the arrival of the Sirhind Brigade.

Dec. 9TH.—The enemy made a strong attack against the position held by IIIrd Corps; the attack failed. At this time indications along the whole front showed that the enemy had withdrawn considerable forces from the western front. Arrangements were made for a combined attack by the British and French (Eighth Army) forces to commence on December 14th, 1914.

The orders for the attack were:—

- (a) British 2nd Division on Petit Bois and Maedelsteed Spur.
- (b) XXIst French Corps to attack to north (?) of the British.
- (c) XVIth French Corps to attack to south (?) of the British.

Dec. 14TH.—The attack commenced with a combined heavy bombardment all along the line at 7 a.m. The British carried both positions, but had to retire from Maedelsteed Spur at nightfall. The French 32nd Division could get no further than the edge of Wytschaete Wood. While the fight was in progress the IIIrd British Corps made demonstrations against the enemy to prevent his sending troops into the area of operations of the IInd Corps.

Dec. 15TH—17TH.—The attack of December 14th was continued, but the operations were chiefly confined to artillery action. On the latter date the plan of operations was modified; the British troops were to continue demonstrations all along the line to support certain French operations being carried out elsewhere.

DEC. 18TH.—The Commander of the Indian Corps decided, to attack the enemy to his front. The positions were :—

Meerut Division.

Gahrwal Brigade—west of Neuve Chapelle.

Dehra Dun Brigade—east of Festhubert.

Bareilly Brigade— ?

Lahore Division.

Sirhind Brigade—Givenchy.

Ferozepore Brigade—Cuinchy, across the canal.

Jullundur Brigade ?

DEC. 19TH.—The Meerut Division advanced early in the morning and gained ground considerably, but owing to a counter-attack had to retire later. The Lahore Division moved at 4.30 a.m., and successfully gained two lines of enemy trenches. It was, however, found impossible to hold the new line and the forces retired. A supporting attack failed to render assistance, and by nightfall nearly all the ground gained had been lost.

DEC. 20TH.—The enemy commenced a heavy bombardment along the whole front occupied by the Indian Division, and launched an infantry attack in the early morning, chiefly against the Sirhind Brigade between Givenchy and La Quinque Rue. By 10 a.m. part of Givenchy had been captured, and the Sirhind Brigade was driven back. This movement exposed the right of the Dehra Dun Brigade, which in consequence suffered very severely. A battalion of the 2nd Ghurkas also had to retire at this time and the difficulty of holding the line was now considerable.

When the news of these retirements came to hand the following orders were issued :—

- (a) 47th Sikhs to reinforce the Sirhind Brigade.
- (b) 1st Manchesters, 4th Suffolks, and two battalions of French Territorials, under General Carnegie, to move from Pont Fixe via Givenchy and take the trenches won by the Germans from the Sirhind Brigade, in flank.
- (c) 58th Rifles to fill the gap caused by the retirement of the 2nd Ghurkas.
- (d) A battalion of the 58th French Division was sent to Annequin as a support.

About 5 p.m. General Carnegie had captured Givenchy and taken two lines of trenches to the north-east, but the enemy still held some trenches to the north of the village.

There was severe fighting all along the line. The 1st British Corps was now directed to send a brigade to support the Indian Corps, and later the whole of the 1st Division was moved up.

DEC. 21ST.—A vigorous but unsuccessful attack was made at 1 a.m. by the 47th Sikhs and 7th Dragoon Guards; while a further effort by the 2/8th Ghurkas and rest of the Secunderabad Cavalry at 4 a.m. also failed.

The 1st Brigade of 1st Division reached Bethune at midnight December 20th-21st, 1914; while 3rd Brigade arrived at the same place on December 21st. The 2nd Brigade was at Lacon by 1 p.m.

The 1st Brigade was directed to move on Givenchy via Pont Fixe, the 3rd Brigade via Gorre, on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind Brigade. The 2nd Brigade was to remain in support.

At 1 p.m. the General Officer Commanding 1st Division issued orders as follows :—

1st Brigade—to attack from west of Givenchy in a north-easterly direction.

3rd Brigade—from Festhubert in a north-north-easterly direction.

The objects to be attained were the capture of the trenches originally held by the Sirhind Brigade and some German trenches to the east of that position. At

5 p.m. the 1st Brigade had gained a good hold on Givenchy; while the 2nd Brigade was half-mile west of Festhubert.

By nightfall the original trenches north-east of Festhubert had been taken and the 1st Brigade was east of Givenchy. The 1st Gloucesters held the line of the track east of Festhubert.

3 p.m.—The 3rd Brigade was at Le Touret, and commenced an attack on the trenches lost by the Dehra Dun Brigade.

10 p.m.—The line which the 2nd Ghurkas had been forced to leave was retaken.

DEC. 22ND.—At 1 p.m. the General Officer Commanding 1st Division took over the command of this section of the front from the General Officer Commanding Indian Division. At this hour the general position was :—

Ferozepore Brigade—north and south of La Bassée canal in its original position.

1st Brigade—Givenchy and its north and north-eastern approaches.

3rd Brigade—east of the Festhubert—La Bassée road.

Dehra Dun and 2nd Brigades—about Richebourg l'Avoué.

Gharwal Brigade—about Neuve Chapelle, their original line.

By the evening the position at Givenchy was re-established, and the 3rd Brigade occupied the old line of trenches east of Festhubert.

During the night most of the units in the southern sector were relieved. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the General Officer Commanding 1st Division.

DEC. 23RD.—There was little fighting; the battle front was now much as before.

JAN. 25TH, 1915.—At 7.30 a.m. the enemy commenced to shell Bethune and formed for attack on the British position south of Givenchy.

The general line was :—

3rd Brigade—Givenchy—point on La Bassée canal west of the railway triangle.

1st Brigade—point west of railway triangle—Bethune—La Bassée road.

Attack South of Givenchy.—The salient in the point west of the railway triangle was soon driven in, and a second partially prepared line, 500 yards west of the original line, was taken up. This latter line had a keep, half way between the canal and the Bethune—La Bassée road, garrisoned by two and a-half battalions. These latter prevented the enemy from advancing further, but he succeeded in gaining some communication trenches near the keep.

At 1 p.m. a counter-attack was made by 1st Royal Highlanders, part of 1st Cameron Highlanders and 2/ King's Royal Rifles, reinforced later by Royal Sussex. Eventually a line was gained running from culvert on the railway (south of Givenchy), via the keep, to the Bethune—La Bassée road. As the 1st Brigade had suffered very severely it was withdrawn and replaced by the 2nd Brigade.

Attack on Givenchy.—This commenced at 8.15 a.m., and the Germans succeeded in getting into the centre of the village, after very heavy fighting. A counter-attack by 2/ Welsh, 1st South Wales Borderers, and a company of the Royal Highlanders, however, drove them out, and by 12 noon the original line round the village was re-established. On the south side of Givenchy the 2/ Munsters fell back in conformity with the troops to the south, but after dark the battalion resumed its original line.

JAN. 29TH.—The enemy made a heavy attack on the keep half-way between La Bassée canal and the Bethune—La Bassée road. The keep itself and the lines to the north were well held, but the attack on the south side of the keep succeeded. Later on the position was regained by a vigorous counter-attack.

FEB. 1ST.—There was some vigorous fighting near Guinchy about 2.30 a.m., but at 10.5 a.m. the ground taken was regained.

SECTION XLV.

The Western Campaign from February 2nd to March 17th, 1915.

THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

FEB. 2ND.—The new formation of the British forces was now as follows :—

Second Army (Smith-Dorrien).

Vth Corps : 27th Division (80th, 81st, 82nd Brigades); 28th Division (83rd, 84th, 85th Brigades); Gheluvelde—south and east of St. Eloi.
IInd Corps : 3rd Division (7th, 8th, 9th Brigades); 5th Division (13th, 14th, 15th Brigades); west of Wytchaete—Messines.
IIIrd Corps : 4th Division (10th, 11th, 12th Brigades); 6th Division (16th, 17th, 18th Brigades); south of Messines—east of Armentières—south of Bois Grenier.

First Army (Haig).

IVth Corps : 7th Division (20th, 21st, 22nd Brigades); 8th Division (23rd, 24th, 25th Brigades); south of Bois Grenier—west of Neuve Chapelle.
Indian Corps : Meerut Division (Bareilly, Gharwal, and Dehra Dun Brigades); Lahore Division (Sirhind, Ferozepore, and Jullundur Brigades); west of Neuve Chapelle—Givenchy.
Ist Corps : 1st Division (1st, 2nd, 3rd Brigades); 2nd Division (4th, 5th, 6th Brigades); Givenchy—Vermelles.

The three divisions of British cavalry took it in turns to occupy part of the line held by the Ninth French Army to the north. The Tenth French Army continued the line to the south from Vermelles.

FEB. 6TH.—There was considerable fighting near the keep to the south of Givenchy. A severe enemy bombardment commenced at 2 p.m., but an attack by two battalions Guards Brigade was successful and some forty yards of ground was gained.

FEB. 14TH.—The 82nd Brigade of 27th Division had to retire from its trenches east of St. Eloi. The 85th Brigade of the 28th Division also lost some ground.

FEB. 15TH.—Both the 82nd and 85th Brigades recovered their original trenches.

FEB. 16TH.—At 1.45 a.m. the right of the 2nd Cavalry Division was attacked but the enemy were easily repulsed.

FEB. 21ST.—The enemy took some trenches occupied by the 2nd Cavalry Division, but could not advance. A counter-attack was carried out, but little progress was made by 5.30 p.m. At 10 p.m., as no further activity was shown by the enemy, a position some forty yards in rear of the original line was taken up.

FEB. 28TH.—A small detachment of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry made an attack on enemy trenches near St. Eloi. The trenches were destroyed.

MARCH 2ND.—A battalion 80th Brigade made a successful attack on enemy trenches at 12.30 a.m. About this time the British Commander-in-Chief decided to make a vigorous offensive movement. The chief reasons for this were : the general aspect of the Allied situation throughout Europe; the success of the Russian efforts against Von Hindenburg; the necessity for assisting the Russians by holding as many hostile troops as possible in the west; and to foster the offensive spirit in the British troops after their very trying winter experiences.

Plan of Attack.

The general arrangements were as follows :—

First attack to commence at 7.30 a.m. on March 10th.

Second main attack : IVth Corps, 8th Division—on Neuve Chapelle and to the north of the village; Indian Corps, Meerut Division—on Neuve Chapelle and to the south of the village.

Third secondary attacks : IVth Corps, 7th Division—towards Aubers and Pietre; Ist Corps—north-east from Givenchy.

Fourth: the artillery were massed about Richebourg St. Vaas, Vieille Chapelle and La Couture.

The actual attack was to be carried out as follows:—

- (a) Very heavy bombardment by the artillery of the enemy's position about Neuve Chapelle; a curtain of fire to be maintained well east of the enemy's position while the infantry attack was in progress.
- (b) Combined attack by the 8th and Meerut Divisions after the enemy's position had been destroyed. This attack was directed to occupy the village and take up a position to the east of it.
- (c) The subsidiary attacks to combine with the main attack as far as possible and generally advance the British line.

MARCH 8TH—9TH.—The British artillery was brought up to the positions detailed above, and preparations were made for the bombardment, etc.

The infantry moved to the front trenches, ready for the advance.

MARCH 10TH.—The artillery bombardment began at 7.30 a.m., and in half an hour the enemy front trenches, with most of the obstacles in front of them, were destroyed.

At 8.35 a.m. the infantry attack commenced.

The 8th Division, 23rd Brigade, now moved against the north-east corner of Neuve Chapelle, while the 25th Brigade (8th Division) advanced against the centre. The Gharwal Brigade attacked the south-eastern corner, the Dehra Dun Brigade on its right attacking slightly further to the east.

The 25th and Gharwal Brigades were very successful and stormed the front positions without much difficulty. The 23rd Brigade, however, had great difficulties to contend with, as the artillery fire had not wholly demolished the wire entanglements on the north-east side of the village. The losses of this brigade were very heavy, as they had to hold on to their position until a further artillery bombardment had broken up the obstacles.

At 8.35 a.m. the artillery commenced to form a curtain of fire to prevent the German supports coming up.

By 12 noon the advance of the 25th Brigade through the village had turned the flank of the enemy opposing the 23rd Brigade, and both brigades occupied positions to the east and north-east of the village. The Gharwal and Dehra Dun Brigades were by now south-east and south of the village.

At 3.30 p.m. the 7th Division came up on the left of the 8th Division and advanced towards Aubers. At first good progress was made, but the advance was checked about the Moulin le Pietre. At the same time the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division was held up west of the Bois du Biez.

The Gharwal and Dehra Dun Brigades formed for attack on the Bois du Biez, but could only advance as far as the River Des Layes. A part of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division was sent forward to assist in this attack, but the enemy brought up reinforcements and the Indian and IVth Corps consolidated their positions.

During the above attack the 1st Corps from Givenchy endeavoured to advance to the north-east, but little progress was made as the wire entanglements had not been destroyed.

MARCH 11TH.—The attack was renewed by the IVth and Indian Corps, but little progress was made. No advance was possible until the various defended localities along the German front had been broken up by artillery fire. Unfortunately the weather conditions were unsuitable for artillery preparation and the troops had to remain on the line occupied the previous day.

MARCH 12TH.—Further attacks were made by the IVth and Indian Corps, but as little progress was made the Commander-in-Chief issued orders for the positions gained to be consolidated and all offensive operations to be suspended.

During the morning of this day the 2nd Cavalry Division was placed at the disposal of Officer Commanding 1st Corps, and this division, with a brigade of North Midland Division, moved forward for the purpose to Rue Bacquerot. The Officer Commanding the IVth Corps, however, decided that as the situation was not as favourable as he had hoped, no further action by the cavalry was advisable.

The British casualties were :—

| | | |
|------------------|-------------------|----------|
| 190 officers and | 2,337 other ranks | killed. |
| 359 " " | 8,174 " " | wounded. |
| 23 " " | 1,728 " " | missing. |
| <hr/> | | |
| 572 | 12,239 | |
| <hr/> | | |

The enemy losses were said to be about 18,000.

SUPPLEMENTARY ATTACKS.

Various holding attacks were made all along the line from time to time.

MARCH 12TH.—The IIIrd Corps, 4th Division, 17th and 18th Brigades, captured L'EpINETTE at 12.30 a.m. and consolidated their position. An advance of about 300 yards was made on a front of about half a mile. Frequent attacks on the new position were repulsed.

The IIrd Corps sent a detachment to attack the enemy's position south-west of Wytschaete, but heavy mist prevented any progress being made.

MARCH 14TH.—At 5 p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the St. Eloi position. Under cover of a mine explosion the infantry attack began and the Germans gained some points on the British front line trenches.

MARCH 15TH.—At 2 a.m. the 82nd Brigade of the 27th Division, Vth Corps, made a vigorous counter-attack and retook part of the village and some of the trenches to the east. At 3 a.m. the 80th Brigade captured other trenches to the east and west of the village. Practically speaking all the lost ground was recovered.

The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry took part in this attack, and were the first overseas contingent employed in the firing line.

MARCH 17TH.—The enemy made further vigorous attacks on the St. Eloi position, but were repulsed.

SECTION XLVI.

The Western Campaign from April 1st to May 26th, 1915.

APRIL 1ST.—Early in April reports came in to the British Commander-in-Chief that the Central Powers were preparing for an important offensive movement against the Allied Western front, which was to be combined with a vigorous attack on the Russian front. Eventually it became clear that the attack on the western front was to be about Ypres and the north, and arrangements were made accordingly.

APRIL 20TH.—The general positions of the Allied forces in the neighbourhood of Ypres were:

Belgian Army—Nieuport—Woumen.

A French Army (?)—Woumen—Langemarck (45th Colonial Division, Steenstraet to Langemarck).

British Second Army.

Canadian Corps : 1st Division (2nd and 3rd Brigades); Langemarck to north-east of Zonnebeke.

Vth Corps : 28th Division, north-east of Zonnebeke—south-east Polygon Wood; 27th Division, south-east of Polygon Wood—east of Veldhoeke—north of Hill 60.

IInd Corps: 3rd and 5th Divisions; Hill 60—St. Eloi—Wyschaete—Messines.
IIIrd Corps: 4th and 6th Divisions; south of Messines—south of Bois Grenier.

British First Army.

IVth Corps, Indian Corps, and Ist Corps; south of Bois Grenier—Vermelles.

Germans.

The forces in the immediate vicinity of Ypres and neighbourhood were: Army of Württemberg, XXVIth Corps, XXVIIth Corps, and part of XVth Corps.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY.

Actions about Hill 60 from April 17th to May 5th, 1915.

APRIL 17TH.—Hill 60 is a commanding hill immediately to the south of Zwartelen, and affords an excellent artillery observation post towards the west and north-west. It was, at this date, in the hands of the Germans.

At 7 p.m. the British 5th Division fired a mine under the hill and captured it without much difficulty. The enemy made counter-attacks during the night without success.

APRIL 18TH.—In the early morning the enemy gained the crest of the hill, but could make no further progress. In the evening the British regained the position.

APRIL 20TH—MAY 1ST.—The enemy made numerous unsuccessful attacks on the hill. On the latter date an attack, supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas, was made, but the Germans were driven back.

MAY 5TH.—The enemy, by means of another attack of asphyxiating gas, succeeded in taking the hill.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

APRIL 22ND.—The enemy carried out a heavy bombardment all along the line, and made use of asphyxiating gas (against the rules of the Hague Convention) for the first time.

About 5 p.m. a thick yellow smoke was seen to be issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixchoote, while at the same time two other gas attacks commenced east of the Ypres—Staden railway.

The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the 45th French Division untenable, and within an hour the position had to be abandoned, the troops falling back on the line of the canal from Boesinghe to Steenstraet. No blame attaches to the French troops for their retirement, as there is no doubt that they would have held their own, but for this treacherous onslaught.

This retirement of the 45th Colonial Division left the north flank of the Canadian Division exposed, and it seemed possible that they might be overwhelmed, especially as the enemy pressed forward in the now undefended gap between Steenstraet and Langemarck with a force estimated at four divisions.

The Canadians, however, although gassed, held on, but it soon became necessary for the 3rd Brigade to form to a flank, and this was done by taking up a new position at right angles to the former one, running from south of Poelcapelle to a small wood west of St. Julien. At midnight the two reserve battalions of the Canadian 2nd and 3rd Brigades were brought up, and had severe fighting in the wood above referred to. At first they succeeded in gaining the northern edge of the wood, but eventually they were pressed back. Some divisional reserves now came up, and though there was heavy fighting all through the night, a new line was at last formed and touch gained with the French right.

The Germans during the evening succeeded in capturing some works south of Lizarne and Steenstraet, and established themselves west of the canal. Late in the evening the British Commander-in-Chief directed the Cavalry Corps and

the Northumbrian Division to move west of Ypres, and placed them under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. At the same time other reserves from the First and Third Armies were directed to be in readiness to assist if required.

APRIL 23RD.—At 10 a.m. the general line in this section of the battlefield was:—

French (45th Colonial Division)—Steenstraet—south of Lizarne—west of canal—Boesinghe.

British (a)—Mixed force from various brigades—Boesinghe—wood west of St. Julien.

(b) Canadian 3rd Brigade—wood west of St. Julien—south of Poelcapelle.

(c)—Canadian 2nd Brigade—original position.

After a conference between General Foch and the British Commander-in-Chief, it was decided to hold on to the existing positions, and for the French to advance and try and regain their original line.

Throughout the day the enemy was very active, but the general British line was well held. Two brigades of the IIIrd Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps were sent to the Ypres area to support the Second Army if required.

APRIL 24TH.—At 3 a.m. the enemy commenced a very heavy artillery bombardment, and the infantry moved to attack at 3.30 a.m. Asphyxiating gas was again used, and the 3rd Canadian Brigade had to retire to the south of St. Julien. This left the west flank of the 2nd Brigade exposed, and the 2nd Brigade moved into a new position: right at Grafenstafel, left about St. Julien.

At 12 o'clock noon a heavy German attack commenced against the front St. Julien—Grafenstafel. This was partially successful, and the British line, after a vigorous counter-attack, was withdrawn further south. The Canadians about Grafenstafel, however, still held on to their original position. By the evening the general battle line in this section was:—

French (45th Colonial Division)—as before.

British (a)—13th Brigade—from French right flank—Pilkem to Ypres road.

(b)—Mixed force—from right of 13th Brigade to Ypres—St. Julien road.

(c)—10th Brigade—from right of Mixed force to west of Fortuin.

(d)—West of Fortuin—Grafenstafel.

APRIL 25TH.—In the early morning the enemy made a vigorous attack against Broodseinde, but no progress was made. There was heavy fighting all along the line.

A British counter-attack was also made by 10th Brigade and part of the York and Durham Brigade against St. Julien, but while the end of the village was gained, a real advance was found to be impossible. At 2 p.m. there was a heavy gas attack against Grafenstafel, and the British held on to their position till 7 p.m., when they had to retire. Throughout the day reinforcements were brought up, and by the evening the general British line from west to east was: 13th Brigade; part of York and Durham Brigade; the Mixed Force; 10th Brigade; Lahore Division; Northumberland Division; a Mixed Force; 28th Division.

APRIL 26TH.—There was little fighting about the line held by the 13th Brigade and the Mixed Force, and this latter force was withdrawn during the day. After a retirement of the troops about Fortuin, the Lahore and Northumberland Divisions made a fresh attack on St. Julien at 10.15 a.m. At the same time the French attacked Lizaire and Het Sas, capturing both places. The attack on St. Julien, however, made little progress, chiefly owing to the use of asphyxiating gas, and the British losses were very heavy. There was much fighting about Grafenstafel and Broodseinde; at the latter place the line was slightly withdrawn.

By the evening the British line ran:—

13th Brigade—from Pilkem to Ypres road—Shelltrap Farm.

10th Brigade—Shelltrap Farm—Fortuin.

Northumberland Division—Fortuin—near Grafenstafel.

28th Division—Grafenstafel—south-east of Polygon Wood.

27th Division—as before.

The Lahore Division was withdrawn during the evening.

APRIL 27TH—28TH.—There was a good deal of fighting all along the line, but little progress was made. In the evening of the 28th the British Commander-in-Chief decided to retire a part of the force and take up a new front.

APRIL 29TH—30TH.—The British Commander-in-Chief met General Foch and arranged to defer the British movement until the result of the French attack on April 30th was known. During the evening of the latter day the 12th Brigade took over the position held by the 13th Brigade.

MAY 1ST.—As the French attack made little progress, the British retirement was at 1 p.m. ordered to commence during the evening of May 2nd, 1915. While the British retirement was in progress, heavy attacks with gas were made against the line south of St. Julien, and the front south of Fortuin—Grafenstafel. At first some trenches were lost, but on the arrival of the supports (including two brigades of a cavalry division) they were regained.

MAY 3RD.—The retirement continued; much heavy fighting about Grafenstafel.

MAY 4TH.—By early morning the British retirement had been completed. The new line ran:—

4th Division—Ypres to Langemarck road—Ypres to Fortuin road.

28th Division—Ypres to Fortuin road—Frezenberg—east of Hooge—north of Hill 60.

5th Division—as before.

During this day the enemy shelled the evacuated trenches heavily, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied.

MAY 5TH—7TH.—The Germans made numerous gas attacks all along the line; they were, however, repulsed with considerable loss in every case.

MAY 8TH.—At 7 a.m. a violent bombardment of the whole line occupied by the Vth Corps (27th and 28th Divisions) commenced. This was followed by a heavy infantry attack, and by 10.15 a.m. the east part of the line was broken in several places. At 12.25 p.m. parts of another brigade had to retire, but the arrival of reinforcements for the whole front prevented much ground being lost. At 3.30 p.m. vigorous counter-attacks were made against Frezenberg and towards Wieltje, the former at first gaining the village (though afterwards driven back); the latter consolidating a slightly advanced position.

In the evening the Commander-in-Chief ordered two cavalry divisions and a Territorial division to move up to the Vth Corps area.

At night the positions were:—

28th Division—as before, but centre east of Verlorenhoek.

MAY 9TH.—Heavy fighting all along the line, especially about Hooge.

MAY 10TH.—Further heavy fighting about Hooge. A German gas attack was repulsed.

MAY 11TH.—During the morning the enemy attacked in force to the north of Hooge; they were, however, repulsed with heavy loss. A second attack at 4.15 p.m. also failed. A third attack at first succeeded, but later on the enemy were driven out of the trenches they had gained.

MAY 12TH.—Except for a heavy bombardment in the early morning, there was little fighting. In the evening the positions were:—

1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions—in place of the 28th Division.

28th Division—in Army Reserve.

The 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, with the artillery and Royal Engineers of the 28th Division were now designated the Cavalry Force.

MAY 13TH.—The general front of the Cavalry Force was now:—

1st Division: 1st and 2nd Brigades—Verlorenhoek to Ypres—Roulers railway; 9th Brigade—in reserve.

2nd Division: 6th and 7th Brigades—railway to Lake Bellewaarde; 8th Brigade—in reserve.

At 4.30 a.m. a very heavy bombardment of the Cavalry Corps front commenced and continued all day. At first the 2nd Brigade came in for the worst attacks, but at 7.45 a.m. 3rd Division (6th Brigade) was very heavily attacked, and forced back some 800 yards. The general line was, however, held.

At 2.30 p.m. a vigorous counter-attack was carried out by the 7th and 8th Brigades. This was at first successful, but later on, owing to the heavy fire, a retirement had to be made, and the new line in this neighbourhood was a slightly curved one, between Verlorenhoek and Lake Bellewaarde.

During the day the 12th and 11th Infantry Brigades had heavy fighting, but they maintained their original front.

In the evening the 3rd Cavalry Division was sent to the Reserve and its place taken by the 2nd Cavalry Division.

MAY 14TH—23RD.—There was general fighting all along the British front. On the 15th the French captured Steenstraet and Het Sas, while on the 16th they forced the enemy to retire across the canal.

MAY 24TH.—In the early morning the enemy made a heavy gas attack about Shelltrap Farm, along the Roulers railway, and about the Lake Bellewaarde. At first some ground was lost, but eventually the original positions were regained, except about Shelltrap farm and Lake Bellewaarde.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST ARMY.

MAY 9TH.—The French were now conducting important operations north of Arras, and the British Commander-in-Chief arranged to co-operate with them. The general idea of the British movements was to

(a) Assist the French.

(b) Prevent German reinforcements being sent south to the Lens area.

(c) Capture Aubers and other districts to the east and thus threaten Lille and La Bassée.

The general plan of the attack was:—

Main attack—8th Division, from Rouges Bancs on Fromelles and the north of Aubers ridge.

Right attack—1st Division and Indian Corps, from about Neuve Chapelle on the southern end of the Aubers ridge.

At 5 a.m. the enemy's positions were bombarded, and by 5.30 a.m. the 8th Division captured some trenches east of Rouges Bancs, but later, owing to the heavy fire, the troops had to retire. The 1st and Indian Corps also attacked, but could make little progress. On the evening of this day the British Commander-in-Chief decided to concentrate all his efforts on the southern section of the line. The 7th Division was now placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding First Army.

MAY 10TH.—Preparations for the new attack were continued: there was much fighting all along the line. It was intended that the new attack should be made on May 12th, 1915, but owing to bad weather it was postponed to May 15th, 1915.

MAY 15TH.—The Canadian Division was placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding First Army.

The general plan of the new attack was:—

(a) Indian Division and 2nd Division to attack enemy's trenches running from Richebourg l'Avoué in a south-westerly direction.

(b) 7th Division: 20th Brigade, from Rue du Bois south-east; 22nd Brigade, via south-east of Festubert against Rue d'Ouvert.

By daybreak the 2nd Division had occupied some of the German trenches, but the Indian Corps had not advanced far. The 7th Division attacked at 7 a.m. and reached a position to the north-west of La Quinke Rue. As no progress appeared to be possible about Richebourg l'Avoué the General Officer Commanding 1st Division decided to suspend operations in that neighbourhood, and the rest of the day was spent in consolidating the front.

MAY 16TH.—There was heavy fighting all along the line.

MAY 17TH.—Fighting was resumed at daybreak. By 11 a.m. the 7th Division had captured more trenches and was directed to advance on Rue d'Ouvert via Chapelle St. Roch. The 2nd Division was ordered to push on to Rue du Marais and Violaines when circumstances permitted. By nightfall the 2nd and 7th Divisions had made good progress. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the 51st Division to move on Estaires and support the First Army.

MAY 18TH.—The weather was bad; there was general fighting all along the line, and by nightfall the front was advanced to the La Quinke Rue—Bethune road.

MAY 19TH.—The 2nd and 7th Divisions were sent to the Reserve; the 51st Division and Canadian Division relieving them. The two latter divisions, with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, were then placed under Lieut.-General Alderson, who now conducted the operations hitherto carried on by the General Officer Commanding First Army.

MAY 20TH.—A post to the west of La Quinke Rue was captured.

MAY 21ST.—The Canadian Division pushed forward some 400 yards.

MAY 22ND.—The 51st Division was transferred to the Indian Corps, which then continued the operations about La Quinke Rue. The Canadian Division was employed to the south of that place. The latter extended their line considerably.

MAY 24TH—25TH.—The 47th Division did good service.

MAY 26TH.—The Commander-in-Chief decided to close the battle as he had gained for the moment the objects he had in view.

SECTION XLVII.

The Western Campaign from June 1st to October 16th, 1915.

(British Forces).

JUNE 1ST.—About this date the front of the Second British Army was extended to the north to the village of Boesinghe.

JUNE 2ND.—The enemy made a strong attack against the Hooge position, but were repulsed after severe fighting.

JUNE 15TH.—The 1st Canadian Brigade captured some trenches to north and north-east of Givenchy, but was unable to hold them.

JUNE 16TH.—The Vth Corps carried out an attack on the Bellewaarde Ridge, and made considerable progress towards the Bellewaarde Lake. Holding attacks were made at the same time by the neighbouring IInd and Vth Corps.

JULY 6TH.—A small but successful attack was carried out by the 11th Brigade against a German salient trench between Boesinghe and Ypres.

JULY 10TH—12TH.—Considerable fighting all along the line

JULY 19TH.—A German redoubt at the west end of the Hooge position was mined and destroyed.

JULY 29TH.—The general British line was now as follows:—

Second Army.

Vth Corps (Ypres Salient).

49th Division (Territorials)—Boesinghe to the Ypres—St. Julien road.

6th Division—Ypres—St. Julien road to Roulers railway.

14th Division (New Army)—Roulers railway to Sanctuary Wood.

Ind Corps.

3rd Division—Sanctuary Wood—St. Eloi.

JULY 30TH.—The Germans used liquid burning devices for the first time (against the Rules of the Hague Convention). The enemy, assisted by burning liquid fire, made a successful attack south of Hooge. At the same time a German attack west of Lake Bellewaarde was repulsed.

JULY 31ST.—The British made a counter-attack south of Hooge village at 2.45 p.m., but the force was not strong enough to make any further advance.

AUG. 9TH.—New dispositions were now made:—

(a) 3rd Division took over 6th Division front.

(b) 16th and 18th Brigades of 6th Division relieved 41st and 43rd Brigades of 14th Division about Hooge.

It was decided to make a counter-attack, and the 16th and 18th Brigades were detailed for this purpose. The brigades advanced against the front north-west of Hooge—east of Sanctuary Wood, and after very severe fighting, captured the German position, the losses under the circumstances being small.

AUG. 10TH—SEPT. 24TH.—Minor fighting all along the line.

SEPT. 25TH.—The general arrangement of the different forces at this time was as follows:—

Allies.

In supreme command—General Joffre.

Northern group of armies (General Foch).

Hely D'Orisel, Belgian Army, French Army; Plumer, Second British Army; Haig, First British Army; D'Urbal, Tenth French Army; Monro, Third British Army; Dubois, ? French Army—Nieuport—east of Ypres—west of Lens—east of Arras—east of Albert—Noyon.

Central group of armies (General de Castelnau).

D'Esperey, Fifth French Army; L'Angle de Cary, Fourth French Army—Noyon—Rheims—Verdun; Petain, ? French Army—Reserve.

Southern Group of Armies (General Dubail).

No details: Verdun—Belfort.

Forces of the Central Powers.

Army of the Duke of Württemberg—Nieuport—Armentières.

Army of Crown Prince of Bavaria—Armentières—Arras.

Army of General Von Buelow—Arras—Noyon.

Army of General Von Fabeck—Noyon to River Aisne.

Army of General Von Heeringen—River Aisne to Auberive.

Army of General Von Einem—Auberive to Ville-sur-Tourbe.

Army of Crown Prince of Prussia—Ville-sur-Tourbe—south of Verdun.

Army of General Von Strautz, Army of General Von Garde, Army of General Von Falkenhausen—south of Verdun—Belfort.

It was decided now that the Allies should make an advance, the general plan being as follows:—

A.—*Main attack*—by General de Castelnau's group of armies. Chief object to break up the German lines of communication in the area Noyon—Laon—Mézières—Verdun.

B.—*Secondary attack*—by General Foch's group of armies. Chief object to gain the area Lille—Douai—Valenciennes.

It was considered that if these two operations were successful the enemy would have to retire from the central area Hirson—Laon—Douai—Valenciennes, and that the Allies would consequently gain the district Verdun—Noyon—Douai—Valenciennes—Hirson—Mézières.

THE ATTACK BY GENERAL FOCH'S GROUP OF ARMIES.

The general plan of operations for this attack was as follows:—

Tenth French Army (D'Urbal)—to capture the Vimy Hills to the south of Lens, and move on Douai from the south and west.

First British Army (Haig)—to capture the La Bassée—Haisnes—Hulloch—Loos position and move on Douai from the north and north-west. One brigade of the 2nd Division was, however, detailed to operate to the north of the canal against the railway triangle. (See below.)

Second British Army (Plumer)—to operate as follows:—

Vth Corps—towards Hooge.

IIIrd Corps—from Bois Grenier, south towards Les Brideaux.

Indian Corps—from Neuve Chapelle towards Moulin-de-Pietre.

THE ATTACK BY THE FIRST BRITISH ARMY.

The British Forces.

These were:—

First Army (Haig).

Ist Corps (Gough): 2nd Division—Givenchy to west of Auchy; 9th Division—west of Auchy; 7th Division—Fontaine des Mortchons.

IInd Corps (Rawlinson): 1st Division—Corons de Ratoire; 15th Division—Fosse No. 3, south of Vermelles; 47th Division (T.)—east of Grenay.

3rd Cavalry Division—reserve in rear of IVth Corps.

N.B.—The reserves under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief were:—

XIth Corps: Guards Division—Lilliers; 21st Division (New Army), 24th Division (New Army)—Boeuvry—Noeux les Nuire.

IInd Corps: 28th Division—Bailleul.

Cavalry Corps—St. Pol and Bailleul les Pernes; Indian Cavalry Corps—Doullens.

THE GERMAN POSITION.

This was as follows:—

First line—Auchy—Fosse No. 8—Hohenzollern Redoubt—Le Rutoire—Fosse No. 7—Fosse No. 5.

Second line—on canal north-east of Auchy—Quarries east side of Hill 69—west of Loos—west of Fosse No. 9.

Third line—south of La Bassée—west of Haisnes—Cité St. Elie—Hulloch—Cité St. Auguste—Lens.

The whole position was very strongly entrenched.

HOUR FOR ATTACK.

As the British force was to use gas, while the French had settled not to do so, arrangements had to be made to suit the requirements of both armies. Finally it was decided to commence

French attack—12.25 p.m., September 25th, 1915.

British attack—6.30 a.m.

THE BRITISH ATTACK.

5.50 A.M.—At 5.50 a.m. a heavy discharge of gas and smoke commenced and lasted for forty minutes. As a whole the result of this manœuvre was successful, but the wind unfavourably affected some parts of the British line, and to a certain extent the movement started at a disadvantage.

6.30 A.M.—The infantry attack commenced at this hour.

2nd Division.

The division (less one brigade) advanced against the line Canal—Auchy, but made little progress, chiefly owing to the fact that the prevailing wind was unsuitable for the use of gas, the gas cloud tending to drift along the line occupied by

the two brigades. There was heavy fighting all along the line, but the advance was checked by the heavy fire of the enemy, and no progress was made. In the afternoon three of the reserve battalions were moved south to assist the 7th Division. By the evening the position was much the same as that held in the morning.

9th Division.

The division advanced against the Madagascar Trench—Fosse No. 8—Hohenzollern Redoubt position, and made considerable progress. The 28th Brigade on the left succeeded in getting into the north end of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but as a whole the general front was not much advanced. The 26th Brigade (right) carried the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse No. 8 and pushed as far as the Three Cabarets to the north of the latter; but no further progress could be made. The reserve battalions of this brigade, however, passed through the Corons, and eventually succeeded, by 8 a.m., in gaining a point some 800 yards west of Haisnes. Here they were checked, and when at about 11 a.m. the 27th Reserve Brigade came up, further progress was, owing to the arrival of heavy German reinforcements, impossible. This 27th Brigade had many difficulties to overcome in its advance, and it was nearly 9 a.m. before it could cross the main German trenches south-west of Haisnes. Later, a further advance on Haisnes took place, but the ground could not be maintained, and the troops accordingly consolidated their new position.

By 12 noon the general front of the 9th Division was: west of Auchy—east of Fosse No. 8—east of Hohenzollern Redoubt, and this position was held throughout the day.

7th Division.

The division advanced to the attack against the Cité St. Elie—Hulloch position; 22nd Brigade on the left, 20th Brigade on the right, 21st Brigade in reserve. The 22nd Brigade, after severe fighting, captured the Quarries, and some of the troops even succeeded in reaching St. Elie, but this position could not be maintained, and eventually a front from the right of the 9th Division, north-west of St. Elie, was taken up. The 20th Brigade carried the German trenches opposite to it by 7.30 a.m., and continued its advance to a point a little west of Hulloch, where it was eventually joined by the 21st Reserve Brigade (part of). By 12 noon the division was on a line from right of 9th Division—Quarries—west of Cité St. Elie—west of Hulloch. During the day the division captured nine field guns, and by the evening still held the front gained at 12 noon.

1st Division.

The division attacked, 1st Brigade on the left, 2nd Brigade on the right, 3rd Brigade in reserve, the objective being the village of Hulloch. The 1st Brigade got close up to the village by about 10 a.m., but the 2nd Brigade could not at first get further than the enemy's first line of trenches, about a point called Lone Pine, where it remained till about 5 p.m. The advance of the 15th Division on the right later on, however, enabled the 3rd Brigade to be brought up from the reserve, and by 6 p.m. the Lone Pine position was captured. The division was finally halted on a front running north and south, about 600 yards from Hulloch.

15th Division.

The division advanced, 44th Brigade on right, 46th Brigade on the left, and 45th Brigade in reserve, on Loos, Hill 70, and Cité St. Auguste, under a very heavy fire, and captured the German front line almost at once. The 44th Brigade took Loos at 7.40 a.m.; the 46th Brigade occupied the ground to the north at the same hour, and by 8.30 a.m. the division was in possession of the village. The advance of the leading brigades on Hill 70 was now continued, and by 9 a.m. the position was captured. The 44th Brigade at once moved forward, but unfortunately lost its direction and speedily found itself in front of the strong position

of Cité St. Laurent, just north of Lens, where it was impossible to make any further advance. The 46th Brigade, after severe fighting, reached Puits 14 bis and north of Hill 70 by 9 a.m., and eventually came up on the left of the 44th Brigade between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. As it was found impossible to advance, the 44th Brigade rallied on the east slope of Hill 70, and took up a good defensive position there; it was heavily attacked, but managed to hold most of the line. The 46th Brigade had also to retire, and by 1 p.m., when a heavy German attack commenced, was on a front north and south through Puits 14 bis. By the evening the 15th Division held the line, south of Grenay—south-east of Loos—west slope of Hill 70—Puits 14 bis.

47th Division.

The division advanced in accordance with its instructions, which were to capture the German trenches in front of them, and then face to a flank (south and east) and cover the advance of the 15th Division. By 7 a.m. Double Crassiers had been taken. Pushing on, the south edge of Loos village was passed; and by 8 a.m. the desired position, south of Grenay—south of Double Crassier—south-east of Loos—to right of 15th Division, was reached.

GENERAL BATTLE FRONT ON EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 25TH, 1915.

This was: west of Auchy—Fosse No. 8—Hohenzollern Redoubt—west of Cité St. Elie—the Quarries—west of Hulloch—west of Hill 70—south-east of Loos—south of Grenay.

SEPT. 26TH.—The 21st and 24th Divisions were brought up to relieve the 1st and 15th Divisions.

The Germans made a heavy attack on the Quarries; in the early morning the 7th Division had to fall back, but in the afternoon the ground lost was regained. The 24th Division made a vigorous attack between Hulloch and the Chalk Pit north of Loos, but the advance could not be continued, and the division fell back on its original line. The 21st Division was heavily attacked during the afternoon and had to retire slightly. By nightfall the general front was much the same, except for a small gain south of Loos, and a new line west of Hill 70—north-west to Loos and La Bassée road—1,000 yards along the road—north-east to west end of Hulloch.

SEPT. 27TH.—The 6th Cavalry Brigade, of 3rd Cavalry Division, was sent to hold Loos.

The 9th Division at Fosse No. 8 was vigorously attacked at dawn, and was slightly pressed back.

28th Division was brought up to assist the 9th Division. At 4 p.m. the Guards Division made an attack to recover the ground between Hulloch and Loos lost the previous day. The 2nd Brigade was to the north of Loos, the 1st in front of Hulloch, the 3rd Brigade in reserve west of Loos. The orders for the attack were:

1st Brigade—to advance and bring their front parallel to Lens to La Bassée road.

2nd Brigade—to occupy the Chalk Pit and Puits 14 bis.

3rd Brigade—to advance via Loos on Hill 70 as soon as the 2nd Brigade succeeded in its task.

The 1st Brigade advanced and occupied the desired position with little loss. The 2nd Brigade reached the Chalk Pit after severe fighting, but could make little progress in Puits 14 bis. The 3rd Brigade succeeded in gaining and holding the west slope of Hill 70.

The 47th Division had severe fighting throughout this day and gained a little ground.

SEPT. 28TH.—The 2nd Guards Brigade assaulted Puits 14 bis at 3.45 p.m., and at first gained some ground, but had to retire later to its original position. The 47th Division gained a little more ground.

SEPT. 29TH—30TH.—General fighting all along the line. The front on the evening of 30th September, 1915, was: west of Auchy—west of Fosse No. 8—Hohenzollern Redoubt—the Quarries—south-east to Lens to La Bassée road—along the road—Chalk Pit—west slope of Hill 70—south and east of Loos—south of Double Crassier—south of Grenay.

The French IXth Corps took over Loos and the part of the British line between Grenay and the north-west slope of Hill 70.

The 47th Division and 12th Division (N.A.) took up the positions originally occupied by the 15th and 1st Divisions, but in the evening the former was sent to the reserve. The 28th Division was sent to support the 1st Corps, and the Guards Division occupied the front about the Hohenzollern Redoubt. The 46th Division (T.) was directed to join the Guards and 12th Division and form the XIth Corps.

OCT. 1ST TO 7TH.—There was general fighting all along the line. On October 2nd the Germans made two vigorous attacks, one on the line Quarries—Cité St. Elie—Vermelles to Hulloch road, and another against the Hohenzollern Redoubt. The former was repulsed, but the latter was successful, as the enemy gained nearly the whole of the redoubt.

During this period the British gained a good deal of ground between Hulloch and Loos from time to time.

OCT. 8TH.—The British force was disposed as follows:—

1st Division—chalk pit to trenches opposite Hulloch.

12th Division—on to the quarries.

Guards Division—quarries to Hohenzollern Redoubt.

7th Division—continuing the line to the north.

After a vigorous bombardment lasting from 10.30 a.m. till 4 p.m., the Germans commenced heavy attacks on Chalk Pit Wood and the position held by the Guards Division. The fighting was very severe throughout the front, but the enemy made little progress and retired to their original positions late in the evening.

OCT. 9TH—12TH.—Fighting all along the line. British prepare for a new attack. On October 11th, 1915, the 2nd Division relieved the left of the Guards and the right of the 7th Division.

OCT. 13TH.—The general plan of the British attack was as follows:—

1st Division.

3rd Brigade—to demonstrate to south of Hulloch and cover attack of 1st Brigade.

1st Brigade—to attack German trenches west of Hulloch.

12th Division—to attack Gun Trench and the quarries.

46th Division (T.)—to attack the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

2nd Division—to co-operate in the attack of the 46th Division.

1st Division.

The advance was at first successful, the 1st Brigade getting up to the enemy's position. The new line, however, could not be held, and eventually, although there was a small gain on the right, little progress was made.

12th Division.

The division attacked vigorously. Gun Trench was captured and held against numerous counter-attacks. On the left the advance was at first successful, but eventually the ground gained had to be given up. The quarries attack gained a great deal of ground and the troops there consolidated their positions.

46th Division.

The general plan of this attack was:—

137th Brigade—to attack the Fosse No. 8 and redoubt from east end of Big Willie (southern communication trench of the redoubt).

138th Brigade—to attack the redoubt and then move on Fosse No. 8.

Staffordshire Brigade—to attack Dump Trench and Fosse No. 8.

A preliminary artillery bombardment and gas discharge was to commence at 1.30 p.m. The infantry to advance at 2 p.m.

THE ATTACK.

The main trench of the redoubt, which had been dug across the chord, was carried at once, but further progress was difficult. The Staffordshire Brigade suffered very severely, but gained a little ground on the right. Meanwhile very heavy fighting went on in the redoubt and to the north of it; at 4 p.m. there was a determined German counter-attack, but this was finally checked. Fighting continued all night.

OCT. 14TH.—At 4 a.m. the enemy was dislodged from the eastern corner of the redoubt and a further German attack was repulsed. A little later the Notts and Derby Brigade took over the position of the 137th and 138th Brigades.

OCT. 15TH—16TH.—The 2nd Guards Brigade relieved the Notts and Derby Brigade, a serious German counter-attack being repulsed while the relief was in progress.

THE ATTACKS BY THE SECOND BRITISH ARMY.

As explained above these were supporting attacks made with the idea of distracting the enemy's attention from the main attack by the First British Army.

THE ATTACK FROM NORTH AND SOUTH OF GIVENCHY.

This attack consisted of two columns:—

A.—5th Brigade of 2nd Division—to attack from Givenchy, three battalions south of canal, one battalion north of canal.

B.—Two battalions of 19th Division to attack north of the 5th Brigade.

5th Brigade.

SEPT. 25TH.—The attack commenced at 6 a.m., and at first was very successful. The German front line trenches were captured and some further advance made. The positions gained could not, however, be held, and by 9.30 a.m. the troops were back again in their original lines.

19th Division.

SEPT. 25TH.—This attack was commenced at 6.30 a.m., the objective being the enemy trenches in front of Chapelle St. Roch. Owing to heavy enfilading fire little progress was made and the troops returned to their original front.

THE ATTACK ON LES BRIDEAUX.

This attack was arranged as follows:—

A.—Three battalions of 25th Brigade, 8th Division, to attack the German lines Corner Fort—Les Brideaux Fort.

B.—One battalion (25th Brigade) to act as reserve.

THE ATTACK.

SEPT. 25TH.—The advance commenced at 4.30 a.m., and by 6 a.m. the enemy's trenches were taken. The work of consolidation of the new position commenced at once, but the heavy counter-attacks compelled a retreat at 1 p.m., and by 4 p.m. the troops were in their original position, except at one point where a new trench had been made across a re-entrant of the old front.

THE ATTACK ON MOULIN DE PIETRE.

In this part of the front the general British dispositions were :—

20th Division (Indian Corps).

Meerut Division : Bareilly Brigade, Gharwal Brigade—from Fauquissart to north-east of Neuve Chapelle.

Dehra Dun brigade—reserve.

Lahore Division : Ferozepore Brigade, Jullundur Brigade—north-east of Neuve Chapelle to Festubert.

Sirhind Brigade—reserve.

19th Division (N.A.) (?) Brigade—about Festubert.

The general plan of attack was :—

A.—Main attack by Meerut Division—to move on Moulin de Pietre, and, if possible, on the Aubers Ridge.

B.—Supporting attack by Lahore Division.

C.—The 19th and 20th Divisions to protect the flanks as required.

Meerut Division.

The Bareilly Brigade on the left made a very successful advance, capturing the enemy's first line trenches almost immediately, and then moving on against the second line trenches and Moulin de Pietre. The Gharwal Brigade on the right, however, had many difficulties to contend with and only advanced slowly. As a result of these movements, a dangerous salient was formed in the British line and no further progress could be made. The Germans soon brought up large reinforcements and the fighting was very severe. The Dehra Dun Brigade found its advance much impeded by the bad weather and the crowded state of the communication trenches, and the general position was now critical. Eventually the troops were drawn off and retired to their original positions.

Lahore Division.

This division advanced with the Meerut Division but could make little progress, and eventually retired to its original front.

19th and 20th Divisions.

These divisions were frequently attacked by the Germans and were unable to make much progress.

THE HOOGE ATTACKS.

The general British position was :—

Vth Corps (14th Division—lent by Vth Corps, 3rd Division) : Ypres—Roulers railway, along the Bellewaarde ridge, Château de Hooze—to a point 400 yards south of the Ypres—Menin road.

SEPT. 25TH.—The 14th Division was to attack the Bellewaarde Farm position, while the 3rd Division was to move against the north of Sanctuary Wood. Hour of attack, 4.30 a.m.

The Attack.

The advance commenced at 4.30 a.m., just after a mine had been exploded. The 14th Division soon captured the Bellewaarde Farm position, and the 3rd Division gained some 600 yards of ground. The Germans then made a counter-attack on the Railway Wood and, after very severe fighting, the British left was forced back. South-east of the Bellewaarde Lake some advance was made, but the progress was small. In the southern section there was heavy fighting all the morning, but in the afternoon the 3rd Division had to retire. By the evening all the troops were back in their original positions.

APPENDIX XV.

*Despatch from the**General Officer Commanding the Indian Expeditionary Force "D."*

General Headquarters, I.E.F. "D," January 17th, 1916.

From General Sir John Nixon, K.C.B., A.D.C., General, Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a report on the operations in Mesopotamia during the months of October, November, and December, 1915.

2. In my last despatch I described events up to October 5th. On that date the Turkish Army under Nur-Ed-Din, which had been defeated at Kut-el-Amara, had reached a previously-prepared position astride the Tigris at Ctesiphon, where it received reinforcements; and our advanced troops under Major-General Townshend reached Aziziyah (thirty miles east of Ctesiphon).

3. During the next six weeks reinforcements, supplies, and transport animals were brought up to Kut and Aziziyah preparatory to a further advance up the Tigris. These preliminary movements were inevitably slow on account of the difficulties of navigation during the low water season, which delayed the passage of shipping.

4. Throughout this period of preparation frequent skirmishes took place with the enemy, who had pushed out advanced detachments to Zeur and Kutunie, seven and fourteen miles respectively above Aziziyah.

5. The cavalry brigade and one infantry brigade advanced from Aziziyah on November 11th, and occupied Kutunie without opposition.

On November 18th General Townshend had concentrated the whole of his force and the shipping at Kutunie.

6. On November 19th the advance was continued, moving up both banks of the river and Zeur was occupied. The enemy's advanced troops withdrew towards Ctesiphon after offering slight opposition. On November 20th the force on the left bank reached Lajj (nine miles from Ctesiphon); the shipping and the right bank detachment arrived on the 21st, the latter crossing the river and joining the main body on the left bank.

7. The Turkish position at Ctesiphon lay astride the Tigris, covering the approach to Baghdad, which is situated some eighteen miles to the north-west. The defences had been under construction for some months. They consisted of an extensive system of entrenchments forming two main positions. On the right bank the front position extended from the river for about three miles in a south-westerly direction; the second line trenches lying some five miles further upstream. On the left bank a continuous line of entrenchments and redoubts stretched from the river for six miles to the north-east; the left flank terminating in a large redoubt. On this bank the second line was about two miles behind the front position and parallel to it for three miles from the Tigris, thence it turned northwards to the Dialah River. Close to the Tigris, on the left bank and midway between the two defensive lines, was situated the Arch of Ctesiphon—a prominent landmark.

A mile in rear of the second line of trenches a bridge of boats connected the two wings of the Turkish Army. Further in rear, the Dialah River, near its junction with the Tigris, was bridged at two points, and entrenchments commanded the crossings.

During General Townshend's concentration at Aziziyah accurate information had been obtained by aerial observation regarding the position of the Turkish defences.

8. The officers employed on these reconnaissances displayed the same intrepidity and devotion to duty that has been commented on in previous despatches. Unfortunately during the actual period of the battle at Ctesiphon a series of accidents deprived the Royal Flying Corps of several officers and machines. Among those forced to descend within the enemy's lines was Major H. L. Reilly, a Flight Commander of exceptional ability, who has much distinguished service to his credit.

9. It was reported that the enemy had over 13,000 regular troops and thirty-eight guns in the Ctesiphon position. There were reports of the early arrival of further reinforcements. Though information on this point was indefinite and lacked confirmation, it was advisable that there should be no delay in attacking and defeating Nur-Ed-Din before the arrival of possible reinforcements.

10. General Townshend, after a night march from Lajj, on November 21st-22nd attacked the hostile position on the left bank at the centre and on the north-east flank. A severe fight lasted throughout the day, resulting in the capture of the front position, and more than 1,300 prisoners.

Our troops pressed on and penetrated to the second line, capturing eight guns and establishing themselves in the enemy's trenches. Here they were subjected to heavy counter-attacks by fresh troops. The captured guns changed hands several times. Finally they had to be abandoned, as shortly before nightfall it was found necessary, owing to diminished numbers, to order the withdrawal of our troops from the forward positions to which they had penetrated back to the first position.

11. On November 23rd our troops were reorganized in the position they had captured, and the work of collecting the numerous casualties was continued.

Owing to heavy losses in killed and wounded it was inadvisable to renew the offensive.

There is no doubt that the Turkish troops who had fought on the previous day were in no condition to resume the fight. The battlefield was littered with their killed and wounded, and many of the trenches were choked with dead. The 45th Turkish Division which had held the front trenches was practically destroyed. But reinforcements came up, and heavy attacks were made all along General Townshend's line throughout the night November 23rd-24th. These were repulsed, and the enemy must have lost heavily.

12. On November 24th wounded and prisoners were evacuated from Ctesiphon to Lajj, where the shipping flotilla was banked in; and General Townshend consolidated the position he had taken up on the battlefield. His left flank, which had been near the Ctesiphon Arch, in advance of the main position, moved back into the general alignment. Owing to the interruption of a water channel which had supplied the trenches on the north-east flank our troops there suffered from want of water; so the right flank was brought nearer the river. This movement was successfully effected under the cover of an offensive movement pushed out from the centre of the position. The enemy displayed little activity throughout this day, except for shell fire. Most of this came from guns on the right bank, which prevented the steamers advancing upstream from Lajj.

13. On November 25th the remainder of the wounded were sent back to Lajj. Up to this time it appeared from hostile movements to their rear—reported by air reconnaissance—that the Turks contemplated a retirement from their remaining positions. But apparently they received fresh reinforcements on the 25th. During the afternoon large columns were seen advancing down the left bank and also inland, as if to turn our right flank; while hostile cavalry threatened our rear.

14. General Townshend was nine miles from his shipping and source of supplies at Lajj, faced by superior forces of fresh troops. He decided to avoid an engagement, and, under cover of night, withdrew to Lajj.

Here he remained during the 26th.

15. A position so far from bases of supply, with a vulnerable line of communication along the winding shallow river was unfavourable for defence. It was necessary to withdraw further downstream to a more secure locality until conditions might enable a resumption of the offensive.

16. General Townshend withdrew unmolested during the night of 27th-28th to Aziziyah.

On the 29th the cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Roberts, east of Kutunie engaged and drove back the enemy's advanced mounted troops who were attacking a stranded gunboat. The 14th Hussars and the 7th (Hariana) Lancers made a successful charge. Some 140 casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

17. On the morning of 30th, continuing the retirement, the main force halted at Umm Al Tubal; a mixed brigade under Major-General Sir C. Mellis pushing on towards Kut to deal with hostile mounted troops which had interrupted the passage of steamers at Chubibat about twenty-five miles below Kut.

18. The troops had to remain at Umm Al Tubal as the ships were in difficulties in shoal water in this vicinity and the enemy's whole force came up during the night. They attacked in great strength at daylight on December 1st.

A fierce fight ensued, the Turks losing heavily from our artillery fire at a range of 2,500 yards. General Townshend took advantage of a successful counter-attack made by the cavalry brigade against a column which attempted to envelop his right flank, to break off the fight and retire by echelons of brigades. This was carried out in perfect order under a heavy shell fire, and by mid-day the enemy had been shaken off. General Townshend reports that it was entirely due to the splendid steadiness of the troops and to the excellence of his brigadiers that he was able to repulse the enemy's determined attacks and extricate his force from the difficult situation in which it was placed.

The mixed brigade, commanded by General Mellis, consisting of:—

30th Infantry Brigade,

1/5th Hants (Howitzer) Battery R.F.A., and the 16th Cavalry,

which had been despatched to Chubibat on the morning of November 30th, was recalled on the night of November 30th-December 1st. This brigade marched eighty miles in three days, including the battle of December 1st. At the end of it their valour and discipline were in no way diminished and their losses did not include a single prisoner.

19. After a march of thirty miles, Shadi was reached on the night of December 1st-2nd, and on the morning of December 3rd General Townshend was installed at Kut-el-Amara, where, it was decided, his retirement should end.

20. The naval flotilla on the Tigris operated on the left flank of the troops throughout the operations that have been described.

From November 22nd to November 25th the gunboats from positions below Bustan (two miles east of Ctesiphon) were engaged against hostile artillery, particularly against concealed guns on the right bank which prevented ships from moving above Bustan.

21. During the retreat from Ctesiphon to Kut the gunboats under Captain Nunn, D.S.O., Senior Naval Officer, rendered valuable services in protecting the steamers and barges and in assisting when they grounded. The naval gunboats were employed at this work day and night, frequently under fire from snipers on both banks.

Owing to numerous loops and twists in the course of the river, it was impossible for the flotilla to remain in touch with the troops during the retirement.

22. On the evening of November 28th, "Shaitan" went aground about eight miles above Aziziyah and could not be refloated. Throughout November 29th, "Firefly" and "Shushan" salved "Shaitan's" guns and stores under heavy sniping from both banks, until the situation was relieved in the afternoon by the action of the cavalry brigade which has already been referred to.

The hull of "Shaitan" eventually had to be abandoned, as the Turks opened fire with guns on the ships which had remained behind.

23. On the occasion of the Turkish attack on the morning of December 1st, at Umm Al Tubal, "Firefly" and "Comet" made good practice with lyddite at a large body of Turks at a range of 3,000 yards. The ships came under a heavy and accurate shell fire, and, at 7 a.m., a shell penetrated the boiler of "Firefly," disabling her. H.M.S. "Comet" (Captain Nunn) took "Firefly" in tow, and in endeavouring to turn in the narrow river, both ships took the ground. "Firefly" was got clear and sent drifting downstream; but "Comet" would not move from the bank, against which she had been wedged by "Firefly."

24. "Sumana" came up and made several unsuccessful attempts to drag "Comet" off the bank. The enemy's fire increased in intensity; they brought up several field guns to short range; the ships were surrounded by Turkish troops and fired on at a range of fifty yards. "Comet" and "Firefly" were badly damaged and on fire. They were abandoned after the guns had been rendered useless and the crews were taken on board "Sumana," which succeeded in effecting her escape.

Subsequently "Sumana" did most valuable work in salving shipping which had got into difficulties further downstream.

25. Throughout these operations Captain Nunn, Lieutenant Eddis, who was wounded, and all officers and men of the naval flotilla behaved with great coolness and bravery under most trying circumstances.

26. The valour of the troops who fought under General Townshend at the battle of Ctesiphon is beyond praise. The 6th Division exhibited the same dauntless courage and self-sacrifice in the attack that has distinguished it throughout the campaign in Mesopotamia.

The dash with which the Indian troops (enlisted from all parts of India) have attacked a stubborn foe in well-entrenched positions, I attribute largely to the confidence with which they have been inspired by the British battalions of the force.

When forced by greatly superior numbers to act on the defensive, and during the retreat to Kut, under the most trying conditions, the troops responded to the calls made on them with admirable discipline and steadiness.

They proved themselves to be soldiers of the finest quality.

27. These fine troops were most ably commanded by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O. I have a very high opinion indeed of this officer's capabilities as a commander of troops in the field. He was tried very highly, not only at the battle of Ctesiphon, but more especially during the retirement that ensued. Untiring, resourceful, and even more cheerful as the outlook grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a commander.

He is imperturbable under the heaviest fire and his judgment is undisturbed.

28. With great regret, I have been forced, by reasons of ill-health, to resign the command of the British forces in Mesopotamia—an appointment I have had the honour of holding during the past nine months.

In order to complete the record of events during my period in command, I will now give a brief narrative of the operations on the Tigris from the time that General Townshend's force reached Kut-el-Amara on December 3rd until the date of my departure from Mesopotamia.

29. When General Townshend reached Kut on December 3rd, measures were taken to withstand a siege until the arrival of relief from reinforcements which were coming from overseas.

Defences were improved. Shipping was despatched to Basrah, evacuating the sick and wounded, and also the Turkish prisoners (1,350 were captured at Ctesiphon) and all were safely brought away in the retreat.

The armed tug "Sumana" was the only vessel left at Kut.

The cavalry brigade and a convoy of transport animals were marched down to Ali Al Gharbi, before the enemy could effect an investment.

The cavalry left on December 6th. On that day the enemy closed on the northern front, and by December 7th the investment of Kut was complete.

30. The cavalry at Ali Al Gharbi was reinforced with infantry and guns from Basrah. Behind this advanced detachment a force under the command of Major-General F. J. Aylmer, V.C., was collected on the line Amara-Ali Al Gharbi, for the relief of Kut as soon as its concentration was completed.

31. The entrenched camp at Kut is contained in a "U"-shaped loop of the Tigris; the town stands at the most southerly end of the peninsula so formed. The northern defences are some 3,200 yards from the town; the peninsula is about a mile in width.

A detached post was established at a small village on the right bank of the river opposite Kut. East of the town was a bridge of boats, covered by a bridge-head detachment on the right bank.

32. On December 8th, the enemy carried out a heavy bombardment from three sides, and Nur-Ed-Din Pasha called upon General Townshend to surrender.

33. On December 9th, our detachment on the right bank, covering the bridge, was forced to retire before a heavy attack. The enemy occupied the right bank at the bridge-head.

During the night, December 9th-10th, the bridge was successfully demolished by a party gallantly led by Lieutenant A. B. Matthews, R.E., and Lieutenant R. T. Sweet, 2/7th Gurkha Rifles.

34. During the following days Kut was subjected to a continuous bombardment and several attacks were beaten off. The enemy's losses were heavy, especially in the abortive attacks on December 12th, when, it is estimated, their casualties amounted to 1,000.

35. Operations were then conducted on the lines of regular siege warfare. A redoubt at the north-east corner of the defences became the special objective of Turkish shell fire and sapping operations.

36. On the night of December 14th-15th a successful sortie was made against trenches facing the detached post on the right bank, and, on the night December 17th-18th two sorties, from the redoubt previously referred to, cleared the enemy's nearest trenches. About thirty Turks were bayoneted and ten were captured.

37. Heavy fire was concentrated on the redoubt during the night December 23rd-24th and throughout the 24th. The parapet was breached and the Turks effected an entrance, but they were driven out by a counter-attack, leaving 200 dead behind. Attacks were renewed later, and throughout the night of December 24th-25th a fierce struggle took place around the redoubt. The enemy again effected a lodgment, but by morning they had been ejected and the assault was finally defeated.

38. No decisive attacks have been attempted by the Turks since their failure at Christmas, which, it is reported, cost them about 2,000 casualties.

39. On December 28th a movement of troops, which was continued for several days, took place from the Turkish main camp (six miles above Kut) to Shaikh Saad—which had been occupied by enemy mounted troops for some time.

40. On January 4th, General Aylmer's leading troops, under Major-General Younghusband, advanced from Ali Al Gharbi towards Shaikh Saad, moving by both banks.

General Younghusband's column got in touch with the enemy on the morning of January 6th. The Turks were entrenched astride the Tigris, three and a-half miles east of Shaikh Saad. An attempt to turn the Turkish right flank did not succeed owing to presence of hostile cavalry and Arabs in superior force on this flank.

41. General Aylmer arrived on morning of January 7th with the remainder of his force and ordered a general attack; Major-General Younghusband commanding on the left bank and Major-General Kemball on the right bank.

Very heavy fighting lasted throughout the day. By evening the enemy's trenches on the right bank had been captured and some 600 prisoners and two guns taken.

On the left bank our troops were entrenched opposite the enemy, who still held their positions on that bank. Attempts to turn their left flank had been checked by counter enveloping movements from the north.

42. The troops were very fatigued next day and little progress was made.

On January 9th, the Turks were forced to abandon their remaining positions and retired upstream, followed by General Aylmer's force. But heavy rain now fell, making the alluvial soil of the roads almost impassable, and prevented active operations for the next two days. It is estimated that the enemy's losses during the three days' fighting at Shaikh Saad amounted to 4,500.

43. The enemy fell back about ten miles, to the Wadi—a tributary which joins the Tigris on the left bank. They took up a new position behind the Wadi and on the right bank of the Tigris, opposite the mouth of the Wadi.

44. General Aylmer concentrated his whole force on the left bank and attacked the Wadi position on the 13th. After hard fighting the Turks were driven out on the 14th and retired five miles further west and entrenched across a defile bounded on the north by a marsh and on the south by the Tigris. They were followed to this position by General Aylmer's force.

45. Throughout these operations the weather was very bad. The heavy rain and high wind caused great discomfort to the troops and made movement by land and by river most difficult. Up to January 17th there was no improvement in the weather and active operations were at a standstill.

46. As, owing to ill-health, I am about to relinquish command of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," I desire to place on record my warm appreciation of the able and devoted assistance afforded me by the Staff at General Headquarters and officers of the various administrative services and departments.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN NIXON, General,

Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D."

APPENDIX XVI.

Despatches from the General Officer Commanding in Egypt.

DESPATCH No. 1.

*From Lieutenant-General Sir J. G. Maxwell, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding the Force in Egypt.*

Army Headquarters, Cairo, February 16th, 1915.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for War the accompanying report from Major-General A. Wilson, C.B., Commanding the Suez Canal Defences, who has conducted the operations to my complete satisfaction. He has been ably assisted by Brigadier-General A. H. Bingley, C.I.E.

I fully endorse what General Wilson says of the conduct of the regimental officers and men, both British and Indian. The French Hydroplane Squadron and the detachment Royal Flying Corps have rendered very valuable services.

The former, equipped with hydroplanes with floats, ran great risks in undertaking land reconnaissance, whilst the latter were much handicapped by inferior types of machines. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, they furnished me regularly with all information regarding the movements of the enemy. I take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Secretary of State for War the great services rendered by the Count de Serionne and the officials of the Suez Canal Company; they have one and all been most helpful, and have unreservedly placed their own personal services and the entire resources of the Suez Canal Company at my disposal. The success of our defence was greatly assisted by their cordial co-operation.

Also Sir George Macauley, K.C.M.G., Major Blakeney, and Captain Hall, of the Egyptian State Railways. In addition to building two excellent armoured trains, these officers worked most assiduously in organizing and superintending the railway arrangements, both along the canal and in the transportation of reinforcements from Cairo. No difficulties of any sort were made, and such difficulties as existed were speedily overcome, and I cannot sufficiently express my obligation to them. Also Major Liddell, late Royal Engineers, Director of Telegraphs under the Egyptian Government. This official was largely responsible for the excellent system of inter-communication which prevailed throughout the canal defences. It is needless for me to add that from Admiral Peirse and the ships of his Majesty's Navy, as well as those of France under his command, most important and valuable assistance was received.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. G. MAXWELL, Lieut.-General,
Commanding the Force in Egypt.

Attack on Suez Canal.

Headquarters, Canal Defences, to the General Staff, Headquarters, Cairo, Ismailia,
February 11th, 1915.

SIR,—I have the honour to submit the following report on the recent attack on the Suez Canal. In order to make the narrative complete, I will preface it with a brief account of what has taken place since I took over command of the canal defences.

I landed at Suez on November 16th, 1914, and went to Ismailia the same day, having been preceded ten days before by Brigadier-General A. H. Bingley, my chief staff officer, who was sent from India in advance of the troops to make preliminary arrangements for their landing and despatch to destination. I there took over command of the canal defences from Colonel W. G. Walker, Commanding 9th Indian Brigade, which had been detached from the 3rd (Lahore) Division for temporary duty in Egypt. In accordance with the instructions received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the canal defences were organized in three sections, with headquarters at Suez, Ismailia Ferry, and Kantara respectively, my own headquarters and the general reserve being placed at Ismailia, with the advanced base at Zagazig and base general hospital at Cairo. These arrangements were completed by December 5th, 1914, when the last units of the force arrived from India.

Preparations for Defence.—The months of November, December, and January were devoted to a systematic development of the naturally strong line of defence afforded by the canal, thus completing the work which had been initiated previous to my arrival. A number of defensive posts were prepared on the east bank, to cover the more important ferries and provide facilities for local counter-attacks. Trenches were dug on the west bank to cover the intervals between posts and frustrate attempts at crossing. Communications were improved by the construction of landing stages and removable pontoon bridges for use at important points.

A flotilla of armed launches, manned by the Royal Navy, was organized for canal patrols. A complete system of telegraph, telephone, and wireless communication was installed, linking up all the posts with headquarters. A system of defence was established for the protection of the railway, the telegraph lines, and the sweet water canal. The detachment of the Royal Flying Corps was organized, staffed with observers, and equipped with accommodation for its planes.

The resources of the Suez Canal Company in tugs, launches, lighters, etc., were carefully examined, so as to utilize them for military purposes. Arrangements were made with the Railway Administration for the collecting of rolling stock at convenient places, in order to expedite the despatch of reinforcements to threatened points. Provision was also made for the organization of the water supply of the troops and the formation of supply depôts, as well as for the rapid collection and evacuation of the sick and wounded. A system of intelligence, censorship, and police surveillance was established, and plans were devised, in consultation with the canal authorities, for the control of shipping in the event of an attack. Last, but not least, a scheme for making inundations, and so limiting the front over which the enemy could attack, was carried out successfully by the Irrigation Department at Port Said and the engineering staff of the Canal Company at El Cap, Kantara, and Ballah. During this period no active operations took place, except a Bedouin raid made by the enemy in the direction of Kantara. A patrol of the Bikanir Camel Corps under Captain A. J. H. Chope, 2nd Gurkha Rifles, consisting of one Indian officer and twenty other ranks, encountered a force of some 200 Bedouins and Turks on November 20th, 1914, near Bir-el-Nuss, and in spite of the enemy's treacherous attack, due to the abuse of the white flag, extricated itself successfully from a somewhat difficult position. Our patrol, which lost one Indian officer and twelve other ranks killed and three Sepoys wounded, inflicted some sixty casualties on the enemy. For their gallant conduct on this occasion No. 1534 Sepoy Ali Khan was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd Class, and No. 115 Sepoy Faiz Ali Khan the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

General Summary of Events.—During the first fortnight in January little direct news of the enemy's advance was forthcoming, though reports of considerable preparations in Syria were constant, and information was received to the effect that advanced posts and depôts had been formed at Khan Yunis, El Arish, El Auja, and Kosseima. The country to the east of the canal within the radius of our aeroplane reconnaissances remained clear of formed bodies of hostile troops, though frequently visited by Bedouin patrols which, in some cases, were accompanied by German officers in Arab dress. About January 15th, however, it became clear that hostile forces of some strength had entered Sinai, and on the 20th the canal defence troops were reinforced from Cairo by the 1st and 3rd Brigades R.F.A., East Lancashire Division, T.F., which proceeded at once to previously prepared positions.

On January 18th a hostile force of 8,000-10,000 was located near Bir-es-Saba by a French naval hydroplane, and on the 22nd a Turkish force was reported to be at Moiya Harab, having arrived there from Gifgaffa. This was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance the next day, and about the same time reports of the presence of hostile troops at Ain Sadr were received, and our mounted troops obtained touch with hostile patrols near Bir-el-Duiedar. On the 22nd small detachments were told off from the reserves to hold lightly the trenches prepared along the west bank. On the 26th forces of some 2,000-3,000 men each were located at Bir Mabeuk, Moiya Harab, and Wadi Muksheib, and the enemy advanced and engaged our covering troops near Kantara, retiring at 3.30 p.m. On the same day two battalions of the 32nd Brigade (33rd Punjabis and 4th Gwalior Infantry) were sent to hold the trenches along the west bank from Bench Mark post to Ballah; while the General Officers Commanding Sections reinforced the west bank trenches in their sections from local reserves. The New

Zealand Infantry Brigade arrived from Cairo, the Otago and Wellington battalions proceeding to reinforce Kubri, while Headquarters and the Auckland and Canterbury battalions detrained at Ismailia. His Majesty's ships, "Swiftsure," "Clio," "Ocean," and "Minerva" entered the canal, taking station near Kantara, Ballah, El Shatt, and Shalouf respectively.

During the 27th and 28th the enemy was further reinforced, and established himself in an entrenched position about five miles east of Kantara, astride the El Arish road. On the morning of the 27th attacks on the Baluchistan and El Kubri posts in No. 1 Section were made at about 3 a.m. Both were beaten off without loss. On the morning of the 28th the outposts at Kantara were attacked, and the enemy was driven off with little difficulty. One battalion from 31st Brigade (2nd Rajputs) was sent to reinforce Serapeum. From the 29th—31st the enemy closed towards the canal, the largest concentration appearing in the vicinity of Gebel Habeita. The 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery, was sent to Toussoum.

On February 1st an advance from the north-east towards the Ismailia Ferry post was detected, and that post, as well as Bench Mark post, was reinforced under the orders of the General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section. On February 2nd our advanced troops from Ismailia Ferry encountered the enemy at some distance from the post, and a desultory action ensued. This was broken off at 3.30 p.m., and the enemy then entrenched himself about two and a-half miles south-east of our defences. In the course of the day considerable bodies of troops were also seen on the move in front of El Ferdan, Bench Mark, Toussoum, and Serapeum. During the night of the 2nd—3rd some firing at El Kubri took place, but nothing further of note occurred in No. 1 Section.

At about 3.30 a.m. on the 3rd a determined attempt was made to effect a crossing some 2,000 yards south of Toussoum. The enemy brought up a number of pontoons and rafts, several of which they succeeded in launching, while two, if not more, actually crossed the canal. This attack was covered by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the east bank. It was met by parties of the 62nd Punjabis under Major Skeen and Captain Morgan, as well as by fire from the 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery. Several pontoons were sunk, and all the men who crossed were disposed of, except twenty, who hid under the west bank and surrendered to the 2nd Rajputs next morning. At daylight the enemy were found to have closed on the Toussoum post, and a counter-attack pushed forward from Serapeum encountered a large force about half a mile from camp. The enemy's attack was not pushed closer than three-quarters of a mile from our position, and they retired about 2 p.m., after shelling our positions intermittently up to that time. Seven officers and 280 men were taken prisoners opposite Toussoum during the course of the fight. A large number of the enemy's dead were found outside Toussoum post and along the east bank of the canal.

At 4.30 p.m., two battalions of the 31st Brigade (27th Punjabis and 128th Pioneers) arrived at Serapeum, and Major-General A. Wallace, Commanding 11th Division, took over command of the section from the Great Bitter Lake to Lake Timsah. During the morning His Majesty's ship "Hardinge" was struck by two 6-inch shells, her funnel being split and forward steering-gear disabled. She moved into Lake Timsah, and later in the day to Kantara, her place being taken by his Majesty's ship "Swiftsure." His Majesty's ship "Ocean" also moved up into this section of the defence. At Ismailia Ferry post the enemy were found at daylight to be entrenching some seven or eight hundred yards from the defences, and two hostile batteries opened fire shortly afterwards. The infantry attack was not pushed home, and no casualties occurred, though many shells burst in the camp and in the vicinity of the town. Shipping detained in Lake Timsah was under fire, and suffered slight damage, but no loss of life.

At Kantara the outposts were attacked between five and six a.m., the enemy being driven off, leaving many killed and wounded and unwounded prisoners. Later in the day a partial attack from the south-east was stopped some 1,200 yards from the position. During the day his Majesty's ships "Swiftsure," "Clio," "Hardinge," and the French ships "Requin" and "D'Entrecasteaux" were engaged, as were also the torpedo-boats and armed launches, all rendering valuable services. The bulk of the fighting fell to the 22nd and 29th Infantry Brigades, but the 28th, as well as portions of the 31st, 32nd, and New Zealand Infantry Brigades, the artillery and engineers of the Lancashire Division (T.F.) and No. 3 Field Company Australian Engineers, were also engaged. Very efficient service was rendered by the detachment Royal Flying Corps, several reconnaissances over the enemy's lines being undertaken during the day.

The enemy engaged at different points along the canal on the 3rd appeared to number some 12,000 to 15,000 men in the aggregate, and six batteries, with at least one 6-inch gun, were located. It appears from accounts received from prisoners that the attacking force consisted of the VIIIth and portions of the IIIrd, IVth, and VIth Turkish Army Corps, and that Djemal Pasha was in chief command. The enemy's plan contemplated simultaneous attacks on Kantara, Ferdan, Ismailia, Shaluf, and Suez, coupled with the main effort to cross the canal near Toussoum. At the first three of the above-mentioned places their efforts were only half-hearted, while at Shaluf and Suez no attacks materialized, though forces are known to have been in the vicinity of those places. Headquarters, with the 7th and 8th Battalions, 2nd Brigade, 1st Australian Imperial Force, arrived at Ismailia during the evening of February 3rd.

On February 4th, as some firing had taken place from the east bank during the night, two companies of the 92nd Punjabis were sent out at eight a.m. to clear the bank, and located a body of some 200 to 250 men still entrenched there. On the approach of this detachment the enemy made signs of surrender, but subsequently reopened fire. Supports of one double company each of the 27th and 67th Punjabis and 128th Pioneers were despatched, under the command of Major MacLachlan, 92nd Punjabis, who concentrated his men, opened a heavy fire, and then charged. This time the enemy threw away their rifles and surrendered, 6 officers, 251 men, and 3 machine-guns being captured; 59 men, including a German officer (Major von den Hagen), were found killed at this point.

The trenches in front of Ismailia and Kantara were found to have been deserted, and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, supported by infantry, moved out from the Ismailia Ferry post. A large body of enemy, estimated at three to four brigades, were encountered seven miles east of Toussoum, and another body some miles to the north. Twenty-five prisoners and ninety camels were captured. No other incident occurred along the front. Reinforcements, consisting of the Herts Yeomanry, 2nd County of London Yeomanry (Westminster Dragoons), and one squadron Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, arrived at Ismailia the same evening.

On the 5th instant our aeroplanes reported that the enemy were retiring towards Katia, while those who had been in front of No. 2 Section appeared to have concentrated about Gebel Habeita. Mabeuik was still occupied, and a reconnaissance from No. 1 Section encountered some of the enemy's infantry near Gebel Murr during the day. There was no change during the 6th, the enemy being still in strength near Gebel Habeita. A reconnaissance by a mixed force, which had been contemplated this day, was cancelled owing to information gathered from prisoners to the effect that considerable reinforcements of the enemy were expected and might be at hand about this time. On the 7th, however, our aeroplanes found this camp deserted. Mabeuik was also found to have been vacated, and the nearest enemy on the northern line appeared at Bir-El-Abd.

The Actions at Toussoum and Kantara—I will now supplement the general summary of events given in the foregoing paragraphs with a more detailed account of the fighting that took place at Toussoum on February 3rd, and at Kantara on January 28th and February 3rd.

The troops in the Toussoum—Serapeum—Deversoir portion of No. 2 Section on the morning of February 3rd were as follows:—

The 19th Lancashire Battery, R.F.A. (T.F.) (four guns), commanded by Major B. Palin Dobson.

The 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two maxims), commanded by Major I. D'E. Roberts, R.A.

1st Field Company, East Lancashire Royal Engineers (T.F.) (two sections), under Captain J. G. Riddick.

Canterbury Battalion, New Zealand Infantry (two platoons), under Maj. C. B. Brereton.

2nd Queen Victoria's Own Rajputs, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. S. Dunsford.

62nd Punjabis, under Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Grimshaw.

92nd Punjabis, under Major T. R. MacLachlan.

2/10th Gurkha Rifles, under Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton.

128th Pioneers (two platoons, acting as escort to 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery), under Lieutenant R. A. Fitzgibbon.

137th Field Ambulance, under Major R. W. Knox, I.M.S.

These troops were disposed as follows:—

(a) On the east bank, in the posts of Toussoum, Serapeum, and Deversoir, a half battalion in each, furnished by the 92nd, 62nd, and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles respectively.

(b) On the west bank, from the entrance to Lake Timsah to Deversoir inclusive, twelve posts, each held by two platoons. Each platoon was allotted some 600 yards of front and found three sentry groups, about 200 yards apart.

(c) In reserve at Serapeum, three double companies.

At about 3.25 a.m., on 3rd inst., the enemy were seen on the east bank near mile 47.4. As the firing was heavy, a double company of the 62nd Punjabis was sent from the reserve to support this point, and this double company was subsequently reinforced by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.

The enemy made three distinct attempts to cross the canal at points between miles 47.4 and 48.4. One boatload of the enemy landed opposite mile 48.3, and were charged by a small party under Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis. All were killed or wounded. Two more boatloads landed opposite mile 47.6, and these were promptly attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan, 62nd Punjabis, who was wounded. Six Turks were killed and four captured at this point, and some twenty who got away and hid themselves under the west bank were captured later by a party of the 2nd Rajputs.

At 8.40 a.m. Colonel S. Geoghegan, commanding 22nd Brigade, after a personal reconnaissance of the enemy's positions, sent a detachment consisting of four double companies drawn from the 2nd Rajputs and the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles to clear the east bank. As this counter-attack developed, the enemy fled in large numbers from the broken ground whence they had made their attempt to cross. Meanwhile the enemy, from their camp at Kateid El Khel, deployed a force estimated at two brigades with at least six guns, and formed a line about two miles north-east of Serapeum, and facing that post. Our troops, delivering a counter-attack, now occupied a ridge about half a mile north-east of Serapeum, and formed a line facing the enemy with their left flank drawn back to the canal.

They consisted of two double companies 92nd Punjabis facing north-east, two platoons 2nd Rajputs facing north, with six platoons 2/10th Gurkha Rifles in support. The whole was under command of Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.

The advance northward on the east bank of the two platoons, 2nd Rajputs, was checked short of the broken ground by fire from the enemy posted there, aided by the fire of small parties which were still hidden at the foot of the west bank. It was here that Captain R. T. Arundell was killed while gallantly leading his men. While this attack was in progress, the Commander of his Majesty's Torpedo-boat "No. 043," Lieut.-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., was asked by Colonel Geoghegan to destroy the enemy's pontoons which were lying on the east bank. Those on shore were destroyed by shell fire, and a party then landed from the boat to see whether there were any others lying behind the bank. The landing party found themselves in front of a trench full of the enemy, and in getting back to their boat Lieut.-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., and Sub-Lieutenant C. V. Cardinall, R.N.V.R., were wounded.

The enemy's main attack from the north-east did not get within 1,200 yards of our line. They, however, shelled our positions on the west bank intermittently until about 2 p.m., when their main body retired eastwards, and our forces withdrew to the positions held in the morning. A small party of the enemy reached the ridge which we had vacated, but they were shelled off it by our artillery, and soon disappeared. In the attack on the Toussoum post, about 350 of the enemy managed to establish themselves during the night in some of the outer trenches, which are only occupied by the garrison by day. A number of this party were killed as soon as it was light by the fire of our machine guns, and the remainder were either driven out or killed, and some eighty prisoners captured by a local counter-attack, which was skilfully led by Lieutenant J. W. Thomson-Glover, 92nd Punjabis. Seven Turkish officers and 280 other ranks, with much material, were taken on this occasion.

At 4.30 p.m. reinforcements from the 31st Infantry Brigade began to arrive at Serapeum, and in the course of the evening four double companies were placed in support at various points on the west bank, and the garrison of the Serapeum post was strengthened. The armed launches commanded by Lieutenants W. H. B. Livesay and E. H. Daughlish, R.I.M., rendered valuable service in this section during the day, and were frequently under fire of the enemy's snipers.

On the morning of the 4th inst., as there was no sign of the enemy's main body to the east, and as the armed launch "Mansura" had been fired upon on the previous evening, and some sniping had taken place during the night from the east bank, Major-General A. Wallace, who had taken over command at Serapeum from Colonel S. Geoghegan, ordered two double companies of the 92nd Punjabis to move north along the east bank of the canal to examine this locality. This party, which was commanded by Captain L. F. A. Cochran, got to the south edge of this area, which they found to be held by the enemy, and then extended round to the east and north-east to round the latter up. The enemy held up a white flag and made signs of surrender, whereupon Captain Cochran and some of his party advanced towards them.

After three Turks had surrendered, fire was reopened by the enemy, and our troops had to fall back. Major-General Wallace then ordered out reinforcements, consisting of one double company each of the 27th and 62nd Punjabis and the 128th Pioneers, the whole under Major T. R. Maclachlan, 92nd Punjabis. The latter collected his men and charged, and the enemy immediately threw down their arms. The prisoners taken here numbered six officers and 251 men, of whom fifty-two were seriously wounded. The enemy's killed numbered fifty-nine, and among them was a German officer, Major von den Hagen. Three machine-guns were

captured, as well as a quantity of miscellaneous stores. It was in this second attack that Captain Cochran was killed.

Turning from events at Toussoum to those at Kantara, the only engagements that need be referred to are the attacks made by the enemy on our outposts on January 28th and February 3rd. In the attack of January 28th, the enemy advanced along the telegraph line on one of our pickets, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Sikhs, under Captain Channer, which they attacked about 2.45 a.m. The action continued for about half an hour, and the enemy attempted to advance, but was unable to do so. Firing gradually ceased, and by daylight the enemy had withdrawn gradually to Point 70 on the Kantara—El Arish road, from which they were driven out by five rounds of lyddite shell fired by his Majesty's ship "Swiftsure."

The attack of February 3rd was conducted on much the same lines, and was directed on two of our pickets furnished by the 89th Punjabis. The enemy's advance was stopped without difficulty, and at daylight thirty-six unwounded prisoners were found in our entanglements.

I have, &c.,

ALEX. WILSON, Major-General.

DESPATCH NO. 2.

Army Headquarters, Cairo,

August 19th, 1915.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward the accompanying despatch of Major-General A. Wilson, C.B., Commanding the Suez Canal Defences.

The troops under General Wilson's command have been on service for over eight months, and though the actual fighting they have experienced has not been severe, yet their work has been heavy and monotonous, owing to the large amount of patrolling necessitated by the enemy's attempts at minelaying and to cross the canal.

Owing to the withdrawal of troops to other theatres of war, and to sickness incidental to the hot season, this patrolling has become very arduous, especially at night.

The list of recommendations for rewards in which I concur and forward is not, I submit, excessive, having regard to the strength of the force, which rose in February and March to 30,000 men.

A considerable number of the officers mentioned are now serving either in the Dardanelles, Aden, or France, some have been killed and many wounded, but, none the less, I feel it my duty to mention their services in Egypt.

It will be seen that a good many recommendations on behalf of the administrative staff have been made, especially the medical branch, but as Egypt has developed into an intermediate base and clearing station for the Indian Forces serving in France and in the Mediterranean, the work and responsibilities of the administrative staff and services have greatly increased, and are consequently specially deserving of consideration.

In conclusion, I would like very specially to bring to the notice of the Secretary of State for War the eminent services of Major-General A. Wilson, C.B., who has commanded the canal defences with ability, tact, and resource since November 16th, 1914.

I have, &c.,

J. G. MAXWELL, Lieut.-General,

Commanding the Force in Egypt.

From the General Officer Commanding, Canal Defences, to the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Cairo.

Headquarters, Canal Defences, Ismailia, August 1st, 1915.

SIR,—On February 11th, 1915, I submitted a report on the operations which took place early in the month in the canal zone, and also a brief résumé of events since I assumed command of the canal defences on November 16th, 1914.

At the time this report was made it appeared from information at our disposal that the operations under reference might only be a preliminary to further hostilities, and that a more determined attack on the canal would be undertaken in the near future. These anticipations have, however, not been realized, and though the enemy has continued to hold the Sinai Peninsula in some strength and has undertaken several minor enterprises, with a view to causing damage to the canal and the shipping using it, no further advance in force has taken place. This result may be attributed to the fact that the losses suffered by the enemy in the attack on the canal were, according to subsequent reports from Turkish sources, heavier than had been originally estimated, while the demoralization of the force, consequent on its retreat across the desert, necessitated a considerable pause for reorganization.

Now that the hot season is well established, and also as considerable forces of the enemy have been withdrawn to other theatres of operations, it is probable that the existing state of affairs will continue for some months. I therefore consider it a suitable opportunity to forward a narrative of events subsequent to my last report, and also to submit the names of officers whose services during the past eight months are, in my opinion, worthy of mention.

My last report dealt with the operations in the vicinity of the canal up to February 10th, 1915, by which date hostilities in its immediate neighbourhood had ceased for the time being. On February 12th, in accordance with instructions from Army Headquarters, a half-battalion 2/7 Gurkha Rifles, under Lieut.-Colonel Haldane, embarked at Suez on board his Majesty's ship "Minerva" to proceed to Tor, with a view to dispersing a force which had been threatening that place for some time past. This force landed at Tor during the night of the 12th-13th, and, in conjunction with 150 men of the 2nd Egyptian Battalion, which had been in garrison at Tor, attacked the enemy at dawn on the 13th.

The attack was completely successful, the enemy losing some sixty killed and 102 prisoners; our losses were one killed and one wounded. Since this occasion no further forces of the enemy have appeared near Tor. For the remainder of February and till March 22nd no incident of note took place. The Imperial Yeomanry Brigade, as well as the Australian and New Zealand Infantry, who had reinforced the troops on the canal, returned to Cairo. Several reconnaissances, principally to Abu Zenima (by sea), El Haitan, Wadi Muksheib, Moiya Harab, and Katia, were pushed out, but no enemy encountered.

* From information received from agents and through aerial reconnaissances, it appeared that during this month the Turks had concentrated mainly at El Arish and Nekhl, while considerable bodies of the beaten troops were withdrawn to Syria, being, it was rumoured, replaced by fresh formations from the north. On March 22nd an infantry patrol moving from Kubri post encountered a force of some 400 men north-east of that post at dawn. The enemy withdrew on being engaged by troops from the nearest posts, and a subsequent aerial reconnaissance discovered a force of some 800 infantry and 200 mounted men with guns about ten miles east of the canal. From the report furnished it appeared that the Turks were entrenching and intended to stay, and, consequently, orders were issued for a column, consisting of two squadrons Hyderabad Lancers, 1/5th Lancashire Battery, R.F.A. (T.F.), detachment Bikanir Camel Corps, 51st and 53rd Sikhs,

and half-battalion 1/5th Gurkhas, to move out next day to engage and drive off the enemy.

This column, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Boisragon, V.C., moved out from Kubri at daylight (23rd), and attacked the enemy in an entrenched position some ten miles east of the canal. After some resistance the enemy fled hastily, leaving behind a quantity of equipment and rifle ammunition.

The only other incident of note during the course of the month was the departure of the 30th Brigade for the Persian Gulf on 23rd. Its place in No. 1 Section was taken by the 28th (F.F.) Brigade, which in turn was relieved by the 31st Brigade from the reserve. Towards the end of the month reports were received of a considerable concentration of the enemy near Es Sirr, some eighty miles due east of Ballah. These reports were verified later by aeroplane observation, which estimated the hostile force as some 4,000, with guns.

On April 7th our mounted patrols from Kantara encountered a hostile force, estimated at 1,200 men, which withdrew after shots had been exchanged. On the same day an aerial reconnaissance reported considerably fewer numbers retiring through Dueidar. The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was moved up to Kantara the same day, and on the 8th moved out in conjunction with part of the Kantara garrison. No enemy was encountered, and the cavalry moved back to Ismailia, reconnoitring the country for some distance east of the canal. On April 8th, owing to suspicious tracks having been noticed on the east bank of the canal between El Kap and Kantara, the canal was dragged and a mine discovered and destroyed. The mine had evidently been placed in the canal under cover of the demonstration of the previous day. Owing to this occurrence it became necessary greatly to increase our patrols. Intermediate night pickets were established between posts, and a system of hourly patrols along the east bank instituted.

On April 28th a reconnaissance of ninety rifles, Bikanir Camel Corps, encountered a hostile force estimated at some 200 men, with guns, about twelve miles due east of Ismailia Ferry post. After a short skirmish the patrol withdrew to the Ferry post with the loss of three killed, four wounded, and two missing; the enemy did not follow up their retirement. Later in the day an aerial reconnaissance located a body of the enemy in bivouac near El Hawawish, and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade (eight squadrons), supported by half-battalion 27th Punjabis and one section Egyptian Artillery, crossed the canal after dark with a view to engaging the enemy at his camp next morning; or, should he have moved towards the canal during the night, to cut off his retreat.

During the night 28th-29th a hostile party, evidently from Hawawish, opened fire on a dredger in the canal north of Bench Mark post, but retired when engaged by one of our pickets. At daylight on 29th an aeroplane found Hawawish evacuated, but later on located the hostile force moving into Mahadat from the south-west, and the cavalry were directed on that place. Our column, however, only succeeded in engaging the rearguard at about two p.m., by which time the enemy had left Mahadat and was moving on Bada. The pursuit was carried on for three to four miles, but the great exhaustion of men and horses, owing to the heat and heavy going through the sandhills, prevented it being carried further. Our losses were one British, one Indian officer, and one sowar killed; one British officer and seven rank and file wounded. The enemy's losses in killed were about twenty, and thirteen prisoners were taken. The column returned to Ismailia early on the 30th.

On April 7th, the 7th Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade left the canal defences to join the Mediterranean Force, and on 26th the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade left for the same destination, being replaced in No. III. Section by the East Lancashire Brigade (Territorial Force). On May 1st a half-battalion 56th Rifles was despatched from Suez to Abu Zenima owing to rumours of an attack

on the Egyptian garrison of that place. This detachment returned on 3rd, no enemy having appeared in the vicinity. On several occasions during the month hostile patrols were located at some distance from the canal, but these all retired eastwards as soon as forces moved against them. On the 29th a small party reached the shore of the Little Bitter Lake, and, wading out, boarded a Suez Canal pile driver, destroying one small boat and taking prisoner an Italian employee of the company. Pursuit was undertaken from the nearest post as soon as the occurrence was reported, but without result.

On the night of the 30th-31st a party of Turks was detected trying to approach the canal between El Ferdan and Ballah. On being fired on they retired, leaving behind a mine, which was discovered and brought in next morning. The next night the party returned with the evident intention of recovering the mine, but hastily retired on being fired on by a picket which had been left near the spot to deal with any such attempt.

On the night of June 2nd-3rd, parties of the enemy opened fire on the posts of Kantara and El Ferdan, but withdrew hastily when engaged. Small columns from the above posts moved out in pursuit, but were unable to come up with the raiders, who appeared to be all mounted men. One Turkish officer was taken prisoner.

Several changes in the garrisons of the canal defences took place during the month of May. Early in the month the Artillery and Engineers, as well as the East Lancashire Brigade of the Lancashire Division (T.F.), left to join the Mediterranean Force, the 4th Mounted Brigade and Divisional Artillery, 2nd Mounted Division, arriving in replacement. On May 29th orders were received for the 1/5th and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles to reinforce the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade with the Mediterranean Force, and these battalions left on May 31st and June 1st respectively. Consequent on the above changes and reductions certain modifications in organization became necessary, and were carried into effect during the month. It was decided to abolish the divisional organization of the 10th and 11th Divisions, and to include the whole of the forces in the canal zone in one command, with a Headquarter Staff approximating to that of a division. These changes were brought into effect from June 1st.

During the month of June there was little change in the situation. Early in the month the 9th Bhopal Infantry and 125th Rifles arrived from France, and were taken on the strength of the Canal Defence Force, in replacement of the 1/5th and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. On the 11th and 12th five Turkish deserters arrived at El Shatt, saying that they had deserted from a force of some 300 men who had reached the vicinity of Mabeiuk, with a view to attacking the canal. A column was at once organized at Kubri to deal with the threat, but nothing materialized, the enemy withdrawing to Nekhl.

On the 30th of the month the British ss. "Teresias" struck a mine laid in the naval section of the canal defences, near the south end of the Little Bitter Lake. From investigations it appeared that a party had reached the east bank of the lake, waded out to the main channel, and succeeded in evading the naval launches which patrol this section, and in placing a mine. Thanks to the skilful handling of the ship and the prompt action of the canal company's officials, the accident only blocked the canal for fourteen hours, and the ship, though seriously damaged, has since been towed into Alexandria for repair.

During July nothing of any note occurred. On two occasions, owing to the reported presence of Turkish patrols in the neighbourhood of Katia, a small column was moved out from No. III. Section to engage or cut them off should they approach the canal; but on each occasion the hostile party retired without touch having been obtained. The extreme heat in the desert made military operations very difficult, and practically confined all movements to the night time.

On July 8th orders were received for two batteries R.H.A. (T.F.) and one infantry brigade to proceed urgently to Aden, and accordingly "B" Battery, H.A.C., and Berkshire Battery, R.H.A. (T.F.), and the 28th (T.F.) Brigade (51st, 53rd Sikhs, 56th Rifles, and 62nd Punjabis) left Suez on the 12th and following days. The artillery were replaced by the 1/15th and 1/17th Batteries, E. Lancs. R.F.A. (T.F.), while the Derbyshire Yeomanry (dismounted) were also sent to the canal zone.

From the foregoing it will be seen that no fighting of any importance has taken place during the past six months, and it appears evident that, owing to the lack of water, climatic conditions, and inability to prosecute campaigns on so many fronts, the Turks will be unable to undertake serious operations in this region till the cold weather arrives and a considerable change in the strategical situation takes place. At the same time there is no doubt of their intention to detain as many of our troops as possible on the defence of the canal by attempts to endanger navigation, and, if possible, to block the canal by sinking a ship in the fairway. Consequently the chief danger that has had to be guarded against, since the main attack in February, has been that of mine-laying in the canal; and, to meet this danger, it has been necessary to employ a large number of men on night patrol duty, especially along the east bank. Up to date, however, except during the actual attack, traffic has continued practically as in times of peace.

During the period under review the morale and, with certain exceptions, the health of the troops has been well maintained. During March an outbreak of dysentery occurred in one battalion, while one or two others were less seriously affected. A great improvement has, however, taken place lately, and the health of the Force may now be taken as normal for the conditions under which it is serving. When it became apparent that a large force would have to be kept on the canal during the hot weather, a scheme for providing shelter against the sun was initiated and efficiently carried out. It has proved of great value, especially in the case of the British mounted troops.

I have, &c.,

ALEX. WILSON, Major-General,
Commanding Canal Defences.

DESPATCH No. 3.

Army Headquarters, Cairo, March 1st, 1916.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to submit this report on military affairs in the Egyptian Command since the Turks attacked the Suez Canal in February, 1915, which attack was made the subject of a separate despatch. I feel it my duty to make this report, because so much of the arduous work done in Egypt by the force under my command, with the cordial assistance of the Egyptian Government, was in connection with the operations of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in the Dardanelles. So far as I am aware, no detailed mention of the services performed has been made in any other despatch. The entire resources of Egypt, military and civil, were unstintingly given to further the necessities of that expedition. The operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula, by threatening Constantinople, drew off the bulk of the Turkish forces belonging to Djemal Pasha's command, which had already been beaten back from the vicinity of the Suez Canal. It was therefore possible, whilst retaining just sufficient force to safeguard the canal, to move troops to other theatres, where their presence was most required. But throughout the summer and autumn of 1915 my principal cause of anxiety was the possibility of trouble on the western frontier, which might lead to serious religious and internal disorders. The attitude of Sayed Ahmed, the

Senussi, was becoming more and more truculent, notwithstanding my efforts to preserve peaceful relations; everything possible was done to avoid hostilities, and they were avoided until late in the year, when hostile acts on his part led to the withdrawal of the Egyptian frontier post at Sollum and subsequent operations.

The duty of guarding the Suez Canal was allotted to the Indian Expeditionary Force "E," under the command of Major-General Sir A. Wilson, K.C.B.

The force was gradually reduced by calls on it for other theatres; thus the 29th Brigade under Major-General Sir H. Cox, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.I., were sent to Gallipoli; subsequently the Punjabi-Mohammedan battalions of that brigade were withdrawn from the Peninsula and replaced by Gurkha battalions taken from brigades on the canal; two double companies of Sikhs from the Patiala Imperial Service Regiment were sent to replace losses in the 15th Sikhs, and every British and Indian officer who could be spared was sent to replace casualties; the 30th Brigade, under Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., K.C.B., was sent to Basrah; the 28th Brigade, under Major-General Sir G. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., was sent first to Aden and then to Basrah; the force was further weakened by the exchange of tired units from the Indian divisions in France with some of the best battalions on the canal.

To this force fell the tiresome and onerous duty throughout the entire summer of exercising ceaseless vigilance over the 100 miles of canal front. Great credit is due for the way this duty was performed; indifferent troops would have been demoralised. Though small bodies of the enemy were constantly endeavouring, occasionally with success, to place mines in the canal or damage the railway, yet no accident of importance occurred except that one merchant ship, the s.s. "Tere-sias," struck a mine. She fortunately escaped with but little damage. The passage of the canal was interrupted on this one occasion for only a few hours.

A little affair, creditable to the Imperial Service troops engaged, occurred on November 23rd, when a squadron of the Mysore Lancers operating fifteen miles east of El Kantara came upon a force of sixty or seventy Turks, the advance party of a raiding party 200 strong. These they pursued for seven miles, killing seven, capturing twelve, and wounding many others. Amongst the dead was a Bedouin leader named Rizkalla Salim, who was responsible for most of the raids on the canal; since his death they entirely ceased.

Part of the 30th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, under the command of Brevet Major S. D. Massy, I.A., with headquarters at Ismailia, carried out daily reconnaissances without a single important accident.

The French Naval Seaplane Detachment, with headquarters at Port Said, under the command of Capitaine de Vaisseau de l'Escaille, whose services were placed at my disposal for intelligence purposes, was continually employed in reconnoitring the Syrian and Anatolian coast from the requisitioned vessels "Raven" and "Anne." The results of their work were invaluable. The "Anne" was torpedoed near Smyrna during an armistice while employed by the Royal Navy, but was fortunately able to reach Mudros, where she was patched up and returned to Port Said. I cannot speak too highly of the work of the seaplane detachment. Lengthy land flights are extremely dangerous, yet nothing ever stopped these gallant French aviators from any enterprise. I regret the loss of two of these planes whilst making dangerous land flights over Southern Syria.

I would be failing in my duty were I not to bring to your lordship's notice the valuable and whole-hearted assistance always readily given by the Count de Serionne and his able assistants of the Suez Canal Company. The whole of the resources of this company were put unreservedly at my disposal. It is perhaps needless for me to report that His Majesty's Royal Navy, under Vice-Admiral Sir R. Peirse, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, was always ready and anxious to help and facilitate the duty of protecting the canal and advising in

any enterprise that needed naval assistance. To the Navy fell the duty of guarding the Bitter Lakes. To the Vice-Admiral Commanding the French Syrian Squadron I am especially indebted, in that he and the officers and ships under his command maintained a constant watch throughout on the Syrian and Anatolian coasts. They supplied me with the fullest information of enemy movements that it was possible to obtain by means of agents, etc. I had only to express a wish and it was at once carried out.

I now submit my report as follows:—Operations on the western front to January 31st, 1916. Outbreak of hostilities on the western front. Early in November, during my temporary absence from Egypt to meet your Lordship at Mudros, the situation on the western frontier, which, as your Lordship is aware, had for some months been a subject for anxiety, became suddenly acute, and a series of acts of hostility committed against our frontier posts at Sollum and Barrani made final rupture with the Senussi inevitable. As early as May, 1915, signs were apparent that the steadily increasing pressure brought to bear upon the Senussi by the Turkish party in Tripoli, under the leadership of Nuri Bey, a half-brother of Enver Pasha, was beginning to take effect.

For some time, even after the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Turkey in 1914, the anti-British influence of this party was not strongly felt, and the attitude of the Senussi towards Egypt remained friendly. It was not until the advent of Gaafer, a Germanized Turk of considerable ability, who arrived in Tripoli in April, 1915, with a considerable supply of arms and money, that this attitude underwent a change. From that moment it became evident that the Turkish influence was gaining weight, and it was only by means of great forbearance, and by tactful handling of a delicate situation by Lieut.-Colonel Snow, commanding the Western Desert, that a rupture was so long deferred.

The first incident of importance occurred on August 16th, 1915, when two British submarines, sheltering from the weather near Ras Lack, on the coast of Cyrenaica, were treacherously fired upon by Arabs under the leadership of a white officer, casualties being suffered on either side. The incident was, however, closed by the acceptance of the Senussi's profound apologies, and of his assurances that the act had been committed in ignorance that the submarines were British.

A period of quiet followed, but at the beginning of November a series of events occurred which placed beyond all doubt the insincerity of the Senussi's continued assurances of friendship. In the first week of that month (November) the crews of His Majesty's ship "Tara" and of His Majesty's transport "Moorina," torpedoed by enemy submarines on the 5th and 7th respectively, were, on landing in Cyrenaica, captured and held prisoners by the Senussi, who, in reply to strong representations for their immediate release, merely feigned ignorance of these occurrences, which he pretended to discredit.

Even then a last effort was made to preserve peace, and Sayed Mohamed el Idris was sent to arrange negotiations whereby the Senussi should get rid of his Turkish advisers in return for a sum of money. But before any decision could be reached matters had got beyond control, and the negotiations collapsed. On the 9th an emergency squadron of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division was sent to strengthen the post at Sollum, which three days earlier had been shelled by enemy submarines, the Egyptian coastguard cruiser "Abbas" being sunk at her moorings, and another, the "Nur el Bahr," receiving considerable damage from shell fire.

On the night of the 14th-15th two Egyptian sentries at Sollum were rushed by Mohafizia (Senussi regulars), and were severely handled and their arms carried off; the following night the camp at Sollum was systematically sniped, though no casualties resulted. On the 17th the Zawia at Sidi Barrani (50 miles east of Sollum) was occupied by a force of some 300 Mohafizia, and on the 18th

the Coastguard Barracks at that place were twice attacked during the night, one coastguard being killed. This was followed on the 20th by an attack on the coastguard outpost at Sabil, a small post about thirty miles south-east of Sollum, though in this case, as at Barrani, the attack failed. In view of these circumstances there was clearly no alternative but to recognize a state of war and to take action accordingly.

The events recorded above had caused a spirit of great unrest to prevail throughout the country, and the possibility of internal disturbances was a source of greater anxiety than the external danger. This unrest was especially evident amongst the Arab population inhabiting the western edge of the cultivation—amounting in the Behera Province alone to over 120,000. The religious influence of the Senussi is great amongst these people, and their natural sympathies are inclined towards their brethren in the Western Desert.

The above considerations made it imperative, on the one hand to keep the sphere of hostilities as far as possible to the west of the Delta, and, on the other hand, to avoid anything in the nature of a reverse. In pursuance of this policy it was decided to withdraw the Western Frontier posts to Mersa Matruh, and to concentrate at that place a force sufficient to deal swiftly with the situation; to secure the Alexandria-Dabba Railway as a secondary line of communication by land with the railhead at Dabba, to occupy the Wadi Natrun and the Fayum as measures of precaution; and to watch closely by constant and careful reconnaissance the Oasis of Moghara.

This course offered the following advantages:—

(a) The advance of the enemy would be opposed at the most westerly point at which a suitable harbour could be found, within one night's journey by sea from Alexandria, defensible on the land front.

(b) The enemy would be met on ground generally practicable to all arms and comparatively well supplied with water.

(c) The Egyptian Bedouin of the coastal belt east of Matruh would be protected if loyal, and coerced if disaffected.

(d) Native opinion in the Delta would be affected favourably by an offensive policy.

(e) As more troops and transport by sea became available an opportunity would be afforded of striking at the enemy's main lines of communications by means of a landing at Sollum.

On November 20th orders were issued for the assembly of the following force at Alexandria:—

In Command.—Major-General A. Wallace, C.B.

Composite Mounted Brigade.—Under Brigadier-General J. D. T. Tyndale Biscoe: Three Composite Yeomanry Regiments (from details 2nd Mounted Division); one Composite Regiment Australian Light Horse (from details Australian Light Horse Brigades); Notts Battery Royal Horse Artillery and Ammunition Column; Auxiliary Services.

Composite Infantry Brigade.—Under Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan: 1/6th Battalion Royal Scots (T.F.); 2/7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (T.F.); 2/8th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (T.F.); 15th Sikhs; Auxiliary Services.

A detachment Egyptian Army Military Works Department (no Royal Engineers being available).

Divisional Train, 1st Australian Division.

The 2nd Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, one company 15th Sikhs, a detachment of 150 Bikanir Camel Corps with an attached Egyptian Army Machine Gun Section, and one armoured train garrisoned by the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles with two 12½-pounder guns of the Egyptian Army Artillery, were despatched on

the 21st inst. to make good the Alexandria-Dabba Railway and patrol to Moghara Oasis.

The 1/1st North Midland Mounted Brigade, with the Berks Battery Royal Horse Artillery, were sent on November 29th to preserve order in the Fayum, and on the same date a squadron of Egyptian Army Cavalry and a detachment of fifty Bikanir Camel Corps occupied the Wadi Natrun.

Finally, to provide for possible contingencies among the Arab population of the Western Behera Province, a composite battalion was made up from details of the 29th Division at Alexandria, detachments being despatched to Hosh Isa and Damanhur on December 7th. By November 23rd concentration was completed, and on the night of the 23rd-24th the first detachments of the 15th Sikhs, under Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, sailed from Alexandria, arriving at Mersa Matruh the following morning.

The presence of enemy submarines necessitated the sea journey being performed by night only. Moreover, the depth of water over the bar in Matruh Harbour limited the ships immediately available for transporting troops and supplies to six trawlers and two small coastguard cruisers. Four additional small steamers were obtained as soon as possible, and a third cruiser was fitted up as a hospital ship. The mounted troops and transport were assembled at railhead at Dabba, and an advanced force was sent forward to make good and develop the wells at Abu Gerab, Baggush, and Jerawla, which constitute the only watering places on the eighty-five miles of desert which separate Dabba from Mersa Matruh. The condition of the wells at the extreme end of the dry season only permitted of two squadrons being passed across at a time.

The concentration of the force at Mersa Matruh, less five squadrons left at railhead on account of insufficiency of water, was completed on December 7th, and on the same date Major-General Wallace moved his headquarters to Matruh. Meanwhile Sollum post had been evacuated by sea on the afternoon of November 23rd, such motor-cars of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Squadron as could be moved having been despatched by land previously.

In the evacuation it was unfortunately found necessary to disable and abandon three light Ford cars and the two Egyptian Army 9 cm. Krupp guns, and to abandon an outlying post of one Egyptian officer and fourteen other ranks which failed to reach the beach in time to embark, and were made prisoners. The garrison of Sollum—strength, British, five officers and twelve other ranks; Egyptian, two officers and ninety other ranks—reached Matruh safely on November 24th. The evacuation of the posts at Bagbag and Sidi Barrani was effected by land on November 23rd, everything of value being removed, except four light cars at the latter post, which were disabled before abandonment. During the march, and after arrival at Matruh, a number of desertions took place among the Egyptian Coastguard Camel Corps. These desertions amounted in all to twelve native officers, two cadets, and 120 other ranks, the deserters taking with them their arms, equipment, and 176 camels.

A detailed distribution of the Western Frontier Force on December 10th, and of troops garrisoning districts in the west of Egypt, in which the population was mainly Arab, and therefore likely to be affected by the invasion, is given in Appendix "A" (not printed).

It must be acknowledged that this force, although the best available in Egypt at the moment, was by no means well adapted for the task which lay before it. Regiments and staffs had been somewhat hastily collected, and were not well known to one another. The Composite Yeomanry Brigade, to give an instance, contained men from twenty or more different regiments. Before a really efficient fighting force could be collected much rearrangement was necessary, with the result that the composition was constantly changing; and it was, in fact, not until the

middle of February that the conditions of the Western Frontier Force could be considered really satisfactory.

Moreover, the lack of sufficient and suitable transport made it necessary for General Wallace to withdraw his troops to Matruh after each engagement. I mention these facts because it should be realized that General Wallace had to overcome many difficulties beyond those caused by the enemy. On December 11th the undermentioned force moved out from Mersa Matruh, with orders to disperse a hostile gathering reported in the neighbourhood of Beit Hussein and Ras Um Rakhum, and to reconnoitre towards Unjeila:—

Commander, Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs (350 men).
2nd Composite Yeomanry Regiment (three squadrons with three machine-guns).

One section Nottinghamshire Battery, Royal Horse Artillery (Territorial Force).

Detachment Royal Naval Armoured Car Division (six armoured cars, one wireless car).

One section South Midland Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps (Territorial Force).

Marching at 7 a.m. the force moved westwards by the coast road, and on reaching Wadi Senaab the cavalry, pushed forward in advance of the column, became engaged with the enemy holding the southern side of the Wadi in considerable strength. Owing to the bad going marching was difficult, and the infantry were unable to co-operate, but, on the arrival of a reinforcement of a squadron of Australian Light Horse in the afternoon, the enemy were finally driven out of the Wadi with loss estimated at not less than 100 killed and wounded.

Our casualties on this day were one officer and thirteen other ranks killed, and two officers and sixteen other ranks wounded. Among the former I regret to report the death of Lieut.-Colonel Snow, killed late in the day by an Arab whom he was endeavouring to persuade to surrender. In the death of this experienced officer the force suffered a heavy loss.

In the action valuable assistance was rendered by the armoured cars of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division. After dark the column concentrated at Um Rakhum, where the night was spent. On the 12th, owing to the fatigue of the Yeomanry horses, nothing further was attempted than the clearing up of the Wadi Shaifa, which resulted in the capture of some twenty-five prisoners and a number of camels and cattle abandoned by the enemy in his retreat.

Meanwhile air reconnaissance disclosed the presence of the enemy in some force at Ras Manaa, about thirteen miles west of Um Rakhum. The column was accordingly reinforced by two companies of the 1/6th Royal Scots, from Matruh, and orders were issued for an advance on Ras Manaa on the following day. On the 13th the column moved at 8 a.m. in the direction of Beit Hussein, but on crossing Wadi Shaifa became engaged with the enemy, and a sharp and somewhat critical action developed.

The enemy, estimated at about 1,200 with two guns and machine-guns, attacked with considerable vigour, but after a critical period the arrival of reinforcements (two guns Notts Royal Horse Artillery and two squadrons Australian Light Horse) from Matruh, turned the scale in our favour, and the enemy were driven back about a mile with heavy loss, though dark put an end to further pursuit. The column retired for the night to Um Rakhum, and the following morning returned to Matruh. Our casualties in this operation amounted to nine rank and file killed and six officers and fifty other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses, on the other hand, as estimated from observation and confirmed by subsequent reports, must have reached a total of at least 250, of whom about 180 killed. On the night of December 14th-15th the posts at the wells of Abu Gerab,

Baggush, and Jerawla were withdrawn owing to their somewhat dangerous isolation, this operation being carried out without incident. From the 15th to the 23rd no operation of importance was undertaken, the period being devoted to the further organizing and strengthening of the force at Matruh. The experience of the operations of December 11th and 13th had clearly shown that to obtain a rapid and decisive result more strength was necessary.

During the third week of December, therefore, the force at Matruh was reinforced by the 1st Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, two naval 4-in. guns, and "A" Battery Honourable Artillery Company (2nd Mounted Division), while shortly afterwards the 161st Brigade (54th Division) relieved the 2nd New Zealand Rifle Battalion on the lines of communication, the latter being withdrawn to Alexandria.

In the meantime the enemy was concentrating in the neighbourhood of Gebel Medwa, about eight miles south-west of Matruh, and by December 24th his strength at that place was estimated from air reconnaissances and other sources to have reached about 5,000 men, of whom more than half were Mohafizia, or regular soldiers, with four guns and some machine-guns, the whole under the command of Gafer.

In Command Main Body.—Major-General A. Wallace, C.B.

Right Column.—Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs; Royal Bucks Hussars; one section Notts Battery, Royal Horse Artillery; 1st Battalion, New Zealand Rifle Brigade; 15th Sikhs; 2/8th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment (T.F.); Notts and Derby Field Ambulance; Water Section, Australian Train.

Left Column.—Brigadier-General J. D. T. Tyndale Biscoe; Brigade Staff and Signalling Troop (2nd Composite Yeomanry Brigade); Notts Royal Horse Artillery (less one section); two troops Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry; one troop Derbyshire Yeomanry; two troops City of London Yeomanry; one squadron Herts Yeomanry; Composite Regiment, Australian Light Horse (three squadrons); Yeomanry Machine-gun Section; Yeomanry Field Ambulance.

Against this concentration, on December 25th, the force detailed above, with Major-General Wallace personally in command, moved out from Matruh. General Wallace's plan was to divide his force into two columns:—

(i.) The right column, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Gordon, 15th Sikhs, and comprising the bulk of the Infantry, with the Bucks Hussars and a section of the Royal Horse Artillery, to advance directly on Gebel Medwa.

(ii.) The left column, under Brigadier-General Tyndale Biscoe, including the remainder of the mounted troops and Horse Artillery, to make a wide detour southward round the right flank of the enemy to deny his retreat to the west.

His Majesty's ship "Clematis" to assist as occasion offered with gun fire from the sea.

Both columns moved before daylight, and by 7.30 the cavalry had cleared the Wadi Toweiwa, about seven miles due south of Matruh. Meanwhile the right column followed the Khedivial Motor Road westward, until, at 6.30 a.m., the advance guard came suddenly under fire from artillery and machine-guns from the south-west. The enemy were soon driven off, and by 7.15 a.m. the main body had crossed the Wadi Raml and could see the enemy occupying an escarpment about one mile south of Gebel Medwa.

At 7.30 a.m. the 15th Sikhs were ordered to attack the enemy from his right flank, the Bucks Hussars and 2/8th Middlesex to co-operate by a containing attack along his front, to be delivered simultaneously with the attack of the Sikhs. The 15th Sikhs accordingly deployed west of the road and commenced their advance, despatching one company to occupy Gebel Medwa in order to secure their right. At the same time the Bucks Hussars moved forward, while the Middlesex Battalion, keeping to the north-east of Gebel Medwa, sent a company to relieve that of the 15th Sikhs occupying the hill, which thereupon rejoined the battalion.

The section Notts Royal Horse Artillery, which came into action on the high ground near the road 2,000 yards east of Gebel Medwa, quickly silenced the enemy's artillery, therein greatly assisting the advance of the infantry, and at 7.45 a.m. His Majesty's ship "Clematis" opened an accurate and useful fire at a range of about 10,000 yards. By 9.30 a.m. the Sikhs, reinforced by two companies of the 1st New Zealand Rifle Brigade (from the Reserve), were still meeting with considerable opposition, and shortly before 10 o'clock a third company of New Zealanders was ordered up to prolong their line to the left and to clear a nullah running parallel to the line of advance, from which the Sikhs were suffering casualties.

Before this company could reach its position the crest in front of the Sikhs was carried, and that battalion, with the two New Zealand companies on the right, pushed rapidly forward, driving the enemy into caves and small gullies, all of which had in turn to be cleared. At 11 a.m. the western edge of the plateau was reached, and the left column could then be seen operating about two miles to the south-west. Signal communication was opened, and the left column, which had been a good deal delayed by some hostile mounted troops, then changed direction north-east, and subsequently north, along the Wadi Majid, where it again became engaged.

By 2.15 p.m. the nullahs at the head of the Wadi Majid had been thoroughly cleared, and after an hour and a-half sharp fighting the Wadi was in our possession—over 100 dead, thirty-four prisoners, eighty camels, and much live stock, as well as 30,000 rounds of small arm ammunition and three boxes of gun ammunition, falling into our hands. At 4 p.m. the cavalry column joined up with the left of the 15th Sikhs, having finally driven off the enemy, with whom they had been engaged since 2 o'clock.

Our casualties during the day, which amounted in all to fourteen rank and file killed and three officers and forty-seven other ranks wounded, were very light in comparison with those of the enemy, of whom over 370 dead and eighty-two prisoners were accounted for apart from the wounded—probably a considerable number—whom they were able to get away. Amongst the booty were the office and personal effects of the enemy's commander, Gaafer, abandoned by him in his flight.

The energy, resolution, and initiative displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon throughout this operation is deserving of the highest praise, and in his difficult task he was magnificently backed up by his own regiment, the 15th Sikhs, temporarily commanded by Major Evans, and by the 1st Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, under Major Austen. The immediate result of the action was the retirement of the Senussi with his Staff and the remains of his force to Unjeila and Bir Tunis.

General Wallace was now free to deal with the situation between Matruh and Dabba, and to this end, on December 28th, a small column, under the command of Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan, was despatched from Mersa Matruh to Jerawla. Several enemy encampments were visited, but no resistance was encountered, and on the 30th the column returned to Matruh, having destroyed some eighty tents and large quantities of grain, and bringing in nearly 100 camels and 500 sheep.

During the early days of January the weather made active operations impossible. On the 1st of the month a collection of eighty tents was reported by aeroplane at Gebel Howimil, and a column was formed to clear up the situation in that neighbourhood. On the 2nd, however, torrential rain fell, which continued, with rare breaks, almost incessantly for a week, the country becoming a sea of mud, so that the start of the column was postponed from day to day. Finally, on the evening of January 9th, the weather cleared, and by the 12th the roads were sufficiently passable to warrant a start being made.

On the 13th the column reached Baggush, and on the 14th the march was continued to Gebel Howmil, where several small camps were destroyed, a quantity of stores burnt, and some camels and live stock taken; nowhere was opposition encountered. The column returned the same evening to Baggush, having covered during the day close upon fifty miles. Under cover of this operation the damaged telegraph line between Matruh and Dabba was successfully restored by the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, and by the evening of the 14th communication was restored.

On January 15th the section Honourable Artillery Company and two squadrons Australian Light Horse left the column for Dabba, the remainder of the force returning to Bir Jerawla, and the following day to Matruh. Marching throughout had been very difficult and tedious owing to the deep going and swampy condition of the ground. On January 19th aerial reconnaissances discovered the presence of a considerable force of the enemy at Hazalin, twenty-five miles south-west of Matruh, the camp comprising at least 100 European and 250 Bedouin tents, including that of the Grand Senussi, which was recognized by Captain Royle, the observer.

In view of the estimated strength of the enemy, General Wallace decided, before striking, to await the arrival of a reinforcement of one battalion of the South African Infantry Brigade, then under orders to sail from Alexandria. This battalion reached Mersa Matruh on the 20th and 21st, and on January 22nd air reports showing that the enemy's position at Hazalin was unchanged, the force shown below set out with General Wallace in command, reaching Bir Shola (sixteen miles) after dark, where troops bivouacked for the night:—

One squadron Royal Bucks Hussars, 1 squadron Dorset Yeomanry, 1 squadron Herts Yeomanry, 1 squadron Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, 1 squadron Surrey Yeomanry, 1 squadron Australian Light Horse, "A" Battery Honourable Artillery Company (less one section), Notts Battery Royal Horse Artillery and Ammunition Column, Australian Signal Section, 1st Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade, 2nd South African Regiment, 15th Sikhs, 1/6th Battalion Royal Scots (T.F.) (less two companies), 2/8th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (T.F.) (less two companies), 1st South Midland Field Ambulance, 137th Indian Field Ambulance, Royal Naval Armoured Car Division (Detachment).

At 6 a.m. on January 23rd the force moved off, disposed as under:—

Right Column.—Commander Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs. 1 squadron Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, Notts Battery Royal Horse Artillery, 15th Sikhs, 2nd South African Regiment, 1st Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade. (Right Column on compass bearing to reported position of Senussi Camp.)

Left Column.—Commander—Brigadier-General J. D. T. Tyndale Biscoe. One squadron Australian Light Horse, 3 squadrons Royal Bucks Hussars, 1 squadron Dorset Yeomanry, 1 squadron Herts Yeomanry, Mounted Brigade Machine Gun Section, "A" Battery H.A.C. (less one section). (Left Column echeloned to the left front of the right moving parallel to and in close touch with it.)

Reserve.—Two troops Yeomanry, 1/6th Battalion, Royal Scots (less half battalion) and S.A.A., moved half a mile in rear of Right Column. The train, with half battalion, 2/8th Middlesex Regiment, remained parked at Bir Shola.

At 8.30 a.m., when the Right Column were about seven miles from Bir Shola, the Left Column reported that the enemy could be seen about two miles ahead of their advanced squadron, and shortly afterwards the latter (Australian Light Horse) became engaged. The Bucks Hussars and H.A.C. were immediately sent forward in support, and simultaneously Colonel Gordon's column pushed on in attack formation, the 15th Sikhs leading.

Relieved by the advance of the infantry, the mounted troops pressed on, endeavouring to work round the enemy's right, and at the same time covering the left flank of Colonel Gordon's attack. The latter, spread over a front of nearly a mile and a-half, led across ground absolutely destitute of cover, while mirage in the early stages made it impossible for a considerable time to locate the enemy's positions. During this advance the infantry suffered somewhat severely from artillery and machine guns, the enemy's fire being both rapid and accurate. Nevertheless, the enemy was gradually pressed back, but his retirement of nearly three miles on to his main positions was conducted with great skill, denying all our efforts to come to close quarters.

By 2.45 p.m. the Sikhs and South Africans, with part of the New Zealand battalion, on the left of the Sikhs, had reached the enemy's main line. But in the meantime the flanks had not made equal progress, and bodies of the enemy were working round both north and south, the line gradually forming the arc of a semi-circle. Soon after 1 p.m. so great was the activity of one of these detachments on our right, or northern flank, that the reserve battalion (1/6th Royal Scots) had to be put in to restore the situation, but by 2.30 p.m. all danger from that quarter was past. On the extreme left, however, by 3.30 p.m. the cavalry of the left column had been forced to give some ground, and with the H.A.C. guns were occupying a position nearly one thousand yards in rear of the field ambulance.

Colonel Gordon was called upon to detach two companies of New Zealanders to assist the cavalry, who were being pressed. With this reinforcement the threat against our left rear was finally repulsed and the enemy driven off. In the meantime the main attack by Colonel Gordon's column had progressed satisfactorily. By 3 p.m. the enemy had been driven from his positions, and shortly afterwards his camp was occupied and burnt, the work of destruction being completed by 4.30 p.m.

As darkness was approaching and the exhaustion of the cavalry horses forbade pursuit, General Wallace decided to bivouac the force about two miles east of the captured position, where the field ambulance had been placed, and whence it could not be moved owing to the deep mud. Throughout the day this factor—of mud—had played an important and unfortunate part. The whole country had been converted by the abnormal rains into a quagmire, which had hampered the operations of the mounted troops, preventing their full co-operation with the infantry. Owing to the mud again the infantry were deprived of the support of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, intended to co-operate against the enemy's left flank, a loss seriously felt during the day.

The troops spent the night in considerable discomfort, as the train was unable to proceed further than about three miles west of Bir Shola; neither supplies nor blankets could be brought up, and the night was intensely wet and cold. The enemy showed no inclination to renew operations, and at 8.30 a.m. on the 24th the force started for Bir Shola. The march to Bir Shola, through deep mud, proved an arduous undertaking, all vehicles having to be drawn by hand, but, above all, the transport of the wounded presented the greatest difficulty. Those unable to ride had to be carried on stretchers, a severe strain upon the troops, tired and thirsty after a cold and sleepless night. Eventually, however, the train was met where it had parked, about three miles west of Bir Shola, and the infantry were relieved of their burden, the force reaching bivouac at Bir Shola at about 5 p.m.

On the 25th the weather cleared and the troops marched back in good spirits to Mersa Matruh, the whole column getting in by 4.30 p.m. Our casualties in the action of the 23rd were unfortunately heavy, as the figures show:—

| | Killed. | Wounded. |
|----------------------------|---------|----------|
| British officers | 1 | 10 |
| British other ranks | 11 | 164 |
| Indian officers | — | 3 |
| Indian other ranks | 19 | 114 |
| Total | 31 | 291 |

Nevertheless, those of the enemy must have been far heavier, and, although difficult to gauge accurately, a conservative estimate, based on observation and on the reports of prisoners, places his losses at not less than 200 killed and 500 wounded. In this action the enemy received a very severe blow, and, if deserters are to be believed, the effect of this reverse, following upon that at Gebel Medwa on December 25th, has gone far to discourage the Senussi and to shake the faith of his followers in the cause.

It was unfortunate that in this, as in previous actions, it was impossible for the infantry to pursue their success to the full, owing to the intense difficulties of transport experienced on every occasion. With greater mobility, allowing of an active pursuit, particularly after the action on Christmas Day, the success obtained would undoubtedly have been far more complete, and would have contributed largely to a more speedy termination of the campaign. In the success attained on the 23rd especial praise is due to the leading of Colonel Gordon, who commanded the main attack, and to the gallantry of the Sikhs, the South Africans and the New Zealanders, who fought with invincible dash and resolution throughout the day.

It was at this stage of the campaign that General Wallace felt himself obliged, owing to age, to tender his resignation of the command which he had held with unvarying success for the past three months. I had decided that the time had now come to undertake the reoccupation of Sollum, and as General Wallace considered that the operations involved a physical strain which would be beyond his powers, I appointed Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., in his place. By this time the force was thoroughly well adapted and equipped for its work. The loss of the 15th Sikhs, ordered to India, was severe, but it and the New Zealand battalion had been replaced by the South African Brigade. The Composite Yeomanry Brigade had vanished, and its place had been taken by the 2nd Mounted Brigade. Two sections of Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery had joined, and with the necessary services this little force was complete in every respect. Lord Lucan's Composite Brigade of three Territorial regiments was almost all that remained of the original command.

In closing this account of the operations on the western frontier up to the end of January, 1916, I wish again to emphasize the unvarying and whole-hearted support accorded throughout by the Royal Navy. In the onerous and often difficult task of transporting troops and material by sea to Mersa Matruh, and in the active co-operation of His Majesty's ship "Clematis," which, by her vigilant patrolling of the coast considerably lightened the burden of the troops, and by her effective gunnery materially assisted in the operations in December; the assistance and support of the Navy has been from start to finish as ungrudging as effective.

The Western Frontier Force also owes much to the Royal Flying Corps, whose work was, as always, of a high order. Special mention should be made of a flight by Lieutenant Van Ryneveld to Qara, by Lieutenant Tipton from Fayum to Moghara, and regular flights to Baharia. The distances covered were very great, and flights of 200 miles have become quite common.

I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the invaluable co-operation of all departments of the Egyptian Government. My relations with his Highness

the Sultan and his Ministers have been most close and cordial, and their influence has set a tone which has been followed by the better-class Egyptians throughout the country.

I have the honour to be,
Your lordship's obedient servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, General,
Commanding the Force in Egypt.

DESPATCH No. 4.

Army Headquarters, Force in Egypt, Cairo, March 16th, 1916.

MY LORD,—In continuation of my despatch of March 1st, 1916, I have the honour to submit the names of officers and other ranks whom I desire to bring to your notice:—

Part I.—In connection with operations on the western front.

Part II.—In connection with Administration in Egypt.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, General,
Commanding the Force in Egypt.

DESPATCH No. 5.

London, April 9th, 1916.

MY LORD,—On March 1st I submitted a report on the force in Egypt up to January 31st, 1916. I now have the honour to supplement that report up to March 19th, 1916, the date on which I handed over command to General Sir A. J. Murray, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

The present despatch describes the operations under Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., for the re-occupation of Sollum. I also venture to submit herewith, for your lordship's favourable consideration, the names of those officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, who have especially distinguished themselves during the period covered by this despatch.

I have the honour to be,
Your lordship's obedient servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, General.

My last despatch ended with the successful engagement at Hazalin, and General Wallace's resignation of the command of the Western Frontier Force, on grounds which have already been explained.

General Peyton's assumption of command on February 9th practically coincided with the final reorganization of the force, and the provision of sufficient camel transport to render the column completely mobile. Henceforth it was possible to follow up any success, instead of having to return to Matruh after each engagement. This meant that the re-occupation of Sollum, which had already received War Office sanction, was now a possibility, and preparations were pushed on as rapidly as possible.

Information from various sources was to the effect that the main hostile force, with certain reinforcements, was in the neighbourhood of Barrani, and that another smaller body was in the camp at Sollum. It was clear that if the country was to be pacified these forces must be beaten. Two courses were open to me:—

(i) To attack at Barrani, and simultaneously to land a force at Sollum by sea.

(ii) To move by land, to supply the force by sea at Barrani, and to arrange for naval co-operation at any point which might be necessary.

The Navy was, as always, prepared to give me every assistance in whichever course I might decide to adopt. On the one hand, Sollum Bay is completely commanded by encircling heights, and, as it would be necessary to remove the mines which had been laid at the entrance, surprise would be impossible. On the other hand, the country between Barrani and Sollum was known to be almost devoid of water, and the physical difficulties to be overcome would certainly be great. After visiting Matruh, and going into the question on the spot with General Wallace, who had not yet left, and with Commander Eyres Monsell, Royal Navy, I decided to utilize the land route only; supplies to be put by sea into Barrani and Sollum as soon as possible after their reoccupation by us. These were my instructions to General Peyton when he left Cairo to take over command. As you are already aware, he carried them out, with the assistance of the Navy, to my complete satisfaction.

Just as the preparations for the advance were approaching completion, news was received that a hostile force had occupied the Baharia Oasis on February 11th. This oasis lies some 200 miles south-west of Cairo and about 100 miles from the rich and thickly-populated districts of Fayum and Minia. The strength of this force, which was discovered by an air reconnaissance on the day of its arrival, was said to be about 500 men; it was increased on the following day to about 1,000. Further reinforcements are known to have arrived from the west, and the more southerly oases of Farafra and Dakhla had both been occupied by the 27th.

This move of the enemy had, of course, been foreseen, and I had obtained War Office sanction to organize a command, under Major-General J. Adye, C.B., for the defence of the southern provinces of Egypt. This command had recently come into being, and General Adye was able to establish his headquarters at Beni Suef and to arrange for a thorough system of patrols from the Fayum to the neighbourhood of Assiut and the south, with a small guard on the important bridge over the Nile at Nag Hamadi. Subsequently, as our successful operations cleared the situation in the north, and the centre of gravity began to shift southward, General Adye was able to strengthen and to extend his defensive line until, at the moment of handing over my command to Sir A. Murray, his most southerly detachment was at Esna.

Meanwhile I had withdrawn the civil officials from the Kharga Oasis as soon as it was known that Dakhla was in the enemy's hands. I had the choice of occupying and protecting that oasis or of withdrawing from it everything which would be of value to the enemy, and contenting myself with occasional patrols. The strategical importance of these oases is, of course, very obvious, but in view of the uncertainty as to what troops would be under my command at any moment I considered that any enterprise distant from the Nile Valley would be out of place, and I restricted General Adye to purely defensive measures, with, however, instructions to prepare a small mobile column with which he could strike at the enemy should he approach the cultivation.

All this time the oases were kept under constant observation by means of aeroplanes. Very long flights were necessary, and to reduce them as much as possible a system of advanced depôts in the desert was started. The credit for originating this system is due to Lieutenant (now Captain) Van Rynefeld, R.F.C., and to Mr. Jennings Bramley, of the Sudan Civil Service, and was first put into practice on the occasion of the flight to Qara mentioned in my previous dispatch.

Such was the situation when I handed over my command on March 19th. Meanwhile the preparations for the advance in the north were steadily proceeding. An advanced depôt was established at Unjeila on February 16th, and, on February 20th General Peyton despatched a force, under Brig.-General H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., consisting of one squadron Royal Bucks Hussars, Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry, Notts Battery R.H.A., 1st South African Brigade, less the 2nd

and 4th Battalions, a detachment 1/6th Royal Scots and two field ambulances, with orders to establish itself at Barrani, and thus to secure the second stepping-stone on the way to Sollum.

On the following day the hostile forces were located by air reconnaissances at Agagia, some fourteen miles south-east of Barrani. Reports by surrendered Bedouin confirmed the accuracy of this information, and added that both Nuri Bey and Gaafer Pasha were in the camp, although Sayed Ahmed himself had left for Siwa. As General Peyton considered that the advanced force was sufficiently strong to overthrow any opposition which it was likely to encounter he ordered General Lukin to continue his march and to attack so soon as he was within striking distance of his enemy.

In accordance with this order the original March programme was adhered to, and on February 24th General Lukin camped at the Wadi Maktil. The 25th was to be a day of rest preliminary to a night approach and attack at dawn on the 26th. However, as on all previous occasions, Gaafer Pasha again showed that he was by no means disposed passively to await attack, and at 5.30 p.m. on the 25th two field guns and at least one machine gun opened fire upon the camp. The action which followed was without importance as the enemy's artillery was soon silenced, and the threatened attack was repelled with a loss to ourselves of one man killed and one wounded. Nevertheless it had been sufficient to bring about a change in General Lukin's plans, and the night march was abandoned in favour of daylight operations.

A Yeomanry reconnaissance sent out at daylight on the 26th found that the position occupied by the enemy on the previous evening had been vacated during the night, but aerial reconnaissance and officers' patrols discovered him in his old position near Agagia. Having collected sufficient information to enable him to form his plans General Lukin moved out at 9.30 a.m. with his whole force, except for a small detachment left to guard his camp. By 10.15 a.m. the Yeomanry had seized a hillock 4,000 yards north of the enemy's position, and three-quarters of an hour later the attack was developed. In the centre the 3rd South African Infantry advanced on a front of about 1,700 yards, the Yeomanry (less one squadron) and two armoured cars operated on the right flank with orders to pursue the moment the enemy should break: on the left was the remaining squadron with two more armoured cars. The 1st South African Infantry and two armoured cars formed the general reserve.

As the attack developed the enemy opened a fairly heavy fire with rifles and machine guns, and two or three field guns distributed their fire over the field. The 3rd South African Infantry moved forward with admirable steadiness. Then, acting exactly as on previous occasions, the enemy's infantry, moving very rapidly, attempted an outflanking movement against General Lukin's left. This was met by a company from the reserve sent up in echelon behind the threatened flank, and the counter-attack at once faded away.

As soon as the danger was over General Lukin, acting with admirable promptitude, withdrew his squadron from the left flank and sent it to strengthen his main pursuing force on his right, and there is little doubt that this quick decision did much to ensure the success of the subsequent operations. As the firing line was now within 500 yards of the position, General Lukin threw into the fight the greater portion of his reserves, including his last two armoured cars, and at the same time sent a Staff officer to warn Colonel Souter, of the Dorset Yeomanry, to be ready for his opportunity. In the face of this vigorous action the enemy was compelled to evacuate his position, and, in exact accordance with the plans, the fight was taken up by the cavalry. The rest of the story may be told in the words of Colonel Souter's report:—

About 1 p.m. I received a message from the General Officer Commanding saying that he wished me to pursue and cut off the enemy if possible. It was my intention to let the enemy get clear of the sandhills, and where there might have been wire or trenches, and then to attack him in the open. I therefore pursued on a line parallel to, and about 1,000 yards west of, the line of retreat, attacking with dismounted fire wherever the horses wanted an easy. About 2 p.m. I saw for the first time the whole retreating force extend for about a mile, with a depth of 300 to 400 yards. In front were the camels and baggage, escorted by irregulars, with their proper fighting force (Mohafizia) and maxims forming their rear and flank guard. I decided to attack mounted. About 3 p.m. I dismounted for the last time to give my horses a breather and to make a careful examination of the ground over which I was about to move.

By this time the Dorset Regiment was complete, and as the squadron of the Bucks Yeomanry had gone on ahead and could not be found, I attacked with Dorsets alone. The attack was made in two lines, the horses galloping steadily, and well in hand. Three maxims were brought into action against us, but the men were splendidly led by their squadron and troop leaders, and their behaviour was admirable. About fifty yards from the position I gave the order to charge, and with one yell the Dorsets hurled themselves upon the enemy, who immediately broke. In the middle of the enemy's lines my horse was killed under me, and, by a curious chance, his dying strides brought me to the ground within a few yards of the Senusi general, Gafer Pasha.

At this moment Colonel Souter was alone, except for Lieutenant Blaksley and Yeoman Brown, both of the Dorset Yeomanry, who had also had their horses shot under them. Around them were about fifty fit or lightly wounded enemy, and the situation was distinctly threatening until the arrival of the machine-gun section decided the issue. Gafer Pasha and his staff were then escorted from the field to a place of safety.

For this happy result great credit is due to Colonel Souter, whose resolution and coolness stood him in great stead at a very critical moment. His name has already been submitted to your lordship for reward.

Colonel Souter adds:—

It is difficult accurately to express the effect of this cavalry charge on the enemy. Throughout the day he had fought with extreme boldness, but when the horses got into him he had only one thought, and that was to get away.

The losses in this remarkable exploit were severe, but they were justified by both the moral and material result achieved. One squadron was deprived of all its leaders, two being killed and two having their horses killed under them. Without their officers' control the men carried on too far, and it was this squadron that suffered most of the casualties. The enemy's losses were also heavy, and it is most improbable that anything would have induced them to stand up to well-handled cavalry again.

This action on the 26th completed the first stage of General Peyton's advance on Sollum, for Barrani was occupied without further opposition on February 28th. The next stage was to bring the remainder of his force and to put sufficient stores into Barrani to enable the advance to be continued. This was a naval operation. For various reasons the advance had been begun some days earlier than I had intended or than the Navy had been led to expect. The Australian train, which had worked splendidly, was required for duty elsewhere, and, although 2,000 transport camels had been provided, we were still dependent upon the supply

ships. Fortunately, these had been provided and stocked in ample time, and Captain Burmester, R.N., and Commander Eyres Monsell were, in fact, able to put supplies into Barrani about a week earlier than the date originally given to them.

The remainder of the South African Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Mounted Brigade, together with the two sections of the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, were accordingly brought from Mersa Matruh, and the whole force was assembled at Barrani by March 8th.

After their defeat at Agagia on February 26th the enemy retreated westwards towards Sollum, and the Egyptian Bedouin (Aulad Ali) began to desert him in large numbers and to appeal to General Peyton for pardon. A number of prominent Sheikhs came into his camp, but the necessity of pushing on the operations made it impossible to enter into lengthy negotiations for the moment.

From Barrani to Sollum two possible routes were open to General Peyton. One, following the Khedivial road along the coast line; the other climbing on to the inland plateau by the Nagb Medean or some other of the various passes, and then following along the higher ground towards the camp at Msead. Tactically and strategically the latter route was undoubtedly to be preferred, since at Sollum the escarpment rises sheerly from the shores of the bay, and to climb it there in the face of opposition must entail heavy loss of life. As is usual in African campaigning the water question was as important as either tactics or strategy. In this case all information was to the effect that a good supply could be found in the wells at Augerin, and that there were large cisterns at the Nagb Medean and Siwiat. This meant that by careful use of the reserve water park which had been organized, and by moving in two bodies, the whole force could use the inland road by the plateau.

The first column, which comprised all the infantry and slow moving troops, left Barrani on March 9th, under General Lukin, with orders to secure a foothold on the plateau, using the Nagb Medean. The second column, composed of mounted troops, horses, and camels, was to leave two days later and to reach Augerin on the day after the Nagb Medean had been secured. That is to say, that the whole force would have been concentrated at Augerin with its outposts in the high ground ready to make its final and decisive attack upon Bir Warr and Msead. This plan was upset by the discovery, on March 12th, that previous reports as to water were far too optimistic. The supply at Augerin was found to be quite inadequate, and the cisterns at Medean and Siwiat were both reported to be dry. Some reconsideration, therefore, became necessary. The situation at that moment was as follows:—

The armoured cars had reached the plateau, using the most westerly pass near Alim er Rabia. Telephone conversation cleverly intercepted at Barrani by a Turkish-speaking operator showed that the enemy was anxious, and in two minds whether to fight or fly: and Captain Blunt, R.E., had discovered a cistern at Alim Tejdid containing sufficient water for two battalions for one night. General Peyton was still rightly averse to risking the losses which he would suffer if compelled to attack the Sollum heights from the coastline, especially as he had already made good a footing on the plateau. On the other hand, the water on the inland route was only sufficient for a portion of his troops. He therefore decided to send two battalions of infantry, the armoured cars, his camel corps company, and his mountain guns under General Lukin along the top of the escarpment, while the remainder of his force was to move by the coast. At midnight on the 13th-14th General Lukin was at Siwiat, the remaining infantry was at Alim Tejdid, and the mounted troops at Bagbag. On the morning of the 14th both columns moved towards Sollum; at 9 a.m. aeroplane reconnaissance reported that the enemy was evacuating his camps. The mounted troops under General

Peyton then joined General Lukin's column on the high ground, and, as the aeroplane had discovered a hostile force some twenty miles to the west, the armoured cars, under Major the Duke of Westminster, were sent on in pursuit.

The result of this pursuit has already been fully reported. It resulted, as your lordship is aware, in the capture of all the enemy's guns and machine-guns, together with about forty prisoners, including three Turkish officers, and in inflicting on the enemy a loss of fifty killed and many wounded. Our loss in this exceptionally successful affair was one British officer slightly wounded.

By the reoccupation of Sollum and this pursuit by the armoured cars, the defeat of the northern column operating against Egypt was made complete. In little more than three weeks General Peyton's force had cleared the country of the enemy for 150 miles, had captured his commander, and taken all his artillery and machine-guns, and had driven his scattered forces far beyond the Egyptian frontier.

Nevertheless, one more object remained to be achieved. It was known that somewhere in Cyrenaica the Senussi held some ninety-five British prisoners, survivors from the "Tara" and "Moorina," which had been torpedoed in November. After thorough examination of prisoners taken on the 14th, Captain Royle came to the conclusion that these prisoners could be found at a place some seventy-five miles west of Sollum. It was decided to make the attempt, and, as has also already been reported, it also was a complete success. The task was again entrusted to the light armoured car battery, under Major the Duke of Westminster, accompanied by the motor ambulances. The distance travelled was 120 miles, and the fact that the rescue was effected without any loss of life does not, in my opinion, detract in any way from the brilliance of the exploit. To lead his cars through perfectly unknown country against an enemy of unknown strength was a feat which demanded great resolution, and which should not be forgotten even in this war, where deeds of rare daring are of daily occurrence.

With the rescue of the prisoners and the safe return of the armoured cars the campaign in the west came to an end, and I think it may fairly be claimed that seldom has a small campaign been so completely successful or had such far-reaching results.

The effect of this success has been to remove the anxiety which was at one time felt as to the possibility of hostile outbreaks in Egypt itself, where agitation was known to be rife. The attitude of the people in Alexandria, and more especially of the very large Bedouin population of the Behera province, has completely changed, and any prestige which we have lost through the evacuation of Sollum has been more than recovered. Moreover, through his failure as a temporal leader Sayed Ahmed has lost much of the influence which was attached to him as a spiritual head.

On the west the Aulad Ali, who had been induced to throw in their lot with the Senussi in the belief that they would be able to raid the rich lands of the delta, have been reduced to a state of starvation, and are now surrendering in such large numbers that feeding them has become so serious a problem that it has been necessary to establish a special branch of the administration for their protection and control.

On the east the failure of the Turks to carry out their threat to attack Egypt and seize the Suez Canal has similarly resulted in a loss of credit and prestige. In the south, scattered forces still hold the oases, and the inherent difficulties of desert campaigning will make them troublesome to deal with; but the failures in east and west have, it may fairly be claimed, had the result of establishing our hold upon Egypt more firmly than ever, and of convincing all the more enlightened of the people that they can gain nothing by intriguing with our enemies.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Imperial Russian Consulate-General, London.
30, Bedford Square, W.C., March 17th, 1916.

The Editor,

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, Whitehall, S.W.

SIR,—I am requested, as a member of the Russian Maritime League, to advise you that, at a meeting of the League for the renovation of the Russian Fleet, held on December 23rd, 1915, at Petrograd, it was decided to express to you, as to a friendly organization, the utmost delight of the League at the activity of the Royal British Navy. The valour, efficiency, and self-sacrifice of the British Fleet have already given to the world, and to our country, many advantages in the great struggle with the Germanic enemies.

Our Society expresses the firm belief in the final victory over our enemies which must finish once for ever with the menace which threatened Europe for such a long time.

But we must not rest when peace is concluded. All nations who have the good luck to possess seashores must remember that "the sea separates and at the same time unites," and all the members of our League wish from the bottom of their hearts that the link formed by the sea between our countries will not cease to develop and be strengthened.

When looking back on the past, the League is conscious of the considerable progress of the Russian Fleet for the last fifteen years, 1900—1915, and in accordance with the renovation of the Russian Fleet the League has decided to change its name to "Maritime League." This we have much pleasure in bringing to your notice.

Our address in future will be, W.O. 10th line, No. 11, Petrograd

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

A. HEYKING,
Consul-General.

Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.,

March 20th, 1916.

SIR,—I beg, with very many thanks, to acknowledge the receipt of your very generous and gratifying letter of the 17th inst., and to state that its contents will be brought before the Council of this Institution at their next meeting (in May), when it will be duly considered and a suitable reply will be forwarded to you.

I have the honour to be,

Yours faithfully,

HAROLD WYLLY, Colonel,
Editor.

Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.,

June 8th, 1916.

SIR,—In continuation of the communication of March 20th, I am now directed to inform you that your letter dated the 17th idem, conveying a message from the Russian Maritime League, has been laid before the Council of the Royal United

Service Institution at their last meeting held on the 6th inst. The Council are deeply gratified at the tribute paid by the League, of which you are a member, to the proofs of valour, efficiency, and self-sacrifice, which the British Navy has already given to the world, and to the part which it has so enduringly played in the great struggle with our common enemy.

The Council share the firm belief entertained by the Russian Maritime League, of which you are the spokesman, in the final victory of the Allies, and in the ultimate disappearance of the menace which for so long has overhung the European nations.

I am further commanded to assure you and your fellow-members that it is the earnest hope of this Council that the link formed by the sea between our countries may bind us and those who come after us more closely together: and in conclusion I am to ask you to believe that the Council of the Royal United Service Institution have watched with real interest the astonishing growth of the Russian Navy, and recognize to how great an extent it has assisted towards the attainment of the end which our allied nations have in view, and to which all our efforts are so unitedly being directed.

I also beg to inform you that it is proposed to publish this correspondence in the next issue of the Proceedings of the Institution, which will appear in August next, a copy of which I shall be pleased to have sent you.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR LEETHAM, Lieut.-Colonel,
Secretary.

The Consul-General,
Imperial Russian Consulate-General,
30, Bedford Square, W.C.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

May, June, and July, 1916.

- THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL AND INDIAN ARTILLERY IN THE MUTINY, 1857. By Colonel J. R. J. Jocelyn. 8vo. 21s. (Presented by the Royal Artillery Institution). (John Murray). London, 1915.
- WITH BOTH'S ARMY. By J. P. Kay Robinson. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- HOW BOTH AND SMUTS CONQUERED GERMAN SOUTH-WEST. By W. S. Rayner and W. W. O'Shaughnessy. 8vo. 2s. (Simkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- NOTES ON STREET FIGHTING. By Colonel C. N. Watts. 12mo. 6d. (Forster Groom & Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- MANUEL FRANCO-TURC. By E. Micriditz. 12mo. (Presented by the Rt. Hon. The Earl Waldegrave). Algiers, 1854.
- STANDING ORDERS OF THE 6TH (THE ROYAL 1ST WARWICKSHIRE) REGIMENT OF FOOT. Crown 8vo. (Presented by the Rt. Hon. The Earl Waldegrave). Cork, 1846.
- MANUAL FOR THE MILITIA—A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON STRENGTHENING AND DEFENDING MILITARY POSTS, HEDGES, WOODS, HOUSES, WALLS, ETC., IN REFERENCE TO THE DUTIES OF A FORCE ENGAGED IN DISPUTING THE ADVANCE OF AN ENEMY. By Lieut.-Colonel Jebb, C.B., R.E. Crown 8vo. (Presented by the Rt. Hon. The Earl Waldegrave). (W. Clowes & Sons). London, 1853.

- SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFICERS OF THE QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT. 12mo. (Presented by the Rt. Hon. The Earl Waldegrave). (Parker, Furnivall & Parker). London, 1854.
- JEFFERY AMHERST—A BIOGRAPHY. By Lawrence Shaw Mayo. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Longmans, Green & Co.). London, 1916.
- DEGENERATE GERMANY. By Henry de Halsalle. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (T. Werner Laurie, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- A TREATISE ON MILITARY FINANCE. 12mo. (Presented by D. Hastings Irwin, Esq.). (T. Egerton). London, 1801.
- A TREATISE CONTAINING THE ELEMENTARY PART OF FORTIFICATION, REGULAR AND IRREGULAR. By John Muller. 8vo. (Presented by D. Hastings Irwin, Esq.). (C. Nourse). London, 1782.
- THE PRINCIPLES OF FORTIFICATION. By Isaac Landmann. (Presented by D. Hastings Irwin, Esq.). (Joyce Gould). London, 1812.
- THE STARS AS GUIDES FOR NIGHT MARCHING IN NORTH LATITUDE 50°. By E. Walter Maunder, F.R.A.S. Crown 8vo. 2s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Charles H. Kelly). London, 1916.
- THE MILITARY MAP—ELEMENTS OF MODERN TOPOGRAPHY—FRENCH SCHOOL OF WAR. 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (MacMillan & Co., Ltd.) London, 1916.
- GERMANY IN DEFEAT. By Count Charles de Souza and Major Haldane Macfall. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 12s. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- A YEAR AGO. By Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Swinton and Captain The Earl Percv. Crown 8vo. 2s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Edward Arnold). London, 1916.
- OUR NAVY AT WAR. By Gerard Fiennes. Crown 8vo. 1s. (George Newnes, Ltd.). London, 1916.
- LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS—AUSTRIA-HUNGARY; FRANCE. By Gaston Bodart, and MILITARY SELECTION AND RACE DETERIORATION. By Vernon Lyman Kellog. 8vo. 6s. (Clarendon Press). Oxford, 1916.
- EYE-WITNESS'S NARRATIVE OF THE WAR. Crown 8vo. 2s. (Edward Arnold). London, 1915.
- BATTERY FLASHES. By "Wagger." Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (John Murray). London, 1916.
- 18TH JUNE, 1915. THE CENTENARY OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. HOW IT WAS COMMEMORATED IN CERTAIN PLACES IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, IRELAND, AND WALES BY THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY. By Major J. H. Leslie. Pamphlet. (Presented by the Author). Woolwich, 1916.
- THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY, 1716 TO 1916. By Major J. H. Leslie. Pamphlet. (Presented by the Author). n.p. 1916.
- ORIGINS OF THE "FORTY-FIVE" AND OTHER PAPERS RELATING TO THAT RISING. (Scottish History Society). Edited by Walter Biggar Blaikie. 8vo. 30s. (T. & A. Constable). Edinburgh, 1916.
- THE FIGHTING TERRITORIALS. By Percy Hurd. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 2s. 3d. (Presented by the Proprietors, *Country Life*). London, 1916.
- A NARRATIVE OF THE LOSS OF THE "ROYAL GEORGE" AT SPITHEAD, AUGUST, 1782. (Bound in the wood of the wreck). 5th edition. 12mo. (Presented by the Rev. Canon G. E. Frewer, M.A.). Portsea, 1842.
- A SURGEON IN KHALI. By A. A. Martin. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Edward Arnold). London, 1916.
- THE SOUL OF THE WAR. By Philip Gibbs. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (William Heinemann). London, 1915.

- ENGLAND'S EFFORT. By Mrs. Humphrey Ward. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (Smith, Elder & Co.). London, 1916.
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- THE FLEETS OF THE WORLD. Oblong 8vo. 6s. (Eveleigh Nash Co., Ltd.). London, 1916.
- THE SOUL OF GERMANY. By T. F. A. Smith. Crown 8vo. 6s. (Hutchinson & Co.). London, 1915.
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- ORDONNANCE DU ROI SUR LE SERVICE INTÉRIEUR DES TROUPES D'INFANTERIE DU 2 NOVEMBRE, 1833. 18mo. (Presented by Colonel H. W. Gray). (Anselin). Paris, 1833

NOTICES OF BOOKS,

Brassey's Naval Annual, 1916. Conducted by Earl Brassey and edited by Mr. John Leyland. War edition. (Clowes, 10s. net.)

The second war edition of this valuable periodical still maintains the high reputation it has acquired as one of the leading, if not the leading, publication of its kind in this or any other country. It is unfortunate, however, that the plans and pictures of British ships have had again to be withdrawn by order of the Admiralty, as they were last year, and their omission will undoubtedly prove a disappointment to many students of the Annual.

The present volume is prefaced by a brief introductory chapter from the pen of Lord Brassey, and Part I. contains six other chapters contributed by competent writers and all dealing with matters connected with the war and its conduct on the seas. Chapter I., which is headed "The World War; A Narrative of Naval Events and Incidents," is continued from last year's Annual, and is written by Commander Robinson, who displays his usual mastery of his subject. The title—the "World War"—is, however, a somewhat misleading one, for great war as the present war is, it is not a "World War" as yet, whatever it may become in the future, not even to the extent the Napoleonic Wars were, in which, practically, the whole of Europe was involved. Mr. John Leyland, who is this year editing the Annual, follows with a very instructive chapter on "Strategy and the War," in which he seeks to elucidate the "strategic geography of the war," and to define "the general situation which limits, defines, and shapes the strategy of these vast campaigns." Mr. Leyland also contributes another interesting chapter on the United States Navy, showing the active development that is taking place in correspondence with the larger and wider policy which has been recently inaugurated in that country. The personnel is to expand with the material side of the Fleet, and within a few years the United States will have

assumed a much higher place in the naval scale of the nations. There is much, however, yet to be achieved, as is shown by a confidential report from Admiral Fletcher, Commanding the Atlantic Fleet, which somehow found its way into the Press, in which the Admiral emphasises among other things the shortage of officers and men, the lack of battle- and swift light cruisers, the limitations of submarines, the want of aircraft, etc., and some other defects and deficiencies, which are, however, to be partly remedied by the new shipbuilding programme. Mr. Alexander Richardson contributes a chapter on "The War and some Portents of Naval Machinery Design," which will be of interest to experts in that subject, while another chapter by an anonymous writer deals with the thorny subject of "Aircraft in the War," in which the author insists emphatically on the vital importance of what is called the "mastery of the air." Another most important and interesting chapter is the one on "The Neutrals and the War," which is contributed by Sir Francis T. Piggott, late Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong and who is "a high authority on the rights of belligerents and the position of neutrals." This chapter should be carefully read by everyone who wishes to understand the foundation on which the blockade and contraband policy of the Allies has been gradually built up and the comparative weakness of the criticism which has been levelled at the policy in the United States.

Part II. contains the usual tables, plans, and details of ships of our own Fleet and of foreign navies. With regard to our own Fleet it has only been possible to indicate vaguely the additions which have been made since the outbreak of the war, but it is known that these additions have been very considerable, and that, according to a statement made by Mr. Balfour in Parliament last March, "the Fleet is far stronger now than it was at the beginning of the war, and is, I believe, stronger than it has ever been in its history." No details either appear to be available as to the new class of monitors which have been added to the Fleet, or of a certain new class of mine-laying vessels, while another novelty has been the construction of fast motor-boats, which are being used as "Fleet messengers."

Part III., dealing with armour and ordnance, has necessarily been somewhat curtailed, dealing as it does with enemy and neutral ordnance tables, all information relative to the ordnance of the Allied Powers being omitted.

Part IV. contains the First Lord's statement on the Naval Estimates, and also contains the statement of the measures adopted to intercept the sea-borne commerce of Germany, and is in fact a statement of the "British Blockade Policy."

Part V. contains the German allegations *re* the "Lusitania," and is followed by the American Note to the German Government and correspondence between the German, Austrian, and United States Governments relative to submarine attacks on merchant vessels. The official despatches and reports on the Dardanelles and Suvla Bay operations are also given, with Vice-Admiral Bacon's despatch on the operations on the Belgian coast, as also the despatch from the Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Station relative to the destruction of the German cruiser "Königsberg" in the Rufiji River. A table showing the warship losses of Great Britain, the Allied Powers, and of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey is also given, while Lord Brassey's farewell speech to his yacht, the celebrated "Sunbeam," when handing her over at Bombay on March 17th of this year to the Government of India as a hospital ship, appears in the Appendix.



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